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STUDIES  IN  HEGEL'S 
PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION 


WITH   A   CHAPTER   ON 
CHRISTIAN    UNITY   IN   AMERICA 


BY 
T.   MACBRIDE    STERRETT,  D.  D. 

PROFFSSOR    OF   ETHICS   AND   APOLOGETICS    IN   THE   SEABURY    DIVINITY   SCHOOL 


NEW    YORK 

D.    APPLETON    AND    COMPANY 

i8qo 


Copyright,  1890, 
By  D.   APPLETON  AND   COMPANY. 


TO   MY   SONS 

THAT   THEY   HAVE   REASONABLE,    HOLY,    AND   VITAL   FAITH 

AND   TO   MY   DAUGHTER    IN   PARADISE. 


PREFACE. 


The  insisting  upon  knowing  what  there  is  in  it, 
even  in  religion,  is  one  of  the  profoundest  impulses 
of  the  human  spirit.  Hegel  tried  to  satisfy  this  de- 
mand in  his  Philosophie  der  Religion.  He  endeav- 
ored to  discover  and  state  the  speculative  idea  of 
religion.  But  with  him  the  speculative  was  both 
vital  and  practical — the  very  life  of  the  spirit  throb- 
bing through  all  the  tangled  mass  of  variegated 
religious  phenomena  in  the  world's  history. 

Dr.  W.  T.  Harris,  the  profoundest  student  of 
Hegel  in  this  country,  says  that  "  no  other  work 
more  deserves  translation  into  English."  But  any 
mere  translation  of  it  would  need  a  further  trans- 
lation into  expository  paraphrase.  The  inadequacy 
of  such  a  translation  may  be  tested  by  the  reader 
in  the  first  few  pages  of  Chapter  VIII. 

I  therefore  offer  some  studies  on  parts  of  this 
great  work,  deeming  them  of  value,  both  in  them- 
selves, and  in  introducing  readers  to  Hegel's  own 
volumes. 


vi  Philosophy  of  Rcligio7i. 

The  title  STUDIES  is  a  most  clastic  one,  bearing 
on  its  face  its  own  apology  for  not  being  finished 
literary  work.  It  signifies  studying  done  "out  loud," 
after  considerable  silent  pondering  over  the  "  what 
there  is  in  it."  It  also  allows  greatest  freedom  for 
new  inferences  and  applications  suggested  by  the 
text.  Hence  this  volume  is  not  a  mere  expository 
paraphrase  of  Hegel.  I  have  adhered  to  the  ex- 
pository form  only  in  Chapters  III  and  VIII.  I  have 
also  followed  Hegel's  order  of  argument  in  Chapter 
IV,  while  freely  making  it  the  basis  of  studies  in 
Apologetics.  The  purpose  of  the  volume  through- 
out is  apologetic.  It  is  written  with  faith  and  in  the 
interests  of  "  The  Faith"  though  demanding  an  almost 
antipodal  orientation  or  point  of  view  to  that  of  both 
deistic  orthodoxy  and  ecclesiasticism.  Some  may 
blame  the  author  for  needlessly  abandoning  some  of 
the  current  methods  of  apologetics.  But  thorough 
and  honost  proof  of  their  faultiness  and  inadequacy 
has  first  been  made.  It  is  mere  time-serving  to 
manufacture  evidences  where  there  are  none.  It  is 
as  useless  as  it  is  wrong  to  attempt  the  "  hard-Church  " 
method  of  overriding  reason  and  conscience  with  the 
mere  might  of  an  uncriticised  authority.  It  is  both 
anti-theistic  and  anti-Christian  to  profane  the  sec- 
ular in  the  interest  of  the  sacred.  It  is  infidel  to 
refuse  to  welcome  the  Light  lightening  every  man 
and  every  institution  that  comes  into  the  world.  To 
posit  an  abstract  Infinite,  a   merely  supermundane 


Preface.  vii 

God,  lands  us  inevitably  in  agnosticism.  To  prove 
the  brightness  of  Christianity  by  portraying  the 
darkness  of  heathenism  leads  to  pessimism. 

On  the  other  hand,  to  discover  the  concrete  In- 
finite immanent  in,  vitalizing  and  educating  man 
throughout  his  history ;  to  maintain  the  essential 
kinship  of  man  with  God ;  to  insist  upon  religion 
being  the  mutual  reconciliation  and  communion  of 
God  and  man,  makes  the  whole  earth  kin,  and  binds 
it  with  chains  of  gold  to  the  head  and  heart  as  well  as 
to  the  feet  of  God.  Thiis  is  the  key  and  motive  to 
the  vital  rationality  of  religion,  interpreting  and 
vindicating  at  their  relative  worth  the  many  ele- 
ments which,  when  put  forth  separately,  are  easily 
overthrown  by  skepticism.  To  acknowledge  that 
these  elements  have  only  relative  validity  is  the  first 
step  toward  integrating  them  as  living  members  in 
a  historical  manifestation  of  the  supreme  A6709  "  rec- 
onciling the  world  unto  himself."  God's  revela- 
tion to  man,  and  man's  discovery  of  God,  are  but  the 
two  sides  of  the  same  divine  education  of  the  race. 
Neither  of  these  sides  is  ever  complete  and  final ; 
neither  of  them  ever  lacks  progressively  adequate 
activity. 

In  the  light  of  the  immanence  of  God  in  the 
religious  history  of  mankind,  old  evidences  seem 
curiously  inconclusive  and  unnecessary.  Place  has 
not  been  found  in  this  volume  for  the  work  of  re- 
setting the  old  faith  in  the  light  of  this  fundamental 


viii  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

truth.  But  the  way  for  this  has  been  radically  pre- 
pared. The  deistic  separation  of  God  and  man,  or 
the  setting  them  merely  side  by  side,  with  only 
occasional  and  mechanically  supernatural  connection, 
has  been  strongly  contended  against,  while  the  op- 
posite error  of  a  pantheistic  confusing  of  the  two 
has  been  avoided  as  both  unspiritual  and  unphilo- 
sophical.  That  is,  both  a  mechanical  naturalism  and 
a  mechanical  supernaturalism  are  abrogated  and  ful- 
filled in  the  concrete  view  of  the  Divine  immanence. 
Otherwise  the  one  of  these  two  views  is  just  as 
atheistic  as  the  other. 

The  use  and  the  abuse  of  the  language  of  meta- 
phor in  religion  have  been  fully  considered.  The 
relative  rationality  of  passing  interpretations  and 
forms  of  religion  is  granted  without  yielding  the 
claim  of  finality  to  any  one  of  them.  In  every  way 
religion,  in  the  high  and  broad  sense  of  vital  kinship 
between  God  and  man,  has  been  vindicated  as  ra- 
tional and  necessary. 

I  have  studied  over  nearly  the  same  part  of 
Hegel's  work  that  Principal  Caird  has  in  his  Philoso- 
phy of  Religion.  That  is  a  masterpiece  of  rare  art 
in  translating  Hegel  out  of  the  narrow,  arid  husk  of 
scholastic  form  and  prolix  technicalities.  I  gladly 
recognize  his  volume  as  one  far  beyond  my  own 
ability  to  produce.  It  is  the  work  of  a  consummate 
literary  artist,  and  a  powerful  preacher  and  thinker. 
I  rejoice  to  see  its  large  and  increasing  circulation  in 


Pre/cue.  ix 

this  country.  1  am  indebted  to  it  for  leading  me  to 
a  study  of  the  original.  Hegel's  own  work  is  heavy, 
formal,  scholastic,  and  removed  from  ordinary,  un- 
scientific conceptions  of  the  revealed  mystery  of  the 
relations  of  God  and  man.  But  it  contains  the  philo- 
sophical key  to  the  heart  of  the  matter.  His  whole 
work  is  to  reconcile  reason  with  religion,  by  finding 
reason  in  religion  and  religion  in  reason.  It  expli- 
cates, in  the  form  of  thought,  the  content  of  religion, 
which  is  ordinarily  held  in  the  form  of  feeling  or 
metaphor,  or  at  best  in  the  form  of  faith,  or  abbrevi- 
ated knowledge. 

The  last  chapter,  on  CJiristian  Unity,  is  obviously 
an  appendix,  written  in  view  of  current  abstract  con- 
ceptions of  the  Church,  which  hinder  the  realiza- 
tion of  its  visible  organic  unity.  It  is  an  attempt  to 
annul  this  abstract  conception  in  the  more  concrete 
historical  view.  It  is  a  study  that  makes  for  truth, 
for  faith,  and  for  unity. 

I  have  to  thank  my  colleague.  Prof.  Charles  L. 
Wells,  for  his  assistance  in  the  tabulation  of  the 
facts  in  regard  to  the  early  Christian  ministry,  in 
this  appendix. 

J.  Macbride  Sterrett. 

Faribault,  September  /,  iS8<). 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   I. 

PAGE 

Hegelianism — A  Prefatory  Study i 

The  different  schools  of  Hegelianism.  Hegelianism  and  Chris- 
tianity. English  and  American  Hegelians.  Prof.  Flint's  criti- 
cism answered. 

CHAPTER    H. 
Introductory ,        .    25 

Growth  of  the  philosophy  of  religion.  Clement  of  Alex- 
andria, Lessing,  Kant.     Key-words. 

CHAPTER    HI. 

Hegel's  Introduction  to  his  Philosophy  of  Religion    38 

Hegel's  sublime  conception  of  religion.  Divorce  between 
religion  and  the  secular  life.  Philosophy  the  interpreter  of  re- 
ligion. Has  it  a  competent  organ  for  this  work  in  reason  ? 
Hegel's  classification  of  the  whole  subject. 

CHAPTER   IV. 

The  Vital  Idea  of  Religion 61 

Hegel's  encyclopaedia  of  the  philosophical  sciences.  The  re- 
ligious relation.  Necessity  of  the  religious  stand-point.  Forms 
of  the  religious  consciousness  —  feeling,  sensuous  perception 
(art),  and  metaphorical  thought.  Rationalistic  apologetics.  Use 
and  abuse  of  metaphor  in  religion.  Can  religion  be  taught? 
Causesof  present  skepticism.    Dreams  of  infallibility.    Clerical- 


xii  Philosophy  of  Religion. 


ism.  Philosophy  and  science.  Relativism  and  Agnosticism. 
Mediation  of  religious  knowledge.  Christian  education.  Proofs 
of  the  existence  of  God.  The  false  and  the  true  finite.  Posi- 
tivism. The  false  and  the  true  infinite.  The  speculative  idea 
of  religion.     Cultus. 

CHAPTER   V. 
Theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism  .       .       .159 

What  have  we  here?  We  have — r.  The  highest  form  of  the- 
ology. The  Divine  personality.  The  English  Hegelians  and 
personality,  2.  An  adequate  first  principle.  Personality  vs. 
individuality.  T.  H.  Green's  metaphysics  of  ethics.  Organic 
unity  in  all  knowing  and  being.  3.  We  have  not  pantheism. 
Immortality.     Thinking  is  worshiping. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Method  of  Comparative  Religion        .       .       .212 

The  rise  and  progress  of  this  science.  The  eighteenth-cent- 
ury Christian  view.  The  skeptical  view.  The  modern  Chris- 
tian scientific  view.  Definition  of  religion.  Objections  to  the 
modern  view.  The  organic  connection  of  Christianity  with  pre- 
ceding religions. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Classification  of  the  Positive  (pre-Christian)  Re- 
ligions   233 

Finality  and  empirical  origins.  True  and  false  methods. 
Evolution  according  to  Hegel  and  Spencer.  Sympathetic  study 
of  other  religions.  The  modem  historico-scientific  classifica- 
tion of  religions.  Hegel's  philosophico-scientific  classification. 
Christianity  the  absolute  religion,  and  its  relation  to  other  re- 
ligions.    Puritanical  interpretation  of  Christian  history. 

CHAPTER   VIII. 
The  Absolute  Religion 268 

Translation  of  Hegel  on  Christianity  as  the  absolute  re- 
ligion.    Miracles.     Biblical  theology.     Kant's  refutation  of  the 


Contents.  xiii 


PAGE 


ontological  argument  stated  and  criticised.  The  Trinity.  Crea- 
tion. The  incarnation.  The  Church.  Dogma  and  sacraments. 
The  work  of  philosophy  in  formulating  and  vindicating  "  the 
Faith."  The  Reformation.  Eighteenth-century  rationalism. 
The  aim  of  philosophy.  Only  reason  can  heal  the  wounds 
made  by  rationalism. 

APPENDIX. 

Christian  Unity  in  America  and  the  Historic  Epis- 
copate   309 

The  declaration  of  the  House  of  Bishops.  Hegel  on  religion 
and  the  State.  The  historical  method  applied  to  the  interpre- 
tation of  the  historic  Episcopate.  Hooker's  view  of  Episcopacy. 
Two  interpretations  to-day — the  governmental  and  the  sacer- 
dotal. Broad  Churchmen  and  Anglo-Catholics.  The  facts  in 
the  case.  Archbishop  Whately  and  Archdeacon  Farrar  on 
Episcopacy.  Bishop  Whipple  on  Christian  unity.  Work  and 
worth  of  the  various  Churches  in  America.  Practical  sugges- 
tions. 


STUDIES  IN  HEGEUS 
PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION. 


CHAPTER  I.     . 

HEGELIANISM — A   PREFATORY   STUDY. 

Hegel  wrote  his  own  actual  posthumous  biog- 
raphy when  he  said,  "  The  condemnation  which  a 
great  man  lays  upon  the  world  is  to  force  it  to  ex- 
plain him."  Scarcely  had  the  grave  closed  over  the 
chief  intellectual  victim  of  the  cholera  in  1831,  when 
this  sentence  issued  in  the  most  wholesale  accepta- 
tion, rejection,  misrepresentation,  criticism,  vitupera- 
tion, and  sectarian  and  heretical  interpretations  of 
the  Hegelian  philosophy.  He  has  been  the  best 
abused  philosopher  of  modern  times.  He  evidently 
apprehended  this  treatment,  as  he  is  also  reported  to 
have  said  of  his  disciples,  "  There  is  only  one  man 
living  who  understands  me,  and  he  does  notT  Cer- 
tainly his  reply  to  the  smart  Frenchman  was  very 
apt.  He  asked  Hegel  if  he  could  not  gather  up  and 
express  his  philosophy  in  one  sentence  for  him. 
*'  No,"  he  replied,  "  at  least  not  in  French^  No  one 
who  has  studied  his  Logic,  at  least,  could  wish  it 
to  be  more  brief.  It  is  one  of  those  books  "  which 
would  be  much  shorter  if  it  were  not  so  short."    The 


2  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

real  value  of  all  great  works  is  not  to  be  measured 
by  the  immediate  assent  they  command,  like  com- 
monplace solutions  of  great  questions  by  ordinary 
men,  but  by  the  amount  of  study  and  discussion  and 
explanation  they  demand  in  order  to  gain  the  wide 
sweep  of  view  and  depth  of  solution  which  they  con- 
tain. 

Hegel  died  master  in  the  field  of  philosophy. 
He  had  conquered  and  founded  an  empire.  His  phi- 
losophy had  pervaded  universities,  state,  and  church. 
His  disciples  were  numerous,  admiring,  ardent.  For 
ten  years  after  his  death  his  system  remained  the 
foremost  intellectual  phenomenon  of  the  time.  In 
the  mean  while,  however,  interpretation  was  suc- 
ceeding faith  and  dismembering  the  parts  of  the  or- 
ganic whole  of  the  master.  Interpreters  of  his  sys- 
tem have  differed  more  than  those  of  the  Bible. 
From  it,  each — the  rigJit  wing,  the  center,  the  left, 
and  the  extreme  left  wings — his  dogma  sought  and 
each  his  dogma  found.  The  comprehensive  system 
offered  various  aspects,  which  seemed  to  various 
types  of  mind  to  be  the  whole  system.  The  right 
wing,  Goeschel,  Gabler,  Daub,  and  Erdmann,  found 
him  to  be  the  champion  of  Christianity  and  of  all 
social  institutions,  while  the  extreme  left  divested  the 
whole  system  of  all  religious  and  ethical  meaning, 
degenerating  into  the  boldest  materialism  and  athe- 
ism. Of  this  school  Feuerbach  is  best  known  to  us 
through  the  early  translation  of  George  Eliot.  The- 
ology was  merely  anthropology.  Dr.  Strauss  is  the 
best-known  representative  of  the  left  wing,  through 
his  mythical  theory  of  the  Life  of  Christ.  While 
the  right  wing  could  plainly  show  that  Hegel  had 
vindicated  God  as  the  subject  of  all  philosophy,  and 


Hegelianism — A  Prefatory  Study.  3 

Christianity  as  the  absolute  and  perfect  religion 
whose  influence  was  gradually  actualizing  moral 
order  in  humanity,  the  left  wings  claimed  that  logi- 
cally the  method  made  "  each  man  his  own  God  " 
(autolatry),  with  "a  right  to  everything"  here,  as 
there  was  no  hereafter.  They  rejected  Hegel's  ac- 
knowledged theistic  and  Christian  position.  But  to 
trace  these  various  orthodox  and  heretical  schools 
of  Hegelianism  would  be  almost  to  write  a  history 
of  modern  German  philosophy. 

This  breaking  up  into  such  opposite  schools 
caused  skepticism  as  to  its  real  worth.  This,  how- 
ever, has  been  the  fortune  of  every  great  truth  or 
system  which  has  ever  influenced  the  human  race. 
The  complete  Socratist  came  only  after  numerous 
partial  and  antagonistic  interpreters  of  Socrates. 
Hegelianism,  indeed,  is  said  by  some  to  be  now  dead 
in  Germany.  The  many  diverse  interpretations  of 
it  have  been  appealed  to  as  a  disproof  of  its  validity. 
Within  twenty-five  years  it  has  almost  ceased  to  ex- 
ist in  Germany  as  a  professed  system,  while  in  very 
truth  both  its  spirit  and  method  are  the  leaven  at 
work  in  all  the  present  philosophic  thought. 

In  a  Philosophical  Verein,  at  Leipsic,  an  expres- 
sion of  surprise  at  the  studied  ignoring  of  Hegel 
only  called  forth  a  flood  of  bitter  but  irrational  de- 
nunciation. Only  with  the  greatest  difficulty  could 
one  find  a  full  set  of  his  works  in  that  book  market 
of  the  Continent.  As  a  professed  system  it  does  not 
reign  in  Germany.  But  it  died  only  as  the  seed 
which  grows.  The  day  of  mere  discipleship  is  past. 
But  philosophy  owns  no  Pope.  Names  stand  only 
for  insights  of  human  thought.  Plato,  Aristotle, 
Leibnitz,  and  Kant,  have    often   been  "  outgrown," 


4  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

and  yet  they  remain  facile  principes,  or,  as  Dante  de- 
scribes Aristotle,  "  the  masters  of  those  who  know  " 
{i  maestri  di  color  die  sanno). 

Hegel's  own  "  method  "  has  been  applied  to  his 
system.  At  first  blank  being,  mere  all  or  nothing  or 
nonsense,  becoming,  through  all  sorts  of  differentiat- 
ing interpretations,  something,  many  things  determi- 
nate, only  to  be  again  discussed  into  fragments,  still 
squirming  with  the  life  of  the  logical  idea  into  other 
and  higher  representations,  till  now  the  transformed 
Hegel  really  occupies  the  intellectual  throne  as  firmly 
as  his  bust  the  pedestal  in  the  Hegelplatz  in  Berlin. 
This  process  of  the  interpretation  of  a  system  Hegel 
himself  thus  outlines : 

A  party  first  truly  shows  itself  to  have  won  the  victory 
when  it  breaks  up  into  two  parties  ;  for  so  it  proves  that  it  con- 
tains in  itself  the  principle  with  which  it  first  had  to  conflict, 
and  thus  that  it  has  got  beyond  the  one-sidedness  which  was 
incidental  to  its  earliest  expression.  The  interest  which  for- 
merly divided  itself  between  it  and  that  to  which  it  was  op- 
posed now  falls  entirely  within  itself,  and  the  opposing  prin- 
ciple is  left  behind  and  forgotten,  just  because  it  is  represented 
by  one  of  the  sides  in  the  new  controversy  which  now  occu- 
pies the  minds  of  men.  At  the  same  time  it  is  to  be  observed 
that  when  the  old  principle  thus  reappears,  it  is  no  longer 
what  it  was  before ;  for  it  is  changed  and  purified  by  the 
higher  element  into  which  it  is  now  taken  up.  In  this  point 
of  view  that  which  appears  at  first  to  be  a  lamentable  breach 
and  dissolution  of  the  unity  of  a  party  is  really  the  crowning 
proof  of  success. 

He  has  been  a  name  to  swear  at  as  well  as  to 
"  swear  by."  He  has  not  been  canonized,  yet  he  is 
master  even  of  those  who  know  him  not.     In  all  that 


Hegelianism — A  Prefatory  Study.  5 

relates  to  philosophy,  religion,  and  history,  Hege- 
lianism is  the  greatest  power  in  Germany  to-day. 

Von  Hartmann  and  Wundt  may  be  the  conspicu- 
ous stars  in  the  present  philosophic  horizon,  but  they 
shine  over  only  a  very  small  part  of  the  planet  that 
Hegel  illuminates.  Von  Hartmann  himself  has  said  : 
"  The  fewest  of  those  who  are  influenced  by  Hegel's 
spirit  are  themselves  aware  of  it ;  it  has  become  the 
common  heritage  of  the  most  cultured  circles  of  the  Ger- 
man people." 

In  Germany,  then,  there  are  but  a  very  few  of  the 
old-fashioned  followers,  disciples,  and  expounders  of 
Hegelianism  as  a  system,  but  its  spirit  and  method 
have  become  inextricably  entangled  with  the  whole 
thought  and  culture  of  the  country.  It  has  had  dis- 
ciples and  expounders  in  Italy,  France,  and  Russia. 
In  Great  Britain  it  has  also  greatly  influenced  philo- 
sophic thought,  though  accepted  and  expounded  as 
a  system  by  none.  Its  introduction  to  an  incurious 
public  some  twenty  years  ago  by  Dr.  J.  Hutchinson 
Stirling  has  been  very  ludicrously  described  by  Dr. 
Masson.  His  Secret  of  Hegel  was  met  "  with  such 
a  welcome  as  might  be  given  to  an  elephant  if,  from 
the  peculiar  shape  of  the  animal,  one  were  uncer- 
tain which  end  of  him  was  his  head."  Some  said 
of  "  this  uncouth  and  turbid  book,"  "  if  this  is  Hegel 
in  English,  he  might  as  well  have  remained  in  Ger- 
man." Others  were  unkind  enough  to  say  that  Dr. 
Stirling  kept  all  the  Secret  of  Hegel  to  himself,  even 
if  he  knew  it.  A  score  of  years,  however,  has  suf- 
ficed to  atone  for  this  barbarian  reception.  Scores  of 
leading  thinkers  have  read,  marked,  learned,  and  in- 
wardly digested  enough  of  Hegel's  method  and  re- 
sults to  thankfully  acknowledge  his  great  worth.     Its 


6  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

influence  is  especially  strong  and  pronounced  at  the 
Universities  of  Oxford  and  Glasgow. 

In  Germany  the  cry  of-  "back  to  Kant"  and 
Neo-Kantianism  is  but  the  first  step  of  the  protest 
against  the  temporary  materialistic  and  psychologi- 
cal thought  which  means  a  speedy  return  to  Kant's 
successors,  and  especially  to  Hegel  as  the  truest  in- 
terpreter and  the  best  finisher  of  Kant's  great  frag- 
ment. They  hear  with  surprise  that  Hegel's  sun  is 
rising  in  America  after  it  has  set  upon  the  fatherland. 
It  is  a  sun  that  sets  to  rise  again.  It  may  safely  be 
said,  however,  that  there  are  no  mere  disciples  and 
blind  adherents  of  Hegel  in  America.  Perhaps  Dr. 
W.  T.  Harris  has  most  nearly  been  a  disciple  and 
exponent  of  Hegel.  Certainly  as  editor  of  the  Jour- 
nal of  Speculative  Philosophy  he  has  done  more  than 
any  other  man  in  America  to  introduce  Hegel's 
method  and  works  to  us.  He  founded  it  for  that 
express  purpose  in  1867.  But  as  a  thinker  he  has 
necessarily  cast  off  the  bonds  of  mere  blind  partisan 
discipleship.  Replying  to  the  complaint  of  the  un- 
American  character  of  the  contents  of  the  Journal, 
he  said,  "  It  is  not  American  tJiought  so  much  as 
American  thinkers  that  we  want."  And  to  think  in 
the  philosophic  way  is  to  transcend  all  national  lim- 
its.  This  is  an  apt  reply,  too,  to  Dr.  McCosh's  cry 
for  an  ''American  philosophy  "  in  the  first  number  of 
the  new  Princeton  Review.  So,  among  the  rapidly 
increasing  number  of  those  who  are  studying  Hegel 
in  America,  there  is  only  the  desire  and  the  deter- 
mination to  think  thought  and  not  merely  to  repro- 
duce the  formulas  of  any  national  thinker.  The  great 
thinkers  of  all  ages,  the  great  contributors  to  the 
Science  of  Knowledge,  are  no  mere  external  authori- 


Hegelianism — A  Prefatory  Study.  7 

ties.  Their  thought  is  to  be  digested  and  organ- 
ically reproduced  necessarily,  it  is  true,  as  American 
thought. 

Hegel  is  recognized  as  a  thinker  whose  compre- 
hension of  thought  and  its  method  no  student  of  phi- 
losophy can  fail  to  acknowledge  as  great  among  the 
greatest.  But  I  judge  it  to  be  unjust  to  characterize 
these  students  of  Hegelian  philosophy  as  Hegelians 
either  in  the  popular,  untrue,  or  in  the  exact  scientific 
sense  of  the  name.  "  Bound  to  swear  in  the  name  of 
no  master  "  in  philosophy,  and  only  in  the  name  of 
Christ  in  religion,  would  better  characterize  them  all, 
so  far  as  I  know.  They  recognize  Hegel's  as  the 
latest  great  epoch-making  contribution  to  the  philo- 
sophic interpretation  of  the  world  and  comprehension 
of  humanity's  experience.  They  are  mastering  and 
using  his  method  rather  than  accepting  all  of  the  re- 
sults which  this  method  yielded  himself  as  he  applied 
it  to  the  great  spheres  of  human  experience.  They 
are  getting  great  help  and  looking  for  greater  from 
the  method  which  is  greater  than  even  his  own  em- 
ployment of  it.  Help  in  comprehension  of  experience 
may  come  from  those  who  are  not  infallible  in  knowl- 
edge. 

I  gladly  give  Prof.  Edward  Caird's  estimate  of 
the  worth  of  the  charge  that  Hegel's  philosophy  has 
entirely  lost  the  credit  in  Germany  which  it  partially 
retains  in  other  countries.  President  Stanley  Hall, 
indeed,  says  that  it  was  this  historical  status  of  Hege- 
lianism that  first  weakened  its  hold  upon  his  mind. 
*'  If  by  adherence  to  Hegel,"  says  Prof.  Caird,*  "  be 
meant  that  kind  of  discipleship  which  is  content  to 

*  Hegel,  by  Prof.  Edward  Caird,  LL.  D.,  p.  223. 


8  Philosophy  of  Religio7t. 

be  labelled  with  the  name  of  Hegelian  as  a  complete 
indication  of  all  its  ideas  and  tendencies,  we  might 
state  the  fact  still  more  broadly.  For  there  are  few, 
if  any,  in  any  country,  who  could  now  take  up  the  same 
position  toward  Hegel  which  was  accepted  by  his 
immediate  disciples."  Philosophers  are  not  creators, 
but  merely  interpreters  of  human  experience.  They 
do  not  spin  from  their  own  brain  baseless  dreams  in 
place  of  substantial  realities.  They  only  comprehend 
the  substantial  reality  beneath  and  permeating  all 
concrete  life — physical,  social,  and  religious. 

Man  is  in  vital  relations  with  his  Creator  and 
Redeemer.  In  his  religious  life  Jesus  Christ  is  the 
fullness  of  all  divine  light  and  life.  As  men  experi- 
ence their  vital  relations  to  him,  they  are  filled  with 
life  and  light.  Philosophy  then  comes  to  interpret 
and  comprehend  this  Christian  experience,  to  trace 
in  intellectual  forms  the  movements  of  the  divine 
Logos  in  all  true  life  and  light.  In  its  truest  sense 
philosophy  is  theology  ;  in  its  highest  form  it  is  Chris- 
tian theology.  Its  chief  interest  in  Germany  and  the 
chief  cause  of  the  diverse  schools  of  interpretation 
have  come  from  its  essentially  theological  character. 
Philosophy  sees  the  universe  as  a  process,  as  a  mani- 
festation of  God.  The  Substance  which  Pantheism 
puts  back  of  all  things  is  seen  to  be  the  self-revealing, 
conscious,  intelligent,  purposeful  Subject — GoD.  Feu- 
erbach  and  all  other  members  of  the  "  left  wing  "  re- 
jected this  Theistic  interpretation  which  Hegel  un- 
doubtedly gave  the  universe.  They  denied  the  es- 
sential validity  of  the  laws  of  thought  {the  unity  of 
thought  and  being),  accepting  them  and  all  their  crea- 
tions and  implications  as  the  work  of  the  individual 
thinker,  and  finally  as  the  mere  result  of  materialistic 


Hegelianism — A  Prefatory  Study.  g 

conditions.  From  Hegel  to  Bruno  Bauer  was  from 
Theism  to  materialism.  Hegel  himself  always  pro- 
fessed his  belief  in  the  doctrines  of  the  Lutheran 
Church.  Against  both  the  rationalistic  school  and 
that  of  mere  feeling  or  faith,  he  labored  to  show  that 
the  dogmatic  creed  is  the  rational  development  or 
intellectual  exposition  of  what  is  implicit  in  Chris- 
tian experience.  Goeschel,  Gabler,  Marheinecke, 
Daub,  and  the  now  venerable  Erdmann  of  evangeli- 
cal Halle,  took  this  position  of  Hegel  in  interpreting 
his  system.  They  affirmed  that  Christian  experience 
is  the  substance  of  their  philosophy.  On  this  ground 
they  maintained  the  full  personality  of  God,  and  like- 
wise defended  historically  the  literal  views  given  by 
the  Scriptures  of  the  person  of  Christ,  as  the  God- 
man — the  Mediator  between  the  divine  and  the  hu- 
man, in  whose  light  we  see  light,  and  in  whose  life 
we  have  life.  Dr.  Dorner,  in  his  History  of  Prot- 
estant Theology  (vol.  ii,  pp.  365-367),  affirms  the 
same  as  to  the  teaching  of  these  right-xving  Hege- 
lians. 

In  England  and  America,  too,  the  interest  in  the 
study  of  Hegel  is  chiefly  owing  to  the  relation  of  his 
thought  to  religion  and  to  Christianity  as  the  abso- 
lute, full,  and  final  religion.  It  attracts  Christian 
thinkers  seeking  for  intellectual  comprehension  of 
religious  experience,  faith,  and  facts.  God  and  the 
universe,  man  and  freedom,  Jesus  Christ  the  Recon- 
ciler and  Finisher  of  all  that  is  imperfect,  all  moving 
on  in  a  divine  process,  which  the  light  that  is  within 
man  sees  by  means  of  the  congenial  but  infinite  Light 
that  enswathes  him ;  in  a  word,  the  divine  Logic 
in  all  experience  is  that  which  Christian  thinkers 
above  others  should  and  do  seek  for.     They  are  at- 


lo  Philosophy  of  Religion, 

tracted  to  Hegel  because  they  find  him  thinking 
mightily  on  the  same  ;  and  yet  the  chief  opposition 
to  the  study  of  Hegel  comes  from  the  odium  theologi- 
cum  of  Christian  teachers.  Hegel  and  his  philosophy 
are  abused  with  insensate  epithets  enough  to  warn  all 
true  (or  stupid)  Christians  from  having  anything  to 
do  other  than  to  revile  this  chief  apologist  of  the 
Theistic  and  Christian  interpretation  of  the  universe. 
Pantheist,  denier  of  human  freedom  and  immortality, 
of  the  historical  Christ,  and  of  his  eternal  person  and 
work,  mere  charlatan  in  philosophy  and  religion, 
whose  real  aim  and  tendency  is  the  destruction  of  all 
that  is  real  and  great  and  true  in  the  universe  and 
man  and  Christianity,  they  ignorantly  affirm  Hegel 
to  have  been.  They  are  moved  with  righteous  but 
ignorant  indignation  against  any  one  daring  to  even 
study  Hegel,  imposing  the  high  theological  and  ec- 
clesiastical tariff  of  anathema  for  such  daring  offense. 
The  object  of  this  chapter  *  is  to  offer  something 
toward  abating  this  unjust  and  ungenerous  attitude 
toward  Hegelianism  and  its  study.  I  can  not  pre- 
tend to  have  made  an  exhaustive  study  of  Hegel  or 
of  German  philosophy  since  Hegel.  I  write  this 
chapter  only  in  part  from  the  results  of  independent 
study.f     So  much,  indeed,  has  been  mis-said  about 

*  This  chapter  is  reprinted  from  The  Church  Review,  April,  1886. 

f  I  give  the  following  references  to  the  best  accessible  English  mate- 
rials on  Hegel :  Prof.  Edward  Caird's  little  volume  on  Hegel  (English) 
is  an  introductory  exposition  of  his  philosophy,  combining  happily  biog- 
raphy and  popular  exposition  of  the  meaning  and  method  of  Hegel's 
Logic.  His  larger  volume  on  The  Philosophy  of  Kant  is  also  a  good  in- 
troduction to  Hegel.  Dr.  J.  Hutchinson  Stirling's  Secret  of  Hegel  is 
said  to  be  helpful  in  the  way  of  exposition.  Prof.  A.  Seth's  article  in  the 
Quarterly  Review,  "Mind,"  October,  1882,  is  as  freely  critical  as  it  is 
justly  appreciative.     Principal  J.  Caird's  Philosophy  of  Religion  does  as 


Hegelianisni — A  Prefatory  Study.         1 1 

Hegelianism  that  I  am  tempted  to  continue  in  this 
gossipy  vein  throughout  this  chapter  and  leave  the 
philosophical  exposition  and  vindication  for  future 
work.  Indeed,  anything  like  a  satisfactory  exposition 
of  the  Hegelian  philosophy  and  its  results  is  beyond 
the  scope  of  any  review  article.  I  attempt  only  a  pre- 
liminary clearing  away  of  misconceptions.  Dr.  Seth 
deprecates  the  false  humility  of  those  students  who 
represent  themselves  as  merely  picking  up  the  crumbs 
at  the  banquet,  merely  guessing  at  his  meaning  with- 
out venturing  to  compass  his  thought.  I  do  not 
assume  such  humility,  for  I  do  not  understand  how 
any  real  student  of  Hegel  can  long  be  ignorant  of  his 
secret  or  method,  nor  how  any  independent  student 
can  accept  Tiim  as  an  infallible  master  either  in  his 
method  or  in  his  own  employment  of  it,  and  much 
less  in  his  own  results  in  various  spheres.  But  I  do 
understand  how  no  real  student  of  Hegel  can  ever 
be  the  same  man  intellectually  after  that  he  was  before 
his  study  of  Hegel.     The  whole  concrete  experience 

well  and  as  popularly  for  Hegel's  Philosophie  der  Religion  what  his 
brother's  little  volume  does  for  Hegel's  Logic.  Dr.  W.  T.  Harris  has  de- 
voted unusual  ability  and  labor  in  making  Hegel  known  to  American 
thinkers  through  his  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  vols,  i-xx,  in 
which  he  has  been  aided  by  a  corps  of  competent  helpers.  He  has  a 
volume  of  critical  exposition  of  Hegel's  Logic  nearly  ready  for  Grigg's 
German  Philosophic  Classics.  Dr.  J.  Steinforth  Kedney's  volume  on 
Hegel's  Esthetics  is  already  published.  Hegel's  Philosophy  of  Histoiy 
is  translated  in  Bohn's  Library.  Dr.  \V.  Wallace  has  translated  the  text 
of  the  Logic  and  prefaced  it  with  helpful  introductory  expositions.  The 
following  books  may  also  be  named  as  Hegelian,  but  not  in  any  merely 
slavish  or  expository  way  :  The  Nation  and  The  Republic  of  God,  by  Dr. 
E.  Mulford  ;  Philosophy  and  Christianity,  by  Prof.  George  S.  Morris, 
Ph.  D.  ;  Prolegomena  to  Ethics  and  Introduction  to  Hume's  Works,  by 
the  late  T.  H.  Green,  the  recognized  leader  of  Hegelianism  at  Oxford  ; 
Ethical  Studies,  by  F.  H.  Bradley. 
3 


12  Philosophy  of  Religio7i. 

of  his  life  and  that  of  humanity  receives  a  new  and 
divine  interpretation  and  exposition — 

And  by  the  vision  splendid 
Is  on  his  way  attended. 

He  finds  in  it  the  poem  of  the  prose  of  every-day 
life,  because  it  gives  the  essential  truth  and  setting  of 
that  life.  True  poetry  systematizes  the  chaotic,  the 
multitudinous  facts  of  experiences.  So,  as  Dr.  Stir- 
ling confessed,  the  system  of  Hegel  is  "  in  a  certain 
sense  only  a  poem."  It  is  a  poem  as  Christianity  is  a 
poem — a  grand  living  system.  It  is  in  fact  only  the 
intellectual  rhythm,  the  Logic  of  the  Logos  in  whom 
are  all  things,  "  both  which  are  in  heaven  and  which 
are  on  earth."  It  is  indeed  always  and  everywhere 
the  function  of  philosophy  to  point  out  this  rhythmic 
movement  of  thought  in  all  forms  of  life — to  express 
all  concrete  experience  in  terms  of  thought.  Philos- 
ophy is  not  all  things,  it  is  only  the  thoughtful  com- 
prehension and  expression  of  them.  Christianity  is 
not  the  product  of  a  dialectic  process,  but  it  is  its 
given  concrete  object.  But  its  intellectual  analysis 
is  the  inevitable  sequent  of  its  reception  by  thinking 
beings.  It  is  true  that  the  transcript  which  philoso- 
phy makes  of  great  concrete  wholes  may  be  unat- 
tractive to  us  in  our  throbbing  concrete  life — very 
unlike  the  flesh  and  blood  of  reality ;  and  when  taken 
for  the  whole,  when  ignoring  that  of  which  it  is  only 
the  intellectual  transcript,  it  becomes  vainly  pufTed 
up  and  deleterious.  "  Feeling,  intuition,  and  faith," 
as  Hegel  said,  "  belong  to  religion  as  essential  ele- 
ments, and  viere  cognition  of  it  is  one-sided."  But  it 
is  one  side,  and  an  essential  side  of  the  religion  of  in- 
tellectual beings.    All  theology  is  proof  of  this.    Even 


Hegelianism — A  Prefatory  Study.         13 

Jacobi,  the  philosopher  of  Faith,  declared  that  the 
reading  of  Kant's  argument  for  the  existence  of  God 
brought  on  a  violent  fit  of  palpitation  of  the  heart. 
So  great  emotion  may  an  intellectual  vision  awaken 
in  heart  and  body  as  well  as  in  mind. 

Hegel  may  indeed  be  justly  accused  of  looking 
chiefly  and  always  for  the  movement  of  thought  in  all 
forms  of  life.  But  this  criticism  is  itself  a  valid  criti- 
cism of  all  those  attacks  upon  Hegel  as  a  teacher  of 
concrete  forms  of  experience.  Philosophy  and  Theol- 
ogy are  both  out  of  place  in  hours  of  our  profoundest 
religious  emotion.  Our  communion  with  God  at  such 
times  is  not  the  immediate  work  of  thought.  But 
when  we  reflect  upon  such  or  any  other  experience 
of  our  own  or  of  mankind,  we  seek  for  the  thought, 
the  Reason,  implicit  in  it.  Philosophy  may  be  said  to 
be  retrospective — looking  back  at  the  thought  at  work 
under  the  forms  of  Nature,  Mind,  Art,  State,  and 
Church — trying  to  comprehend  all  as  the  work  and 
expression  of  governing  immanent  reason.  This  is 
not  easy  work ;  and  it  is  special  work  that  demands,  as 
other  departments  of  science  do,  trained  minds  that 
also  feel  the  need  that  it  seeks  to  supply.  Faith,  feel- 
ing, the  mere  reasonings  of  the  understanding,  have 
their  place  in  man's  work ;  but  the  worth  of  all  knowl- 
edge and  the  reality  of  all  being  is  also  a  question  for 
man's  study.  The  intellectual  comprehension  of  the 
thought  and  reality  of  the  unfolded  universe — the 
manifestations  of  God  as  Subject  rather  than  of  sub- 
stance— this  is  the  "  vision  splendid  "  of  that  philoso- 
phy which  is  thoroughly  and  essentially  theological. 
With  Hegel  philosophy  and  theology  are  synony- 
mous. It  is  this  that  attracts  and  fascinates  relig:ious 
thinkers.     As  in  the  old  Roman  Empire  "all  roads 


14  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

lead  to  Rome,"  so  in  Hegel  every  finite  truth  leads 
up  to  and  is  explained  in  God.  Perhaps  a  personal 
confession  may  not  be  out  of  place  here,  and  may  be 
of  worth.  My  own  interest  in  this  study  began  and 
continues  as  a  purely  theological  one — the  intellect- 
ual search  for  "  God  as  the  self-conscious  Reason  of 
all  that  really  is."  That  is  Hegel's  true  first  princi- 
ple. He  early  declared  that  "  the  great  immediate 
interest  of  philosophy  is  to  put  God  again  absolutely 
at  the  head  of  the  system  as  the  one  ground  of  all, 
the  principiuni  essctidi  ct  cognoscendiy  Again,  he  de- 
voutly exclaims,  "  What  knowledge  is  worth  know- 
ing if  God  be  unknowable  ? "  (Philosophic  der  Re- 
ligion, vol.  i,  p.  27.)  This  spirit  is  present  through- 
out all  of  his  works  that  I  have  read.  His  Logic  is  a 
Theology.*  His  Philosophy  of  History  is  a  Theod- 
icy .f     So,  too,  are  his  History  of  Philosophy  :j;  and 

*  Hegel's  Logic,  pp.  133,  172,  248,  Wallace's  translation,  and  Jour- 
nal of  Speculative  Philosophy,  iii,  369. 

f  "  That  the  history  of  the  world,  with  all  the  changing  scenes  which 
its  annals  present,  is  this  process  of  development  and  realization  of  spirit 
— this  is  the  true  Theodicy,  the  vindication  of  God  in  history.  Only 
this  insight  can  reconcile  spirit  with  the  history  of  the  world,  viz.,  that 
what  has  happened  and  is  happening  every  day  is  not  only  not  '  without 
God,'  but  is  essentially  his  own  work  "  (Philosophy  of  History,  p.  477). 

X  Speaking  of  the  History  of  Philosophy  he  says  :  "  For  these  thou- 
sands of  years  the  same  Architect  has  directed  the  work,  and  that  Archi- 
tect is  the  one  living  Mind  of  which  the  nature  is  Thought  and  Self-Con- 
sciousness" (Logic,  p.  18,  Wallace's  translation).  He  goes  on  to  say  that 
differences  of  system  which  philosophy  presents  are  not  irreconcilable 
with  unity.  It  is  one  philosophy  at  different  degrees  of  completion.  In 
his  introduction  to  the  History  of  Philosophy  he  states  most  plainly  a 
Philosophy  of  the  History  of  Philosophy,  which  is  in  most  cheerful  con- 
trast with  the  comfortless,  saddening  view  maintained  by  Mr.  George  H. 
Lewes.  Mr.  Lewes's  purpose  throughout  his  History  of  Philosophy  is  to 
show  the  negative  answer  given  by  every  system  to  the  question,  What  is 
truth  ?     Each  system  is  refuted  by  the  succeeding  ones,  and  the  whole 


Hegelianism — A  Prefatory  Study.         15 

his  Philosophy  of  Religion  explications  of  God  in  the 
minds  and  hearts  of  men. 

Not  only  the  name  but  also  the  nature  and  works 
of  God  are  ever  the  theme  to  which  he  turns  and  in 
which  he  ends.  He  points  out  that  philosophy  seeks 
to  apprehend  (not  create  or  evolve),  by  means  of 
thought,  the  same  truth  that  the  religious  mind  has 
by  faith.  His  last  work  was  on  The  Arguments  for 
the  Existence  of  God,  in  which  he  treated  the  per- 
fect matter  in  these  proofs  as  distinguished  from  the 
imperfect  manner  of  statement.  In  the  preliminary 
chapters  of  his  Logic  he  had  already  criticised 
Kant's  supposed  destruction  of  these  classic  argu- 
ments. He  maintained  that  no  critical  reasonings 
could  destroy  the  necessity  and  right  of  the  mind  to 
rise  from  the  finite  to  God  ;  that  these  arguments  are 
only  imperfect  descriptions  of  the  implicit  relations 
of  man  and  the  universe  to  God  and  of  the  steps  of 
the  implicit  logic  of  Religion. 

Man  is  a  being  that  thinks,  and  therefore  sound  Com- 
mon Sense  as  well  as  Philosophy  will  not  yield  up  their 
right  of  rising  to  God  from  and  out  of  the  empirical  view 

"  affords  accumulated  proofs  of  the  impossibility  of  Philosophy."  Some 
Christian  teachers  seem  glad  to  use  this  sad  skepticism  as  a  defense  of 
the  faith.  (Thus  Christlieb,  Modern  Doubt  and  Christian  Belief,  p.  80.) 
Hegel  well  says :  "  The  history  of  philosophy  would  be  of  all  studies 
most  saddening  when  it  displayed  to  us  the  refutation  of  every  system 
which  time  has  produced.  .  .  .  The  refutation  of  a  system,  however,  only 
means  that  its  limits  are  passed  and  that  the  fixed  principle  in  it  has  been 
reduced  to  an  organic  element  in  the  completer  system  that  follows. 
Thus  the  history  of  philosophy  in  its  true  meaning  deals  not  with  the 
past,  but  with  the  eternal  and  the  veritable  present ;  and  in  its  results 
resembles  not  a  museum  of  the  aberrations  of  the  human  intellect,  but  a 
pantheon  of  godlike  figures  representing  various  stages  of  the  immanent 
logic  of  all  human  thought "  (Logic,  p,  137). 


1 6  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

of  the  world.  .  .  .  And  what  men  call  the  proofs  of  God's 
existence  are  seen  to  be  ways  of  describing  and  analyzing 
the  inward  movement  of  the  mind,  which  is  the  great  think- 
er, that  thinks  the  data  of  the  senses.  .  .  .  This  leap  into 
the  supersensible  is  thought,  and  nothing  but  thought.  .  .  . 
Animals  make  no  such  passage,  and  in  consequence  they 
have  no  religion.* 

I  In  fact  his  whole  Logic,  which  contains  his  system 
.!  or  method  in  pure  scientific  form,  seems  to  me  to  be 
but  his  explication  of  the  nature  and  activities  of 
God  immanent  in  the  actuality  and  order  of  the 
world,  and  transcendent  as  its  efficient  and  final 
■  Cause.  All  objects  of  science,  all  terms  of  thought 
and  forms  of  life  lead  out  of  themselves  into  a  sup- 
porting, fulfilling,  organized  unity.  In  this  com- 
pleted unity  they  find  their  truth  and  reality.  That 
unity  and  truth  is  not  external  and  mechanical,  but 
living,  loving,  intelligent,  and  self-conscious.  It  is 
God,  the  Category  of  all  categories — the  Subject  of 
all  absolute  predicates.  All  knowledge,  from  one 
side,  is  an  exaltation  of  man  toward  God,  while,  re- 
garded from  the  other  side,  it  is  the  manifestation  of 
God  to  man.f 

*  Hegel's  Logic,  p.  87,  Wallace's  translation. 

f  The  ancient  philosophers  have  described  God  under  the  image  of  a 
round  ball.  But  if  that  be  his  nature,  God  has  unfolded  it,  and  in  the 
actual  world  he  has  opened  the  closed  shell  of  truth  into  a  system  of 
nature,  into  a  state  system,  a  system  of  law  and  morality,  into  the  system 
of  the  world's  history.  The  shut  fist  has  become  an  open  hand,  the 
fingers  of  which  reach  out  to  lay  hold  of  man's  mind  and  draw  it  to  him- 
self. Nor  is  the  human  mind  a  mere  abstruse  intellect,  blindly  moving 
within  its  own  secret  recesses.  It  is  no  mere  feeling  and  groping  about  in  a 
vacuum,  but  an  intelligent  system  of  national  organization.  Of  that  sys- 
tem Thought  is  the  summit  in  point  of  form,  and  thought  may  be  de- 
scribed as  the  capability  of  surveying  on  its  surface  the  expanse  of  Deity 


Hegelianism — A  Prefatory  Study.         ly 

Both  atheistic  and,  sad  to  put  in  the  same  com- 
pany, Christian  Agnosticism  are  throughout  thor- 
oughly repudiated.  God  knowable  because  self-man- 
ifesting, and  man  in  duty  bound  to  study  this  knowl- 
edge, are  with  Hegel  self-evident  and  demonstrable 
principles.  He  studies  human  history  as  men  of 
science  do  nature — with  the  presupposition  that  it  is 
rational — the  ^''  coining  to  itself^'  of  that  human  reason, 
which  only  ^^ finds  itself^'  and  finds  itself  only,  when 
it  finds  God's  Reason  immanent  in  all  its  knowledge, 
and  this  finding  is  mediated  by  "  the  Light  of  the 
World."  Assuredly  he  deserves  the  epithet  that 
Novalis  gave  Spinoza,  "  the  God-intoxicated,"  intel- 
Iccttially  at  least,  and  not  without  a  tinge  of  the  emo- 
tional and  mystical.  This  I  know  will  bring  the  quick 
retort,  "  Certainly,  for  he  also  was  a  pantheist."  I  once 
supposed  this  current  charge  to  be  true.  I  now  know 
it  to  be  false.  Not  only  do  his  words  but  also  his 
whole  system  refute  the  charge.  "  The  Absolute  Sub- 
stance of  Spinoza,"  says  Hegel,  ''  certainly  requires 
something  to  make  it  absolute  Mind,  and  it  is  a  right 
and  proper  requirement  that  God  should  be  defined  as 
absolute  Mind  " — that  is,  God  is  more  than  the  panthe- 
istic substance.  Again,  "  God  is  more  than  life :  he  is 
Mind."  Again,  in  criticising  Spinoza,  he  says  that 
Substance,  as  accepted  by  Spinoza  as  defining  God, 
"  is,  as  it  were,  a  dark,  shapeless  abyss,  which  devours 
all  definite  content  as  utterly  null,  and  produces  from 

unfolded,  or  rather  as  the  capability,  by  means  of  thinking  over  it,  or 
entering  into  it,  and  then  when  the  entrance  has  been  secured,  of  think- 
ing over  God's  expansion  of  himself.  To  take  this  trouble  is  the  ex- 
press duty  and  end  of  ends  set  before  the  thinking  mind,  ever  since  God 
laid  aside  his  rolled-up  form,  and  revealed  himself.  (Quoted  from  Hegel 
by  Wallace  in  his  translation  of  Hegel's  Logic,  p.  xxii.) 


1 8  Philosophy  of  Religion, 

itself  nothing  that  has  a  positive  subsistence  in  itself. 
.  .  .  God  is  Substance.  He  is,  however,  no  less  the 
Absolute  Person.  That  he  is  the  Absolute  Person, 
however,  is  a  point  which  the  philosophy  of  Spinoza 
never  perceived  ;  and  on  that  side  it  falls  short  of  the 
true  notion  of  God  which  forms  the  content  of  relig- 
ious consciousness  in  Christianity."  * 

Again,  "  Everything  depends  upon  the  absolute 
Truth  being  apprehended  not  merely  as  Substance, 
but  as  Subject."  As  opposed  to  both  deistic  and 
atheistic  views  of  the  universe,  he  might  deserve  the 
name  pantheist,  refusing  to  know  a  world  without 
God,  but  emphasizing  the  truth  that  the  world  only 
has  its  being  and  truth  in  God.  But  pantheist  in  the 
sense  of  making  all  but  mechanical  parts  of  one  stu- 
pendous substance  or  unknowable  power,  without 
will  and  without  conscious  intelligence,  he  was  not. 
The  fundamental  idea  of  his  system  (in  his  Logic)  is 
that  the  unity  to  which  all  things  must  be  referred  is 
a  spiritual,  self-conscious  principle,  showing  that  all 
other  categories  used  to  explain  the  world  are  resolv- 
able into  this.  Substance,  Essence,  Force,  Law, 
Cause,  are  only  partial  expressions  which  find  their 
truth  in  the  highest  category  of  self-conscious,  self- 
determining  Spirit. 

The  monks  of  the  East  once  made  a  riot  in  Alex- 
andria because  Theophilus  denied  that  God  had  a 
physical  body.  Hegel  did  not  differ  from  Theophi- 
lus. Some  of  those  who  call  him  pantheist  do  not 
differ  much  from  the  rioting  monks.  Carlyle's  retort 
was  as  sensible  as  the  question  whether  or  not  he 
was  a  pantheist :  "  No  !  I  am  not  a/^;z-theist,  nor  2ipot- 

*  Hegel's  Logic,  pp.  89,  91,  and  236,  Wallace's  translation. 


Hegelianism — A  Prefatory  Study.         19 

theist,  either."  Pantheist,  in  the  Christian  sense,  I 
believe  Hegel  was.  I  have  failed  to  find  any  view 
expressed  in  his  Logic  or  in  his  Philosophy  of  His- 
tory or  in  his  Philosophy  of  Religion  which  derogates 
from  the  glory  of  God  or  the  chief  end  of  man.  The 
intelligent,  self-conscious,  self-determining  Subject 
embraces  the  universe  and  man  without  detriment 
either  to  the  actuality  or  evanescence  of  the  world  or 
to  the  freedom  and  immortality  of  man.  Hegel  as- 
serts that  the  maxim  of  Pantheism  is  the  doctrine  of 
the  eternity  of  matter,  that  "  from  nothing  comes 
nothing  "  (Logic,  p.  143).  With  this  goes  the  doctrine 
of  necessity.  No  system  which  does  not  include  de- 
terminism and  exclude  freedom  is  really  pantheis- 
tic. "  Out  of  something  comes  everything  by  inevi- 
table necessity  " — this  form  includes  the  double  false- 
hood of  pantheism.  But  a  more  strenuous  opponent 
of  these  errors  can  not  be  found  than  Hegel.  It  is 
but  the  most  absurd  travesty  of  it  which  can  define 
the  Hegelian  conception  of  God  as  "  a  self-evolving, 
impersonal  process,  which,  after  having  traversed  all 
the  spheres  of  matter  and  mind,  attains  to  a  knowl- 
edge of  its  6^^^head  in  the  speculative  reason  of  man." 
God,  as  self-conscious,  is  not  the  end  of  an  evolution, 
but  all  things  created  find  their  reality  in  him.  Men 
are  not  mechanical  parts  of  God,  nor  do  they  lose 
their  identity,  though  they  find  themselves  truly,  only 
in  him.  In  proportion  to  their  perfection  they 
reflect  him  —  become  his  created  image.  God  in 
his  manifestation  as  Creator  is  the  maker  of  his  im- 
age. He  defines  God  to  be  the  Pure  Personality, 
whose  self-conscious  freedom  is  self-contained,  not 
evolved,  in  time.  The  fleeting  show  (Schcin)  of  tem- 
poral phenomena  does  not  create  nor  destroy  the 


20  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

self-consciousness  of  God  or  of  man  made  in  his  im- 
age. That  Hegel  taught  both  the  personality  of 
God  and  the  immortality  of  man  is  most  strenuously 
maintained  by  the  recognized  exponent  of  Hegel's 
own  view — Dr.  Erdmann.  By  God,  as  Subject,  not 
as  pantheistic  substance,  he  means  the  internal  self- 
active  nature,  or  the  Essence  which  impels  itself  into 
phenomenal  being.  Man's  immortality  as  well  as  his 
true  being  is  in  his  organic,  not  mechanical,  union 
with  God.  We  do  not  charge  pantheism  upon  the 
Biblical  doctrine  of  creation,  nor  the  absorption  and 
loss  of  individual  souls  in  Christ,  upon  St.  John  and 
St.  Paul.  God  and  man  in  Christ  are  freely  spoken 
of  as  being  in  indissoluble  union.  It  is  no  longer  we, 
but  Christ  in  us.  God  determines,  works  in,  us  to 
will  and  to  do  of  his  good  pleasure.  In  the  fullness 
of  the  completed  work  of  creation  and  Redemption 
"  God  shall  be  all  in  all."  There  is  what  may  be 
called  a  Christian  pantheism  and  determinism.  And 
other  than  this  I  do  not  find  in  Hegel.  Nature  and 
Man  are  treated  of,  not  as  discordant  and  irreconcila- 
ble with  God,  but  as  forming  one  organic  whole  in 
him  without  losing  their  relative  independent  reality. 
It  may  be  worthy  of  notice  that  all  English  and 
American  Hegelians  accept  these  truths,  and  also 
that  they  believe  them  to  be  Hegel's  own  teaching.* 

*  The  English  Church  Quarterly  Review,  January,  18S4,  contains  a 
commendable  exposition  of  English  Hegelianism  and  its  Religion  by  one 
who  evidently  is  not  a  Hegelian.  He  says :  "  An  impression  may  prob- 
ably be  felt  that  Hegelianism  is  unfavorable  to  distinct  belief  in  the  Di- 
vine Personality.  As  regards  the  English  branch  of  the  school  such  an 
accusation  would  be  wholly  untrue.  The  very  principle  of  the  system  is 
that  the  Divine  Mind  is  in  unity  with  the  human,  and  that  both  are  per- 
sonal." He  quotes  Prof.  Green's  definition  of  personality  as  "the  qual- 
ity in  a  subject  of  being  consciously  an  object  to  itself.     Again,  "  The 


Hegelianism — A  Prefatory  Study.        21 

Hegers  system  rightly  understood,  I  believe,  as 
G^bler  maintained,  assumes  a  self-conscious  Absolute 
Reason  before  the  world  process,  and,  as  Daub  main- 
tained, that  in  it  reason  is  the  organ,  not  the  source 
of  the  knowledge  of  God,  and,  as  Hegel  himself 
maintained,  that  Christianity  is  the  absolute  full  and 
final  religion  for  man. 

Prof.  Flint,  of  Edinburgh,  said  that  he  regarded 
Hegel's  method  most  valuable  and  helpful  and  his 
results  very  rich  mines  of  thought,  but  that  we  must 
divorce  it  from  Hegel's  Pantheism,  which  he  found 
in  the  very  first  pages  of  his  Logic.  Prof.  Harris 
(Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  October,  1879) 
has  briefly  replied  to  the  same  charge  made  by  Prof. 
Flint  in  his  Anti-Theistic  Theories.  He  points  out 
that  Prof.  Flint  misconceives  the  dialectic  method  of 
The  Logic.  Hegel's  dialectic,  like  Plato's,  is  not  a 
method  of  proceeding  from  a  first  principle  which 
continues  to  remain  valid,  as,  e.  g.,  a  mathematical 
axiom  does.  The  dialectic  shows  that  the  first  prin- 
ciples which  are  hypothetically  placed  at  the  basis 
are  inadequate,  and  that  they  presuppose  as  their 
ground  and  logical  condition  a  concreter  principle. 
The  concrete  principle  is  at  once  the  logical  and  the 

genuineness,  not  merely  of  Principal  Caird's  theism,  but  of  his  Chris- 
tianity, is  undoubted."  Again,  "  Hegelianism  gives  us  no  cosmos  of  ex- 
perience into  which  the  mysteries  and  miracles  of  Christianity  do  not 
readily  fall.  .  ,  .  The  whole  connection  of  God  with  the  world  involves 
for  the  Hegelian  who  believes  in  God  a  relation  in  His  nature  to  human- 
ity, which  may  truly  be  called  a  tendency  toward  incarnation."  The 
same  verdict  must  be  rendered  as  to  American  Hegelianism  by  all  who 
read  the  emphatic  and  devout  maintenance  of  the  stanchest  Christian 
Theism  in  all  the  books  that  deserve  the  credit  (or  slur)  of  being  He- 
gelian. Read  Dr.  Mulford's  sublime  words  on  "  The  Personality  of 
God,"  The  Republic  of  God,  chap.  ii. 


22  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

chronological  presupposition.  The  dialectical  pro- 
cedure is  a  retrograde  movement  from  error  back  to 
truth,  from  the  abstract  back  to  the  concrete  and 
true,  from  the  finite  and  dependent  back  to  the  infi- 
nite and  self-subsistent.  We  are  proceeding  toward 
a  first  principle  rather  than  from  one  when  we  study 
Hegel's  Logic.  Hence  Hegel  does  tiot  (as  Prof. 
Flint  thinks)  "  profess  to  explain  the  generation  of 
God,  man,  and  nature  from  the  pure  Being  that  is 
pure  nothing."  He  only  shows  that  "  pure  Being," 
which  is  the  highest  principle  according  to  many 
thinkers,  is  not  so  adequate  as  that  of  "  Becoming," 
and  this  not  so  adequate  as  that  which  has  become 
(or  Being  determinate),  nor  this  as  adequate  as  "  in- 
finite being,"  etc.  He  passes  in  review  all  the  cate- 
gories and  discovers  their  defects  —  i.  e.,  their  pre- 
suppositions. This  is  merely  a  brief  statement  of 
Hegel's  own  interpretation  of  the  categories.  The 
first  category  of  mere  blank  empty  Being  may  be  taken, 
as  it  often  is,  as  a  metaphysical  definition  of  the  abso- 
lute or  of  God.  So  with  all  the  succeeding  catego- 
ries— each  of  which  is  fuller,  richer,  concreter,  and 
therefore  an  approximately  more  adequate  definition 
of  God.  But  each  of  these  is  reached  7iot  by  evolu- 
tion from  the  lower  one,  but  from  the  implications 
and  presuppositions  that  the  defects  of  the  lower 
one  exhibits.  Indeed,  Hegel  in  the  Logic  (page 
244,  Wallace's  translation)  warns  most  explicitly 
and  emphatically  against  this  very  misinterpreta- 
tion that  Dr.  Flint  makes.  The  advance  from  mere 
being  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  "  deepening  of  being  in 
itself  whereby  its  inner  nature  is  laid  bare,  rather 
than  as  an  issuing  of  the  more  perfect  from  the  less 
perfect." 


Hegelianism — A  Prefatory  Study.         23 

Each  lower  category  is,  and  is  not,  till  it  is  seen 
in  relation  with  something  higher  and  fuller.  Each 
partial  result,  through  its  unsatisfactoriness,  seeks  the 
truth  just  beyond  and  yet  implied  in  it.  It  is  the 
unrest  of  the  negative  of  each  category  or  definition 
that  impels  the  process  onward  till  the  last  category 
of  thought  is  reached — that  of  The  Idea — Spirit,  Self- 
conscious  Reason,  Self-determining  Intelligence — 
God.  God  is  not  the  end  or  result  of  this  process, 
but  he  is  the  real  presupposition  that  lies  back  of 
and  gives  comparative  worth  to  every  stage  of  the 
process.  St.  Augustine's  exclamation  as  to  our  souls 
might  well  be  applied  to  each  of  these  imperfect  cate- 
gories. Being,  Essence,  Causality,  Mechanism,  and  Life 
— all  but  that  of  Spirit  : 

Thou  hast  made  us  for  thee,  O  God  !  And  our  souls 
are  restless  till  they  rest  in  thee. 

Moreover,  Hegel's  doctrine  of  God  is  the  Chris- 
tian and  not  the  deistic  or  pantheistic  doctrine.  God 
is  the  real  concrete  infinite  only  because  of  his  essen- 
tial Triune  nature.  In  him  all  finite  beings  fijtd,  not 
lose,  their  reality.  As  a  category  either  of  thought 
or  of  being,  Hegel  did  not  treat  it  as  Spinoza  did 
stibstance — "  as  a  mere  terminus  ad  quern — a  lion's  den 
in  which  all  the  tracks  of  thought  (and  being)  termi- 
nate, while  none  are  seen  to  emerge  from  it."  All 
finite  beings  emerge  from  it  and  exist  in  it,  only  being 
clothed  sub  specie  cet  emit  atis  :  "All  things  in  God" 
does  not  mean  "  nothing  but  God."  Self-realization 
through  self-sacrifice  in  a  fuller  life  is  the  movement 
of  Hegel's  whole  philosophy.  This,  Prof.  Caird  says, 
he  got  from  the  study  of  Christianity.  "  Die  to  live  " 
is  the  nearest  possible  expression  of  Hegel's  philos- 
4 


24  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

ophy  in  one  sentence.  To  him  Christ's  words,  "  He 
that  saveth  his  life  shall  lose  it,  and  he  that  loseth 
his  life  shall  save  it,"  is  the  first  distinct  expression 
of  the  very  truth  of  the  nature  of  all  Spirit.  The 
tracing  of  this  through  all  the  forms  of  Spirit  is  the 
whole  work  of  his  philosophy.  The  "  more  life  and 
fuller  that  I  want "  is  found  only  through  dying  unto 
the  selfish  self  and  living  into  the  truer  self.  The 
Christian  doctrine  of  God,  as  Triune,  is  the  expres- 
sion of  this  nature  of  God's  self-revelation,  including 
the  element  of  self-sacrifice.  "  What  Christianity 
teaches  is  only  that  the  law  of  the  life  of  Spirit — the 
law  of  self-realization  through  self-abnegation — holds 
good  for  God  as  for  man,  and,  indeed,  that  the  Spirit 
that  works  in  man  to  'die  to  live  '  is  the  Spirit  of 
God.  For  Hegel  such  a  doctrine  was  the  demon- 
strated result  of  the  whole  idealistic  movement 
which  is  summed  up  in  his  Logic.  So  far,  then,  as 
Christianity  means  this,  it  was  not  in  any  spirit  of 
external  accommodation  that  he  tried  to  connect  his 
doctrine  with  it.  Rather  it  was  the  discovery  of 
this  as  the  essential  meaning  of  Christianity  which 
first  enabled  him  to  recognize  it  as  the  ultimate  lesson 
of  the  idealistic  movement  of  thought."  * 

I  have  indeed  barely  touched  upon  the  outskirts 
of  the  full  refutation  of  the  charge  of  pantheism.  I 
have  done  less  as  regards  the  charge  of  his  sublimat- 
ing all  the  facts  and  doctrines  of  Christianity  into 
mythical  products.  The  fuller  and  juster  vindication 
against  both  these  charges  demands  an  exposition  of 
at  least  his  Logic  and  his  Philosophie  der  Religion. 

*  Caird's  Hegel,  p.  2i8. 


CHAPTER   II. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

Hegel  was  radically  and  throughout  a  theologian. 
All  his  thought  began,  continued,  and  ended  in  that 
of  Divinity.  We  may  justly  say  that  even  the  re- 
ligious element  is  pervasive  of  all  his  works.  Writ- 
ing almost  like  a  zealot  against  the  current  indif- 
ference to  vital  theology,  he  exclaims  pathetically, 
"  What  knowledge  would  be  worth  the  pains  of  ac- 
quiring if  knowledge  of  God  be  not  attainable ! "  * 
He  had  the  indispensable  requisite  for  treating  of  re- 
ligion— that  is,  the  love  of  religion  within  himself  and 
sympathetic  hospitality  to  all  manifestations  of  it  in 
the  world.  His  Philosophic  der  Religion  is  thus  the 
very  heart  of  all  his  thinking.  The  posthumous  ed- 
itor of  this  work  (Dr.  Marheineke)  styles  it  "  the  high- 
est bloom  of  Hegel's  philosophy."  Pathos,  power, 
sweetness,  and  righteous  severity  mingle  in  winning 
strains  in  the  profound  and  scholastic  exposition  of 
man's  highest  relation. 

The  Philosophy  of  Religion  has  not  been  in  good 
repute  among  theologians  till  recently.  This  and  the 
cognate  Science  of  Religions,  or  Comparative  Relig- 
ion, have  been  looked  upon  with  suspicion  as  imply- 
ing or  leading  to  the  reduction  of  Christianity  to  a 

*  Pliilosophie  der  Religion,  vol.  i,  p.  37. 


26  Philosophy  of  Religi07i. 

level  with  other  religions.  There  has  lingered  a  relic 
of  the  method  of  some  of  the  earlier  Christian  apolo- 
gists. All  other  religions  were  simply  the  work  of 
the  devil,  the  imitator,  "the  Ape"  of  God.  He  had 
cunningly  introduced  elements  of  truth  into  those 
masses  of  corruptions  in  order  to  more  easily  seduce 
mankind.  Nor  has  the  more  general  theory  of  the  sys- 
tematic corruption  of  a  primitive  supernatural  revela- 
tion given  a  much  more  generous  or  just  estimation  of 
the  religions  of  the  world.  It  is  true  that  Clement 
of  Alexandria  and  others  taught  a  doctrine  of  the 
Logos  as  the  Divine  Pedagogue  (©eto?  natSaywYo?), 
which  was  essentially  that  of  the  modern  philosophy 
of  religion.  But  the  successful  trend  in  the  Church 
was  that  which  identified  the  Logos  locally  and  ex- 
clusively wnth  God's  teaching  in  and  through  herself, 
till  finally  the  possibility  of  a  distinction  between  re- 
ligion in  itself  and  the  Church  was  a  conception  not 
to  be  allowed  for  a  moment.  The  only  ray  of  light 
granted  by  the  theologians,  who  were  also  great  men, 
was  a  certain  doniim  naturale  that  served  to  curse 
rather  than  bless  the  heathen.  Protestant  Christian- 
ity inherited  and  emphasized  the  same  narrow  view 
of  one  exclusive  channel  for  the  work  of  God  in  hu- 
manity. Until  recently  the  only  classification  allowed 
was  that  of  Christianity  and  false  religions.  Any  at- 
tempt to  examine  pagan  religions  impartially  or  to 
point  out  the  vital  truth  in  them  that  gave  them  their 
power  over  men  was  imputed  to  disloyalty  to  Chris- 
tianity. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  fifteenth  century  the 
intellect  of  man  began  to  break  the  shackles  of  igno- 
rance and  authority.  The  Renaissance,  the  Reforma- 
tion, the  almost  simultaneous  discovery  of  the  great 


hitroductory.  2  7 

globe  earth  and  the  greater  vault  of  the  heavens,  and 
the  growth  of  the  historical  and  physical  sciences, 
greatly  widened  the  horizon  of  man's  knowledge. 
Old  Asia  and  new  America,  the  civilizations  and  re- 
ligions of  Greece,  India,  China,  and  Mexico,  hurled 
heaps  of  new  facts  into  men's  minds.  Wonder  was 
followed  by  study  and  observation,  this  by  necessary 
skepticism  as  to  the  traditional  theories  as  to  man, 
earth,  and  heavens,  and  crude,  monster  attempts  at 
reconstructing  new  theories,  too  often  disparaging 
the  old  in  admiration  of  the  new.  Any  final  con- 
struction or  synthesis  of  all  the  elements  was  far  be- 
yond the  range  of  the  finite  views  and  methods  of  the 
Eclaircissement,  Ratio?ialtsm,  and  Atifklacrmig  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  These  various  national  forms  of 
the  same  narrow  mental  method  were  even  less  fitted 
for  an  appreciative,  impartial,  and  scientific  study  of 
the  various  religions  of  the  world  than  either  Roman- 
ism or  Protestantism.  The  theory  of  a  primitive 
revelation  and  of  the  donum  nahirale  gave  them  some 
elements  of  universality  which  deistic  rationalism 
never  possessed.  Its  general  theory  that  religion  was 
the  invention  of  priests  or  poets  or  rulers  still  holds 
its  place  in  the  lower  infidel  discussions  of  to-day.  It 
was  reserved  for  the  nineteenth  century  to  make  a 
scientific  study  of  the  religions  of  the  world,  and  to 
arrive  at  a  philosophic  comprehension  of  what  religion 
is  as  a  universal  and  necessary  part  of  human  life. 

Two  truths  are  now  generally  accepted:  First, 
that  there  is  such  a  branch  of  knowledge  as  the  sci- 
ence of  religions  or  comparative  religion  ;  and,  second, 
that  the  co-ordinate  relation  of  God  and  man  in  re- 
ligion is  organic  and  has  a  law  or  logic  which  may 
rightly  be  called  the  pJdlosophy  of  religion.     Chance 


28  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

and  chaos  are  no  longer  allowed  to  reign  in  this  de- 
partment of  experience.  Thought  insists  upon  find- 
ing thought,  spirit  in  finding  spirit  in  religion.  Phi- 
losophy, or  the  intelligent  comprehension  of  concrete 
experience,  is  the  one  science  with  which  mind  can 
not  long  dispense.  Least  of  all  can  the  universal  and 
necessary  religious  experience  of  humanity  be  left  as 
a  "  mighty  maze  without  a  plan,"  as  Hume  virtually 
pronounced  it  to  be.  The  science  of  religions  is  the 
appreciative,  intelligent  study  of  all  the  religious  phe- 
nomena in  the  world.  As  comparative  religion  it  has 
as  its  motto  that  he  who  hiows  only  one  religion  knows 
none.  This  science  may  not  yet  be  very  far  advanced ; 
but  its  progress  in  the  making  has  been  very  rapid. 
Facts  thus  gathered,  classified,  and  generalized  then 
demand  interpretation.  What  is  religion  whose  mani- 
festations have  been  thus  systematized  ?  Is  it  an  il- 
lusion, an  excrescence,  or  is  it  a  reality  ?  Can  spirit 
or  intelligence  find  itself  in  it  ?  Thus  the  science  of 
religions  must  be  followed  by  the  science  or  philoso- 
phy of  religion.  On  any  basis  but  that  of  skeptical 
agnosticism  its  reality  must  be  affirmed.  It  is  a  real, 
reciprocal  communion  of  God  and  man.  In  it  the 
seeking  and  finding  each  of  the  other  is  real.  The 
revelation  may  be  slight  and  the  worship  ignorant, 
but  in  their  various  measures  they  are  divinely  and 
humanly  rational  and  real.  This  idea  of  religion,  as 
the  mutual  reconciliation  of  God  and  man,  becomes 
the  very  center  of  all  thought  about  religion.  This 
reconciliation,  the  attainment  of  which  is  found  to  be 
the  motive  in  all  religion,  exists  in  idea  eternally.  The 
logical,  thoughtful  development  of  the  idea  of  relig- 
ion, which  contains  implicit  phases  or  moments  in  its 
process  or  dialectic,  constitutes  the  philosophy  of  re- 


Introductory.  29 

ligion.  This  idea  in  its  eternal  actuality  is,  as  Hegel 
shows  in  Part  III,  only  fully  and  intelligently  stated 
in  the  Christian  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Trinity.  This 
is  from  the  Divine  standpoint.  It  is  the  eternal  pro- 
cess or  history  of  God.  "  God  was  first  known  in  the 
Christian  religion,  and  this  is  the  meaning  of  its  cen- 
tral doctrine  of  the  Trinity."  On  the  other  hand,. is 
the  human  side  of  the  relation — the  idea  as  it  appears 
in  human  history.  This  history  illustrates  the  phases 
or  moments  of  the  process  of  the  idea.  The  science 
of  religions  illustrates,  but  only  inadequately,  the  sci- 
ence or  the  philosophy  of  religion.  It  does  not,  how- 
ever, create  it.  It  is  claimed  by  some  that  the  history 
of  religions  gives  us  the  only  philosophy  of  religion 
that  we  can  have.  This  no  theologian,  much  less 
Hegel,  would  allow.  The  intimate  interrelations 
and  mutual  dependencies  of  the  two  must  be  granted. 
But  this  evolution  in  temporal  history  is  to  be  trans- 
lated into  a  process  of  thought  which  transcends  his- 
tory. The  explication  of  this  process  of  thought  is 
theology  or  the  science  of  religion.  The  religious 
experiences  of  man  while  illustrating,  must  themselves 
be  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  fundamental  idea  of  re- 
ligion. This  furnishes  the  only  adequate  criterion  of 
their  place  in  the  historical  manifestation  of  the  idea ; 
and  this  Hegel  insists  and  shows  is  only  to  be  found 
in  Christianity,  the  absolute  religion — the  irXripcoiJui  or 
fullness  of  the  revelation  o.  the  idea  in  time.  Thus 
the  philosophy  of  religion,  though  it  comes  last  in 
time,  is  prior  in  idea.  It  is  primary,  inspiring,  di- 
rective, and  interpretative,  as  the  plan  is  of  the 
builded  cathedral.  The  other  is  the  objectified,  mani- 
fested, interpreted,  as  well  as  suggestive,  illustrative, 
confirmative,  and  corrective. 


30  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Hegel  is  easily  chief  and  master  in  this  depart- 
ment. But  he  had  his  predecessors,  into  whose  work 
he  entered  to  carry  it  far  toward  completion.  Les- 
sing  may  well  be  called  the  modern  founder  of  the 
philosophy  of  religion.  He  restated  and  reaffirmed 
Clement's  idea  of  revelation  as  a  Divine  education  of 
the  race.  Child  of  the  German  rationalism  as  he  was, 
he  could  not  wholly  free  himself  from  its  shackles. 
From  Lessing  to  Schleiermacher  was  from  rational- 
ism to  faith,  and  on  to  Hegel  went  the  process,  till 
faith,  as  "  abbreviated  knowledge,"  was  made  explicit 
as  thought.  The  idea  which  Lessing  gave  the  thought 
of  his  time  was  forceful  in  freeing  it  from  the  shack- 
les of  both  theological  and  rationalistic  dogmatism. 
It  helped  toward  mental  hospitality  and  philosophical 
comprehension,  inasmuch  as  it  considered  religion 
as  a  whole  process,  and  humanity  as  essentially  relig- 
ious. Still,  as  a  child  of  the  Enlightenment  {Auf- 
klaerung),  he  sought  too  exclusively  for  the  essence  of 
religion  in  morality,  esteeming  dogma,  worship,  and 
church  as  merely  conventional  and  accessory.  He 
failed  to  see  in  them,  as  he  did  see  in  morality,  the 
genuine  outcome  of  the  same  religious  principle. 
This,  too,  was  the  error  in  Kant's  philosophy  of  re- 
ligion. Duty  alone  was  real.  His  Religion  within 
the  Bounds  of  mere  Reason  stripped  religion  of  every- 
thing but  the  bald  ethical.  The  relation  between 
God  and  man  was  that  of  Wordworth's  Duty : 

Stern  daughter  of  the  voice  of  God  ! 

It  was  not  conceived  of  as  broader  or  more  inti- 
mate, more  congenial  or  loving,  than  it  was  under 
the  old  law.  "  Religion  is  the  recognition  of  our 
duties   as  Divine   commands."      But   what   was  his 


Introductory.  3 1 

conception  of  God,  other  than  the  bald  deistic  one 
of  the  current  philosophy  and  theology  as  repre- 
sented by  Wolff  ?  The  abstract  Infinite  of  the  mere 
understanding,  in  no  vital,  necessary  relations  with 
the  finite,  the  God  afar  off,  who  had  none  but  arbi- 
trary mechanical  connection  with  the  world,  was 
rightly  held,  as  Kant  had  proved,  to  be  unknowable, 
with  whom  man  could  have  no  conscious,  real  com- 
munion. The  subjective  Ego  was  the  all  of  knowl- 
edge. The  postulating  of  a  great  First  Cause,  as  a 
Deus  ex  machind,  was  but  an  infirmity  of  reason,  and 
was  only  God  in  name,  an  "  otiose  deity  as  a  more  or 
less  ornamental  appendage  to  the  scheme  of  things." 

The  idea  of  such  a  God,  as  Kant  had  himself  dem- 
onstrated, no  more  proves  his  existence  than  the 
idea  of  a  hundred  dollars  proves  one's  possession  of 
them.  The  analogy  is  perfect,  and  hence  also  the 
demonstration.  There  is  no  more  a  real,  vital,  or- 
ganic, or  kin-connection  between  such  a  God  and 
man  than  there  is  between  dollars  and  one's  pocket. 
Only  if  God  be  a  living  God,  in  organic  relations 
with  his  creatures,  can  he  be  known  or  his  manifes- 
tation be  discerned.  Only  if  man  is  himself  inexpli- 
cable except  as  sharing  the  inspiration  and  life  of  this 
present  God,  has  religion  any  intelligible  reality. 

Schleiermacher,  Herder,  and  Jacobi  lead  in  the 
reaction  from  this  mechanical  deism  and  individual- 
istic morality,  and  in  maintaining  the  validity  of  the 
elements  of  faith,  feeling,  and  the  more  mystical  ele- 
ments of  the  religious  consciousness.  God  again 
became  the  living,  present,  inspiring,  loving  God 
that  religion  demands,  and  the  moral  order  of  the 
world  became  the  Divine  life  on  earth.  Fichte  em- 
phasized the  ethical  element  in  this  present  Divine 


32  Philosophy  of  Religion, 

life  in  which  men  had  a  conscious  part.  Schelling 
saw  God  everywhere  seeking  for  himself  through  all 
the  series  of  intermediaries  from  brute  matter  to 
spiritual  mind.  But  this  became  that  kind  of  mysti- 
cism which  to  intelligence  is  but  a  misty  bridging 
over  of  the  schism  between  God  and  man  that  deism 
had  left  as  its  result.  Thought  still  insisted  upon 
satisfaction.  Intelligence  would  not  leave  the  field 
till  it  found  its  own  larger  self  in  the  consciousness 
man  had  of  communion  with  God.  It  gladly  ac- 
cepted the  advance  made  by  mysticism  upon  deism. 
It  accepted  the  grateful  reality  of  the  reunion  of 
God  with  his  creation  and  creatures.  But  it  de- 
manded that  the  reunion  be  vital  and  organic — a 
logic  of  spirit,  of  intelligence,  which  man's  spirit 
could  know  because  he  was  in  it.  It  demanded  that 
the  felt  communion  be  explicated,  as  far  as  possible, 
as  thought  for  thought. 

Hegel  represented  most  fully  this  demand  of  the 
spirit  for  cognitioii  of  the  content  and  implications  of 
the  religious  consciousness.  Gathering  together  the 
results  of  all  previous  attempts,  he  proceeded  to  an 
exposition  of  the  idea,  as  the  concrete  content  of  all 
the  facts  and  contrasts.  In  the  misty  bridge  of  feel- 
ing and  faith  he  discerned  the  implicit  and  real  logic 
of  spirit  binding  man  and  God  into  an  organic  unity. 
He  attempted  to  translate  feeling  into  the  language 
of  thought  in  order  to  maintain  it  rather  than  to  do 
away  with  it.  He  gave  it  more  than  a  mere  subjec- 
tive basis  which  continually  sinks  the  mind  into  doubt 
and  despair,  or  into  indifferentism.  This  is  really 
the  motive  and  aim  throughout  his  writings.  But  he 
gives  it  technical  treatment  in  volumes  xi  and  xii  of 
his  Werke,  which  contain  Die  Philosophic  der  Religion. 


Introductory.  33 

The  most  important  parts  of  these  volumes  are 
the  Introduction  (Die  Einleitung),  pages  1-85  ;  Part 
First,  treating  of  the  content  of  the  idea,  and  the 
various  phases  of  the  religious  relation  ;  and  Part 
Third,  giving  an  exposition  and  demonstration  of 
Christianity  as  the  absolute  religion.  Part  Second  of 
these  volumes  gives  an  exposition  of  the  various  re- 
ligions of  the  world  as  phases  or  moments  in  the 
struggling  evolution  of  the  idea  till  its  full  final  mani- 
festation in  Christianity.  This  is  the  least  valuable, 
because  the  most  empirical  part  of  the  volumes,  de- 
pending as  it  does  upon  the  fullness  and  correctness 
of  the  current  knowledge  of  these  religions.  More 
knowledge  of  them  may  lead  to  placing  them  in  dif- 
ferent positions  as  illustrating  phases  of  the  develop- 
ment of  the  idea.  Here  it  is  that  the  science  of  re- 
ligions can  correct  the  science  of  religion.  Exactness 
here  is  not  essential,  as  it  is  not  possible  without  fuller 
knowledge.  He  characterizes  the  Chinese  religion 
as  that  of  Measure,  or  temperate  conduct ;  Brahman- 
ism  as  that  of  Phantasy,  or  hiebriate  dream  -  life ; 
Buddhism  as  t\i2it  o{  Self-involvement ;  that  of  Egypt 
as  the  imbruted  religion  of  Enigma,  as  symbolized  by 
the  Sphinx ;  that  of  Greece  as  the  religion  of  Beauty  ; 
the  Jewish  as  that  of  Sublimity ;  and  Christianity  as 
the  absolute  religion,  the  fully  revealed  religion  of 
truth  and  freedom. 

Thus  he  attempted  a  unification  of  all  sides  and 
phases  of  religion,  and  permeated  and  joined  them 
all  by  one  principle  and  one  method,  "  the  method  of 
the  self-explicating  Idea.''  *  Immense  learning,  severe 
scientific   method    in    simple   language,  combine   in 

*  Vol.  i,  p.  59. 


34  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

rearing  this  massive  temple  to  the  indwelling  living 
Deity.  For  throughout  one  feels  the  warm  religious 
emotion  of  one  who  loved  and  worshiped  God.  In  it, 
too,  the  polemical  spirit  burns  like  a  consuming  fire 
against  the  anti-theistic  and  anti-Christian  theories  of 
his  day.  And  none  of  these  called  forth  so  much  of 
his  scathing  criticism  as  the  current  rationalism  in 
theology  and  philosophy.  This  produced  works  simi- 
lar to  those  of  the  English  Deists  and  their  Christian 
opponents  as — e.  g.,  Toland's  Christianity  not  Mysteri- 
ous and  Locke's  Reasonableness  of  Christianity.  Such 
an  "  Age  of  Reason  "  was  more  odious  and  foolish  to 
Hegel  than  to  any  other  devout  defender  of  Chris- 
tianity, and  his  polemic  against  it  is  sufficient  to  de- 
stroy it  forever  in  any  intelligently  religious  mind. 
He  maintained  that  to  know  God  is  eternal  life.  But 
this  know^ledge  of  God  was  not  that  of  either  the 
apologists  or  the  opponents  of  Christianity  in  the 
eighteenth  age  of  reason — not  a  knowledge  of  reasons 
pro  and  con,  but  of  real  vital  experience  of  communion 
with  God. 

I  append  the  following  brief  vocabulary  or  expli- 
cation of  the  most  pregnant  of  Hegel's  key-words : 
"  The  notoriously  troublesome  word  "  Vorstcllung  I 
have  rendered  *'  representation,"  "  figurate  concep- 
tion," and  "  pictorial  thought."  It  means  literally  a 
presentation  or  introduction  which  the  mind  makes 
to  itself  of  absolute  truth  in  terms  of  sense,  under- 
standing, and  imagination.  It  is  /zV/z^r^-thinking,  en- 
visaging the  invisible  in  the  visible.  It  is  metaphor- 
ical, finite  thought.  It  is  the  work  of  philosophy  to 
elicit  the  latent  infinite  thought  out  of  this  form,  to 
translate  Vorstellung  into  Begriff.  I  have  uniformly 
translated  Begriff  hy  "  idea,"  to  distinguish  it  from  Idee 


Introductory.  35 

(Idea).  A  Bcgriff,  "  idea,"  is  literally  a  gripping-  to- 
gether into  unity  the  various  elements  or  members  of 
a  concrete  thought.  It  is  a  comprehension.  Idee  {Idea) 
is  the  Idea  of  all  ideas,  the  ultimate  comprehension 
of  all  unities.  It  is  thought  as  a  totality  or  system. 
It  is  the  A070?  of  all  logics.  It  is  God,  as  Absolute, 
self-conscious,  voluntary  Thought,  vitalizing  and  com- 
prehending all  ideas  {Begriffe). 

The  word  atifheben  has,  as  Hegel  observes  (Logic, 
155),  the  double  signification  of  "  to  destroy  "  and  "  to 
preserve,"  as  the  Gospel  fulfills  the  law.  I  have  ren- 
dered it  variously,  as  abrogate,  fulfill,  annul,  transmute. 
Its  exact  signification  is  to. reduce  to  "  moments."  A 
"  moment "  is  a  constituent  element  or  factor  in  a 
unity.  Its  isolated  reality  is  annulled  by  its  being 
preserved  as  a  dynamic  element  in  a  concrete  unity. 
The  acid  and  base  are  aufgehoben  in  the  salt.  The 
three  Persons  are  moments  in  the  Godhead. 

Vernunft  is  reason  as  speculative,  synoptic,  syn- 
thesizing, the  faculty  of  unity  or  comprehension. 
Verstand  is  reason  as  the  understanding  which  an- 
alyzes, defines,  and  holds  separate  elements  as  ulti- 
mate and  independent  data.  It  is  the  faculty  of  the 
finite.  The  dialectic  is  the  protest  of  thought,  negat- 
ing the  abstract,  partial  conceptions  of  the  under- 
standing. It  is  a  phase  of  reason  rising  on  stepping- 
stones  of  annulled  abstractions  to  fulfilling  concrete 
unity.  All  life  and  thought  and  progress  are  such 
only  in  virtue  of  this  inherent  element  of  the  dialectic. 

Thought  defines ;  but  thought  also  criticises  and 
negates  its  partial  definitions  in  higher  ones.  The 
dialectic  is  the  restless  protesting  element  of  thought 
that  is  ever  restless  till  it  rests  in  the  supreme  con- 
crete unity,  God.  The  whole  of  Chapter  IV  illus- 
5 


36  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

trates  the  dialectic  of  thought  from  the  finite  to  the 
Infinite.  Hegel's  use  of  the  terms  abstract  and  coji- 
crete  is  purely  and  finely  philosophical.  Ordinarily 
the  term  concrete  is  applied  to  something  obvious  to 
the  senses,  found  in  time  and  place,  and  abstract  to 
any  mere  mental  conception.  Hegel  uses  abstract 
for  that  form  of  knowing  which  wrings  a  part  or  ele- 
ment out  of  its  organic  connection  or  relations  of 
thought,  and  concrete  for  that  form  which  grasps  these 
elements  indissolubly  together  in  organic  unity.  Ab- 
stract is  therefore  a  one-sided,  sectarian  view,  and 
concrete  is  catholic,  looking  before  and  after  and  com- 
prehending all  relations  as  elements  of  an  idea  (Be- 
griff).  The  understanding  abstracts,  while  the  reason 
concretes,  gives  a  synoptic  view  of  the  various  inter- 
connected and  interdependent  elements.  Sense  and 
Science  are  abstract ;  philosophy  is  concrete.  More- 
over, it  is  only  in  the  true,  organic,  vital  concrete 
that  genuine  necessity,  Nothwendigkeit,  is  found.  The 
ethical  or  spiritual  alone  gives  the  true  type  of  an 
organism  and  the  true  significance  of  necessity.  In 
such  each  member  is  at  the  same  time  an  end  in  it- 
self and  a  means  to  the  whole,  and  the  whole  realizes 
itself  in  each  member  and  in  the  totality.  Hegel  re- 
fuses to  commit  the  absurdity  of  defining  an  ethical 
by  a  physical  organism.  It  is  only  when  this  is  for- 
gotten that  his  persistent  use  of  the  term  necessity 
seems  to  strangle  freedom.  In  fact,  with  Hegel  "  the 
truth  of  necessity  is  freedom  "  (Logic,  243).  The 
members  of  the  ethical  organism  are  linked  by  spir- 
itual necessity  to  one  another,  so  that  "  if  one  mem- 
ber suffer  all  the  members  suffer  with  it."  Each  is 
not  foreign  to  its  limiting  others.  All  are  elements 
of  a  spiritual  whole,  being  at  home,  realizing  them- 


Introductory.  37 

selves  only  in  and  through  this  necessary  relation 
with  the  others.  This  is  the  Christian  conception 
of  concrete,  spiritually  determined  freedom.  God's 
service  is  perfect  freedom.  All  else  is  spiritual  schism, 
which  is  bondage  to  death  and  the  devil.  The  ab- 
stract sects  of  any  idea,  person,  or  institution  can  only 
be  reconciled  into  their  place  as  moments  of  an  or- 
ganic unity  by  a  process  of  mediation,  Vermittelung. 
ThQ^mmediate  is  the  simple,  sensuous,  undeveloped. 
It  is  the  state  of  nature,  while  the  vicdiated  is  the 
state  of  culture,  of  realized  being,  of  organic  connec- 
tion. Man  is  abstractly  rational,  made  in  the  image 
of  God  ;  but  it  is  only  by  a  process  of  mediation,  of 
culture,  of  discipline,  that  he  becomes  concretely 
such  in  the  ethical  organism  of  the  kingdom  of  God. 
The  absolutely  mediated  is  that  whose  process  of  medi- 
ation is  self-determined,  whose  realization  is  due  to 
the  evolution  of  its  own  forces  through  its  organic 
relations  to  other  elements  and  to  the  whole.  Thus 
the  finding  one's  self  at  home  in  others,  and,  above  all, 
in  God  and  his  kingdom  of  spirits,  is  essential  to  true 
concrete  freedom  and  self-realization.  The  same  is 
true  of  all  thoughts  and  of  all  institutions. 


CHAPTER   III. 

HEGEL'S   INTRODUCTION   TO   HIS    PHILOSOPHY   OF 
RELIGION.'^ 

Hegel  begins  by  asking  what  the  true  conception 
of  religion  is,  which  is  the  object  presented  to  the  phi- 
losophy of  religion.  He  answers  it  immediately  in  a 
passage  which  should  become  classic,  as  commanding 
immediate  and  universal  admiration:  "  It  is  the  realm 
where  all  enigmatical  problems  of  the  world  are 
solved ;  where  all  contradictions  of  deep,  musing 
thought  are  unveiled  and  all  pangs  of  feeling  soothed. 
It  is  the  region  of  eternal  truth,  rest,  and  peace.  .  .  . 
The  whole  manifold  of  human  relations,  activities,  joys, 
everything  that  man  values  and  esteems,  wherein  he 
seeks  his  happiness,  his  glory,  and  his  pride — all  find 
their  final  middle  point  in  religion,  in  the  thought,  con- 
sciousness, and  feeling  of  God.  God  is,  therefore,  the 
beginning  and  the  end  of  everything.  He  is  the  cen- 
ter which  animates,  maintains,  and  inspires  everything. 
By  means  of  religion  man  is  placed  in  relation  to  this 
center,  in  which  all  his  other  relations  converge,  and 
is  elevated  to  the  realm  of  highest  freedom,  which  is 
its  own  end  and  aim.  This  relation  of  freedom  on 
the  side  of  feeling  is  the  joy  which  we  call  beatitude ; 

*  Vorlesungen  ueber  die  Philosophic   der  Religion,  Zwei  Baender, 
herausgegeben  v.  Phil.  Marheineke.     Berlin,  1840. 


Hegel's  Introduction.  39 

.  .  .  On  the  side  of  activity  its  sole  office  is  to  mani- 
fest the  honor  and  to  reveal  the  glory  of  God,  so 
that  man  in  this  relation  is  no  longer  chiefly  con- 
cerned with  himself,  his  own  interests  and  vanity,  but 
rather  with  the  absolute  end  and  aim.  All  nations 
know  that  it  is  in  their  religious  consciousness  that 
they  possess  truth,  and  they  have  always  looked  upon 
religion  as  their  chief  worth,  and  as  the  Sunday  of 
their  lives.  Whatever  causes  us  doubt  and  anxiety, 
all  our  sorrows  and  cares,  all  the  narrow  interests  of 
temporal  life,  we  leave  behind  us  upon  the  sands  of 
time ;  and  as  when  we  are  standing  upon  the  highest 
point  of  a  mountain,  removed  beyond  all  narrow 
earthly  sights,  we  may  quietly  view  all  the  limits  of 
the  landscape  and  the  world,  so  man,  lifted  above  the 
hard  actualities  of  life,  looks  upon  it  as  a  mere  image, 
which  this  pure  region  mirrors  in  the  beams  of  its 
spiritual  sun,  softening  all  its  shades  and  contrasts 
and  lights.  Here  the  dark  shadows  of  life  are  soft- 
ened into  the  image  o£  a  dream  and  transfigured  into 
a  mere  frame  for  the  radiance  of  the  eternal  to  fill. 
.  .  .  This  is  the  general  view,  sentiment,  or  con- 
sciousness of  religion,  whose  nature  it  is  the  object 
of  these  lectures  to  observe,  examine,  and  under- 
stand." *  He  whose  heart  does  not  respond  to  this 
call  away  from  the  finite  world  can  have  no  interest 
in  this  task.  While  it  is  the  purpose  of  philosophy  to 
demonstrate  the  necessity  of  religion  and  to  lead  men 
to  cognize  the  religious  elements  in  themselves,  it 
does  not  propose  to  make  a  man  religious  in  spite  of 
himself.  But  no  man  is  wholly  without  some  rela- 
tion to  this  central  interest  of  humanity.     Religion  is 

*  Philosophic  der  Religion,  vol.  i,  pp.  3-5. 


40  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

essential  to  him  as  a  human  being,  and  not  an  alien 
sensation.  But  the  relation  of  religion  to  man  de- 
pends much  upon  his  general  view  of  the  world  and 
of  life.  These  views  distort  and  tear  away  the  true 
impulse  of  spirit  in  the  direction  of  religion.  The 
philosphy  of  religion  must,  therefore,  first  work  its 
way  through  and  above  all  these  false  views  or  phi- 
losophies of  life.  These  begin  outside  of,  but  by 
their  own  movement  are  brought  into  contact  and 
conflict  with  philosophy. 

I.  ^\\Q.  first  of  these  is  the  separation  of  religion  from 
the  free  worldly  consciousness. 

{a)  Man  has  his  week-days  in  which  he  busies 
himself  with  worldly  affairs ;  his  Sunday  comes  to 
bring  him  into  new  activities.  The  religion  of  the 
truly  pious,  unsophisticated  man  is  not  a  special  mat- 
ter to  him,  but  it  penetrates  with  its  breath  of  flavor 
all  his  feelings  and  activities.  His  consciousness  re- 
lates every  aim  and  object  of  his  daily  life  to  God. 
But  from  this  worldly  side,  vitiation  and  variance 
creep  into  his  religion.     As  Wordsworth  says — 

The  world  is  too  much  with  us  ;  late  and  soon, 
Getting  and  spending,  we  lay  waste  our  powers. 

The  development  of  this  variance  may  be  desig- 
nated as  the  rise  of  the  understanding  ^nd  of  human 
interests.  The  laws,  qualities,  orders,  and  character- 
istics of  natural  things  and  of  the  creations  and  ac- 
tivities of  man  are  inquired  into.  He  is  conscious  of 
himself  as  a  knowing  and  a  creative  agent.  Science, 
art,  politics,  methods  of  making  life  easier  and  culture 
wider,  all  these  come  to  be  looked  upon  as  his  own 
possessions.  And  with  this  comes  the  consciousness 
of  a  separation  from  the  Sunday,  consciousness  of  de- 


HegeVs  Introduction.  41 

pendence  for  everything  upon  a  higher  power.  Self- 
dependence  rises  in  contrast  with  the  spirit  of  humility 
and  dependence.  Still,  man  must  recognize  that  the 
materials  and  means  for  all  this  work  are  givni  to  him. 
The  world  and  his  mind  and  their  powers  are  not  his 
creations.  He  may  and  must  still  confess  that  God 
made  them.  As  the  worldly  consciousness  encroaches 
further,  he  makes  his  peace  with  religion  by  the  gen- 
eral admission  that  God  has  made  all  things. 

{^.)  But  even  where  one  makes  this  assertion  in 
earnest,  as  a  pious  man,  there  is  danger  of  variance 
creeping  in.  Piety  particularizes  and  says  that  God 
made  this  and  this.  Everything  is  considered  as  a 
special  Providence.  Its  view  is  the  teleological  one. 
But  this  again  brings  in  the  use  of  the  understanding, 
which  points  out  as  many  indications  of  defects  and 
of  absence  of  purpose  as  otherwise.  The  most  beau- 
tiful flower  may  be  a  chalice  filled  with  poison.  The 
storm  which  purifies  the  air  may  devastate  the  earth. 
What  is  food  to  one  is  poison  to  another.  The  dis- 
ease is  as  real  as  medicine.  This  external,  physical 
teleology  of  piety  is  weakened  by  the  relative  imper- 
fection of  the  physical  process,  and  by  the  finiteness 
and  separateness  in  which  its  objects  are  viewed.  A 
more  profound  synthesis  of  these  merely  finite  and 
external  ends  or  aims  must  be  made.  The  under- 
standing demands  consistency  and  necessity.  With 
this  the  principle  of  selfhood  develops  completely. 
The  Ego  becomes  the  center  of  relations.  Cognition 
deals  with  these  relations.  It  is  no  longer  sufficient 
to  designate  God  as  the  cause  of  the  thunderbolt,  or 
of  a  political  revolution.  The  immediate  finite  cause 
is  what  is  sought  for.  Thus  our  science  may  formu- 
late a  world  that  does  not  need  God.     This  is  the 


42  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

primary  attitude  of  Positivism,  which  makes  a  breach 
with  all  religion.  Science  and  religion  thus  develop 
into  such  contrast  that  there  seems  to  be  nothing  but 
positive  opposition  and  enmity  possible.  Science  is 
confident  and  proud.  It  knows  that  it  knows,  and 
denies  any  other  than  finite  knowledge.  Religion, 
with  its  earnest  affirmation  that  there  is  a  real  super- 
finite,  that  God  makes  all  things,  is  distrustful  of 
cognition  that  has  formulated  a  world  of  finite  neces- 
sity. And  yet  cognition  can  not  be  bowed  out  of 
the  controversy  nor  its  results  overlooked  and  denied. 
In  the  needed  harmonization,  in  which  God  may  ap- 
pear in  the  world  and  the  world  in  God,  full  satisfac- 
tion must  be  given  to  the  highest  demands  of  cog- 
nition. While  religion  can  not  be  dragged  down  into 
the  realm  of  finitude,  it  must  make  a  wide  enough 
synthesis  to  grasp  all  its  contents. 

The  need  of  this  conciliation  is  more  apparent  in 
the  Christian  religion,  because  cognition  is  an  inher- 
ent element  in  itself.  Christianity  concerns  itself 
with  the  salvation  of  the  individual  from  conscious 
alienation  from  God.  I  am  to  be  saved.  My  own 
freedom  and  happiness  are  an  end  and  aim.  Self- 
hood is  not  lost  in  sacrifice.  But  this  subjectivity, 
this  selfhood  is  in  itself  the  principle  of  cognition. 
This,  however,  again  is  sometimes  made  absolute, 
and  the  contrast  developed  again  within  Christianity 
itself  of  faith  and  cognition.  Hence  the  various  dis- 
cords of  the  day  between  head  and  heart. 

II.  Hegel  then  passes  to  the  question  of  \\^q posi- 
tion of  the  philosphy  of  religion  toward  both  philosophy 
and  religion. 

The  general  relation  of  philosophy  to  religion  is 
that  of  nearest  kinship.     Hegel  never  ceases  to  iden- 


Hegel's  Introduction.  43 

tify  them  in  respect,  at  least  as  to  their  subject-mat- 
ter. While  all  realms  where  thought  is  manifest  are 
the  fields  of  philosphy,  there  is  none  so  congenial  as 
that  of  religion,  because  it  also  is  a  universal,  pene- 
trating and  covering  all  other  realms  like  philosophy. 
"  The  subject  of  religion,  as  well  as  of  philosophy,  is 
the  eternal  truth  in  its  objectivity,  or  God,  nothing 
else  but  God,  and  the  explication  of  his  nature."  * 
Again  :  **  Philosophy  has  for  its  aim  the  cognition  of 
truth,  the  cognition  of  God,  for  he  is  the  absolute 
truth,  in  so  far  that  nothing  else  is  worth  knowing 
compared  with  God  and  his  explication.  Philoso- 
phy cognizes  God  as  essentially  concrete  and  spiritual, 
self-communicating  like  light.  Whoever  says  God 
can  not  be  cognized,  says  that  God  is  envious,  and 
he  can  not  be  in  earnest  in  his  belief,  however  much 
he  may  talk  about  him.  Rationalism,  the  vanity  of 
the  understanding,  is  the  most  violent  opponent  of 
philosophy,  and  is  offended  when  it  demonstrates  the 
presence  of  reason  in  the  Christian  religion ;  when  it 
shows  that  the  witness  of  the  spirit  of  truth  is  de- 
posited in  religion.  In  philosophy,  which  is  theol- 
ogy, the  whole  object  is  to  point  out  the  reason  in 
religion.  In  philosophy,  religion  finds  its  justifica- 
tion from  the  standpoint  of  thinking  consciousness, 
which  unsophisticated  piety  does  not  need  nor  per- 
ceive." f  But  the  faith  of  naive  piety  is  only  abbrevi- 
ated knowledge,  which  philosophy  or  theology  expli- 
cates. Philosophy  is  falsely  charged  with  placing 
Ttself  above  religion,  for  it  has  no  other  content  than 
faith.  It  only  gives  this  content  in  the  form  of  think- 
ing.   Thus  religion  and  philosophy  coalesce,  differing 

*  Philosophic  der  Religion,  vol.  i,  p.  21.  f  Ibid.  vol.  ii,  p.  353. 


44  •  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

only  as  theology  and  religion  do — in  regard  to  their 
mode  of  being  occupied  with  God.  And  in  this  dif- 
ference are  found  all  the  difficulties  which  seem  so 
insuperable. 

Philosophy  takes  religious  ideas  out  of  the  domain 
of  feeling  and  practical  experience,  and  makes  them 
objects  of  thought,  seeks  the  thought  implicit  in  them, 
and  translates  them  into  their  equivalents  in  thought. 
Whatever  is  real  is  rational.  Without  this  principle 
the  cosmos  would  be  chaos.  Religion  is  the  most 
real  concern  of  man.  Without  it  man  would  not  be 
man.  But,  also,  without  thought  man  would  not  be 
man.  And  thought  seeks  its  like  in  all  realms  of  hu- 
man experience.  Religion  can  not,  if  it  would,  sui- 
cidally avoid  the  scrutiny  of  intelligence.  The 
thoughtful  religious  mind  demands  a  rational  expli- 
cation of  the  religious  consciousness.  The  reflective 
thought  of  the  mere  understanding  analyzes  this  into 
contrasts,  oppositions,  antinomies.  Its  rationalism 
dismembers  and  lets  the  life  out  of  all  religion.  But 
this  critical  standpoint  can  never  be  more  than  tem- 
porary with  a  sincere  man  or  age.  The  revolution- 
ary, iconoclastic  rationalism  is  but  the  negative  ele- 
ment that  soon  spurs  the  spirit  on  to  a  larger  horizon 
and  comprehension  of  truth.  Philosophy  must  come 
to  swallow  up  all  such  negative  relations  in  victorious 
unity.  Hence  it  comes  after  the  positive  sciences, 
with  their  negation  of  the  absolute.  Its  duty  is  not 
to  collect,  observe,  and  classify,  but  chiefly  to  inter- 
pret. It  seeks  to  translate  the  religious  phenomena 
of  the  world  into  a  process  of  thought,  logical  and 
rational,  to  give  them  rational  significance  and  sj^s- 
tematic  coherence  and  order.  Speculative  philosophy 
Ts  the  consciousness  of  the  Idea  (Idee),  which  is  the 


HegeVs  Introduction.  45 

concrete  unity  of  all  differences  and  contrasts.  Re- 
ligion also  has  for  its  subject  the  content  of  philosophy 
as  a  whole,  grasped  implicitly  as  a  whole  by  faith  and 
feeling.  Thought  merely  seizes  upon  this  whole,  the 
absolute  truth,  and  brings  out  to  intelligence  all  its 
implicit  contents  and  contrasts. 

The  philosophy  of  religion  starts  with  the  presup- 
position that  religion  and  religious  ideas  can  be  taken 
out  of  the  domain  of  feeling  into  that  of  thought.  It 
is 'simply  a  different  attitude  of  the  human  spirit  to- 
ward the  same  object — God. 

"  What  signifies  the  expression  God  ? "  asks  Hegel 
(vol.  i,  page  26).  For  philosophy  it  signifies  the  na- 
ture of  God  expressed  in  thought — a  logical  or  intel- 
ligently explicated  knowledge  of  him.  For  religion 
it  signifies  an  image-concept,  an  example,  an  illustra- 
tion or  picture  corresponding  to  the  logical  definition 
of  God,  or  to  theology.  Each  answer  implies  and 
contains  the  other.  They  are  but  different  modes  of 
the  occupation  of  the  spirit  with  God.  In  both  it  is 
spirit  finding  spirit  in  mutual  search.  The  philoso- 
phy of  religion  deals  only  with  self-manifesting  spirit 
— finite  and  Infinite.  God  is  not  its  result,  but  its  be- 
ginning. But  spirit  is  rational  in  itself,  and  also  mani- 
fests itself  rationally.  The  philosophy  of  religion 
deals  with  this  immanent,  eternal,  living  rationality 
of  the  absolute  spirit,  and  also  with  its  phenomenal 
manifestations.  It  is  not  merely  our  subjective  rea- 
sonings, the  unvitalized  rationalism  of  the  individual 
finite  understanding,  as  to  the  being  and  nature  of 
God  ;  but  it  is  simply  the  explication  of  the  eternal 
and  phenomenal  process  of  spirit  finding  spirit,  the 
reconciliation  and  vital  relationing  of  God  with  man 
and  man  with  God.     It  apprehends  the  process  of 


46  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

losing  the  negative  rationalism  of  the  individual  and 
the  finding  its  truer  self  in  the  life  and  being  of  God. 
Such,  in  brief  and  imperfect  exposition,  is  Hegel's 
essentially  religious  attitude  in  all  his  thinking.  For 
this  is  always  and  everywhere  an  explication  of  spirit. 
He  might  well  have  exclaimed  with  the  devout 
Kepler,  "  I  read  thy  thoughts  after  thee,  O  God  ! " 
Hegel  next  treats  of  the  relation  of  the  philosophy  of 
religion  to  positive  or  dogmatic  religion.  This  is  em- 
bodied in  the  Creeds  and  in  Systematic  Divinity  as 
based  upon  the  Bible.  In  all  definitions  of  dogma 
reason  forms  an  element.  "  At  first  thinking  was  al- 
lowed to  be  merely  the  exegesis  which  collects  the 
thoughts  of  the  Bible."  But,  as  matter  of  fact,  rea- 
son contains  inherent  principles  and  presuppositions 
which  come  into  play  in  the  work  of  interpretation, 
which  must  be  more  than  mere  verbal  translation, 
substituting  one  word  for  another  of  the  same  scope. 
Explication  and  systematization  must  explain  and  sys- 
tematize in  accordance  with  mental  principles  and 
prejudices. 

Commentaries  on  the  Bible  often  give  us  the  cur- 
rent rather  than  Scriptural  conceptions.  There  is 
some  reason  for  the  couplet : 

This  is  the  book  where  each  his  dogma  seeks, 
And  this  the  book  where  each  his  dogma  finds. 

Exposition  is  often  imposition ;  or,  as  Hegel  ex- 
presses it,  "  the  Bible  has  been  treated  like  a  nose  of 
wax," 

Thus  rationalistic  theology  sprang  up  and  pro- 
ceeded till  it  put  itself  in  opposition  to  the  Bible  and 
to  Church  dogma.  The  mere  understanding  takes 
the  facts  and  doctrines  of  Spirit  in  its  finite  molds 


Hegel's  Introduction.  47 

and  ends  in  annihilating  the  religious  content  and 
completely  impoverishing  Spirit.  This  rationalism 
(Aufklarung)  led  to  the  baldest  deism  and  morality. 
But  Hegel  here,  and  elsewhere  at  greater  length, 
emphatically  renounces  and  controverts  this  ration- 
alism. Its  abstract  metaphysics  of  the  understanding 
analyzes  all  life  out  of  Spirit.  It  separates  God  and 
man.  It  rests  content  with  making  God  the  great 
outside  First  Cause,  an  otiose  Deity,  not  even  so  much 
as  a  Deus  ex  machind,  to  occasionally  interfere  with  his 
foreign,  outcast  cosmos.  But  the  thinking  reason  of 
Spirit  conceives  God  as  essentially  concrete  fullness. 
The  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Trinity  is  absolutely  essen- 
tial to  the  conception  of  God  as  eternal,  living  Spirit. 
(This  assertion  is  maintained  and  fully  developed 
only  in  Part  III  of  the  second  volume.)  The  phi- 
losophy of  religion  is  the  thinking  explication  of  this 
Concrete  Spirit.  It  disdains  the  dusty  road  of  ration- 
alistic theology,  and  can  not  stand  in  the  opposition 
to  Church  dogmas  that  it  does. 

On  the  contrary,  its  kinship  with  positive  doctrine  is 
infinitely  greater  than  appears  at  first  glance,  and  the  re- 
habilitation of  the  dogma  of  the  Church,  after  it  had  been 
reduced  by  the  understanding  to  a  minimum,  is  so  largely 
the  work  of  philosophy  that,  for  this  very  reason — which  is 
its  true  content — it  has  been  decried  as  an  obscuration  of 
spirit  by  a  rationalistic  theology,  which  does  not  rise  above 
the  limits  of  the  understanding.* 

Every  ray  of  light  from  the  Spirit,  indeed,  appears 
as  an  obscuration  to  the  night  of  rationalism.  It 
hates  philosophy  because  it  has  rehabilitated  what 
it  thought  it  had  reduced  to  disjecta  membra.     The 

*  Philosophic  der  Religion,  vol.  i,  p.  33. 


48  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Creed-breaking  age  of  the  rationalism  of  the  under- 
standing is  followed  by  a  Creed-restating  age  of  the 
comprehensive  and  synthetic  reason.  There  can  not 
be  two  kinds  of  reason  and  two  kinds  of  Spirit — 
Divine  and  human — absolutely  different  from  each 
other.  Hence  philosophy  can  not  be  at  variance 
with  religion. 

Spirit,  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  Spirit  of  God,  is  not  a  Spirit 
beyond  the  stars,  beyond  the  world  ;  God  is  present,  omni- 
present, and  as  Spirit  he  is  in  every  spirit.  God  is  a  living 
God,  all  energy  and  action.  Religion  is  a  creation  of  the 
Divine  activity  and  not  the  invention  of  man.  The  expres- 
sion that  God  as  reason  rules  the  world  would  be  sense- 
less did  we  not  assume  that  it  refers  to  religion  also,  and 
that  the  Divine  Spirit  is  active  in  the  determination  and 
formation  of  it.  The  perfection  of  reason  through  thinking 
does  not  stand  in  any  contrast  to  the  Spirit,  and,  therefore, 
it  can  not  absolutely  differ  from  the  work  which  Spirit  has 
produced  in  religion.  The  object  of  reason  is  reason  itself, 
Spirit,  Divine  Spirit.* 

I  have  translated  these  passages  in  full  that  none 
may  doubt  the  earnestness  of  Hegel's  scornful  re- 
pudiation of  the  rationistic  theology.  Theologians 
may  refuse  this  succor,  or  even  take  offense  at  seeing 
their  doctrine  stated  in  terms  of  reason ;  but  when 
once  cognition  has  arisen,  its  rights  can  not  be 
withheld.  It  will  either  stop  in  the  Dead  Sea  of 
rationalism  or  lead  on  to  the  Mediterranean  of  phi- 
losophy. Hegel  found,  in  his  day,  many  tendencies 
and  principles,  both  religious  and  rationalistic,  that 
were  hostile  to  philosophy's  taking  religion  for  the 
subject  of  its  investigation.      He,  therefore,  briefly 

*  Philosophic  der  Religion,  vol.  i,  p.  34. 


HegeVs  Introduction.  49 

considers  these  hostile  principles,  claiming  to  find  in 
them  all,  or  in  their  comprehension,  the  historical 
element  out  of  which  the  perfect  philosophical  think- 
ing has  developed  itself.  He  finds  in  his  day  that 
men's  minds  are  so  occupied  with  the  knowledge  of 
finite,  secular  things,  that  knowledge  of  Divinity  has 
but  little  real  interest  for  them.  The  unbounded 
growth  of  the  sciences  has  quenched  the  nobler  long- 
ing to  search  after  the  knowledge  of  God,  has  prac- 
tically rendered  us  securi  adversus  Deiwi.  But  in 
reality  none  of  these  things  are  worth  knowing  if 
God  be  not  knowable.  Our  vanity  is  really  our 
degradation.  Even  theologians  are  found  who  aid 
in  this  most  unchristian  view  of  the  unknowableness 
of  God. 

1.  There  is  great  indifTerence  to  Church  dogmas. 
Their  significance  is  minimized  or  ignored.  Many 
fail  to  attach  proper  importance  to  the  dogmas  of 
the  Trinity,  of  the  Resurrection,  and  to  miracles. 
Not  only  rationalism,  but  even  pious  theologians, 
reduce  the  doctrine  of  the  Divinity  of  Christ  to  its 
lowest  significance.  The  current  religious  literature 
fully  discloses  this  indifference  to  orthodox  dogma. 
Philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  is  attempting  to  reach 
a  comprehension  and  a  higher  appreciation  of  these 
Church  dogmas,  and  thus  to  replace  them  in  their 
true  value. 

2.  Again,  this  depreciated  value  of  dogmas  is 
shown  by  the  historical  method  of  treating  them.  The 
interest  is  not  in  their  truth,  but  in  their  historical 
origin  and  growth.  These  theologians,  whether  be- 
longing to  the  historical  school  or  to  that  of  tradi- 
tion, are  "  like  clerks  of  some  mercantile  house,  who 
keep  account  only  of  somebody  else's  wealth  without 


50  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

having  any  property  of  their  own  ;  it  is  true  they 
receive  a  salary ;  but  their  sole  merit  is,  that  they 
serve  in  recording  the  wealth  of  others.  .  .  .  They 
know  as  little  of  God  as  the  blind  man  knows  of  the 
picture  whose  frame  he  has  felt.  All  they  know  is, 
how  a  certain  dogma  was  framed  by  this  or  that 
Council,  what  reasons  the  framers  advanced,  and 
how  the  one  view  or  the  other  predominated."  * 
But  they  lack  the  one  thing  needful,  the  main  point 
in  both  philosophy  and  religion — the  entering  of  the 
mind  into  a  direct  communication  with  the  highest 
interests. 

3.  Again,  the  theory  of  immediate  or  intuitive 
knowledge  of  God  arises  to  rebuff  philosophic  intel- 
ligence in  the  sphere  of  religion.  Faith,  feeling,  the 
testimony  of  the  Spirit  to  each  soul,  is  claimed  to  be 
the  highest  possible  experience.  This  is  much  more 
congenial  to  philosophy  than  the  other  two  attitudes. 
It  is  really  the  first  stage  of  philosophic  knowing, 
which  only  goes  on  to  see  and  to  comprehend  what 
is  implied  in  this  direct  personal  knowledge  of  God. 

Hegel  makes  a  fuller  examination  and  criticism  of 
these  hostile  and  yet  helpful  principles  in  Part  I  of 
his  work — The  Idea  or  Conception  of  Religion. 

Before  entering  upon  this,  however,  he  states 
briefly  the  objections  to  any  philosophy  of  religion. 
Is  a  rational  knowledge  of  religion  possible  ?  Is  not 
reason  quite  presumptuous  in  attempting  this  task  ? 
Some  object  to  its  competency  to  deal  with  religion 
as  a  kind  of  truth  that  has  been  authoritatively  re- 
vealed ;  but  if  religion  is  real  and  cognition  an  essen- 
tial part  of  man,  then  they  can  not  be  kept  separate 

*  Philosophic  der  Religion,  vol.  i,  p.  42. 


HegeVs  Introduction.  51 

except  by  doing  violence  to  one  or  the  other  as  both 
rationalism  and  Romanism  do.  Others  deny  the 
competency  of  reason  to  attain  knowledge  of  any- 
thing but  finite  phenomena,  as  positivism  and  agnos- 
ticism. Others  maintain  that  the  only  religious  ex- 
perience possible  is  in  the  realm  of  feeling — of  the 
accidental  feeling  of  individual  subjectivity.  This 
leads  to  the  denial  of  God's  objectivity  and  finally  to 
atheism.  Each  man's  God  is  the  product  of  his  own 
feeling,  which  may  be  held  to  be  either  psychological 
or  even  physiological.  The  so-called  Left-wing  He- 
gelians, Feuerbach  and  Bruno  Bauer,  gave  this  athe- 
istic and  materialistic  interpretation  to  religion.  It 
need  scarcely  be  said  that  Hegel  would  not  consider 
them  worthy  of  any  sane  man's  belief. 

But  how  do  we  know  that  reason  is  competent 
to  deal  with  religion  ?  A  criticism  of  the  organ  of 
knowledge  is  still  insisted  upon.  This  was  the  futile 
task  of  Kant's  Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason,  for  this 
criticism  must  ever  be  done  with  the  instrument  un- 
der criticism.  Reason  alone  can  examine  reason, 
which  presupposes,  what  it  tries  to  prove,  its  capacity 
and  its  rationality.  It  is  the  futile  task  of  learning  to 
swim  before  going  into  water.  Its  capacity  can  only 
be  proved  in  its  use.  It  is  often,  too,  the  suicidal 
task  of  sawing  off  the  limb  which  bears  one  up.  As 
a  matter  of  fact  reason  is  the  organ  and  reason  is  also 
the  object  of  thought.  Whatever  is  real  is  rational  and 
whatever  is  rational  is  real.  In  religion  as  in  other 
realities  reason  only  finds  itself,  its  other,  larger,  truer 
complementary  self.  Philosophy  as  well  as  the  finite 
sciences,  has  real  subject-matter— reason,  spirit,  God 
— and  a  competent  organ  of  knowledge.  God  is  not 
to  be  demonstrated  as  an  external,  alien  object,  but 


52  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

he  is  felt,  found,  and  followed  in  all  rational  activity 
of  spirit.  He  is  not  proved  or  known  by  anything 
foreign  to  his  own  being.  He  reveals  himself  in 
thought  and  to  thought.  A  philosophy  of  religion 
is  simply  the  tracing  the  process  of  thought  in  the 
relation  of  finite  spirit  to  its  congenial  infinite  spirit, 
the  Father — a  process  which  is  implicit  in  religious 
feelings,  activities,  and  worship.  It  only  presupposes 
that  religion  is  not  a  chaos,  a  chance  irrational  realm, 
but  a  realm  of  reason,  of  spirit.  It  is  this  rationality 
of  the  real  that  binds  God  and  man  in  no  merely 
arbitrary  or  accidental  relations.  Kinship  is  every- 
where present.  The  old  metaphysical  distinction  of 
the  abstract  infinite  which  made  only  a  deistic  theol- 
ogy possible  is  replaced  by  the  true  concrete  Infinite, 
which  is  the  organic,  vital  correlation  of  spirit.  The 
rigid  opposition  and  alienation  of  Infinite  and  finite, 
of  God  and  man,  is  the  false  assumption  that  makes  a 
philosophy  of  religion  or  any  philosophy  or  cosmical 
comprehension  impossible.  The  fundamental  notion 
that  makes  any  philosophy  possible  is  the  fact  of  the 
genuine  concrete  Infinite,  which  makes  the  whole 
earth  kin  and  binds  it  with  chains  of  gold  to  the 
head  and  heart  as  well  as  to  the  feet  of  God.  This 
unity  of  correlatives,  as  of  parent  and  child,  is  the 
true  starting-point,  the  goal  and  also  the  guiding 
thread  of  method  in  explication  of  which  Hegel  is 
always  engaged,  but  in  no  place  in  such  profound 
and  convincing  way  as  in  his  Philosophic  der  Re- 
ligion. 

Hegel  concludes  his  Introduction  by  giving  a 
classification  of  the  whole  subject.  We  at  once  note 
the  triplicity  that  characterizes  all  his  works — A,  B, 
C;  a,  b,  c;  a,  ^,  7;  I,  II,  III ;  i,  2,  3,  form  the  ap- 


Hegel's  Introduction.  53 

parently  mechanical  and  arbitrary  divisions  which 
everywhere  meet  the  eye. 

But  with  Hegel  this  results  naturally  from  his 
method — that  of  the  self-explication  or  self-unfolding 
of  the  idea  or  comprehensive  concept  of  religion. 
This  manifests  itself  primarily  in  its  universality  ;  sec- 
ondarily, in  its  particularity  or  differentiation ;  third- 
ly, in  the  ripe  and  rich  individuality,  or  synthesis  of 
the  unity  and  difference — the  U.  P.  I.  of  formal  logic. 

"  This  is  the  rhythm,  the  pure  eternal  life  of  spirit 
itself,  without  which  it  would  be  a  corpse.  It  be- 
longs to  the  spirit  to  manifest  itself  as  its  own  object. 
But  at  this  standpoint  it  is  merely  finite.  Its  third 
phase  is  where  it  finds  its  own  self  in  this  objectivity, 
becomes  at-one  with  it,  and  thereby  attains  its  free- 
dom. For  freedom  is  this  being  at  home  in  what  once 
seemed  foreign." 

I.  The  general  idea  or  conception  of  religion  in 
its  universality,  as  faith  and  cultus. 

II.  The  various  pre-Christian  religions,  regarded 
as  specializations  or  particular  forms  of  the  general 
conception. 

III.  Christianity  as  revealed,  or  absolute  religion, 
the  full  adequate  realization  of  the  conception  of  re- 
ligion. 

I.  The  general  conception,  or  idea  of  religion,  is 
not  abstract  and  contentless  like  the  general  concepts 
of  formal  logic  and  unphilosophical  sciences.  It 
contains  the  whole  nature  of  the  subject,  as  the  seed 
contains  the  trunk  and  branches,  the  sap,  flower,  and 
fruit  of  the  tree,  but  not  in  such  a  way  that  one  can 
see  them  through  a  microscope,  before  their  actual 
evolution  from  the  seed. 

I.  The  phase  of  universality  \^  a  phase  of  thinking. 


54  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Religion  may  have  its  historical  starting-point  in  the 
sensuous  and  finite,  but  thought  is  always  at  work 
upon  this  crude  form,  interpreting  into  some  intelli- 
gible form.  It  is  not  merely  emotional.  God  is  not 
the  highest  feeling  but  the  highest  thought,  and  to 
this  all  true  religion  leads  us.  Even  among  men  the 
highest  spiritual  relationship  can  not  exist  without 
intellectual  culture. 

2.  But  when  this  universal  idea  proceeds  to  self- 
specification,  as  it  does  in  the  subjective  conscious- 
ness of  the  individual,  the  phase  of  contradiction  ap- 
pears. The  thought  and  the  thinker  are  two  com- 
batants. I  think  the  universal,  the  absolute,  and  yet 
I  am  the  finite  and  empirical ;  I  am  the  middle  term 
of  the  syllogism,  containing  only  the  characteristics 
of  the  two  extremes.  I  am  thus  not  merely  one  of 
the  two  struggling  elements,  but  I  am  the  struggle 
itself  (Romans  vii,  15). 

This  relation  of  opposing  elements  passes  through 
the  forms  of  (i)  Feeling,  (2)  Sense-perception,  and  (3) 
Representation  or  pictorial  thought,  till  pure  thought 
is  reached,  where  the  religious  consciousness  will  com- 
prehend itself  in  its  fully  explicated  conception  or 
idea.  Thus  the  content  of  religion  may,  for  different 
persons,  or  for  the  same  person  at  different  times,  be 
either  felt  or  imagined  or  thought. 

3.  From  this  standpoint  of  God  and  man  the  pri- 
mary religious  relation  is  that  of  fear  toward  an  ab- 
solute, awful,  arbitrary  power.  Some  have  main- 
tained that  all  religion  thus  originated  in  fear. 

Primus  in  orbe  deos  fecit  timer. 

But  fear  separates.  One  flees  from  what  he  fears. 
Religion  has  to  unite.     Hence  this  standpoint  must 


Hegel's  Introductio7i  55 

be  overcome,  and  man  recognize  his  true  essence  to 
be  in  God.  He  must  come  to  recognize  himself  as 
made  in  God's  image,  the  child  of  God.  The  pro- 
cess of  this  reconciliation  constitutes  the  phase  of 
cultus  or  worship.  The  ciiltiis  embraces  the  whole 
internal  and  external  activity  which  has  for  its  object 
the  bringing  about  this  at-one-ment,  this  transforma- 
tion of  fear  into  love.  It  is  too  often  used  with  refer- 
ence merely  to  the  outward  and  visible  part,  not  lay- 
ing sufficient  stress  upon  the  inward  and  spiritual 
activity  of  the  soul  with  God.  But  the  Christian 
cultics  embraces  not  only  sacraments,  rites,  and  cere- 
monies, but  also  the  inward  history  of  the  "  way  of 
salvation  "  that  repentance,  conversion,  regeneration, 
and  sanctification,  which  can  only  take  place  within 
the  soul  under  God's  grace. 

In  this  true  cicltus  lies  the  real  reconciliation  of 
the  £wo  conceptions  of  God,  as  transcendent  and  im- 
manent. When  God  is  recognized  as  without  and 
above,  as  an  object  of  consciousness  among  other  ob- 
jects, there  can  be  no  real  reconciliation  in  works  of 
external  worship — in  lip,  knee,  and  hand  service. 
But  when  the  Divine  is  recognized  within  the  soul, 
as  an  act  of  self-consciousness,  there  is  no  reconcilia- 
tion to  be  effected,  and  quietism  displaces  all  cultus. 
Hegel  notes  especially  the  barrenness  of  cultus  re- 
sulting from  the  merely  immanent  conception  of 
God.  Without  the  transcendent  relation  of  God  and 
our  consequently  obligatory  relation  to  him,  all 
cultus  shrinks  into  mere  subjective  emotions  and 
sentiments.  "  The  cultus  contains  as  essential  ele- 
ments the  actions,  the  enjoyments,  the  assurances, 
the  confirmations  and  attestation  of  a  Supreme  Be- 
ing.    But  these  can  have  no  place  if  the  objective 


56  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

and  obligatory  element  is  lacking  in  them.  For  this 
would  cut  off  progress  of  consciousness  to  objective 
knowledge,  and  likewise  progress  from  subjective 
emotion  to  action.  Each  of  these  is  most  intimately 
connected  with  the  other.  Man's  idea  of  his  obliga- 
tion in  regard  to  God  depends  upon  his  conception 
of  God ;  his  self-consciousness  corresponds  to  his 
consciousness.  Neither  can  he  conceive  of  any  defi- 
nite, obligatory  action  in  regard  to  God,  if  he  has  no 
knowledge  or  definite  conception  of  him  as  an  ob- 
jective existence.  Only  when  religion  becomes  a 
real  relation,  and  contains  the  difference  of  conscious- 
ness can  the  cultus  assume  its  true  form  and  become 
a  living  process  in  the  annulment  of  the  difference. 
But  this  movement  of  the  cultus  is  not  limited  to  this 
inwardness  in  which  consciousness  frees  itself  from 
its  finitude  and  becomes  consciousness  of  its  essence. 
In  this,  the  subject  knowing  himself  to  be  in  God, 
enters  the  source  of  his  life.  But  cultus  is  not  merely 
internal.  Its  infinite  life  begins  to  develop  in  an  ex- 
ternal direction  also ;  for  the  individual's  life  in  the 
world  has  the  substantial  social  consciousness  for  his 
basis.  Just  how  he  will  determine  his  aims  in  life 
depends  on  the  consciousness  of  its  essential  truth. 
It  is  on  this  side  that  religion  reflects  itself  in  world- 
ly affairs,  and  the  knowledge  of  the  world  makes  its 
appearance.  This  entrance  into  the  real  world  is 
essential  to  religion,  where  it  appears  in  the  form  of 
social  morality  "  (p.  70). 

The  cultus,  therefore,  generally  speaking,  is  the 
eternal  process  of  the  subject  positing  itself  as  identi- 
cal with  its  essence.  God  becomes  his  God.  The 
transcendent  object  of  consciousness  becomes  the 
immanent  self-consciousness.     The  reconciliation  of 


Hegel's  Introduction.  57 

the  two  conceptions  of  God,  however,  is  only  reached 
in  cultus  as  a  process  of  presupposed  unity  of  differ- 
entiation and  of  reconciliation. 

The  Incarnation,  the  unity  of  God  and  man  as  an 
external  fact,  represents  the  unity.  This  essential 
element  of  religion  is  found  in  some  distorted  form 
in  all  religions.  So,  also,  is  the  estrangement  of  man 
from  God,  the  Christian  doctrine  of  sin  being  its 
profoundest  form.  But  this  evil  is  seen  to  be  foreign 
and  hostile  to  me.  O  wretched  man  !  none  can  de- 
liver from  the  body  of  this  death  but  God,  through 
Jesus  Christ,  who  is  the  perfect  man.  So  we  finally 
come  to  fully  and  freely  "  delight  in  the  law  of  the 
Lord,"  as  our  own  law.  And  thus  the  transcendent 
God  becomes  immanent ;  from  being  merely  an  ob- 
ject of  Consciousness,  he  becomes  our  perfect  Self- 
Consciousness. 

II,  Positive  {pre-Christian)  Religions. — The  whole  of 
Part  I  is  devoted  to  the  discussion  of  the  above  given 
phases  of  religion  in  its  universal  idea.  But  this  uni- 
versal is  now  to  unfold,  to  particularize  itself,  to  posit 
its  elements  of  differentiation.  The  idea  exists  only 
as  activity.  Religion  can  not  exist  as  mere  idea.  It 
becomes  self-explicating,  self-actualizing  in  the  sphere 
of  human  consciousness.  This  is  the  material  in 
which  the  idea  realizes  itself.  The  seed  bursts  forth 
into  differences.  This  is  only  a  mid-station  to  the 
end.  It  is  not  the  end  any  more  than  the  child  is  the 
man.  Now,  these  mid-stations  of  the  self-explicating 
idea  form  the  various  positive  or  pre-Christian  re- 
ligions. These,  indeed,  are  not  true  religion,  revealed 
religion,  our  religion.  But  they  are  all  contained  in 
ours,  because  they  are  essential,  though  subordinate 
stages,  in  the  whole  process  toward  fully  revealed 


58  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

religion.  They  are  not,  and  they  are,  foreign  ele- 
ments. In  their  historical  aspects,  as  actual  religions 
of  men,  claiming  to  be  true,  they  are  false,  and  pre- 
sent most  uncongenial  and  irreligious  aspects.  But, 
so  far  as  they  represent  phases  of  the  idea,  moments 
in  its  process  toward  perfect  self-realization,  they  are 
neither  foreign  nor  false.  Isolated  they  are  false, 
made  elements  of  the  concrete  truth  they  are  not. 
"  These  phases,  in  their  lower  forms,  appear  as  fore- 
bodings or  superstitions  which  grow  by  accident, 
like  flowers  and  other  forms  of  nature."  And  yet 
even  here  there  is  an  underworking  of  some  essential 
phase  of  the  idea  of  religion  itself.  Thus  the  thought 
of  incarnation  is  found  in  every  religion,  however 
far  it  may  be  below  the  Christian  conception.  These 
religions  often  give  a  most  distorted  and  whimsical 
conception  of  God  and  his  worship.  But  it  is  wrong 
to  see  nothing  in  them  but  superstition  and  fraud,  or 
to  content  ourselves  with  a  mere  natural  history  sort 
of  a  study  of  them.  We  must  seek  their  meaning, 
interpret  them,  find  the  rational  element  in  them. 
They  also  were  fellow  human  beings  who  conceived 
and  believed  these  religions.  Nothing  human  is 
without  some  shade  of  reason.  And  what  is  human 
and  rational  in  them  is  ours,  though  only  an  inferior 
and  passing  phase  of  our  higher  conception.  This 
does  not  imply  a  justification  of  their  horrible  and 
absurd  parts ;  but  it  does  imply  that  they  all  are  his- 
torical manifestations  (with  all  the  misrepresentation 
that  this  implies)  of  various  phases  of  the  idea  on  its 
way  to  the  goal  of  adequate  manifestation  or  per- 
fected self-consciousness.  The  philosophical  contem- 
plation of  these  religions  thus  differs  from  the  his- 
torical.    The  one  considers  them  from  the  point  of 


Hegel's  hitroduction,  59 

view  of  the  perfect  idea  of  religion,  while  the  other 
studies  only  their  accidental  external  forms.  Both 
profess  to  study  only  that  which  is — the  one  what  is 
rationally,  the  other  what  is  temporally  and  acci- 
dentally. In  order  to  study  them  in  the  higher  way, 
in  the  light  of  the  idea  of  religion,  we  ask  of  each  re- 
ligion (i)  what  is  its  conception  of  God,  and  (2)  how 
does  this  conception  affect  the  worshiper's  concep- 
tion of  himself  ?  The  conception  may  be  lofty  enough 
to  beget  the  conception  of  his  own  imperishable  na- 
ture. Thus,  the  conception  of  the  soul's  immortality 
enters  into  the  history  of  religion  as  an  essential  ele- 
ment. 

The  conception  of  God  gives  the  basis  for  a  classi- 
fication of  these  religions,  which  we  give  in  full  in 
Chapter  VII.  We  note  here  only  the  three  main 
divisions:  i.  Nature  Religions.  2.  Religions  in  which 
spiritual  individuality  asserts  itself.  3.  Religions  of 
free  personality. 

III.  Revealed  or  Manifest  Religion. — The  process  of 
the  idea  is  not  an  aimless,  endless  one.  "  It  is  neces- 
sarily implied  in  the  idea  of  religion,  that  spirit  must 
here  as  elsewhere  run  its  course.  It  is  really  spirit 
in  so  far  as  it  exists  through  negating  (swallowing, 
digesting,  and  assimilating)  all  finite  forms  of  itself, 
thus  becoming  the  real  concrete  or  absolute." 

The  characteristics  of  the  idea  as  actualized  in  the 
various  pre-Christian  religions  are  seen  to  be  self- 
characterizations  of  the  idea.  These  partial  reflec- 
tions, false  by  themselves,  are  then  taken  up  by  the 
return  movement  of  the  idea  upon  itself.  Its  own 
content  thus  becomes  adequate  to  itself ;  and  this 
constitutes  revealed  or  realized  religion,  in  which 
God  is  manifest.  This  is  the  absolute  religion,  or 
7 


6o  Philosophy  of  Religion, 

Christianity.  Christianity  is  the  realized  fulfillment 
of  all  preceding  religions,  but  not  merely  the  sum 
and  result  of  them.  Nor  is  it,  like  them,  temporary 
and  finite.  It  does  not  pass  over  into  another,  for  it 
is  ultimate,  the  perfect  realization  of  the  idea  of  re- 
ligion. It  reveals  the  intrinsic  unity  of  the  Divine 
and  human  nature.  This  is  the  ne  plus  ultra  of  re- 
ligion. At  first  there  was  a  veil  over  religion,  and  it 
did  not  appear  in  its  truth.  In  due  time  religion  ap- 
peared unveiled.  This  was  not  an  accidental  or  arbi- 
trary time,  but  a  time  fixed  in  the  essential  and  eternal 
counsel  of  God,  chosen  by  eternal  reason  and  wis- 
dom. It  is  this  idea  of  religion  itself,  the  Divine  idea, 
the  Idea  of  God  himself,  which  has  thus  specified 
itself  in  this  course  of  development  toward  its  own 
ultimate  realization. 

"  This  course  of  religion  is  its  true  theodicy.  It 
displays  all  the  productions  of  the  Spirit  and  every 
form  of  its  self-cognition  as  necessary — necessary,  that 
is,  because  spirit  is  that  living,  active  impulse  which 
attains  self-consciousness  or  self-realization  as  medi- 
ated by  the  series  of  its  own  self-posited  differen- 
tiations. Such  self-knowledge  is  absolute  truth."  * 
He  elsewhere  explicates  the  absolute  religion  as  :  *'  {ci) 
The  Revealed  Religion.  (<^)  The  positive  or  externally 
revealed  religion,  which  seeking  and  finding  and  re- 
alizing man,  becomes  {c)  the  Religion  of  truth  and 
freedom."  f 

*  Page  84.  f  Vol.  ii,  p.  ig2. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

THE  VITAL  IDEA  (BEGRIFF)   OF   RELIGION.* 

Proper  exposition  demands  amplification.  Am- 
plification means  addition  as  well  as  subtraction  from 
the  text.  In  this  chapter  I  add  much  and  subtract 
more.  I  merely  follow  the  outline  given  by  Hegel, 
and  do  not  misrepresent  his  thought.  I  develop 
the  inferences  and  implications  suggested  to  my 
mind,  rather  than  give  a  direct  exposition  of  the 
text.  If  it  is  not  Hegel's  Philosophy  of  Religion,  it 
is  Hegelian  in  method  and  spirit. 

Hegel  begins  this  part  of  the  work  with  the 
question,  "  What  is  our  starting-point,  and  how  have 
we  won  it  ?  " 

In  the  work  of  the  Logic,  God  the  Absolute 
Idea,  the  v6r](n<i  i/o/fo-eo)?,  the  Categories  of  categories, 
is  found  to  be  the  ultimate  reality,  the  thought  which 
alone  has  being  in  itself,  and  which  imparts  what- 
ever measure  of  thought  and  being  that  all  else  has 
to  it.  This  is  the  ripe,  concrete  result  of  the  Logic, 
or  philosophy  proper.  The  Philosophy  of  Religion 
is  a  part  of  a  system.  In  his  Encyclopaedia  of  the 
Philosophical  Sciences  Hegel  includes  the  whole  in 
three  main  divisions:  i.  Logic,  or  the  Science  of 
the  Idea ;    2,  the  philosophy  of  nature ;  and,    3,  the 

*  Hegel's  Religions-Philosophic,  I,  Part  First,  pp.  87-252. 


62  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

philosophy  of  spirit.  The  first,  as  we  have  said, 
might  better  be  called  metaphysics  ;  the  third  in- 
cludes psychology  and  anthropology,  the  philoso- 
phy of  the  state,  and  the  philosophy  of  Absolute 
Spirit.  This  last  comprises  a  brief  outline  of  the 
philosophy  of  art,  the  philosophy  of  revealed  re- 
ligion, and  philosophy  proper.  All  these  lead  to 
the  fuller  comprehension  of  absolute  spirit.  All  are 
but  parts  of  the  one  stupendous  whole  of  this  reality, 
which  is  Thought,  Idea,  Spirit,  God.  Thus  his  sys- 
tem is  encyclopedic,  aiming  at  the  rational  compre- 
hension and  synthesis  of  the  totality  of  being.  It  is 
an  attempt  to  unveil  what  is  the  rational  or  real  being 
of  the  universe,  which  is  Thought — not  our  subjective 
thought  but  that  Thought  or  Logos,  which  is  the  life 
and  substance  of  all  phenomenal  being.  God  reveals 
himself,  i,  In  the  logical  idea;  2,  in  nature;  and,  3, 
in  mind.  It  is  the  same  manifestation  in  different 
phases,  and  at  different  stages  of  the  process.  In 
the  Logic  the  various  succeeding  categories  of 
thought  are  all  relative  and  progressively  more 
adequate  definitions  of  God.  The  logical  Idea  in  its 
completed  development  may  indeed  be  called  but  a 
phantom  Deity.  So  may  all  theology.  Both  are 
but  descriptions  of  the  only  reality,  and  yet  both  are 
revelations  of  this  reality  to  our  thinking.  But  this 
"  unearthly  ballet  of  bloodless  categories "  of  the 
Logic  freely  goes  forth  from  itself  as  NATURE  *  and 
becomes  truly  incarnate  in  man  as  SPIRIT,  the  cul- 
mination and  the  interpretation  as  well  as  the  inter- 
preter of  Nature. 

I  have  never  read  Hegel's  Philosophie  der  Natur, 

*  Cf.  last  paragraph  of  the  Logic. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  63 

the  most  severely  critcised  of  all  his  works.  The 
spirit  is  too  adumbrated  there  for  it  to  be  thoroughly 
and  congenially  studied.  But  when  he  comes  to  the 
interpreter  of  nature,  to  the  study  of  mind  or  spirit, 
he  traces  with  glad  heart  and  mind  the  very  linea- 
ments of  Him  in  whose  image  man  is  made.  Novalis 
said  that  "  Nature  is  a  kind  of  illuminated  table  of 
contents  of  the  spirit."  Hegel  would  rather  apply 
tliis~to^  man.  That  which  could  only  be  spelled  out 
with  difficulty  in  nature  he  could  read  while  running 
in  the  mind  of  man,  and  rise  in  rapid  flight,  rather 
than  on  stepping-stones  into  the  world  of  intelli- 
gible reality.  Nature  is  to  be  studied  as  the  cradle 
of  man,  but  his  social  and  intellectual  relations  are 
more  truly  formative  of  him.  And  it  is  in  the  study 
of  mind  in  these  its  own  works — the  state,  art,  and 
religion — that  Hegel  is  peculiarily  great  and  convin- 
cing. These  are  objective  to  man ;  these  are  the  work 
of  the  Spirit  in  different  grades  of  its  manifestation. 
The  science  of  man  is  "  writ  large  "  in  human  his- 
tory, in  man  objective  in  all  his  institutions  of  family, 
states  and  church,  in  his  systems  of  art,  religion, 
and  science.  Humanity  is  man.  But  humanity,  as  a 
merely  empirical  existence,  is  not  "  the  measure  of 
the  stature  of  the  fullness  "  of  perfect  man.  "  Groan- 
ing and  travailing,"  he  yet  lives  and  moves  and  has 
his  being  in  God  ;  and  the  goal  of  all  his  history  is 
union  with  God — resemblance  to  God.  God  is  the 
beginning  and  the  goal  of  man  as  spirit.  Religion 
is  the  sphere  of  man's  activity  where  the  process 
toward  this  goal  is  a  present,  though  progressively 
more  adequately  realized,  enjoyment.  Hence  the 
Philosophy  of  Religion,  or  the  thoughtful  compre- 
hension of  the  mutual  relations  of  man  and  God,  as 


64  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

implicit  in  all  religion  and  as  fully  revealed  in  the 
Christian  religion,  is  of  the  highest  and  most  vital 
interest. 

A.  Concerning  God. 

In  a  philosophy  of  religion  we  can  not  begin  with 
the  full  and  scientifically  adequate  conception  of  God 
attained  in  philosophy. 

We  have  to  begin  with  the  conception  of  God 
which  is  present  in  the  ordinary  religious  conscious- 
ness, and  develop  the  presuppositions  and  conse- 
quences of  this  ordinary  conception  to  the  philosoph- 
ical one. 

We  know  God  and  that  he  is.  We  know  that 
he  is  the  creator  of  heaven  and  earth.  We  know 
and  believe  in  our  hearts  that  God  is  absolute  Truth 
and  absolute  Being  upon  whom  all  else  depends;  but 
this  conception  is  comparatively  abstract  and  unsci- 
entific. It  is  the  object  of  the  philosophy  of  religion 
not  to  merely  explain  it  in  its  own  terms  and  concep- 
tions, but  in  those  of  speculative  thought.  It  is  to 
translate  the  same  content  from  the  form  of  repre- 
sentation or  figurate  thought  into  the  form  of  the 
idea  *  which  holds  all  the  elements  of  religion  in  ne- 
cessary and  vital  relation  as  a  body  does  all  its  mem- 
bers. There  is  a  reputed  saying  of  Hegel,  legendary 
for  aught  I  know,  yet  essentially  genuine,  that  think- 
ing is  real  worship — das  Denken  ist  auch  wahrer  Got- 
tesdienst.  This  is  as  pregnant  and  practical  as  the 
classic  "  lahorare  est  orare,"  and  this  is  the  divine  serv- 
ice that  Hegel  proposes  to  render  in  his  work  on  the 
Philosophy  of  Religion.      In  being  thus  related  to 

*  Cf.  last  part  of  Chapter  II. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  65 

God  in  thinking,  man  is  as  truly  worshiping  as  if  he 
were  praying  or  laboring. 

To  say  that  God  is  Absolute  is  not  to  unveil  him 
to  thought.  When  we  add  that  he  is  the  Absolute 
Substance  and  all  else  phenomenal  and  relative,  we 
do  not  get  further  than  the  pantheism  of  Spinoza.  It 
is  not  till  we  have  seen  him  as  Subject  or  Spirit  that 
we  know  Him.  Substance  must  be  seen  translating 
itself  into  Subject  both  in  religion  and  in  philosophy. 
But  even  this  definition  of  God  as  Subject  or  Spirit 
may  be  held  in  the  lifeless  abstract  way  of  deistic 
conception.  It  must  be  seen  revealing,  manifesting 
itself,  as  self-imparting  love  rather  than  as  self-with- 
holding jealousy.  This  conception  is  directly  given, 
externally  revealed,  in  Christianity.  Philosophy 
studies  this  religion  in  order  to  reach  the  same  result, 
a  last  which  is  really  first  and  concomitant  in  all 
thinking. 

But  as  religious  we  begin  with  this  conception  in 
us.  But  where  in  us  is  it  ?  In  what  form  of  our 
subjective  consciousness  does  this  religious  appre- 
hension of  God  as  Spirit  take  place  ?  We  ourselves 
as  spirits  are  a  complex  of  feeling,  imagination,  faith, 
and  thought.  In  which  form  do  we  have  this  con- 
viction that  God  is  Spirit?  Where  in  us  is  God  at 
home?  We  say  that  he  is  omnipresent,  but  we  final- 
ly determine  that  it  is  chiefly  in  thought  that  he  ap- 
pears to  us  an  Absolute  ;  and  here  absolute  Substance 
precedes,  in  our  apprehension  of  God,  absolute  Spirit. 
God  is  universal  Substance,  yet  probably  no  religion 
or  philosophy  ever  held  the  vulgar  conception  of 
pantheism  which  makes  God  to  be  simply  the  sum 
total  of  all  things.  The  conception  is  rather  of  an 
unrelated   nature  or  essence   that  endures   forever, 


66  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

while  all  things  else  are  but  the  most  evanescent  and 
contingent  manifestations  of  some  of  the  most  remote 
of  its  attributes.  Hence,  Hegel  says,*  *'  Spinoza  can 
be  better  termed  an  a-cosmist  than  an  atheist."  God 
as  absolute  substance  is  forever,  while  the  world  is 
not,  except  as  the  transient  shadow  of  this  reality. 

Spinozism  may  be  termed  the  philosophy  of  ab- 
stract identity,  having  no  essential  characteristics  or 
attributes.  But  the  whole  of  philosophy  is  nothing 
but  the  study  of  the  specific  forms  or  characteristics 
of  the  TO  Trap  (or  rather,  according  to  Hegel,  of  the 
o  eU).  The  philosophy  of  religion  exhibits  a  series  of 
increasingly  adequate  determinations  of  the  essential 
attributes  of  God  through  substance  up  to  spirit. 
This  divine  universal  or  spirit  in  uncharacterized 
form  imparts  himself  to  our  consciousness,  and  re- 
ligion begins  with  God  as  an  object  of  consciousness. 

B.    T/ie  Religions  Relation. 

Religion  is  itself  a  relation,  a  living  and  true  con- 
nection of  God  and  man.  It  is  the  work  of  philoso- 
phy to  show  the  necessity  of  this  religious  relation.  It 
must  be  seen  to  be  not  accidental  and  transient,  the 
result  of  fear,  priestcraft,  or  illusion,  but  a  very  ne- 
cessity of  man  as  spirit  to  thus  relate  himself  to  God 
as  well  as  essential  on  God's  side  to  thus  relate  him- 
self to  man. 

The  necessity  of  religion,  say  some,  needs  no 
other  proof  than  its  universality  ;  but  all  men  are  not 
religious  even  if  you  include  the  lowest  forms  of  su- 
perstition. Well,  says  another,  its  necessity  is  evi- 
dent from   its  being  essential   to  the  founding  and 

*  Hegel's  Logic,  p.  237. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religio^i.  67 

maintaining  of  states  and  all  forms  of  social  life  and 
morality.  Plutarch  is  quoted  as  giving  best  expres- 
sion to  this  political  necessity  of  having  some  re- 
ligion in  every  state.  But  no  such  merely  external 
necessity  or  expediency  can  long  maintain  any  re- 
ligion. It  ceases  to  be  useful  as  soon  as  it  is  seen  to 
be  merely  useful.  Many  radical  socialists  believe  that 
it  has  thus  been  used  to  keep  the  poorer  classes  in 
subjection ;  that  bills  upon  heaven  have  thus  been  ex- 
changed for  the  labor  of  the  poor.  Hence  they  urge 
the  necessity  of  destroying  all  religion.  Meantime 
their  too  often  just  iconoclasm  springs  itself  from  im- 
plicit religious  feeling.  Religion  is  necessary  to  the 
well-being  of  any  society  because  it  is  intrinsically 
necessary,  involved  in  the  very  nature  of  man,  as  pro- 
gressivel}^  realizing  his  manhood  in  the  image  of 
God. 

I.  The  Necessity  of  the  Religious  Standpoint. — Relig- 
ion is  not  merely  instinctive,  but  is  the  result  of  a 
process  of  mediation.  Beginning  life  with  relation  to 
finite  things  of  time  and  sense,  the  human  spirit  forces 
itself  above  this  point  of  view,  and  thinks  of  the 
great  invisible  beyond.  Visible  things  are  temporal, 
there  must  be  an  eternal ;  our  life  is  but  a  vapor,  there 
must  be  everlasting  substance.  No  mere  process, 
from  one  finite  thing  to  another  larger  one,  satisfies 
this  movement  of  the  spirit.  The  most  universal 
conception  of  a  finite  cosmos  that  can  be  framed  by 
scientist  or  philosopher  can  not  long  arrest  this  ne- 
cessary movement  of  the  spirit  to  the  infinite  and 
eternal,  as  the  real  ground  of  every  cosmos.  In  noth- 
ing short  of  this  can  the  spirit  of  man  come  to  real 
self-consciousness.  Epicurus  and  his  modern  follow- 
ers can  give  no  larger  conception  than  that  of  cosmos 


68  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

cycling  back  to  chaos.  It  is  in  new  form  the  old 
myth  of  Saturn  creating  and  devouring  his  own 
children  and  then  devouring  himself.  Modern  sci- 
ence to-day,  in  its  non-theistic  form,  is  Saturn  creat- 
ing. It  may  seem  to  be  optimistic.  But  its  logical 
creed  ends  in  chaos  whence  it  started,  and  pessimism 
is  its  last  word.  Schopenhauer  and  Von  Hartmann 
are  the  real  philosophers  of  all  atheistic  science. 
Every  doctrine,  every  formula  of  the  universe  that 
does  not  rest  on  the  idea  of  system-making  Logos  or 
Spirit,  has  implicitly  chaos  and  pessimism  at  the  core. 
But  if  its  gods  have  gone  away,  they  must  return  to 
save  it  from  destruction.  Religion  is  necessary  even 
to  science.  The  undevout  astronomer  is  mad, 'and 
his  music  of  the  spheres  will  soon  pass  into  wails  of 
so  many  lost  Pleiades,  unless,  like  Kepler,  he  reads 
God's  thoughts  after  Him.  No  mind  to-day  will 
stop  with  mere  atoms.  Some  little  of  the  Logos  or 
system  or  thought  is  seen  by  all.  Mere  matter  is  no 
longer  mindless  matter.  In  the  chaotic  flux  of  sepa- 
rate atoms  there  is  some  relating,  comparing,  synthe- 
sizing power  seen  at  work.  Evolution  is  itself  the 
partially  revealed  Logos,  Ldea,  Spirit,  God.  It  is  in- 
volved in  matter  and  not  the  evolution  of  mere  crass, 
mindless,  world-stuff.  The  mind,  in  science,  refuses 
to  stop  with  the  actuality  of  finite  things.  It  neces- 
sarily rises  to  the  point  of  view  of  their  ideality,  in 
which  their  actuality  becomes  a  mere  moment  or 
constituent  element.  Actual  things  are  separate  and 
independent.  Idealization  sees  them  not  only  con- 
nected and  related,  but  organically  related — deprived 
of  independent  existence,  depending  upon  each  other 
and  upon  the  whole  for  their  being.  Thus,  the  egg 
in  its  ideality  is  a  chicken.     Man  is  man,  only  as  a 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  69 

member  of  the  family,  the  state,  and  the  church.  In 
this  process  the  finite,  separate  existence  dies  to  self, 
to  live  a  more  realized  self  in  the  larger  whole.  Its 
reality  is  that  of  a  moment,  or  a  constituent  element 
in  the  larger  unity.  It  is  abrogated,  destroyed,  and 
in  the  same  process  restored  and  enlarged.  Such  is 
the  double  significance  of  the  favorite  word  aiifge- 
hobcn  of  Hegel.  The  act  of  consciousness  affords  the 
simplest  illustration  of  this  ideality.  There  are,  at 
first,  two  separate  things — the  ego  and  the  non-ego  ; 
but  consciousness  grasps  them  both  in  its  unity  with- 
out destroying  either.  They  both  become  constitu- 
ent elements  of  knowledge.  Its  larger  illustration  is 
seen  in  our  apprehension  of  nature  and  spirit.  They 
are  different,  and  yet  they  are  identical  in  their  es- 
sence. Thus  far  much  of  the  current  agnosticism 
will  go.  It  is  intellectually  forced  to  posit  a  com- 
mon substratum — a  great  unknown,  one  from  which 
all  spring  and  in  which  all  are  identical.  This 
may  be  the  formless  substance  of  Spinoza,  or  the 
blank,  cold,  abstract  absolute  of  Schelling.  All  have 
got  beyond  calling  this  substratum  mere  matter, 
and  making  mind  a  mere  function  of  it.  Matter  has 
been  spiritualized  and  defined  ultimately  as  unknow- 
able force.     This  is  the  latest  idol  created. 

But  beyond  this  subjective  necessity  which  forces 
all  thinkers  to  some  substratum,  in  which  nature  and 
spirit  are  sublimated,  it  must  be  shown  objectively 
that  they  sublimate  themselves  from  mere  finitude  in 
the  religious  relation.  Science  itself  rises  clear  out 
of  materialism.  In  its  categories  of  causality,  force, 
order,  law,  mind  casts  phenomena  into  category  after 
category  of  thought,  including  the  higher  ones  reached 
by  science,  and  still  is  forced  on  till  that  of  self-con- 


yo  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

scions  spirit  is  reached  as  the  ultimate.     No  finite  or 
mechanical,  chemical,  or  even  vital  relations  of  things 
are  adequate  to  contain  nature.     Spirit  alone  is  ulti- 
mately seen  to  be  its  causal  and  sustaining  truth. 
This  is  the  only  vocation  of  nature — to  be  offered  up  as 
a  burnt-offering,  that  out  of  it  may  spring  forth  Psyche. 
But  such  a  Psyche  is  not,  at  first,  a  real  spirit.     In 
Nature  spirit  is,  as  it  were,  inebriate,  or  in  a  dream- 
life.     Spirit  is   only   implicit   in   nature,  in   man   it 
comes  to  consciousness.     At  first  it  is  as  finite  spirit. 
But  we  are  forced  by  an  irresfstible  self-necessity  to 
rise  above  all  finite  spirit,  even  above  humanity — to 
spirit  absolute  and  universal — in  which  all  finite  spirit 
lives  and  moves  and  has  its  being.     Spirit  faids  itself 
in  Nature,  which  at  first  sight  seems  to  limit  and  en- 
slave.    Man  becomes  the  interpreter  of  it,  and  it  be- 
comes his  servant.     He  is  also  born  into  a  limiting 
world  of  social  relations.     At  first  sight  he  may  seem 
to  be  the  passive  creation  and  tool  of  heredity  and  of 
domestic,  social,  and  national  influences.     But  it  is 
in  and  by  means  of  these  that  he  first  finds  himself, 
comes  to  himself,  realizes  himself.     "  They   are   an- 
other which  is  not  another  " — foreign,  yet  not  hostile. 
Abstracted  from  them  he  is  not  truly  man,  but  only 
an  amputated  fragment.     All  these  relations  are  ne- 
cessary parts  of  the   man  himself.     As  he  lives  in 
them  he  realizes  himself.     Thus  it  was  that  old  Rome 
realized    herself.      Her    god    Terminus   was    elastic 
enough  to  include  and  transform  all  hostes  into  cives 
siii,  and  she  became  imperial  mistress  of  the  world. 
In  its  largest  definition  this  limiting  social  environ- 
ment is  what  Hegel  calls  "  the  moral  {sittliche)  world  " 
— the  state.      Citizen  of   no  petty  state,  but  of  the 
world — cosmopolitan — is  the  highest  point  in  which 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religioiu  ji 

spirit,  as  finite,  can  find  its  freedom  and  realize  itself. 
Spirit  only  lives  and  grows  in  this  social  medium. 
In  it  man  finds  his  freedom,  and  lives  a  human,  ra- 
tional, and  spiritual  life.  Without  this  he  would  be 
a  naked  waif,  a  native  Simeon  Stylites,  a  nonentity. 
Unus  homo,  nullus  Jwmo.  Without  society  no  persons. 
Isolation  impoverishes,  society  develops  and  enriches 
the  individual.  From  the  individualistic  standpoint 
all  social  customs  and  institutions  are  limits  to  free- 
dom. Rousseau  voiced  this  individualism  in  the 
eighteenth  century.  The  savage  is  the  only  freeman. 
Carlyle  fairly  shouted  it  out  on  the  transcendental 
ke}^  while  all  the  world  wondered.  But  that  phase 
is  passed  or  passing.  Egoism,  individualism  is  seen 
to  be  morbid  selfishness  and  self-destruction.  We 
are  bound  on  a  voyage  of  discovery  to  find  ourselves 
in  everything  foreign.  All  things  are  ours.  Noth- 
ing human  is  longer  alien  to  us.  We  love  ourselves 
trul}'  in  loving  others,  thus  loving  ourselves  into  new 
and  fuller  life.  The  famih',  the  state,  art,  religion, 
and  philosophy  are  not  only  our  clothing,  but  ver}- 
bone  of  our  bone,  and  flesh  of  our  flesh,  and  spirit  of 
our  spirit.  No  one  has  ever  done  as  much  as  Hegel  to 
emphasize  and  manifest  this  true  freedom  in  bounds, 
the  freedom  of  apparent  necessity ;  and  to  protest 
against  the  one-sided  subjective  freedom  of  sheer 
individualism.  His  ethics  are  entirel}"  social.  The 
Philosophy  of  the  State  (Philosophic  des  Rechts)  is 
his  only  work  on  moral  philosophy.  He  treats  the 
famil)^  as  the  instinctive  realization  of  the  moral  life ; 
and  the  state,  in  its  larger  sense,  as  the  very  con- 
summation of  man  as  man.  He  restored  the  Greek 
ideal  of  the  moral  life — enlarged,  enriched,  and  ful- 
filled by  the  Christian  ideal.     The  upward  impulse  of 


72  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

transcending  spirit,  its  inherent  necessity  to  pass  be- 
yond the  finite,  will  not  stop  short  of  the  Christian 
ideal  of  man  complete  only  in  God.  Social  limitation 
after  social  limitation  may  be  transformed  into  con- 
stituent elements  of  concrete  freedom,  even  to  the 
highest  type  of  genuine  humanitarianism — and  yet  the 
spirit  wings  its  flight  into  the  beyond.  We  approxi- 
mate more  and  more  to  our  real,  full  life,  without  at- 
taining. The  goal  flies  before  us.  The  last  words  of 
Schiller's  Pilgrim  expresses  this  experience : 

Und  das  Dort  ist  niemals  hier. 

Inadequacy  is  yet  present  with  us.  Necessity 
forces  us  on  panting  after  "  more  life  and  fuller." 
Man  is  yet  finite — only  relatively  complete  in  these 
social  relations.  Even  in  the  highest  form  of  human- 
ity, in  universal  history,  the  spirit  groans  after  fuller 
life,  only  finding  its  goal  in  Spirit  universal  and  abso- 
lute, in  which  all  finite  spirit  exists.  And  it  is  here 
that  Hegel  finds  the  necessity  of  religion — the  ne- 
cessity in  man  to  transcend  all  that  is  finite  and  rela- 
tive, and  to  rise  into  communion  with  God.  The 
beyond  that  must  be  the  here  is  the  world  of  Absolute 
Spirit.  It  is  a  present  Spirit  or  Intelligence,  mediat- 
ing itself  to  man  through  nature,  art,  religion,  and 
philosophy. 

In  art  this  relation  of  human  to  absolute  Spirit 
appears  in  the  form  of  sensuous  perception,  in  philos- 
ophy in  the  form  of  thought,  and  in  religion  in  the 
form  of  feeling  and  of  representative  or  pictorial 
conception.  This  relation  seems  most  immediate 
and  real  in  religion.  In  it  God  is  omnipresent,  and 
nature  and  humanity  are  seen  sub  specie  cBteriiitatis. 

But  this  necessity  of  religion,  or  of  the  religious 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  ']Ty 

point  of  view,  is  deducible  not  only  from  the  world 
of  finite  nature  and  mind,*  it  is  also  deducible  from 
the  very  idea  of  religion  itself,  proceeds  necessarily 
from  the  all-embracing  unity,  is  an  essential  element 
of  the  Divine  Spirit  itself.  But  this  can  only  be  seen 
after  an  examination  of  the  religious  consciousness. 

II.  Forms  of  the  Religious  Consciousness. — Religion 
is  never  merely  intellectual.  Consciousness  of  God, 
or  religious  certitude,  at  first  seems  to  be  an  immedi- 
ate relation  between  the  soul  and  God.  We  are  as 
sure  of  God  as  we  are  of  our  own  selves.  It  is  more 
true  to  say  that  in  suppressing  this  consciousness  of 
God  we  extinguish  ourselves,  than  to  say  that  in  de- 
stroying ourselves  we  extinguish  God.  But  perfect 
certitude  of  a  thing  does  not  prove  its  truth.  We 
say  that  we  believe,  and  do  not  know ;  but  faith  is 
itself  a  kind  of  knowledge,  often  an  implicit  knowl- 
edge of  the  most  fundamental  and  essential  elements 
of  our  moral  and  intellectual  nature.  In  this  way  it 
is  equivalent  to  Reason.  We  believe,  saj's  Jacobi, 
that  we  have  bodies ;  we  do  not  know  it.  We  be- 
lieve that  God  exists ;  we  do  not  know  it.  We  can 
fully  sympathize  with  this  reaction  against  the  nega- 
tive results  of  Kant's  criticism  of  the  arguments  for 
the  existence  of  God.  We  can  say  with  Jacobi  that 
Philosophy  can  not  give  us  God,  freedom,  or  immor- 


*  Prof.  T.  H.  Green,  in  his  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  has  made  this  de- 
duction in  most  admirable  and  philosophic  form.  The  metaphysics  of 
Nature  as  well  as  of  man,  mental  and  moral — that  is,  their  implicit  con- 
ditions, the  total  environment  which  their  existence  presupposes,  that 
which  is  immanent  in,  back  of  and  sustaining  Nature  and  man — their 
only  adequate  metaphysics  is  that  Eternal  Spirit,  or  Self-consciousness, 
"  with  whom  the  human  spirit  is  identical  in  the  sense  that  he  is  all 
which  the  human  spirit  is  capable  of  becoming." 


74  Philosophy  of  Religiori. 

tality,  if,  like  him,  we  restrict  knowledge  to  the 
sphere  of  the  understanding,  and  regard  Spinoza's  as 
the  only  consistent  scheme  of  Philosophy.  Call  it 
faith  or  reason,  or  what  you  will,  the  human  Spirit  is 
not  thus  impotent  to  rise  beyond  the  finite,  the  neces- 
sitated, and  the  temporal.  It  will  break  out  in  forms 
of  theosophy  or  mysticism,  or  zealous  fanaticism — 
in  some  way  it  will  protest  against  the  limits  placed 
to  human  vision  by  Kant,  Hamilton,  Mansel,  and  the 
"  whole  cloud  of  witnesses "  that  they  may  cite  to 
prove  their  agnostic  philosophy.  The  last  and  high- 
est consecration  of  all  true  religion  must  be  an  altar 
— ur^vtiidTa  ©eft) — to  the  unknown  and  unknowable 
God,"  says  Hamilton.  St.  Paul  says,  "  I  know  him 
whom  I  have  believed."  St.  John  says,  "  We  Jmoio 
that  we  know  him  " ;  and  the  world  of  thinkers  as 
well  as  the  world  of  plain,  honest  men  holds  with  St. 
Paul  and  St.  John.  Innumerable  expressions  appar- 
ently the  most  contradictory  might  be  adduced  as  to 
the  relation  between  faith  and  knowledge,  all  which 
would  need  such  sifting  as  we  can  not  find  place  for 
here.  It  opens  up  the  whole  question  between  gnos- 
ticism and  agnosticism — the  most  vital  philosophic 
question  of  the  day.  Hegel's  whole  life-work  was  to 
maintain  the  power  and  worth  of  human  cognition. 
With  agnosticism  he  had  less  patience  than  with 
mysticism.  The  one  utterly  saps  the  vitality  of 
thought,  the  other  only  floods  it  with  more  sap  than 
it  has  channels  prepared  to  receive.  The  one  denies 
that  we  can  know  any  reality,  and  affirms  that  all 
that  we  can  ever  see  is  our  own  shadow ;  that  our 
knowledge  is  strictly  conditioned  to  the  prison  walls 
of  our  own  senses,  and  conceptions,  and  ideas.  We 
know  less  of  realities  than  Plato's  cave-men.     Hegel 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  75 

maintained  the  validity  of  human  knowledge  ;  that 
our  faculties  give  us  truth ;  that  there  is  a  genuine 
kinship  between  thought  and  being ;  and  that,  wing 
our  flight  where  we  may  in  the  universe,  we  shall 
always  find  ourselves  at  home,  because  we  shall  al- 
ways find  intelligence  everywhere.  But  Hegel  has 
been  accused  of  such  gnosticismx  as  would  imply  his 
own  personal  omniscience.  Because  he  maintains 
the  validity  of  our  thought,  and  the  ultimate  identity 
of  perfect  thought  and  being  ;  because  he  refuses  to 
believe  in  a  Ding  an  sick  God  who  always  plays  hide- 
and-seek  in  vain  with  children  made  in  his  own  im- 
age, he  has  been  most  foolishly,  and  sometimes  even 
savagely,  denounced  as  impious.  But  the  thinker 
who  maintains  such  gnosticism  as  belongs  only  to 
the  piercing  eyes  of  God  has  never  yet  been  admitted 
to  the  circle  of  philosophic  thinkers.  Hegel  un- 
doubtedly uses  expressions  as  to  the  comprehension 
of  thought  that  might,  though  only  arbitrarily,  be 
interpreted  as  the  height  of  human  arrogance.  Per- 
fect knowledge  of  a  perfect  world — no !  he  did  not 
make  this  insane  claim  for  human  thought ;  but  he 
did  claim  the  power  of  human  thought  to  know  re- 
ality. He  did  maintain  that  thought  is  the  ultimate 
reality,  that  thought  is  things,  and  things  are  thought ; 
that  God  is  the  highest  Thought,  and  that  we  can 
know  him  through  thought.  Prof.  T.  H.  Green  re- 
alized the  criticism  which  Hegel's  Absolute  Idealism 
is  exposed  to.  Holding  to  absolute  Idealism  himself, 
maintaining  that  there  is  nothing  intrinsically  un- 
knowable to  us  in  the  universe  or  in  God  himself, 
he  yet  thinks  that  Hegel  often  states  his  philosophy 
in  a  form  that  affronts  the  common-sense  conviction 
of  reality.     Thus,  he  says  that,  while  God  is  in  us, 


76  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

is  our  self,  we  are  so  conditioned  that  we  can  not 
grasp  the  whole  as  God  sees  it.  Language  which 
seems  to  imply  such  identification  of  our  thought 
with  God,  or  with  the  world  of  spiritual  reality,  can 
lead  to  nothing  but  confusion.  But  he  adds  this  ap- 
preciative criticism  :  "  That  there  is  one  spiritual 
self-conscious  Being,  of  which  all  that  is  real  is  the 
activity  or  expression  ;  that  we  are  related  to  this 
spiritual  Being,  not  merely  as  parts  of  the  world 
which  is  its  expression,  but  as  partakers  in  some  in- 
choate measure  of  the  self- consciousness  through 
which  it  at  once  constitutes  and  distinguishes  itself 
from  the  world ;  that  this  participation  is  the  source 
of  morality  and  religion ;  this  we  take  to  be  the  vital 
truth  which  Hegel  had  to  teach."  *  He  says  further 
in  regard  to  Hegel's  philosophy :  "  It  may  be  doubted 
whether  it  has  thoroughly  satisfied  even  those  among 
us  who  regard  it  as  the  last  word  of  philosophy  ; 
yet,  when  we  think  out  the  problem  left  by  previous 
inquirers,  we  find  ourselves  led  to  it  by  an  intellectual 
necessity  y 

It  is  because  our  experience  is  a  member  or  ele- 
ment of  a  living,  organic  totality  that  we  may  read 
in  it  the  principle  and  nature  of  the  whole.  This  may 
be  in  the  form  of  faith,  or  "  abbreviated  knowledge," 
or  the  apprehension  of  the  essential  principle,  while 
"  knowledge  "  may  be  restricted  to  the  expansion,  to 
the  worked-out  details,  relations,  and  applications. 
There  is  no  complete,  mechanical  separation  between 
human  and  divine  intelligence,  but  the  most  congenial, 
consubstantial  connection.  Now  "  I  know,"  though 
only  in  part.    When  my  union  with  the  Divine  Spirit 

*  Works  of  T.  H.  Green,  vol.  iii,  p.  146. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.'  J  J 

becomes  perfect,  "  then  shall  I  know  even  also  as  I 
am  known."  More  than  something  like  this  I  can  not 
possibly  attribute  to  Hegel ;  less  than  this  I  should 
wish  no  one  to  believe. 

Religion  on  its  phenomenal  side  certainly  does 
not  start  with  knowledge  in  any  technical  sense  of 
the  word,  yet  its  most  subjective  form  is  not  devoid 
of  some  element  of  intelligence.  The  one  who  has 
God  in  the  form  of  feeling  or  of  pictorial  conceptions 
is  yet  a  knowing,  thinking  man  ;  and  man  is  not  such 
a  bundle  of  side-by-side  faculties  as  the  old  abstract 
psychology  affirmed.  Feeling,  and  willing,  and  know- 
ing are  in  reciprocal  and  organic  union  in  man.  The 
self-conscious  Ego,  the  intelligent  subject  is  present 
in  and  through  them  all,  distinguishing  man's  desires 
and  feelings  from  those  of  mere  animals.  Thus,  in 
examining  the  nature  of  the  religious  consciousness, 
or  in  tracing  the  elevation  of  the  human  spirit  from 
earth  to  heaven,  from  self  to  God,  we  find  three 
closely  interrelated  forms — feeling,  representation,  and 
thonght — which  are  the  forms  of  the  ascending  spiral. 

I.  The  most  immediate  form  in  which  the  certi- 
tude of  God  appears  is  that  of  emotion  or  feeling. 
Thus  it  is  said  that  we  know  God  immediately,  in- 
tuitively, in  the  heart ;  that  our  feeling,  rather  than 
our  reason,  is  the  ground  of  our  certitude. 

Take  first  the  assertion  that  we  know  God  only 
intuitively.  It  is  the  word  only  that  renders  the 
statement  false.  This  intuitionism  is  often  the  creed 
of  despair  in  philosophy  as  well  as  in  religion.  The 
criticism  of  the  understanding  has  destroyed  the  fair 
unity  of  our  religious,  ethical,  and  philiosophical  con- 
ceptions. Our  old  gods  are  apparently  slain,  yet  we 
can  not  but  believe  them  still  living.     Granted  that 


78  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

we  can  not  prove,  but  rather  destroy  proof  of  them 
by  reasoning,  then  we  have  this  last  resort,  to  deny 
the  jurisdiction  of  reason  in  these  provinces.  We 
have  "  innate  ideas,"  "  intuitive  principles  of  moral- 
ity," "  immediate  knowledge  of  God."  We  do  not 
find  God  at  the  end  of  any  syllogism.  Nor  do  the  best 
instruments  of  science  find  him  for  us  in  Nature.  The 
absolute  infallibility  of  the  Bible  and  Church  has  been 
rudely  shattered,  and  yet  we  do  have  absolute  and 
immediate  religious  certitude.  God  is  nearer  us 
than  even  we  ourselves  are.  The  noisy  chatter  of 
the  critical  schools,  the  logomachies  of  theologians 
and  philosophers,  the  agnosticism  of  science,  make 
us  martyrs  of  both  despair  and  disgust.  We  soar 
above  them  all  to  the  mount  of  transfiguration, 
where  God  and  spiritual  realities  warm  us  into  the 
spirit  of  rapt  devotion,  and  give  us  that  absolute 
conviction  that  is  essential  to  our  very  being.  How 
often  has  the  reasoning  of  the  friends  as  well  as  of 
the  foes  of  Christianity  thus  driven  the  best  spirits  to 
claim  higher,  firmer  grounds  of  faith  in  intuition.  Ja- 
co\i\  s  faith,  Neander's  Pectus  est  quod  theologiuvifacit, 
the  oversold  of  the  transcendentalists,  and  the  unut- 
terable vision  of  saints  and  mystics,  all  are  valid  wit- 
nesses at  least  against  the  adequacy  and  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  mere  understanding  in  the  apprehension  of 
spiritual  realities.  Take  the  so-called  "  Evidences  of 
Christianity"  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  who  does 
not  sympathize  with  Coleridge  when  he  exclaims 
against  such  evidences — "  Evidences  of  Christianity,  I 
am  weary  of  the  word ! "  The  eighteenth  century 
was  pre-eminently  rationalistic.  The  supremacy  of 
reason  was  acknowledged  by  all.  It  was  proposed 
to  defend  Christianity  by  proving  its  reasonableness. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  79 

One  should  only  believe  what  he  can  prove.  And 
so  the  manufacture  of  reasons  for  believing  Chris- 
tianity went  on  till  but  few  of  the  manufacturers  or 
their  customers  had  any  vital  faith  left,  and  the  Evan- 
gelical school  and  Methodism,  with  all  their  lack  of 
reason  and  abundance  of  feeling,  brought  about  a 
real  revival  of  religion.  The  more  Christianity  was 
proved,  the  less  it  was  believed.  Who  cares  for  a 
revival  of  another  such  "  age  of  reason  "  ?  Who 
longs  for  a  return  of  such  rational  evidences  of  the 
faith  ?  What  faith  can  be  vital  that  is  grounded  on 
such  intellectual  evidences?  Such  reasoning  was 
most  subjective,  mechanical,  artificial,  sophistical, 
and  at  the  highest  merely  logical.  Reason  meant  the 
understanding,  conditioned  by  sense,  and  not  the  vital 
reason  that  sees  the  whole  complex  of  man's  being 
and  environment,  and  takes  true  and  comprehensive 
views  of  them.  The  "  age  of  reason  "  would  better 
be  styled  the  age  of  "  reasons,"  of  any  and  of  all 
kinds  of  arguments  pro  and  con.  A  new  objection 
to  Christianity  was  sprung  by  some  pre-Huxley  free 
lance,  and  the  defenders  of  the  faith  said,  "  Well,  now, 
that  is  a  pretty  hard  blow,  and  we  must  consider 
how  we  can  weaken  its  effect " — that  is,  ^\nq  some 
accidental,  special-pleading  reasoning,  paying  him 
back  in  his  own  coin.  Such  reasoning  is  almost 
sure  to  become  sophistry  and  lead  to  inventing 
evidences  where  there  are  none,  and  of  telling  lies 
for  God.  Some  ground  or  reason  may  be  given  for 
everything  under  the  heavens.  But,  as  Hegel  says, 
"  To  be  confined  within  the  range  of  mere  grounds, 
is  the  principle  and  position  of  the  Sophists."  *  They 

*  Ilcgel's  Logic,  p.  ig6. 


8o  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

brought  forward  various  points  of  view  or  grounds, 
or  reasons,  without  confessing  that  these  grounds 
were  themselves  ungrounded  or  without  necessary 
content.  Such  grounds  are  always  as  available  and 
as  numerous  for  attack  as  for  defense.  "  In  a  time," 
he  adds,  "  so  rich  in  reflection  and  so  devoted  to 
ratiocination  as  our  own,  he  must  be  a  poor  creature 
who  can  not  advance  a  good  ground  for  every- 
thing, even  for  the  worst  and  most  depraved."  In 
speaking  of  the  attempt  made  to  esteem  the  so- 
called  proofs  of  God's  existence  as  the  only  means 
of  producing  faith  in  God,  he  says :  "  Such  a  doctrine 
would  find  its  parallel,  if  we  said  that  eating  was 
impossible  before  we  had  acquired  a  knowledge  of 
the  chemical,  botanical,  and  zoological  qualities  of 
our  food ;  and  that  we  must  delay  digestion  till  we 
had  finished  the  study  of  anatomy  and  physiology."  * 
This  would  be  nonsense,  and  yet  these  sciences  about 
food  and  digestion  are  a  necessity  for  thinking  man. 
To  eat  is  not  the  whole  of  life.  Intellectual  compre- 
hension of  the  process  is  worth  something.  And  to 
have  immediate  certitude  and  enjoyment  of  religious 
truth  can  not  be  ultimate  for  the  thoughtful  worship- 
er. It  is  not  merely  reflective,  analytical  thinking, 
but  also  comprehensive,  synthetic,  speculative  think- 
ing that  is  a  necessity  of  our  nature.  In  the  pro- 
found maxim  of  Anselm,  credo  ut  intelligani,  the  ut 
intelligam  is  recognized  to  be  a  necessity  of  his  na- 
ture as  well  as  the  credo.  So,  too,  with  his  saying, 
fides  quarit  iiitcllecttim. 

But  whatever  be  the  reasons  for  this  claim  of  im- 
mediate intuitive  knowledge  of  God,  and  however 

*  Hegel's  Logic,  p.  3. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  8i 

much  we  sympathize  with  the  attitude  of  those  mak- 
ing it,  we  must  not  forbear  to  examine  more  closely 
the  assertion. 

What  is  it  to  know?  Knowledge  in  its  lowest 
terms  implies  at  least  a  self  and  an  object — that  is, 
we  know  God  as  an  object  of  consciousness  with- 
out knowing  how  or  what  He  is.  We  know  Him 
intuitively  as  the  absolute  Being.  But  if  this  is  all 
that  we  know,  it  is,  as  Hegel  says,  not  worth  the 
knowing,  for  of  all  the  categories  of  thought  that  of 
mere  undefined  Being  is  the  emptiest  and  most  sterile. 
Such  being  is  mere  being,  negative  being,  nothing.''' 
"  Being  is  the  same  as  nothing."  This  is  one  of  the 
celebrated  paradoxes  of  Hegel,  meaning  that  if  every 
characteristic,  attribute,  and  quality  is  abstracted, 
there  remains  only  the  blank,  indefinable  identity  of 
mere  being  which  is  thus  indistinguishable  from  noth- 
ing. "  No  great  amount  of  wit,"  he  says,  "  is  needed 
to  throw  ridicule  on  this  maxim."  His  only  interest 
is  to  show  what  an  utterly  barren  and  inadequate 
definition  being  is  to  give  to  God. 

But,  granted  this  intuition  of  the  Being  of  God,  it 
remains  our  own.  The  being  of  God  is  an  object 
within  our  own  consciousness.  We  distinguish  be- 
tween the  two  elements,  but  can  only  do  so  by  as- 
serting being  of  only  one  of  them.  It  is  my  con- 
sciousness. I  am,  have  being,  therefore  the  other, 
God,  is  not,  except  as  part  of  me.  I  take  the  being  to 
myself.  I  can  doubt  everything  except  my  own  be- 
ing, for  in  doubting  I  am  the  doubter  and  the  doubt 
itself,  and  so  doubt  flees  away  and  leaves  pure,  real 
being  only  in  me.     This  is  a  reduction  of  intuitional- 

*  Cf.  Hegel's  Logic,  p.  137. 


82  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

ism  to  subjective  idealism,  the  basis  of  most  agnosti- 
cism. Feuerbach,  the  left-wing  Hegelian,  applied 
this  subjective  view  to  theology  in  his  Essence  of 
Christianity  (translated  by  George  Eliot).  God  is 
simply  the  reflection  or  objectification  of  the  indi- 
vidual within  his  own  mind.  Theology  is  Jbut  objecti- 
fied anthropology.  A  figure  of  speech,  personifica- 
tion, accounts  for  it  all.  Max  Stirner  produced  the 
rediictio  ad  absurdum  of  this  subjectivism  in  "  The  Indi- 
vidual and  his  Possession,"  in  which  absolute  anarchic 
individualism  is  proclaimed.  Thus  the  dialectic  forces 
this  form  of  knowing  God  to  a  denial  of  his  real  ex- 
istence, to  Kant's  position  that  we  can  never  know 
any  but  our  own  mental  states  and  ideas.  If  God  is 
still  to  be  held,  there  must  be  found  a  place  within 
the  me,  where  he  really  exists,  inseparable  from  my 
beinsf.  We  have  then  the  second  form  of  immediate 
knowledge  of  God.  God  is  in  me  in  feeling  or  Senti- 
ment {Gefuhl).\  In  feeling  God  within  me  I  have  the 
most  absolute  certitude  of  his  existence.  Vainly  I 
seek  him  in  the  intellect;  I  only  find  him  in  piy 
heart.     Intellect  separates,  feeling  unites. 

While  fully  granting  a  measure  of  truth  to  this 
position,  we  must  say  that  it  is  false  when  held  so  as 
to  exclude  all  activity  of  thought.  Thinking  man  can 
have  no  doors  within  himself  locked  against  this  ac- 
tivity. He  thinks  all  over,  even  in  the  deep  recesses 
of  the  heart. 

To  feel  anything  implies  at  least  some  distinction 
between  the  one  who  feels  and  the  object  felt.  In  the 
religious  relation  this  object  is  so  universal  and  abso- 
lute as  to  almost  extinguish  the  subject.  We  are 
emptied  that  he  may  fill  us.  We  easily  recall  the 
most  extravagant  terms  in  which  saints  and  mj^stics 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  83 

have  expressed  this  total  self-effacement  under  the 
felt  presence  of  God. 

Faith  passes  into  contemplative  love,  and  this  into 
ecstatic  bliss. 

But  it  may  also  take  the  form  of  abject  fear.  We 
are  naught,  vile  earth,  worms  of  the  dust,  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  Almighty.  All  that  is  left  of  us  is  mere 
fear,  passing  into  repentance,  and,  it  may  be,  into 
love  and  peace. 

We  ought  thus  to  feel  God ;  but  mere  feeling  of 
anything  is  no  proof  of  the  worth  of  the  feeling. 
Within  the  sphere  of  feeling  we  have  the  most  varied 
content,  and  some  discriminating  power  is  needed  to 
specify  what  feeling  is  strictly  religious,  and  some 
standard  of  excellence  by  which  to  grade  all  feelings 
that  we  have.  The  loveliest  flowers  and  the  most 
noxious  weeds  alike  spring  up  within  the  heart.  To 
feel  a  thing  does  not  vindicate  its  goodness  or  worth. 
How  do  we  distinguish  between  the  feeling  of  right 
and  wrong,  of  love  and  hatred,  of  God  and  the  devil  ? 
Not  by  mere  feeling,  but  by  an  intelligent,  rational 
insight  into  the  real  worth  of  these  objects  felt.  The 
pleasures  of  the  sensualist  are  felt  as  much  as  the 
raptures  of  the  saint,  and  mere  feeling  vindicates 
the  one  as  well  as  the  other.  Without  some  criterion 
outside  of  feeling,  then,  we  are  left  with  the  maxim, 
Dc  gustibiis  noil  disputandum,  or  do  what  gives  you  the 
most  pleasurable  feeling.  Feeling  depends  upon  the 
temperament  and  idiosyncrasies  of  the  individual. 
We  may  say  to  a  friend,  "  You  ought  to  feel  thisj"  and 
he  returns  the  irrefutable  answer,  "  I  am  so  constituted 
that  I  can  not."  Again,  we  may  feel  merely  fantastic 
creations  of  the  imagination.  We  may  be  moved 
with  pictures  of  ourselves  as  noble,  heroic,  holy  souls, 
9 


84  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

with  hopes  and  fears  that  may  be  utterly  groundless. 
Feeling  is  thus  the  worst  form  of  subjectivism.  Ani- 
mals, too,  feel,  but  they  do  not  have  religion  because 
they  do  not  think. 

But  this  view  may  be  expressed  in  a  higher  form. 
We  have  God  in  our  hearts.  Heart  means  more  than 
mere  temporary  accidental  feeling.  It  is  the  abiding 
center  or  core  of  our  life.  It  is  our  character.  But 
the  Bible  expressly  ascribes  evil  as  such  to  the  heart. 
Selfishness,  anger,  wrath,  malice,  fill  the  hearts  of 
many.  Only  the  intelligent  man  can  say  in  his  heart, 
"  There  is  a  God."  "  The  foolish  body  "  denies  it. 
The  heart  needs  to  be  kept  "  with  all  diligence,"  to  be 
changed,  regenerated,  according  to  the  form  of  some 
intelligent  good.  Again,  the  most  cultured  intelli- 
gence does  not  exclude  feeling,  but  rather  nourishes 
and  elevates  it.  True  religion  is  in  the  heart.  Pec- 
toral theology  is  the  vital  theology  ;  but  feelings  are 
not  self-kindled,  the  heart  is  not  self-moved.  Objects 
of  love  create  love,  and  objects  of  enmity  create 
hatred.  They  alone  who  know  God  aright  will  love 
him  aright.  They  who  do  not  know  him  aright 
may  have  the  most  intense  religious  feeling.  The 
most  degraded  idolater  can  appeal  to  his  heart  as 
proof  of  his  religion.  To  distinguish  between  true 
and  false  religion  we  must  appeal  to  intelligence.  It 
is  the  intelligent  heart  that  knows  God  and  the  in- 
telligent will  that  obeys  him. 

Thought,  too,  must  come  to  discriminate  between 
myself  and  the  object  felt  in  my  heart.  Thought 
must  come  to  make  God  a  free,  intelligent,  external 
object.  Thinking  our  way  out  of  mere  feeling,  we 
come  to  know  God  as  he  is  and  as  worthy  of  adora- 
tion.    Our  religious  feeling  is  seen  to  rest  on  that 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  85 

which  certifies  to  its  value  as  distinguished  from  other 
kinds  and  grades  of  feeling.  Thus,  knowledge  enters 
as  an  element  of  religion.  Thought  is  seen  to  be  the 
vindication  of  the  religion  of  the  heart.  Religion 
must  be  felt,  must  be  in  the  heart,  but  it  must  be  in- 
telligible feeling.  Hegel  does  not  deny  the  necessary 
and  continuous  element  of  feeling  in  religion.  In 
fact,  he  maintains  that  it  is  essential  to  any  truth  be- 
ing ours,  that  it  be  in  our  feeling,  in  our  heart.  He 
only  contends  against  that  form  of  faith  that  appeals 
to  feeling  as  its  sufficient  ground,  and  maintains 
that  it  is  the  function  of  thought  to  justify  good  and 
true  feelings  and  to  condemn  evil  feelings. 

But  there  are  various  forms  of  knowledge.  There 
is  knowledge  coming  through  the  senses ;  there  is 
knowledge  of  the  logical  understanding  which  in 
theology  defines  the  whole  content  of  religion  in 
definite,  dogmatic  propositions ;  there  is  knowledge 
gained  through  scientific  induction  which  has  much 
to  tell  us  about  the  great  part  of  human  experience 
that  is  constituted  by  religion  ;  there  is,  finally,  knowl- 
edge in  the  form  of  the  comprehension  of  the  organic 
unity  of  all  parts  of  the  totality  of  experience,  the 
necessary  self -relation  of  all  elements  in  a  living 
whole.  In  which  form  of  knowledge  is  religion  to 
be  found  ?  In  all  of  these,  we  may  say.  Yet  it  is 
only  the  last,  that  of  speculative  thought,  that  gives 
us  our  indiscerptible  grip  on  God  and  absolutely  vin- 
dicates the  religious  relation  manifested  in  the  less 
adequate  forms  of  art,  of  imagination,  of  inductive 
and  logical  knowledge.  But,  as  elsewhere,  this  true 
first  is  chronologically  the  last.  The  speculative 
comprehension  of  the  religious  relation  never  comes 
to  many  men,  and  comes  to  others  only  late  in  life. 


86  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Hegel  is  never  tired  of  asserting  that  religion  and 
philosophy  have  the  same  content,  only  differing  in 
form  of  knowing  it.  Philosophy  tries  to  comprehend 
that  which  religion  is.  The  philosophic  content  of 
religion  is  comprehension  in  a  living  system  of  the 
"  abbreviated  knowledge  "  of  faith.  As  such  it  is  the 
highest  form  of  theology ;  but  both  theology  and 
philosophy  are  only  the  religion  of  the  few,  while  re- 
ligion is  both  the  theology  and  the  philosophy  of  the 
many.  With  the  many,  religion  lingers  in  the  form 
of  representative  or  metaphorical  conceptions.  The 
thought  of  God  is  the  soul  of  the  religion  of  the 
heart.  It  is  also  the  soul  of  religion  expressed  or  in- 
terpreted in  language  of  metaphor  and  general  con- 
cepts. But,  before  passing  to  this  most  general  form 
of  religious  knowledge,  Hegel  devotes  a  section  to  a 
more  primary  form,  in  which  man  objectifies  the  ab- 
solute— that  is,  the  form  of  art,  the  creation  of  sensu- 
ous intuitio7i  or  perception. 

2.  Sensuous  perception  is  the  direct  apprehension 
of  an  object  under  the  external  conditions  of  time 
and  space.  Material  things  here  represent  as  sym- 
bols the  subjective  object  of  devotion  in  the  heart. 
It  may  thus  be  called  extertial  representation  or  sym- 
bolism. In  its  highest  form  it  constitutes  the  realm 
of  the  Beautiful  and  its  forms  of  Art.  Art,  Religion, 
and  Philosophy  may  be  said  to  be  the  three  forms  in 
which  the  Absolute  exists  for  man.  Sensuous  percep- 
tion or  external  representation  is  the  organ  of  this 
knowledge  in  art,  representative  conception  in  re- 
ligion, and  speculative  comprehension  that  of  philos- 
ophy. 

It  will  not  do  to  cover  the  lower  forms  of  idolatry 
with  the  beautiful  veil  of  art.     Yet,  in  the   lowest 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion,  87 

form,  the  heathen  sees  in  his  images,  or  in  his  stock 
or  stone,  a  representation  of  something  higher  and 
invisible.  Natural  objects  were  at  first  images  of 
non-natural  powers.  Art,  undoubtedly,  sprang  out 
of  idolatry,  as  astronomy  out  of  astrology.  In  art, 
the  human  spirit  labors  to  manifest  the  absolute  in 
visible  form  as  the  Beautiful — to  portray  the  Divine 
to  eye  and  ear.  The  Divine  is  really  the  center  and 
heart  of  all  Art.  Hence  its  ultimate  relation  with 
religion.  It  is,  in  fact,  an  essential  phase  of  religion. 
But  when  made  the  chief  phase  of  religion  it  be- 
comes false — relapses  into  idolatry.  It  reached  its 
highest  form  among  the  Greeks.  Their  religion  was 
the  religion  of  the  Beautiful.  Hegel  barely  notes 
this  phase  of  religion  here.  For  fuller  treatment  of 
it  we  may  refer  to  his  Esthetics.* 

Religion  for  us,  however,  finds  expression  rather 
in  what  we  may  call  mental  art.  Mental  conceptions 
take  the  place  of  objective  nature  and  forms  of  art, 
in  our  representation  of  the  Divine.  Sensuous  per- 
ception is  ideally  transformed  into  pictorial  mental 
conception  and  generalized  definitions.  Methinks  I 
see  God — where  ?  In  my  viind's  eye,  says  the  relig- 
ious Hamlet.  The  passage  has  been  made  from  sense 
to  thought.  The  whole  process  of  name-giving  is 
the  work  of  this  phase  of  thought.  The  first  Adam 
had  made  this  passage,  and  could  therefore  respond 
to  God's  request  that  he  should  give  a  name  to  every 
beast  and  bird.  The  plural  "  we  "  is  a  primary  men- 
tal generalization  of  two  different  sensuous  persons. 
They   are   grasped   together  into   one    mental   con- 


*  Hegel's  Esthetics :  A  Critical  Exposition,  by  J.  Steinforth  Kedney, 
D.  D. ;  Griggs  &  Co.,  Chicago. 


88  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

cept.    All  our  most  general  and  abstract  terms — law, 
force,  order,  substance,  essence,  being,  even  that  of 
God — are  the  result  of  this  work  of  thought.     Sensu- 
ous things    are   thus   immersed  and  regenerated  in 
this  mental  process.     But  there  is  a  tendency  to  re- 
vert to  their  material  equivalent.     Used  as  symbols 
to  represent  more  than  any  complex  of  sense  could 
give,  and  as  symbols  of  more  than  themselves  actu- 
ally present,  they  are  sometimes  personified  and  thus 
accepted  as  the  exact  equivalent  of  what  they  were 
intended  to  represent  in  a  metaphorical  way.     Meta- 
phors are  thus  objectified.    In  this  phase  it  resembles 
the  lowest  form  of  art.     It  is  mental  idolatry.     In- 
stead of  objectifying  in  sensuous  forms,  it  accepts  its 
definite  mental  pictures  as  the  very  incarnation  of 
the  absolute.     A  representation  {Vorstellu7tg)  *  is  a  gen- 
eralized picture  introducing  an  object  to  the  mental 
eye.     It  is  a  device  of  thought  to  get  above  sense. 
It  works  these  conceptions  partly  out  of  sense  and 
partly  out  of  materials  emanating  from  self-conscious 
thought.f     Sometimes  they  are  the  very  images  of 
real   thought,   and   yet   only   formally   so,  for  they 
never  get  beyond  the  limits  of  the  understanding. 
The  timeless  and  invisible  are'envisaged  under  con- 
ceptions valid  only  for  temporal  and  sensible  objects. 
Besides,  these  conceptions  are  independent,  and  can 
only  be  externally  connected. 

This  picture-thinking,  as  Hegel  styles  it,  forms 
the  bulk  of  that  done  by  the  mass  of  mankind.  But 
it  is  only  proximate  and  inexact.  The  work  of  phi- 
losophy is  needed  to  transform  such  conceptual  think- 
ing into  organic  thought.     Conceptions,  like  works 

*  Cf.  last  part  of  Chapter  II.  f  Hegel's  Logic,  p.  31. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion,  89 

of  art,  "  half  conceal  and  half  reveal."  These  mental 
images  may  at  one  time  help  to  wing  the  flight  of 
the  soul  heavenward  if  used  as  helps,  or  they  may 
chain  it  down  to  earth,  if  metaphor  is  literalized. 

3.  Representation.  —  The  religious  consciousness 
finds  spontaneous  and  helpful  expression  in  this 
language  of  conceptions  and  metaphors.  It  is  pecul- 
iarly the  language  of  religion.  But  it  may  become 
a  hindrance  and  a  limit  to  the  true  expression  of 
religion  as  well  as  a  help.  Admit  its  worth,  but 
scan  its  inadequacy  and  misuse.  A  pictorial  con- 
ception may  mislead  as  well  as  a  sensuous  picture. 
Men  may  be  so  blinded  that  they  will  fight  and  die 
for  abstract  and  inadequate  conceptions,  as  a  hea- 
then will  for  his  gods  of  wood  and  stone.  John 
Wesley  wrote  to  the  Calvinist  Toplady,  "  Your  God 
is  my  devil."  Yet  each  of  them  would  have  en- 
dured the  pains  of  martyrdom  to  maintain  his  own 
conception  of  God. 

We  must  note  more  closely  some  of  the  uses  and 
abuses  of  this  form  of  thinking  in  interpreting  the 
religious  consciousness. 

From  the  cradle  to  the  grave  our  religious  life  is 
nourished  and  strengthened  by  metaphors.  The 
soul's  loftiest  flights  are  winged  by  metaphor.  The 
world  of  sense  and  imagination  are  gleaned  for 
choicest  imagery  to  express  the  invisible  and  the 
spiritual.  The  language  of  the  Bible  and  of  devo- 
tional literature  of  all  ages  is  essentially  anthropo- 
morphic, but  only  as  metaphor.  The  cold  critic  may 
challenge  the  religion  because  of  its  language.  He 
may  caricature  the  common  Christian  conception  of 
God  as  that  of  a  "  non-natural  magnified  man,  living 
just  around  the  corner."     He  literalizes  where  they 


90  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

spiritualize.  And  yet  even  the  devout  soul  often 
literalizes.  Winged  as  it  is  by  metaphor,  it  is  often 
chained  to  metaphor.  It  accepts  metaphors  as  equiv- 
alents, instead  of  symbols,  of  spiritual  truth.  But  as 
new  experience  comes,  the  spirit  waxes  strong  enough 
to  break  through  the  letter  that  chaineth.  The  in- 
adequacy of  its  former  conceptions  being  realized, 
there  comes  a  state  of  mental  unrest.  The  mind  is 
continually  battling  with  inadequate,  worn-out  con- 
ceptions, and  emancipating  itself  from  the  temporal 
and  finite  elements  in  its  conceptions  of  the  Infinite. 
It  recognizes  not  only  the  contradiction  between  its 
imaginative  conceptions  and  the  absolute  and  infinite 
nature  of  its  object,  but  also  the  contradictions  of 
its  conceptions  among  themselves.  As  the  artist 
realizes  that  his  creations  are  inadequate  representa- 
tions of  the  ideal,  so  do  religious  people  recognize 
that  their  conceptions  of  the  invisible  and  spiritual 
are  inadequate ;  and  while  using  this  figurate,  meta- 
phorical language,  they  tacitly  assert  that  it  is  merely 
figurative.  The  form  is  not  equal  to  its  content.  It 
only  suggests  and  embodies  the  content  in  such  a 
way  as  to  enable  them  to  immeasurably  transcend  it. 
Thus  we  speak  of  the  Father  and  the  Son  in  the 
Trinity,  tacitly  denying  that  we  affirm  their  relations 
to  each  other  to  be  the  same  as  the  relation  of  a  hu- 
man father  and  son  to  each  other.  We  affirm  only  a 
likeness,  a  similarity  to  the  human  relation  that  helps 
us  better  to  express  the  true  nature  of  God.  So,  too, 
when  we  speak  of  the  wrath  of  God,  his  vengeance, 
his  throne,  his  rigJit  hand,  and  his  holy  arm,  we  rec- 
ognize that  they  are  only  inadequate  figures.  The 
Scriptural  expression,  "  The  fruit  of  the  tree  of  knowl- 
edge of  good  and  evil,''  contains  intellectual  and  moral 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  91 

elements,  which  submerge,  and  force  us  to  rise  above 
its  sensuous  element  of  tree  and  fruit.  So  it  is  that 
very  many  of  our  anthropomorphic  conceptions  of 
God  are  used  and  not  abused.  Dwelling  on  them  as 
metaphors  and  parables,  they  suggest  and  awaken 
the  highest  spiritual  communion  with  God,  while  at 
the  same  time  they  are  not  accepted  as  exact  equiva- 
lents for  the  spiritual  realities  they  thus  suggest. 

How  best  to  conceive  God  to-day  under  the 
changed  conditions  of  modern  science  and  culture  is 
the  chief  task  of  religious  teachers  and  apologists. 
How  to  discard  antique  and  effete  conceptions  (mis- 
representations of  our  religious  truth  that  create  the 
skeptic,  and  give  him  a  man  of  straw,  or  quixotic 
windmills  to  do  battle  with)  and  to  replace  them  with 
new,  vital,  and  more  adequate  ones — this  is  a  work 
not  to  be  declined  by  earnest  and  intelligent  Christians 
to-day.  Our  own  self-necessitated  iconoclasm  has  de- 
stroyed our  old  idols  ;  can  not,  must  we  not,  make 
new  and  better  ones  ?  A  divine  revelation  must 
come  and  be  interpreted  under  these  limitations  of 
human  mind  and  language,  or  it  would  be  as  un- 
meaning as  the  equation  of  two  unknown  quantities 
x^=iy.  But  the  experience  and  content  of  the  hu- 
man mind  varies — advances,  we  believe — and  so  the 
materials  out  of  which  it  must  frame  its  conceptions 
varies  and  increases.  Are  we  to  be  equal  to  this  task 
laid  upon  us  by  the  Zeit-Geist  of  the  present  century, 
as  our  fathers  of  other  centuries  have  been  equal  to 
their  task  ?  This  is  not  the  highest  sort  of  vindica- 
tion that  thought  has  to  make  of  religion — not  the 
absolute  vindication  that  the  philosophy  of  Religion 
offers ;  but  it  is,  nevertheless,  a  very  lofty  one  that 
may   well  engage   the  sanctified   intellect  of  those 


92  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

who  have  to  speak  to  the  people  through  pulpit  and 
press  to-day. 

Not  only  do  these  pictorial  conceptions  help  us  to 
rise  far  beyond  themselves,  but  also  external  facts  of 
history  serve  the  same  purpose,  though  they  may 
also,  like  abused  conceptions,  smother  the  idea  in 
names  and  dates  and  external  events.  But  almost 
none  are  too  stupid  to  draw  a  moral  from  history. 
They  read  between  the  lines,  and  interpret  merely  ex- 
ternal events.  Some  plan,  idea,  providence,  or  spir- 
itual interpretation  is  thus  given  to  all  history.  This 
may  often  be  far  below  a  philosophy  of  History,  but  it 
at  least  shows  the  tentative  efforts  of  the  ordinary 
consciousness  toward  the  comprehension  of  the  spir- 
itual import  of  mere  events.  The  events  of  the  life 
of  Jesus  are  genuine  divine  history  ;  but  as  mere  facts 
they  are  of  the  same  value  as  other  historical  events. 
Yet  they  have  an  inner  and  spiritual  content  that 
only  reason  can  see  and  interpret.  Divine  activity, 
eternal  transactions,  and  absolute  divine  relations  are 
manifested  in  the  sensuous,  finite  events  that  form 
the  external  history  of  Jesus  Christ.  The  content  is 
infinite,  the  form  only  finite.  Faith,  spirit,  thought, 
it  is,  which  sees  the  infinite  content.  Spirit  testifies 
to  spirit,  and  the  son  of  man  recognizes  the  Son  of 
God  in  Jesus  of  Nazareth. 

"  The  histor)'-  of  Christ's  life  is  thus  the  external 
evidence,  but  faith  changes  its  signification ;  for  the 
important  point  is  not  merely  faith  as  a  belief  in  this 
external  history,  but  in  the  doctrine  that  this  man 
was  the  Son  of  God.  There  the  sensuous  content 
becomes  quite  a  different  one  ;  it  is  changed  into  an- 
other, and  the  demand  or  postulate  is  that  it  should 
be   proved   by  evidence.      The  subject  is  changed 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  93 

completely ;  from  a  sensuously,  empirically  existing 
subject  it  becomes  a  divine  one — an  essentially  high- 
est phase  of  God  himself.  This  content  is  no  longer 
sensuous ;  when,  therefore,  the  demand  is  made  to 
prove  it  in  the  former  sensuous  manner,  this  mode  is 
inadequate,  to  begin  w^ith,  since  the  subject  is  of  an 
entirely  different  nature."  * 

Spiritual  truth  comes  to  all  primarily  in  this  form 
of  representative  knowledge.  It  is  translated  out  of 
the  form  of  feeling,  which  it  has  largely  created,  and 
given  some  definite  characteristics  and  attributes. 
The  genesis  of  the  religious  feeling,  it  is  true,  belongs 
to  the  primitive  depths  in  which  God  and  the  soul 
are  practically  one.  The  child  has  the  native  capacity 
for  religion.  Religious  training  would  be  in  vain 
without  this  presupposition.  To  give  the  child  any 
conceptions,  any  symbols,  names,  or  attributes  of  God 
is  to  meet  the  essential  religious  wants  of  his  nature, 
by  helping  him  to  positive  conceptions  of  what  he 
feels  blindly  stirring  within  his  soul. 

Hegel  notes  the  pedagogical  question  as  to  whether 
or  not  religion  can  be  taught.  He  holds  the  induc- 
tion of  children  into  objective  forms  of  worship  and 
faith  to  be  essential  to  their  religious  development. 
Religious  training  is  as  essential  as  any  other  part  of 
education.  He  would  approve  of  the  catechetical 
method,  which  is  followed  in  all  the  public  schools 
of  Germany  to-day.  So  bare  a  skeleton  as  Sadler's 
"  Church  Doctrine  and  Bible  Teaching  "  is  a  positive 
help  at  this  stage,  as  it  is  a  positive  hindrance  when 
its  abstract,  dogmatic,  literalized  imagery  is  given  as 
meat  to  strong  men.     But  it  is  just  in  this  pictorial, 

*  Philosophic  der  Religion,  vol.  ii,  p.  323. 


94  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

anthropomorphic  form  that  religion  can  be  taught. 
It  is  educed  and  nourished  by  such  definite  concep- 
tions. The  love  of  God  is  depicted  as  the  love  of 
a  parent  for  a  child,  only  infinitely  greater,  and  his 
anger  likewise.  The  conception  of  almightiness  may 
be  made  the  beginning  of  wisdom  and  love  as  well  as 
of  obedience.  Faith  lays  hold  of  all  these  concep- 
tual attributes,  and  raises  the  believer  into  closer 
communion  with  God.  Fear  is  changed  into  confi- 
dence. God  is  not  a  hostile  but  a  friendly  power. 
We  are  only  complete  in  Him  as  we  identify  our- 
selves with  Him.  Any  poor  earth-born  mortal  with 
God  on  his  side  is  always  the  majority — is  on  the  side 
of  the  biggest  guns  which  triumph  over  all  foes. 
This  was  one  of  the  points  of  difference  in  the  bitter 
disagreement  between  Hegel  and  Schleiermacher. 
Hegel  made  the  feeling  of  nothingness  and  of  sheer 
dependence  a  lower  and  transient  phase  of  religion, 
while  Schleiermacher  maintained  that  it  always  con- 
stituted true  religion.  He  maintained  that  the  Church 
at  the  Reformation  rightly  apprehended  and  restored 
the  central  doctrine  of  justification  by  faith.  Through 
faith  one  is  so  united  with  God  that  he  has  absolute 
assurance  of  salvation,  and  absolute  freedom  in  his 
spiritual  life.  God's  laws  are  seen  to  be  the  laws  of 
his  own  true  being,  God  is  for  him,  and  he  will  not 
fear  what  the  devil  or  man  worketh  against  him.  It 
is  the  testimony  of  the  Spirit  that  authenticates  re- 
ligious truth.  The  positive  catechetical  stage  must 
be  so  conducted  as  to  lead  to  personal  conviction. 
But  this  comes  only  through  mediation.  At  first 
truth  is  received  as  "  Church  doctrine  and  Bible 
teaching."  Thus  the  incarnation — the  very  core  of 
revealed  or  absolute  religion — is  received  naively  on 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  95 

authority.  It  is  the  same  with  other  doctrines.  But 
thought  unavoidably  comes  to  reflect  upon  these 
doctrines,  to  criticise  and  examine  them  in  their  picto- 
rial and  dogmatic  form.  Their  limitations  and  con- 
tradictions then  appear.  Doubt  comes  to  shake  the 
whole  fabric  of  man's  creed.  Certitude  is  then 
sought  through  rationalistic  investigations  and  evi- 
dences, only  to  multiply  doubts.  Then  recourse  is 
had  to  the  belief  of  the  majority.  The  quod  semper 
maxim  is  appealed  to.  Thousands  and  millions  of 
the  wisest  and  best  men  have  believed  thus,  oecumen- 
ical councils  have  thus  decreed  the  creed ;  therefore 
it  must  be  true.  Thus,  faith  ceases  to  be  living  and 
personal.  The  superstition  of  pagan  oracles  appears 
in  the  form  of  absolute  and  unsubstantiated  infalli- 
bility of  council  and  Church. 

I  am  free  to  admit  that,  so  long  as  religious 
thought  tarries  in  this  realm  of  figurate  concep- 
tions and  definitions,  and  demands  absolute  infallible 
certitude  of  such  conceptions,  there  can  be  no  other 
one  offered  than  this  same  doctrine  of  ecclesiastical 
infallibility.  All  the  so-called  evidences  of  Chris- 
tianity that  try  to  meet  rationalism  on  its  own  low 
plane  can  attain  to  nothing  more  than  probability 
or  credibility.  Put  "  old  faiths  in  new  light,''  and 
old  foes  will  appear  with  ficiu  faces.  Restate  doc- 
trines; reconceive  them  in  harmony  with  the  changed 
conditions  of  modern  science  and  culture ;  disinte- 
grate and  reintegrate  the  Creed  with  the  evolution- 
ary hypothesis ;  reform  the  Reformation ;  let  the 
new  Theology  and  the  new  Reformation  replace  effete 
conceptions  by  modern  and  more  adequate  ones ;  let 
science  and  religion  find  a  modern  reconciliation  of 
concepts,  and  still  no  permanent  certitude  will  be 


10 


g6  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

reached.  All  this  work,  as  I  have  said  (page  91),  is 
very  valuable,  and  none  of  us  who  are  in  earnest 
about  helping-  our  fellow-men  can  do  otherwise  than 
heartily  engage  in  translating  out  of  the  old  into 
new  conceptions.  But  we  are  still  in  the  realm  of 
inadequate  forms  and  language,  which  our  thought 
will  never  cease  to  criticise.  So  one  must  let 
thought  have  its  perfect  work,  and  reach  its  ulti- 
mate comprehension  of  the  religious  idea  and  rela- 
tion in  which  the  absolute  rationality  of  Christian 
doctrine  is  vindicated,  or  else  he  must,  if  still  haunted 
by  the  phantom  of  infallibility  of  conceptions,  fall 
back  on  sheer  authority.*  Thought  must  transcend 
the  conceptions  of  both  common  rationalism  and 
common  orthodoxy,  before  the  faith  can  have  that 
vital,  personal,  intellectual  vindication  of  which  any 
ex  cathedra  infallibility  is  the  veriest  ape.  Either  this 
Philosophy  of  Religion  must  be  attained,  or  we  must 
rest  on  the  external  evidences  of  miracle  and  coun- 
cils. The  only  other  alternative  is  to  refuse  to  ex- 
amine, to  ask  for  no  evidences,  to  keep  the  simple 
faith  of  childhood  in  mature  years  by  arbitrary  re- 
pression of  thought. 

Apologetics  may  seem  to  advance  independently. 
Yet  its  work  is  constantly  that  of  an  interplay  of 
thought  and  conceptions  and  reasonings,  and  author- 
ity, with  authority  as  the  ultimate  place  of  refuge. 
Common  rationalism  will  then  ask  for  the  authority 
of  ex  cathedra  authority,  for  the  credentials  of  infalli- 
bility. The  appeal  is  to  miracles.  But  they  are  not 
evidences  of  our  own  senses.     We  were  not  present 

*  The  worth  and  the  worthlessness  of  this  notion  of  infallibility  are 
admirably  considered  by  the  Rev.  Dr.  Kedney,  in  his  Christian  Doctrines 
Harmonized,  vol.  ii,  p.  242. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  97 

when  the  revelation  was  thus  confirmed.  We  must 
accept  the  testimony  of  eye-witnesses.  That  the 
apostles  were  eye-witnesses  we  must  ultimately  be- 
lieve, because  the  Church  says  they  were.  Then 
rationalism  smiles  at  the  credulity  of  believers  in 
miracles.  Modern  science  seems,  at  least,  to  render 
their  occurrence  utterly  improbable.  The  nczver 
criticism  plays  havoc  with  the  verbally  inspired  Bible 
of  the  orthodox.  The  new  method  of  historical 
study  reveals  the  human  element  as  dominant  in  all 
church  history,  robbing  all  councils  of  the  ecclesias- 
tical gloss  of  infallibility.  The  Bible,  Reason,  and 
the  Church,  one  after  another,  are  made  the  stand- 
ing-ground of  Apologetics,  and  yet  not  one  of  them 
is  infallible.  Each  one  needs  a  larger  apologetic  to 
vindicate  its  authority.  They  are  all  relatively  suf- 
ficient grounds,  when  themselves  grounded  upon  the 
authority  of  the  absolute  idea  of  Religion.  I  am  the 
last  one  to  depreciate  their  relative  value.  I  am 
convinced  that  modern  Apologetics  must  largely  deal 
with  these  methods,  and  that  it  makes  no  mistake  in 
its  appeal  to  the  Bible,  to  Reason,  and  to  the  Church 
as  authorities.  I  am  the  last  one  to  abate  anything 
from  the  just  deliverances  of  the  Christian  conscious- 
ness as  embodied  in  these  three  forms  of  authority. 
But  I  do  not  believe  that  any  or  all  of  them  can 
absolutely  vindicate  our  deepest  religious  verities, 
much  less  the  temporary  and  imperfect  conceptions 
in  which  these  verities  are  often  couched.  None  of 
them  can  afford  us  a  "  short  and  easy  method  with 
skeptics."  The  Bible  is  infallible.  The  argument 
is,  "  Believe  or  be  damned."  The  nineteenth  century 
shrugs  its  shoulder  into  at  least  an  interrogation- 
mark.    Reason  is  infallible.    The  argument  is,  at  least, 


98  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

"  Believe  this  or  nothing."  The  agnostic  chooses 
the  latter  alternative.  Then  comes  the  hard-church 
argument,  aflfirming  the  right  of  might,  of  mere  pos- 
session. The  Church  is  infallible.  Its  assertion — for 
it  proffers  no  argument — is  the  quicunque  vult  of  the 
Athanasian  Creed,  and  its  last  word  is  the  anathema. 
Never  argue,  but  continually  affirm  and  maintain 
the  old  teaching.  Apologetics  are  an  impertinence. 
All  attempts  at  restating  and  resetting  gospel  truth 
in  the  culture  of  the  nineteenth  century  is  decried. 
Once  allow  an  inch  to  reason,  and  it  will  take  in- 
numerable miles.  And,  when  reason  does  this,  it 
does  not  give  definite  answers  to  all  questions.  It 
opens  more  questions  than  it  can  close.  It  chal- 
lenges its  own  dogmas  of  previous  ages.  It  ends  at 
best  in  semi-agnosticism.  It  can  not  speak  ex  ca- 
thedra. Its  confession  must  be,  "  We  are  none  of  us 
infallible,  not  even  the  youngest" — not  even  the 
nineteenth  century  reason  of  the  mere  understand- 
ing. There  is  only  one  perfect  Gnostic — that  is  God. 
And  yet  we,  as  his  children,  must  strive  to  become 
like  him  in  mind  as  well  as  in  heart.  Yet  old  text- 
books are  worn  out,  and  many  new  ones  are  very 
superficial.  Many  are  justly  weary  of  such  unevi- 
dencing  evidences.  Many,  though  heathen  with  the 
understanding,  are  yet  Christian  with  the  heart. 
They  believe,  in  spite  of  such  evidences. 

Skepticism  is  prevalent  to-day  among  all  intel- 
lectual classes.  Is  the  devil  at  the  bottom  of  it  all  ? 
I  am  unwilling  to  impute  it  to  that  source  as  long  as 
there  are  so  many  patent  causes  for  it  within  the 
Church  itself,  which  I  can  sum  up  under  two  heads : 
I.  The  Church's  persistent  use  of  the  uncriticised 
category  of  infallibility.     2.  The  practical  atheism  of 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  99 

the  Church  teaching,  which  often  banishes  God  from 
the  secular  world. 

I.  Infallibility  is  the  dream  of  mere  seminarians, 
and  the  tool  of  ecclesiastical  politicians.  By  both, 
the  Divine  Self-Revelation  to  human  children  is 
dwarfed  and  rendered  mechanical  and  arbitrary. 
Fleeing  the  light  of  human  reason,  it  buries  itself  in 
closets,  to  issue  forth  as  the  party-whip  to  compel 
men  to  obedience  and  faith.  Refusing  to  notice  the 
human  instruments  and  the  historical  experience 
by  which  this  Divine  Revelation  is  mediated  to 
men  ;  refusing  to  recognize  the  work  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  in  the  movements  of  men's  minds  and  human 
experience  in  this  century,  it  persistently  anathema- 
tizes all  attempts  to  reset  the  old  truths  in  new  light- 
It  assumes  infallibility  to  pronounce  itself  infallible. 
It  divorces  intellectual  insight  from  the  holy  life  of 
love  and  good  works.  It  divorces  God's  own  Self- 
Revelation  from  his  divine  love  and  goodness,  and 
makes  it  as  arbitrary  as  the  deliverances  of  the  gods 
of  ancient  or  modern  superstition.  Much  of  modern 
skepticism  is  simply  the  inherently  just  and  necessar}' 
demand  of  the  human  spirit  to  know  the  source  and 
ground  of  such  asserted  infallibility  for  Bible  and 
Church  and  Reason.  It  is  more  than  willing  to  yield 
to  rational  authority.  But  it  will  not,  and  it  ought 
not  to  yield  the  blind  obedience  demanded  to  any 
authority.  It  must  see  what  it  is  in  the  Bible  and 
in  the  Church  and  in  Reason  that  makes  them  au- 
thorities that  should  be  respected,  and  that  will  help 
instead  of  hinder  the  aspirations  of  the  human  mind 
and  heart.  It  insists,  and  rightly  too,  in  pruning  off 
excrescences,  temporary  and  accidental  elements,  me- 
chanical, verbal  inspiration,  and  ecclesiastical  infalli- 


lOO  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

bility,  which  sets  itself  above  history,  or  manufactures 
its  own  history.  A  candid  examination  of  any  of 
these  arbitrary  infallibilities  easily  silences  their  ex 
cathedra  tones,  or  makes  them  to  be  mere  voices 
from  the  tomb  or  from  dream-land.  It  opens  more 
questions  than  any  one  of  these  authorities  can  an- 
swer except  with  its  anathema.  It  compels  it,  if 
honest,  to  say,  "  I  don't  know,"  to  many  questions. 
I  compels  it  to  retire  to  the  lower  throne  of  semi- 
agnosticism.  There  is  a  vast  amount  of  dogmatic  and 
ecclesiastical  rubbish,  relics  of  by-gone  contests  and 
victories  that  must  be  frankly  proclaimed  as  non-es- 
sential to  the  faith.  The  doctrine  of  the  Divine  guid- 
ance into  truth,  as  men  are  able  to  see  the  truth,  must 
supplant  that  of  mechanical  infallibility.  The  author- 
ity of  the  Bible  and  the  Church  must  be  vindicated  on 
other  and  more  real  and  congenial  grounds.  Skepti- 
cism must  question,  not  to  reject  in  toto  but  to  reassert 
in  more  vital  form.  Bible  and  Church  and  Reason  will 
always  command  men's  reverence,  when  a  true  ra- 
tionale of  their  authority  is  presented.  It  is  necessary 
for  the  strong,  growing  human  spirit  to  question  the 
absolute  infallible  authority,  in  order  to  submit  itself 
to  all  worthy,  adequate,  ethical  ones.  Relatively, 
under  necessary  limitations  of  human  conditions,  the 
triad  of  Bible,  Church,  and  Reason,  will  be  accepted  by 
anxious  skeptics,  as  the  very  essential  media  for  the 
Self-Revelation  of  God  to  men.  Obedience  to  them 
will  be  self-imposed.  They  will  be  neither  arbi- 
trary nor  foreign.  They  will  be  the  best  presenta- 
tion of  one's  own  duties,  privileges,  and  laws.  Look- 
ing at  the  way  in  which  they  have  been  evolved,  and 
at  the  goal  they  seek  for  man,  he  will  find  in  them 
all  the  very  motions  of  the  Holy  Spirit  guiding,  lur- 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  loi 

ing-,  commanding  into  new  truth  and  new  and  fuller 
self-realization.  Other  authority  God  himself  does 
not  care  to  give  to  spirits  made  in  his  own  image, 
and  other  authority  his  own  children  should  neither 
expect  nor  desire. 

2.  The  second  cause  of  much  skepticism  to-day  is, 
the  practical  atheism  of  much  Christian  teaching, 
which  often  banishes  God  from  the  so-called  secular 
life.  Such  teaching  denies  that  the  world  is  even 
God's  footstool.  It  denies  that  the  world  is  yet 
under  the  Divine  guidance.  It  fences  off  what  it  calls 
the  Church  from  what  it  stigmatizes  as  the  secular  life, 
refusing  it  any  part  or  place  in  the  great  kingdom  of 
God.  It  practically  banishes  God  from  the  largest 
part  of  his  own  world,  reduces  his  kingdom,  alienates 
his  allies,  and  denies  the  very  revelation  that  it  ad- 
mits. Religion  as  a  cult  or  as  dogma  is  elevated 
above  religion  as  a  life,  above  the  daily  activity  in  all 
the  divinely  appointed  spheres  of  life,  above  science, 
civilization,  industry,  and  morality.  The  spirit  of 
truth  and  love  and  mutual  helpfulness,  which  per- 
meates and  sustains  all  the  great  secular  institutions 
and  labors — that  is,  the  religion  of  Christ  that  there 
is  in  honest  secular  life  is  despised,  or  spoken  of  with 
abated  approval.  The  religion,  the  communion  with 
God  through  nature,  art,  through  labor  in  the  com- 
mon and  the  professional  and  scientific  spheres  of 
human  activity,  is  not  recognized  as  religion,  or  as 
being  evidence  of  and  as  helping  forward  the  king- 
dom of  God. 

It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  priest  who 
thinks  that  he  manufactures  God  by  a  hoc  est  incus 
corpus  (mumbled  hocus-pocus)  considers  himself  more 
religious  than  the  man  who  labors  ten  hours  a  day 


I02  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

for  the  daily  bread  of  his  family,  or  than  the  great 
artists,  engineers,  scientists,  scholars,  and  philanthro- 
pists who  are  laboring  for  the  well-being  of  human- 
ity. The  priest  may  think  so.  But  the  great  mass 
of  God's  children,  who  have,  in  his  good  Providence, 
been  born  in  this  century  of  human  culture,  will  only 
say,  and  say  rightly,  that  if  this  is  true,  then  religion 
is  of  no  worth  to  them.  Formal  ecclesiasticism  and 
orthodoxy  have  made  more  skeptics  than  they  have 
converted.  There  is  often  more  faith  in  honest  doubt 
of  such  misinterpretations  of  Christianity  than  in  half 
such  creeds. 

Such  religion  narrows  instead  of  broadens  men's 
humanity  and  the  kingdom  of  heaven  on  earth.  Such 
skepticism  is  really  broadening  the  kingdom,  and  forc- 
ing its  keepers  to  make  broader  her  mantle  of  gener- 
ous appreciation  and  love  for  all  that  cultivates  and 
elevates  humanity.  Such  religion  is  daily  calling  down 
upon  its  head  the  woes  pronounced  upon  it  by  the 
Christ  when  he  saw  it  among  the  Scribes  and  Phari- 
sees, the  ecclesiastical  and  puritanical  keepers,  not 
spreaders,  of  the  faith  in  his  day.  Such  skepticism  is 
the  real  stirring  of  the  Spirit,  protesting  against  hav- 
ing its  work  in  secular  spheres  condemned  as  profane. 

Modern  skepticism  is  very  serious  and  earnest  and 
wistful.  Much  of  it  needs  but  the  true  presentation 
of  Christianity  as  the  life  and  light  of  the  world,  as  the 
Divine  love  seeking  and  saving  and  civilizing  and  per- 
fecting men — the  most  Divine  because  the  most  human 
power  on  earth,  to  joyfully  accept  and  enter  the  social 
state  in  which  the  spirit  of  Christ  reigns.  Wherever 
work  is  being  done  for  the  education  and  the  progress 
of  man,  there  is  the  spirit  of  Christ ;  and  where  Christ 
is  there  is   his  church.     That  much  of  this  is  not 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  103 

within  the  organized  Church,  is  as  much  the  fault  of 
the  Church  herself  as  it  is  of  those  that  follow  not 
after  the  professed  keepers  of  his  faith.  See  how 
Christ's  Spirit  is  working,  often  unrecognized,  in  the 
countless  non-Christian  and  even  anti-Christian  broth- 
erhoods and  forms  of  social  and  co-operative  socie- 
ties. Their  mutual  helpfulness,  patience,  earnestness, 
and  self-sacrifice,  what  a  really  divine  service  of  man 
they  often  constitute !  And  yet  what  a  cry  it  is  to 
the  Church  for  that  divine  brotherhood  that  was 
Christ's  ideal  of  his  church  on  earth  !  Let  the  Catho- 
lic Church  proclaim  by  deed  as  well  as  by  word  this 
mission  to  help  men  to  the  highest  realization  of  such 
brotherhood,  and  it  will  become  the  Catholic  Church. 
She  will  lead  earnest  skeptics  into  her  fold,  because 
they  will  recognize  it  as  their  home,  and  not  the  for- 
tress of  an  enemy.  Let  the  Church  reveal  herself  as 
the  means  of  genuine  salvation  for  man,  and  not  as  an 
end  to  herself,  and  men  who  now  scoff  will  come  to 
work  and  worship  in  her  fold.  Identify  Christianity 
with  moral  goodness  and  brotherly  love,  and  the 
Church  with  all  the  means  wherever  and  however 
used  for  the  perfecting  of  redeemed  humanity ;  ac- 
knowledge all  the  light  and  truth  that  God  is  dis- 
closing to  the  students  of  science,  applied  arts,  and 
philosophy  to-day  as  the  self-revelation  of  the  light 
which  lighteneth  every  man  that  comes  into  the 
world — in  a  word,  acknowledge  the  truth,  and  the 
ranks  of  earnest  skepticism  would  be  thinned  as  no 
polemical  apologetics  or  ecclesiastical  fulminating 
canons  could  ever  thin  them,  Christianity  is  neither 
primarily  nor  chiefly  a  cult  or  dogma.  The  unjust 
over-emphasis  of  these  two  phases  of  Christianity  have 
been  the  bane  of  Rome  and  Geneva  in  all  their  forms. 


I04  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Finality  claimed  for  provisional  forms  of  thought 
and  worship  and  organization,  means  sterility  in  the 
Church  and  skepticism  out  of  it.  Skepticism  rarely 
attacks  the  character  of  our  Divine  Master.  Let  us 
rejoice  if  it  does  attack  our  caricatures  of  his  spirit 
and  method  and  purposes.  Family  life,  social  and 
civil  life,  associations  for  the  pursuit  of  knowledge 
and  mutual  self-help — none  of  these  genuinely  human 
interests  and  activities  are  thought  alien  to  himself 
by  Christ.  He  finds  himself  in  them  all.  And  when 
the  worship  and  dogma  of  cult  schismatize  themselves 
from  the  larger  life  of  Christ's  Spirit  in  these  concrete 
forms  of  human  activity,  they  only  belittle  and  render 
themselves  harmful.  This  is  that  most  deadly  sin  of 
spiritual  schism,  the  only  schism  that  our  Lord  ever 
thought  of  condemning.  The  Church  excommunicates 
herself  from  the  larger  life  of  redeemed  humanity, 
for  the  crime  of  the  vital  heresy  of  limiting  the  rev- 
elation and  communication  of  Christ  to  his  own,  to 
one  system  and  one  channel.  What  wonder,  then, 
that  his  sheep  of  the  one  fiock  are  skeptical  as  to  the 
dicta  of  such  unbelievers?  The  cultured  classes  of 
France  are  all  skeptical.  The  cult  of  institutionalism 
has  excommunicated  what  the  cultured  world  knows 
to  be  true,  and  the  result  is  that  there  religion  is  for 
the  priests  and  the  peasants.  The  best  men  in  France 
say  that  M.  Gambetta  only  uttered  the  truth  in  his 
now  famous  mot,  '■'■Vemtemi  cest  le  cldricalismey  The 
Church  there  means  opposition  to  modern  science 
and  progress.  It  means  the  clergy.  The  clergy 
teach  superstitious  follies  in  the  name  of  Christ,  in- 
stead of  his  more  patent  life  and  light  in  the  secular 
spheres  of  men's  interests  and  duties,  and  measure 
all  goodness  by  a  petty  ecclesiastical  standard.    The 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  105 

conversion  of  the  cultured  classes  there  means  the 
abandonment  of  clericalism.  The  Bishop  of  Manches- 
ter has  recently  referred  to  the  same  evil  in  the  Church 
of  England.  There  are  some  signs  of  a  petty  but  ram- 
pant revival  of  the  same  maker  of  skepticism  in  our 
own  land.  Hence  I  can  not  forbear  making  a  pertinent 
quotation  trom  Canon  Freemantle's  Bampton  Lecture. 
The  supremacy  of  clericalism  infallibly  brings  a  per- 
version of  the  Christian  ideal,  and  draws  away  the 
consciousness  of  dignity  and  holiness  from  common 
life  by  a  pretended  and  false  distinction  between  secu- 
lar and  spiritual  things.  "  By  clericalism,"  he  says 
(page  364),  "  I  understand  the  system  which  unduly 
exalts  the  clerical  office,  and  the  function  of  public 
worship,  so  as  to  draw  away  the  sense  of  divine 
agency  and  appointment  from  other  offices  and  other 
functions.  This  tendency,  as  has  before  been  said, 
is  not  really  one  which  exalts  the  Church.  It  exalts 
the  clergy  alone ;  it  dwarfs  and  emasculates  the 
Church.  The  clergy,  and  those  to  whom  the  system 
of  public  worship  is  dear,  must  learn  to  make  the 
great  sacrifice  of  Christians.  They  must  learn  to 
'live  not  for  themselves,'  to  '  look  not  on  their  own 
things,  but  also  on  the  things  of  others.'  The  sys- 
tem they  administer  must  be  felt  not  to  exist  for 
itself,  but  for  the  general  community.  They  must 
efface,  if  need  be,  themselves  and  their  system  in  the 
effort  to  save  the  world.  They  must  be  willing  to  be 
nothing,  that  Christ  may  be  all  in  all.  They  must 
desire  that,  if  it  were  possible,  there  should  be  not 
only  holy  orders  of  bishops  and  presbyters,  but  holy 
orders  of  artists,  and  poets,  and  teachers  of  science, 
and  statesmen.  They  should  be  forward  to  recognize 
good  in  departments  which  are  not   theirs,  and    in 


io6  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

forms  very  different  from  their  own.  A  ministry 
imbued  with  such  a  spirit  as  this  may  still  be  the 
luminous  and  inspiring  focus  where  light  and  heat 
are  stored  for  diffusion  through  the  whole  mass; 
whereas,  by  almost  identifying  Christianity  with  pub- 
lic worship,  and  absorbing  all  ministries  in  the  cleri- 
cal function,  and  thinking  more  of  correct  forms  of 
appointment  and  ordination  than  of  the  Divine  gifts 
which  form  the  true  succession  of  spiritual  leaders, 
we  may  become  the  greatest  of  all  obstacles  to  the 
establishment  of  the  kingdom  of  God." 

"  Ultima  ratio  regunt "  was  the  inscription  on  one 
of  the  cannons  of  Louis  XIV.  Some  of  the  kings 
and  priests  of  the  Church  of  God  have  labeled  their 
ecclesiastical  canons  with  the  same  maxim  of  tyranny  ; 
but  until  the  authority  of  Church  councils  and  priests 
be  vindicated  as  rational,  as  "  made  for  mati"  as  the 
best  means  subordinate  to  the  moral  and  spiritual 
welfare  of  believers — until  they  are  thus  seen  to  be 
Jure  divino,  they  will  be  inefficient.  Clericalism  may 
make  itself  obnoxious,  or  it  may  assume  the  method 
of  Jesus  and  of  St.  Paul,  and  commend  itself  to  every 
man's  conscience,  and  thus  speak  with  the  only  vital 
authority  that  avails  in  dealing  with  men's  souls. 
Such  clerical  work,  and  such  a  living  and  Catholic 
Church,  will  not  lack  that  authority  which  is  pow- 
erful, and  which  skeptics  really  crave.  Such  vital 
Christianity  will  be  a  far  more  efificient  antidote  to 
doubt  than  whole  libraries  of  polemical  Evidences. 
Many  of  these  volumes  are  as  hot  and  as  harmless  as 
papal  anathemas.  Such  "  aids  to  faith  "  have  recently 
been  somewhat  severel}'^  characterized  thus :  * 

*  The  Rev.  Dr.  William  Kirkits,  of  Baltimore. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  107 

"  There  is  scarcely  any  kind  of  literature  so  ex- 
asperating, and  even  demoralizing,  as  Christian  apolo- 
getics. Most  of  these  tedious  volumes  are  character- 
ized by  a  haughtiness,  a  truculence,  a  contemptuous- 
ness,  a  cynical  indifference  to  the  salvatit)n  of  souls,  a 
cheerful  alacrity  in  sacrificing  any  number  of  sinners 
to  a  single  syllogism,  which  almost  make  humane 
readers  regret  that  they  were  not  written  in  defense 
of  the  devil.  Mediaeval  arguments  against  heresy, 
Protestant  arguments  against  Popery,  Puritan  argu- 
ments against  Prelacy,  theistic  arguments  against  ag- 
nosticism— they  are  almost  all  alike.  Opponents  are 
fools  or  knaves,  or  a  mischievous  compound  of  the 
two.  Moreover,  they  really  intend  to  dethrone  the 
Almighty  and  to  ruin  souls.  They  are  not  misguided 
*  brethren '  to  be  *  gained,'  but  reprobates  to  be  de- 
stroyed by  '  fire  from  heaven.'  " 

This  is  too  severe,  at  least  too  sweeping  ;  for  there 
is  a  gathering  host  of  devout  men  who  are  writing  in 
full  sympathy  with  the  culture  of  the  present  cent- 
ury,* and  yet  wise  enough  to  know  that  wisdom  was 
not  born  with  this  generation ;  men  who  perceive 
that  Jesus  has  suffered  almost  as  much  from  his 
friendly  caricaturists  as  from  his  crucifiers,  and  yet 
can  boldly  say  to  the  latter,  "  Ye  know  not  what  ye 
do " ;  men  who  know  the  mutations  of  human  lan- 
guage and  conceptions,  and  yet  maintain  the  necessity 


*  The  writers  of  the  recent  volumes  of  that  remarkable  establishment 
for  producing  apologetical  literature — The  Bampton  Lecture — ably  illus- 
trate this  improved  modern  method  of  aiding  faith.  The  volumes  by 
Prebendary  Row,  Bishop  Temple,  Canon  Freemantle,  Prof.  Hatch,  Mr. 
R.  E.  Bartlett,  and  Prof.  Cheyne  are,  to  use  a  much-abused  expression, 
fully  abreast  of  modem  thought,  and  interpret  Christianity  in  concep- 
tions understanded  of  the  people  of  this  nineteenth  century. 
II 


io8  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

of  Church  dogma  and  Bible  truth  ;  men  whose  un- 
faltering faith  and  sweet  reasonableness  are  doing 
much  to  hold  and  win  back  many  whom  modern 
culture  has  alienated  from  formal  Christianity.  They 
are  ready  to  exclaim  with  Schleiermacher,  "  Woe  is 
me  if  Christianity  be  not  more  than  wj  system  !  "  and 
yet  to  say  yea  to  Coleridge's  assertion,  "  Christianity 
finds  me,"  and  to  Jacobi's,  "  Only  in  finding  God 
does  one  find  himself."  Such  men,  however,  have 
come  to  fully  appreciate  the  limitations  and  contra- 
dictions inherent  in  the  common  language  and  con- 
ceptions in  which  Christian  truth  is  envisaged  and 
held.  Both  are  inadequate  to  the  content.  Both 
pictorial  conception  and  the  dogmas  of  the  mere  un- 
derstanding are  partial,  abstract,  and  self-contradict- 
ory. They  have  their  worth.  They  are  the  cre- 
ations of  the  human  spirit  brooding  upon  Divine 
revelation.  The  Holy  Spirit  has  through  them  been 
guiding  us  to  fuller  apprehension  of  the  truth.  They 
are  not  worthless ;  they  are  not  false,  except  when 
held  abstractly  as  the  last  utterance  of  the  Spirit,  as 
the  last  insight  into  Divine  revelation,  and  the  un- 
changeable and  perfect  image  of  the  whole  truth. 
And  it  is  the  same  Holy  Spirit  that  is  urging  men  on 
to  a  wider  vision,  up  loftier  mounts,  and  into  deeper 
communion.  It  is  the  same  Spirit  co-working  with 
our  spirits,  groaning  with  our  spirits,  as  it  reveals 
the  imperfection  of  our  hitherto  attainment  and  ex- 
pression of  spiritual  knowledge.  This  Spirit  thus 
demands  that  we  find  in  religion  the  absolute  and 
self-consistent  truth.  Thought  does  demand  the  good 
work  of  replacing  worn-out  conceptions  by  new  and 
more  adequate  ones — more  adequate  because  more 
in  touch   with  current  thought  and  conceptions  in 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  109 

other  departments  of  mental  activity.  But  it  also 
demands  an  apprehension  of  the  absolute  ground  or 
authority  upon  which  all  these  rest,  and  an  intelli- 
gent, synthetic  comprehension  of  them  all  in  the  or- 
ganic unity  of  the  idea  of  religion  itself.  It  thus  un- 
dertakes a  criticism  of  the  faculties  of  imagination 
and  the  understanding.  It  shows  both  the  worth 
and  the  worthlessness  of  their  work.  Hegel,  in  his 
Logic,''^  fully  justifies  the  place  and  work  of  the  un- 
derstanding in  giving  definite  but  stereotyped  con- 
ceptions. At  the  same  time  he  shows  how  it  must 
be  transcended  by  the  further  activity  of  thought. 
In  this  work  he  notes  chiefly  the  limitations  of  the 
language  of  the  pictorial  imagination  —  that  is,  of 
Representation  {Vorstelhmg),  or  the  envisaging  of  the 
invisible  in  terms,  pictures,  and  conceptions  drawn 
from  the  visible  and  finite  realm.  The  infinite  and 
universal  is  represented  in  forms  of  the  finite  and 
contingent.  It  is  thus  manifested  to  us,  but  not  ade- 
quately. The  form  is  not  adequate  to  the  content. 
Thus,  the  absolute  representation  of  the  Absolute  is  in- 
trinsically impossible.  The  content  of  religion  may 
be,  and  is,  felt  and  imagined,  but  the  ultimate  demand 
of  the  human  spirit,  moved  by  the  Divine  Spirit,  is 
that  it  also  be  thought. 

We  have  already  seen  how  it  is  contained  in  feel- 
ing, and  how  it  passes  into  the  form  of  conception,  being 
thereby  only  further  developed  instead  of  abolished. 
Thought  now  proceeds  to  criticise  these  its  own  cre- 
ations. This  is  partly  the  work  of  common  rational- 
ism. It  is  a  phase  in  the  life  of  every  thoughtful 
person.     It  is  more  developed  in  some  men  and  in 

*  Page  122. 


no  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

some  ages  than  in  others.  It  appears  as  the  Aiifklae- 
rjcng  and  the  Eclaircisse7nent,  as  Deism  and  as  Ration- 
alism, Skepticism  and  Agnosticism.  Thus,  it  exposes 
the  following  chief  defects  of  its  own  conceptions 
and  dogmas  :  They  are  {a)  stereotyped  metaphors, 
{p)  external  and  abstract  propositions,  and  {c)  mutually 
self-contradictory  conceptions.  Prof.  Wallace  has 
thus  stated  *  Hegel's  criticism  of  this  approximate 
but  inexact  form  of  thinking  in  which  religious  truth 
is  largely  stated : 

"  Such  thinking  does  not  grasp  these  objects,  but 
sets  them  before  it.  («.)  It  is  still  trameled  by  the 
senses.  Thought  and  sensation  strive  for  the  mastery 
in  it.  Thought  is  bound  fast  to  an  illustration,  and 
of  this  illustration  it  can  not  as  presentative  thought 
divest  itself ;  the  eternally  living  idea  is  chained  to 
the  transient  and  perishable  form  of  sense.  It  is 
metaphorical  and  material  thinking,  which  is  helpless 
without  the  metaphor  and  the  matter,  {b^  Presenta- 
tive thought  envisages  what  is  timeless  and  infinite 
under  the  conditions  of  time  and  space.  It  loses 
sight  of  the  moral  and  spirit  of  historical  develop- 
ment under  the  semblance  of  the  names,  incidents, 
and  forms  in  which  it  is  displayed.  The  historical 
and  philosophical  sense  is  lost  under  the  antiquarian. 
Presentative  thought  keeps  the  shell,  and  throws 
away  the  kernel.  (^.)  The  terms  by  which  such  a 
materialized  thought  describes  its  objects  are  not  in- 
ternally connected  ;  each  is  independent  of  the  other, 
and  we  only  bring  them  together  for  the  nonce  by 
an  act  of  subjective  arrangement." 

This  criticism  of  thought  is  partly  the  work  of 

*  Hegel's  Logic,  Prolegomena  xci. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  1 1 1 

the  understanding  which  has  itself  created  the  object 
of  criticism.  It  is  also  partly  the  work  of  the  reason, 
as  the  faculty  of  the  infinite,  the  faculty  of  compre- 
hension, of  S3^stemization,  .of  concrete  totality.  It 
refuses  to  abide  by  the  work  of  the  understanding 
and  the  imagination  as  the  7ie  plus  ultra  attainment  of 
thought.  The  idea,  as  comprehensive,  concrete,  or- 
ganic synthesis  of  parts  into  members,  free  in  its  self- 
determination,  living  in  all  parts  of  itself — some  such 
a  speculative  synthesis  of  apparently  incongruous  ele- 
ments of  life  and  thought  it  is  that  lures  and  forces 
thought  on  to  higher  attainment.  Thought's  faith  in 
itself,  in  the  universe,  and  in  God,  may  be  said  to  be 
faith  in  such  a  vast,  self-consistent,  self-developing 
system.  Despair  of  thought  is  exactly  despair  of 
system ;  but  this  despair  is  not  the  chronic  or  healthy 
state  of  thought.  Thought  is  positive,  aggressive, 
laborious  in  its  persistent  infusion  .of  the  lucidity  of 
reason  into  all  within  its  ken.  It  is  the  logos  within 
joyfully  recognizing  itself  in  the  logos  without.  It  is 
subjective  consciousness  ripening  into  self-conscious- 
ness as  it  is  recreated  through  experience  in  the 
image  of  God's  mind.  It  is  thus  only  that  man,  rec- 
ognizing himself  as  the  interpretation  of  experience, 
can  become  the  adequate  interpreter  of  it.  Thought 
finds,  then,  all  the  ordinary  categories  of  the  under- 
standing and  conceptions  of  the  imagination  inade- 
quate to  interpret  its  experience  into  system.  Sys- 
tem it  must  have,  else  agnosticism,  despair,  and  death 
for  spirit.  It  does  not  seek  to  utterly  abolish  and 
destroy  the  content  of  feeling  and  imagination,  but  to 
realize  them  in  more  vital  form.  Thoughtful  com- 
prehension makes  us  neither  unfeeling  nor  without 
understanding:  and  imaarination.     As  the  definite  and 


1 1 2  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

pictorial  form  is  above  that  of  undeveloped  subject- 
ive feeling,  so  is  this  larger  comprehension  of  the 
contents  of  the  religious  consciousness  but  an  ad- 
vance in  form.  It  is,  to -use  the  favorite  and  preg- 
nant phrase  of  Hegel,  the  form  of  necessity — that  is, 
the  form  in  which  every  part  is  mutually  correlated 
and  essential  to  every  other  part  as  the  head  is  neces- 
sary to  the  heart  and  both  necessary  to  the  vital 
body.  The  highest  form  of  necessity  is  seen  only  in 
spiritual  organisms.  Here  necessity  becomes  self- 
necessity,  determinism  self -determinism,  and  the 
whole  an  organism  of  organisms  with  self-conscious- 
ness throughout.  The  higher  form  can  never  be  ad- 
equately illustrated  or  explained  by  a  lower*  one. 
You  can  not  explain  the  lowest  organism  in  terms  of 
inorganic  bodies.  You  can  not  explain  an  ethical  or 
spiritual  organism  in  terms  which  only  describe  a 
physical  organism.  Science  could  not  move  a  step 
without  this  admission.  The  lowest  form  of  organic 
life  is  not  very  different  from  inorganic  matter.  The 
lowest  form  of  animal  life  is  like  a  plant,  but  different. 
Man  is  like  an  animal,  but  different.  Mere  likeness 
would  reduce  the  exquisitely  graded  forms  of  the 
world  to  the  blank  identity  of  nondescript  proto- 
plasm. The  widest  generalizations  of  science  tend 
toward  some  such  indescribable  primal  world-stuff. 
Abstracting  difference  after  difference,  it  attains 
wider  genera,  orders,  kingdoms,  finally  passing  into 
some  undifferentiated  form  of  protoplasm.  Science 
thus  reconciles  and  unifies  all  things  by  abstracting 
all  unlikeness  and  reducing  them  to  identity — matter 
or  force.  It  may  thus  attempt  to  explain  man  in 
terms  of  animal  life,  and  animal  life  in  terms  of  chem- 
ical and  mechanical  relations ;  but  it  is  false  to  nature 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  1 1 3 

in  this  attempt.  It  reaches  its  richer  results  when  it 
is  descriptive,  and  notes  the  differences  between  its 
objects  that  demand  different  grades  of  categories  of 
description.  The  vegetable  kingdom  is  rightly  con- 
sidered richer  than  the  realm  where  only  mechanical 
and  chemical  relations  are  used  ;  and  the  animal  king- 
dom is  inclusive  of  still  more  various  differences. 
These  kingdoms  rise  above  and  upon  each  other. 
Chemical  forces  abrogate  in  combining  separate 
atoms.  Life  abrogates  while  transforming  them  into 
a  higher  unity.  The  plant  contains  fiber  and  sap, 
but  is  more  than  the  mere  sum  of  these  and  its  other 
elements.  A  new  and  higher  conception  is  needed 
to  describe  the  animal  Who  contains  all  the  ele- 
ments of  the  lower  kingdoms,  and  yet  is  more  than 
the  mechanical  equivalent  of  all  the  elements  from 
these  kingdoms  that  it  holds  in  a  transmuted  form. 
Yet  in  all  these  relations  science  posits  external  ne- 
cessity. Any  one  thing  is  the  result  of  the  totality 
of  conditions  and  elements  implied  in  it.  It  scarcely 
dares  rise  to  the  category  of  true  necessity,  to  that 
which  is  immanent  in  the  idea  or  system  of  self-con- 
sciousness, where  ^^/^relation  and  ^^//"-determination 
are  essential  categories.  The  course  of  Philosophy 
ends  here  with  just  what  science  has  as  yet  declined 
to  accept.  Its  progress,  too,  is  from  lower  to  higher 
categories.  It  supplies,  in  fact,  all  the  categories  that 
science  uses,  giving  them  their  relative  truth  and 
yet  transcending  all,  while  realizing  them  all  in  its 
ultimate  category  of  the  Idea,  Reason,  self-conscious 
Personality.  It  is  the  completion  of  the  system  of 
categories,  any  one  of  which  is  not  false,  as  a  mem- 
ber of  the  whole,  only  false  when  held  as  ultimate. 
Philosophy  maintains  that  there  is  one  system,  or  the 


1 1 4  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

systematic  unity  of  all  things,  and  that  this  unity  is  im- 
manent and  self-creative,  self-determining  as  to  all  its 
parts  or  members,  creating  and  thereby  manifesting 
and  realizing  itself  in  its  differences.  This  Idea  or 
system  may  be  chronologically  last  and  only  reached 
by  infinite  struggle  through  the  study  of  all  phenom- 
ena on  lower  levels  ;  but  when  once  reached  it  is  seen 
to  be  essentially  and  creatively  the  true  first  cause. 
It  is  the  idea  of  the  plant  or  animal  that  determines, 
creates  its  various  parts.  It  is  never  the  mere  sum 
of  them.  The  idea  only  realizes  itself  through  them, 
fulfills  itself  in  all  its  self-differentiations.  The  true 
first  cause,  then,  is  not  the  empirical  origin  but  its 
completed  form.  Man  may  have  sprung  from  the 
ape,  but  is  not  explainable  by  the  ape  and  any  num- 
ber of  external  conditions.  The  idea  of  man  is  more 
than  the  sum  total  of  all  empirical  antecedents  and 
concomitants.  He  is  a  man  for  all  that.  We  can  no 
more  explain  him  by  these  than  we  can  explain  a 
grand  cathedral  by  a  description  of  every  bit  of  stone 
and  mortar  and  wood  that  forms  it.  Its  idea,  its 
plans  as  thought  out  in  the  brain  of  an  architect,  is 
its  true  explanation,  its  real  first  cause.  Illustrations 
without  number  might  be  adduced  of  this  unscientific 
use  of  the  post  hoc  ergo  propter  hoc  by  scientists.  I 
have  used  these  few  only  to  illustrate  the  difficulties 
and  contradictions  found  by  thought  in  current  con- 
ceptions of  religious  truth,  by  which  it  is  forced  on 
to  the  higher  comprehensive  unity  of  the  Idea.  Il- 
lustrations, too,  without  number  might  be  adduced 
to  show  how  metaphorical  conceptions  about  God 
and  man  are  literalized,  how  the  understanding  de- 
fines and  isolates  these  from  essential  relations,  how 
contradictory  many  religious  conceptions  are  to  each 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  1 1 5 

other,  how  categories  of  thought  applicable  only  to 
lower  realms  are  dogmatically  applied  to  express  the 
true  content  of  the  religious  relation  as  felt  in  the 
heart,  how  inadequate  they  are  to  represent  the  real 
heart  of  religion — that  intimate,  vital,  congenial,  in- 
dissoluble, organic,  and  necessary  relation  between 
God  and  man.  All  these  it  is  which  raises  the  storm 
of  adverse  criticism  and  of  anxious  doubt  that  are 
the  most  conspicuous  phases  of  the  religious  world 
to-day.  The  pious  soul  and  the  devout  thinker  alike 
demand  a  higher  point  of  view. 

The  religious  knowledge  of  ordinary  thought  is 
strained  through  finite  images  and  materialized  con- 
ceptions— is  representative,  figurate,  and  consequent- 
ly inadequate  Even  in  the  higher  form  of  system- 
atic theology  it  is  one-sided  and  inadequate  because 
passed  through  the  sieve  of  a  narrow  and  rationaliz- 
ing logic.  This  narrow  logic  let  free  plays  havoc 
with  dogmas,  exaggerating  differences  instead  of  giv- 
ing unity.  There  must,  then,  be  a  higher  method  of 
knowing  the  content  of  religion,  of  grasping  the 
manifold  elements  of  divine  truth  so  that  they  shall 
be  seen  as  correlated  members  of  an  organic  whole. 
Nature,  man,  God,  these — their  reality  and  unity,  can 
only  be  rationally  conceived  of  and  held  under  the 
form  of  an  orgajiic  unity,  which  is  The  Speculative 
Idea  of  Religion. 

There  is  an  essential  necessity,  then,  for  thought 
to  translate  the  content  of  the  religious  relation  out 
of  these  inadequate  forms  into — 

III.  The  Speculative  Idea  of  Religion. — Complaint 
is  sometimes  made  that  philosophy  destroys  instead 
of  transforms  the  content  of  the  religious  conscious- 
ness.    It  is  only  true  in  the  sense  that  the  fruit  de- 


1 1 6  Philosophy  of  Religion, 

stroys  the  blossom.  Those  who  love  the  blossom 
and  do  not  appreciate  the  fruit  will  find  little  in  the 
philosophy  of  religion  to  their  taste.  Those  who  ex- 
pect to  find  all  the  old  conflicting  metaphorical  con- 
ceptions retained  and  justified  in  their  old  form  will 
be  disappointed.  Transformation  means  change  and 
development.  It  will  be  appreciated  only  by  those 
who  think  through  the  transformation.  The  same 
objection  is  made  to  Theology  that  it  destroys  re- 
ligion, that  little  worth  having  is  left  of  religion  in 
the  form  of  Theology  or  Philosophy.  Further  notice 
will  be  taken  of  this  objection  after  the  transforma- 
tion. 

It  must  be  noted  that  we  make  no  objection  to 
the  purely  religious  use  of  metaphorical  conceptions. 
It  is  only  when  they  cease  to  wing  the  flight  heaven- 
ward, and  when  the  understanding  insists  upon  their 
limitations  and  contradictions,  so  that  they  can  no 
longer  be  the  unquestioning  language  of  the  heart, 
that  thought  is  forced  on  to  transcend  them.  We 
have  admitted  that  the  language  of  religion  is  gen- 
erally used  with  the  tacit  acknowledgment  that  it  is 
inadequate ;  that  God  and  heaven  and  its  blissful  life 
are  all  "  beyond  compare " ;  that  language  and  im- 
agination are  utterly  beggared  in  attempting  any 
exhaustive  description  of  them  ;  that  it  multiplies 
all  its  conceptions  by  the  infinite  and  subtracts  from 
them  all  that  is  accidental,  empirical,  and  sensuous ; 
that  all  these  are  but  suggestions  to  the  imagination 
and  heart  to  enable  the  soul  to  immeasurably  tran- 
scend them.  Thought  does  not  criticise  its  own  lan- 
guage of  devotion  when  thus  used.  It  is  only  when 
we,  or  others,  misconceive  and  abuse  it  that  thought 
begins  its  dialectic,  its  labor  of  chastising  love  upon 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  1 1 7 

it.     Our  Lord  himself  spake  much  in  parables — spir- 
itual truth  was  like  various  natural  objects — yet  even 
his  disciples  were  sometimes  with  those  others  who 
heard  but  did  not  understand.     His  wonderful  para- 
ble of  calling  his  "  flesh  meat  indeed,"  and  his  "  blood 
drink  indeed,"  was  a  "  hard  saying  "  to  them,  and  he 
had  to  warn  them  that  only  the  Spirit  could  give  life. 
The  highest  representation  that  we  make  is  that 
of  the  Absolute  as  God.     But  what  does  the  word 
God  signify  to  us  ?     What  are  the  mental  images 
and  concepts  that  it  contains  for  us  ?     That  depends 
upon  who  we  are,  and  at  what  period  of  life  and  cult- 
ure we  are,  at  the  time  of  uttering  it.     Here  we  may 
notice  the  dialectic  at  work  at  home.     We  begin  at 
the  conceptions  of  God  held  by  the  most  superstitious 
heathen  and  follow  along  through  the  higher  forms 
of  the  world-religious,  criticising  and  refusing  to  ac- 
cept any  of  their  conceptions  of  God  as  adequate  or 
worthy.     We  continue  the  examination  of  the  Chris- 
tian conception  of  God  in  different  epochs  of  time 
and  culture,  still  criticising  current  conceptions.    We 
criticise  the  conceptions  of  God  that  many  of  our 
fellow-Christians  about  us  have.     It  is  still  fashion- 
able in  some  pulpits  to  even  revile  the  Calvinistic 
conception  as  being  most  inhuman  and  most  undivine. 
We  find  every  phase  of  heresy  repeating  itself  in 
common  conceptions  of  God.     We  criticise  our  own 
conceptions.     From  the  mother's  knee  to  the  dying 
couch  we  are  transforming  or  replacing  imperfect 
conceptions  about  God  by  more  worthy  ones.     We 
acknowledge  that  our  highest  conception  only  faintly 
adumbrates  and  suggests  the  inexpressible    Infinite 
and  Absolute.     Thus  God  remains  the  abstract  and 
simple  Absolute.     This  tacit  acknowledgment,  how- 


1 1 8  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

ever,  has  led  to  the  shocking  position  that  God  is 
unknown  and  unknowable.  The  truth  in  this  doc- 
trine of  the  Unconditioned  is  that  he  is  inconceiv- 
able under  any  temporal  and  visible  conditions  ;  that 
our  concept-making  faculty  only  creates  out  of  such 
conditions,  and  therefore  can  never  adequately  repre- 
sent him  to  the  eye,  soul,  or  mind. 

We  try  to  make  our  conception  mean  more  by 
adding  attributes — mere  generalized  conceptions — 
which  are  not  seen  to  proceed  out  of  the  essential 
nature  of  God.  They  are  fixed  and  independent 
qualities  not  mutually  related  and  mutually  creating. 
They  are  conceptions  about  God,  not  derivative  from 
him.  Lacking  substantial  ground  and  organic  rela- 
tion, they  are  seen  to  be  formally  and  mutually  self- 
contradictory  the  moment  they  are  taken  out  of  their 
purely  devotional  use.  They  are  externally  attached 
to  the  empty  conception  of  the  Absolute.  If  God  is 
Almighty,  there  is  no  place  for  him  to  be  All-wise. 
If  he  is  just,  he  can  not  be  merciful.*  A  scheme  of 
these  attributes  is,  therefore,  proposed  by  theologians 
for  harmonizing  these  contradictions,  which  barely 
satisfies  while  it  is  being  made.  The  defect  in  this 
method  of  defining  God  through  attributes  is,  that 
they  are  only  special  characteristics,  whose  only 
ground  is  our  subjective  conceptions.  Thus  comes 
the  feeling,  so  strong  among  the  Orientals,  that  God 
is  the  "  many-named,"  and  yet  the  nameless.  A  suc- 
cession of  such  predicates  can  no  more  describe  the 
essential  nature  of  God  than  a  series  of  points  can 
describe  a  straight  line,  or  than  a  series  of  distinct 
organs  can  describe  a  living  animal.    The  life  is  more 

*  Philosophic  der  Religion,  vol.  i,  p.  153,  and  vol.  ii,  p.  230. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religio7t.  1 1 9 

than  all  organs;  in  fact,  creates  and  integrates  and 
lives  in  them  all.  They  do  not  determine  or  describe 
it,  but  the  reverse.  We  may  call  God  the  Creator. 
In  this  figurate  conception,  not  unjustly  labeled  "  the 
carpenter  theory,"  there  is  no  essential  or  necessary 
relation  between  God  and  the  world.  He  might  or 
might  not  have  created  the  world.  His  creative  at- 
tribute is  not  an  essential  one,  but  depends  upon  his 
arbitrary  choice.  It  defines  God  only  as  related  to 
a  contingent  world,  thus  indicating  his  relation  to  an- 
other and  not  to  himself.  Then  his  almightiness  cre- 
ated only  dead,  inert  matter,  without  form  and  void. 
His  wisdom  is  then  conceived  as  coming  to  repair 
his  first  creation.  He  might,  moreover,  have  re- 
frained from  using  both  these  attributes.  The  crea- 
tion is  not  essential  to  his  immanent,  divine,  self- 
activity.  "  But  we  are  conscious  that  God  is  not 
represented  in  a  living  way  in  this  enumeration  of 
arbitrary  and  self-contradictory  predicates.  To  say 
that  they  must  be  conceived  only  in  sensu  eminentiori, 
does  not  remove  the  contradictions.  The  true  solu- 
tion is  only  contained  in  the  Idea  (Idee)  in  which  they 
are  seen  to  be  self-determinations  of  God,  who  in 
them  all  differentiates  himself  from  himself,  and  yet 
eternally  subsumes  and  realizes  himself  in  them."  * 

Thought  makes  the  like  criticism  of  the  doctrine 
of  original  sin,  and  of  the  Holy  Trinity,  as  held  in 
ordinary  religious  conception.  Hegel  himself  is  the 
staunchest  maintainer  of  the  Nicene  doctrine  of  the 
Godhead.  Its  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  is  the  only  ab- 
solute and  essential  definition  of  God.  But  the  ordi- 
nary, unphilosophical  conception  of  the  Trinity  is  a 

*  Philosophic  der  Religion,  vol.  ii,  p.  230. 
12 


I20  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

mixture  of  sensible  and  empirical  elements  with  super- 
sensible and  philosophical  ones,  of  picture-thought 
(Vorstellung)  and  of  the  speculative  thought  idea 
(Begriff),  all  enveloped  in  mystery.  If  positive,  defi- 
nite conception  is  attempted,  the  result  is  either  trithe- 
ism  or  Sabellianism.  To  excommunicate  for  these  two 
errors  would  be  to  almost  empty  the  seats  of  the 
laity  and  to  decimate  the  stalls  of  the  clergy. 

This  is  the  continual  process.  Metaphors  are 
used,  then  stereotyped  and  abused,  and  then  criti- 
cised. But  all  this  is  the  work  of  the  self-same  mind. 
Metaphors  are  for  worship,  and  thus  they  reveal 
without  defining  God.  They  are  literalized  and  used 
in  constructing  schemes  of  theology.  They  are  ar- 
gued about  and  with ;  but  argument  ends  in  reveal- 
ing their  inadequacy,  and  the  demand  then  is  for 
something  better,  or  for  nothing  at  all.  It  is  I  who 
worship,  I  who  argue,  and  I  who  criticise,  doubt, 
and  press  forward  to  self-consistent  systemization  of 
necessary  truth.  We  refuse  to  abide  in  the  world  of 
abstractions  and  contradictions  into  which  the  criti- 
cal understanding  has  uncreated  our  fair  world  of 
sentiment,  fancy,  and  devotion.  We  decline  its  prof- 
fered gift  of  disjecta  membra. 

The  parts  in  his  hand  he  may  hold  and  class, 
But  the  spiritual  link  is  lost,  alas ! 

The  demand  of  thought  now  is  for  the  spiritual 
link  which  shall  make  these  dry  bones  live,  recre- 
ating and  living  in  "  the  whole  body  fitly  joined 
together,  .  .  .  making  increase  of  the  whole  unto  the 
building  up  of  itself  in  love."  God  and  his  attri- 
butes, man  and  his  faculties,  the  world  and  its  mani- 
foldness — is  there  no  process  by  which  these  can  be 


The  Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  121 

held  as  essentially  and  organically  related  ?  Is  there 
no  system?  Is  chaos  and  not  cosmos  ultimate  for 
thought?  The  dialectic  of  thought  forces  u§  to  seek 
a  process  of  mediation,  by  which  thought  does  attain 
unto  the  idea,  system,  cosmos,  in  which  the  religious 
consciousness  finds  its  fullest  content  and  vindica- 
tion. Religion  is  the  actual  and  mutual  relation  of 
the  Divine  and  human  spirit."  What  is  thus  given 
immediately  as  the  naive  perception  of  the  soul,  has 
been  criticised  and  shown  to  be  impossible  by  the 
understanding,  translating  conceptions  into  definite 
and  mutually  independent  entities.  God  is  there, 
we  are  here ;  any  communion  is  only  fancy.  But 
thought  denies  its  own  agnosticism,  and  appeals  to 
Philosophy  to  show  the  coherent,  systematic,  rational, 
and  necessary  relation  of  God  and  man.  There  must 
be,  is  its  naive  faith,  an  idea  or  an  absolute  Idea  (Idee) 
in  which  all  the  constituent  elements  of  the  religious 
consciousness  shall  be  seen  to  be  correlated  mem- 
bers of  an  organic  whole,  in  which  one  member  im- 
plies and  necessitates  the  whole,  while  the  whole  im- 
plies and  necessitates  and  finds  itself  in  all  the  mem- 
bers. Thus  religion  can  be  demonstrated  to  be 
necessary  in  the  high  sense  of  being  implicit  in  the 
self-development  and  realization  of  the  Absolute  Idea 
itself.  Hegel  says  that  "  every  act  of  mind  contains 
implicitly  the  principle  which,  when  purified  and  de- 
veloped, rises  to  religion."  *  This  is  the  high  argu- 
ment of  the  whole  Logic — no  thing,  no  thought  is  iso- 
lated and  alone.  All  meet  and  mingle  and  have  their 
only  being  in  Him  who  is  the  ultimate  category  of 
thought,  and  at  the  same  time  the  primal  source  of 

*  Logic,  p.  115. 


122  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

all  things  and  all  thought.  Only  the  necessary  is  the 
free,  but  it  is  free  only  when  it  is  not  necessitated 
from  without,  or  by  the  totality  of  mechanical  con- 
ditions, but,  when  its  necessity  is  immanent,  springs 
from  its  own  idea,  is  its  own  realization  or  self-de- 
termination. But  this  result  is  only  reached  by 
thought,  through  a  winding  and  dialectic  process. 
This  process  is  the  work  of  thought  upon  the  relig- 
ious consciousness.  Or  we  may  say  that  it  is  the 
implicit  mediation  of  thought.  We  have  now  to 
note  some  of  the  stages  in — 2.  The  mediation  of  the 
religious  consciousness  within  itself. 

The  religious  consciousness  keeps  insisting  that 
its  knowledge  of  God  and  spiritual  truth  is  immediate. 
Philosophy  finds  that  the  simplest  kind  of  knowledge 
has  passed  through  media;  much  more  is  it  true  of 
the  rich  content  of  the  religious  consciousness.  We 
call  a  thing  immediate  that  is  known  directly  through 
itself  without  any  relations  to  other  things.  It  is  the 
7taive  perception,  the  first  impression  that  a  thing 
makes  upon  our  senses,  before  it  is  seen  in  a  net- 
work of  relations  and  in  the  process  of  a  develop- 
ment. A  man  considered  thus  immediately  is  the 
child,  an  oak  is  the  acorn.  Mediation  signifies  the 
process  by  which  a  thing  passes  out  of  its  immedi- 
ateness  into  its  development  and  realization.  A  cult- 
ured man  is  the  mediated  man — the  untutored  child, 
who  has  passed  through  all  the  media  of  social,  po- 
litical, scientific,  and  literary  culture.  In  fact,  every 
concrete  thing  exists  thus  by  means  of  relations. 

Nothing  in  the  world  is  single : 

All  things  by  a  law  divine 
In  one  another's  being  mingle. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  123 

This  relation  of  one  thing  to  another  in  a  depend- 
ent, conditioned  way  is  called  Reflection.  It  is  viewed 
in  the  light  which  it  casts  upon  another,  or  which 
another  casts  upon  it.  "This  is  the  first  form  of  rela- 
tioning  or  connecting  the  disjecta  membra,  the  iso- 
lated phenomena  of  observation.  We  associate  one 
with  another,  thereby  knowing  them  both  better. 
Thought  does  not  stop  with  mere  definition  of  sepa- 
rate things.  The  canon  of  identity  and  the  lazv  of  con- 
tradiction do  not  express  its  whole  work.  They  afifirm 
that  every  finite  thing  is  itself  and  no  other,  and  that 
A  is  not  B.  But,  even  in  thus  defining,  thought  re- 
lates and  connects  things,  both  w^th  each  other  and 
with  the  defining  mind.  This  is  fully  worked  out  in 
the  second  division  of  the  Logic — Essence  ( Weseri),  all 
of  whose  categories  are  those  of  reflection  of  one 
thing  into  and  upon  one  another.  Substance  and 
qualities,  cause  and  effect,  are  the  chief  of  these  cate- 
gories of  reflection  or  relation.  Here  the  world  of 
separate  phenomena,  of  qualitative  and  quantitative 
differences,  merges  into  a  world  of  infinite  variety,  of 
essentially  related  and  transitory  existences ;  each  of 
which  is  only  as  it  determines  and  is  determined 
by  others,  according  to  universal  laws.  Attribute 
means  nothing  without  substance,  effect  without 
cause,  and  vice  versa.  These  are  the  categories  that 
modern  science  uses  in  relating  and  correlating  end- 
lessly diverse  phenomena  into  its  system,  held  to- 
gether by  external  and  mechanically  necessary  laws. 
It  is  here  that  false  necessity  enters  with  its  chain  of 
absolute  power.  One  thing  is  necessitated  by  all 
others  to  which  it  is  related.  Every  effect  has  a 
cause.  It  is  what  it  is  because  it  is  so  determined 
or  created  by  its  cause.     Man  is  thus  viewed  as  an 


1 24  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

effect  of  the  total  physical  conditions  which  enter 
into  and  environ  him.  Within  the  adamantine  em- 
brace of  this  necessity  all  things  are  swept  and  kept 
chained  forever  and  forever.  It  is  needless  to  do  more 
than  thus  refer  to  this  doctrine  of  necessity  or  deter- 
minism that  is  maintained  in  all  its  rigor  by  the  chiefs 
of  science  to-day.  These  categories  of  science  are 
the  work  of  thought,  and  can  not  be  said  to  be  false. 
Yet  they  are  false  when  held  as  ultimate.  Thought 
uses,  but  refuses  to  be  bound  by,  or  to  stop  with, 
them.  It  goes  on  to  mediate  them  into  higher  and 
more  adequate  forms.  Relativism  and  physical  ne- 
cessity are  superseded  by  the  idea  (Begriff)  which 
itself  evolves  all  difference  and  all  relations  out  of 
itself,  and  realizes  itself  in  and  through  them.  Here 
relation  becomes  self-x€i2X\on,  the  determined  be- 
comes the  5^//"-determined.  Here  thought  posits 
the  category  of  spiritual,  organic  unity,  of  which  all 
physical  and  vital  organisms  are  but  faintest  adum- 
brations. It  is  a  concrete,  living,  self-differentiating, 
and  self-integrating  whole,  apart  from  which  no  mem- 
ber is  aught  but  a  fragment,  and  which  itself,  apart 
from  its  members,  is  naught.  It  is  an  organism,  not 
merely  of  organs,  as  in  a  physical  body,  but  of  organ- 
isms. The  life  of  the  whole  is  in  every  part,  and 
every  part  lives  only  in  the  whole.  Each  part  is 
a  microcosm,  and  the  whole  the  macrocosm,  of  free, 
self-determined,  spiritual  activity.  Hegel  makes  the 
category  of  Reciprocity  to  be  the  bridge  from  the 
necessity  of  relativity  to  the  freedom  of  the  idea.  A 
cause  is  only  a  cause  in  its  effect.  It  is  bound  to  its 
effect  as  much  as  its  effect  is  to  it.  Each  is  an  alter 
ego,  finds  itself  duvd  not  an  enemy  in  the  other.  They 
are  reciprocally  complementary.     Thus,  reciprocity 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  125 

is  a  higher  category  than  cause  and  efifect,  and  trans- 
forms their  external  necessity  into  immanent  necessity. 
This  infifiite  connection  with  self  becomes  the  idea  (Be- 
griflf)  which  freely  posits  all  differences— substance, 
cause,  and  effect — and  yet  finds  itself  in  them.  The 
truth  of  necessity  is  thus  seen  to  be  freedom.  Things 
are  mutually  related  and  determined  by  each  other, 
not  as  enemies  but  as  congenial  relatives  —  "  each  of 
them,  in  its  connection  with  the  other,  being  as  it  were 
at  home  and  combining  with  itself."*  The  Idea  con- 
tains all  the  earlier  categories  of  thought  merged  in  it. 
It  is  infinite  creative  form,t  complete  in  all  its  crea- 
tions, and  not  in  distinction  from  them.  Thought  pro- 
ceeds further  through  the  categories  of  the  subjective 
idea  (logical  forms  proper)  of  the  objective  idea,  in  such 
forms  as  mechanism,  chemistn,  and  teleology,  to  the  Abso- 
lute /</m(Idee)  or  Spirit,  or  Self-conscious  Personality, 
which  is  beyond  and  creative  of,  yet  lives  in,  without 
destroying,  the  personality  of  all  other  spirits — "  in 
knowledge  oi  whom  is  eternal  life,  and  whose  service  is 
perfect  freedom."  This  logical  ultimate,  is  the  chro- 
nological first,  the  vot]<ti^  vo^aewii  which  Aristotle  long 
ago  termed  the  supreme  form  of  the  idea.  The  simplest 
act  of  the  mind,  the  truth  grasped  by  any  of  the  lower 
categories  leads  out  from  itself,  foundationless  and 
restless  till  it  rests  in  its  perfect  explanation  and  cause : 

.  .  .  Flower  in  the  crannied  wall, 
I  pluck  you  out  of  the  crannies  ; 
Hold  you  here,  root  and  all,  in  my  hand, 
Little  flower  ;  but  if  I  could  understand 
What  you  are,  root  and  all,  and  all  in  all, 
I  should  know  what  God  and  man  is. 

*  Cf.  Logic,  p.  243.  f  Ibid.  p.  247. 


126  Philosophy  of  Religioji. 

But  we  are  anticipating  too  much.  We  have  yet 
to  notice  some  of  the  steps  of  mediation  by  which 
this  mount  of  transfiguration  is  reached.  The  Logic 
does  nothing  else  than  exhibit  this  restless  progress 
of  thought  through  all  lower  and  progressively  more 
adequate  categories  to  this  Category  of  categories. 
Thinking  means  just  this  process  of  finding  itself,  its 
higher  freedom,  in  realms  that  at  first  seem  foreign 
necessity.  No  one  category  is  false  which  one  goes 
through  on  the  way  to  truth,  but  is  itself  a  phase  of 
truth,  an  organic  element  of  the  Idea,  which  becomes 
false  the  moment  it  is  torn  from  the  living  body. 
The  Idea  is  the  completed  system,  not  of  fragments, 
but  of  organic  members.  Hegel's  Logic  is  thus  at 
once  Metaphysics  and  Theology.  The  whole  of  it  is 
an  explication  of  the  nature  and  activity  of  God.  So 
a  full  explication  of  the  mediation  of  thought  would 
require  a  full  exposition  of  the  Logic.  Here  we  can 
notice  but  a  few  of  the  steps,  by  the  way  of  example. 

We  talk  of  immediate  knowledge,  immediate  in- 
tuition, and  of  things  immediately  present  to  our 
senses.  The  truth  is,  that  there  is  nothing  that  is  im- 
mediate or  unrelated. 

"  Nothing  in  the  world  is  single."  Everything  to 
be  known  must  be  known  through  relations,  and  to 
be  fully  known  must  be  seen  as  a  member  of  a  sys- 
tem. The  absolutely  unmediated,  unrelated,  is  the 
absolutely  indefinable,  unknowable.  Strip  any  exist- 
ent thing  of  all  its  relations,  and.  its  mere  existence  is 
mere  nothing.  It  is  only  cognizable  and  real  as  it 
becomes  related,  mediated.  The  seed  may  be  said 
to  be  the  immediate  form  of  a  tree ;  but  the  seed  it- 
self is  the  result  of  many  mediations.  I  am  here,  but 
my  immediate  presence  here  is  mediated  by  my  hav- 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  127 

ing  made  the  journey  hither.  Even  in  the  lowest 
form  of  sensuous  perception,  knowledge  is  the  result 
of  the  relation  of  a  subject  to  an  object.  1  am  con- 
scious of  a  thing  or  of  myself  as  affected,  impressed, 
mediated  by  the  object  perceived.  Cogito  ergo  sum 
is  sometimes  proposed  as  signifying  immediate  knowl- 
edge of  self ;  but  I  know  myself  only  as  thinking,  act- 
ing, living.  There  is  no  passive  substrate,  or  inact- 
ive ego.     Thinking  activity  is  its  very  essence. 

Quite  as  true  is  it  that  all  religious  knowledge 
is  mediated.  Christian  education  is  the  educing  of 
something  by  means  of  something.  From  childhood 
up  there  is  the  mediation  of  Bible  instruction,  cate- 
chism, forms  of  worship,  creeds,  and  doctrines.  Bap- 
tism is  not  an  opus  opcrattim,  done  once  for  all.  It  in- 
volves instruction  in  "all  things  which  a  Christian 
ought  to  know  and  believe  to  his  soul's  health." 
Baptism  is  only  completed  in  Confirmation.  "  Ye 
are  to  take  care  that  this  child  be  brought  to  the 
Bishop,  to  be  confirmed  by  him  so  soon  as  he  can  say 
the  Creed,  the  Lord's  Prayer,  and  the  Ten  Command- 
ments, and  is  sufficiently  instructed  in  the  other  parts 
of  the  Church  Catechism  set  forth  for  that  purpose." 

The  Holy  Communion  follows,  still  further  real- 
izing the  Sacrament  of  Baptism,  which  can  not  be 
said  to  be  really  finished  till  sanctification  is  attained. 
The  Roman  Church  completes  it  by  the  Sacrament 
of  Extreme  Unction. 

Revealed  religion  is  religion  mediated  b)^  revela- 
tion. Revelation  is  mediated  by  signs  and  wonders, 
and  mighty  works,  and  a  whole  course  of  historical 
manifestations.     It  is  truth  done  in  history. 

In  what  is  called  the  testimony  of  the  Spirit  there 
is  the  relation  of  the  human  to  the  Divine  Spirit, 


128  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

made  possible  and  realized  by  means  of  all  previous 
spiritual  culture. 

Religion  considered  as  the  elevation  of  the  human 
spirit  to  the  Divine  is  a  process  either  from  the  finite 
self  and  world  to  the  Infinite,  or  from  the  Infinite  to 
ourselves  as  included  in  it.  Our  knowledge  of  God 
through  the  so-called  proofs  of  his  existence  is  pro- 
fessedly mediated  knowledge,  passing  from  step  to 
step  in  a  process  of  argument.  Kant  has  forever 
shown  how  they  fail  as  formal  demonstrations.  We 
must  note  their  limitations  as  formal  proofs,  and  yet 
maintain  the  labor  of  thought  they  contain.  Hegel 
says  that  they  are  only  a  formal  statement  of  the  im- 
plicit logic  of  religion,  only  ways  of  analyzing  and 
describing  that  inward  movement  of  mind  above  the 
things  of  time  and  sense,  or  that  leap  or  flight  of 
thought  from  the  natural  to  the  supernatural  as  its 
own  true  self.  Thought  does  make  this  leap.  It 
does  thus  intelligize  the  data  of  sensations  and  elicit 
universality  out  of  them.  Considering  nature,  it  rises 
to  God.  This  does  not  mean  that  they  find  Him  as 
the  result  of  the  widest  induction.  It  means  that 
nature  implies  God,  that  nature  is  the  *'  other "  of 
God,  who,  though  seen  in  consequence  of,  is  also  seen 
as  the  absolute  ground  of  the  initial  step  and  the 
whole  process.  Neither  is  He  found  at  the  end  of  a 
syllogism,  though  the  formal  statement  of  the  onto- 
logical  argument  seems  to  imply  this.  In  truth,  it  as- 
serts thought's  own  self-necessitated  relation  to  God. 

As  formal  proof s  all  these  vainly  write  the  sign  of 
equality  between  all  knowledge  and  God.  God  is 
not  merely  the  equivalent  of  all  finite  things,  effects, 
design,  intelligence,  nor  of  the  highest  human  con- 
ception of  him.     "  It  is  not  on  the  finite  ground  oc- 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  129 

cupied  by  the  Sciences  that  we  can  expect  to  meet 
the  indwelling  presence  of  the  Infinite.  Lalande  was 
right  when  he  said  that  he  had  swept  the  whole 
heaven  with  his  glass  and  had  not  seen  God."  *  Yet 
these  proofs  "  which  start  from  finite  being  give  an 
expression  to  the  necessary  exaltation  of  thought  to 
God."  They  are  no  inventions  of  an  over-subtle  re- 
flection, but  the  necessary  and  native  channel  in 
which  the  movement  of  mind  runs,  f  We  must  ad- 
mit, after  Kant  and  John  Stuart  Mill,  that  merely  as 
arguments  or  formal  proofs  they  fail.  We  say  that 
they  give  very  inadequate  expression  to  the  inner, 
implicit  logic  of  religion  and  thought,  which  syllo- 
gizes God  and  man  in  indissoluble  union.:}; 

All  proof  is  through  mediation  or  the  connecting 
of  one  thing  with  another  in  necessary  relation ;  but 
this  necessary  relation  may  be  merely  mechanical.  It 
can  be  proved  that  a  roof  is  necessary  to  a  house,  and 
shingles  and  nails  to  a  roof.  All  forms  of  external 
effects  are  necessitated  by  their  causes  or  by  the  to- 
tality of  empirical  conditions  that  will  not  permit  it 
to  be  otherwise.  Given  one,  you  can  prove  the  other. 
Then  there  is  subjective  necessity.  We  are  so  consti- 
tuted that  we  can  not  feel  otherwise.  Given  certain 
conditions,  and  we  can  prove  certain  subjective  emo- 
tions. Then  there  is  proof  from  logical  necessity. 
The  thing  to  be  proved  is  contained  in,  deduced 
from,  dependent  upon,  necessitated  by  the  premise. 
No  one  of  these  forms  of  proof  is  congruous  with  the 
being  of  God.  He  is  the  underivative,  undeducible, 
and  found  not  by  the  widest  possible  inductions  of 

*  The  Logic,  p.  105.  f  Ibid.,  p.  113. 

\  Hegel  makes  extended  examination  of  these  proofs  throughout  his 
Logic,  and  chiefly  in  a  large  appendix  to  his  Philosophic  der  Religion. 


130  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

science ;  and  yet  neither  sound  common  sense  nor 
philosophy  will  yield  up  the  right  to  rise  to  God 
from  and  out  of  the  empirical  view  of  the  world. 
Man  is  a  being-  who  thinks,  and  thinks  not  only  in  the 
categories  which  science  uses,  but  also  in  the  cate- 
gories of  religion  and  philosophy.  Thinking  elicits 
not  only  the  universality  of  science  out  of  finite 
things,  but  also  thinks  the  concrete  universality 
which  religion  calls  God.  The  finite  implies  the  in- 
finite as  the  center  implies  a  circumference,  the  rela- 
tive and  dependent  imply  the  absolute,  the  transitory 
the  eternal ;  the  wisdom,  life,  and  truth  in  the  world 
imply  an  all-wise,  almighty,  eternally  living  God, 
No  criticism  can  destroy  or  antiquate  this  implicit 
logic  of  the  human  mind.  The  formal  statements  of 
this  process  are  not  merely  invalid,  but  the  proof  they 
afford  creates  at  best  a  hard,  cold,  unsatisfying  con- 
viction. They  do  not  give  us  the  vital  knowledge  of 
God.  None  can  wonder  at  their  insufficiency  to  con- 
vert an  atheist ;  but  they  are  misinterpreted  when 
accepted  only  at  their  formal,  logical  worth.  They 
very  inadequately  describe  that  movement  of  spirit 
that  makes  the  ascent ;  but  this  ascent  of  the  spirit, 
though  above  the  comprehension  of  the  understand- 
ing, is  neither  superhuman  nor  mysterious  nor  un- 
real. It  is  the  same  I  as  thinking  which  is  in  this 
movement  of  spirit.  It  is  the  same  thought,  which 
with  its  abstract  logical  method  fails  to  relate  organ- 
ically and  necessarily  God,  man,  and  the  world  into 
a  rational  and  coherent  system.  It  can  only  allow 
them  to  exist  in  side -by -side  mechanical  relations. 
Deism  is  its  highest  Theology,  agnosticism  its  ul- 
timate attitude  toward  the  non  -  finite.  Thought 
pauses,  but  only  pauses  at  this  stage.     Finite  cosmos 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion,  1 3 1 

does  not  satisfy  it  now  as  the  unscientific  view  of  the 
world  did  not  at  an  earlier  stage.  It  relates  itself  to 
the  Infinite  ;  it  refuses  its  former  theory  of  Relativism, 
and  says  that  the  relation  is  now  seen  to  be  vital,  or- 
ganic, essential ;  it  denies  its  former  maxim,  Omnis  de- 
tcrviinatio  est  negatio,  and  asserts  that  every  relation 
or  determination  or  limit  means  new  and  fuller  con- 
crete existence ;  it  asserts  that  the  finite  and  Infinite 
are  thus  organically  related,  and  hence  that  we  have 
only  a  phantom  or  a  fragment  when  we  hold  either 
one  in  separation  from  the  other. 

Hegel's  chief  work,  therefore,  consists  in  showing 
the  inadequacy  of  the  ordinary  conceptions  of  both 
the  Infinite  and  finite,  from  which  spring  most  of  our 
intellectual  woes  in  the  shape  of  relativism,  skepti- 
cism, and  bad  Theology.  Thought  works  in  the 
form  of  the  dialectic  upon  the  inadequate  concep- 
tions of  the  Infinite  and  the  finite,  forcing  them  on 
out  of  their  unnatural  separation  through  successive 
self-contradictions  and  self-abrogations  till  both  are 
fulfilled  in  each  other  and  the  true  concrete  Infinite 
appears. 

Herein  is  demonstrated  for  thought  the  truth  of 
the  heart  of  religion — i.  e.,  real,  living,  organic  com- 
munion of  man  and  God.  The  problem  of  philosophy 
is  always  that  of  determining  with  increasing  accu- 
racy the  significance  and  the  mutual  relations  of  the 
three  great  objects  of  thought — God,  the  world,  and 
man.  False  definitions  and  theories  concerning  these 
can  not  but  have  a  blighting  influence  upon  religion. 
The  religious  relation  may  be  naively  apprehended. 
But  thought  is  as  much  a  part  of  me  as  religious 
feeling,  and  when  it  goes  to  work  it  must  see  for  it- 
self hozv  the  finite  and  the  Infinite  are  related.  God 
13 


132  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

and  man  are  not  discordant,  irreconcilable  ideas,  but 
essential  parts  of  one  organic  system — of  its  own  sys- 
tem— of  pure  thought — of  Philosophy.  Religion  as- 
serts and  lives  by  the  real  relation  of  real  God  and 
real  man.  Philosophy  here  only  attempts  to  under- 
stand, to  see/or  ttse/f  what  is  in  religion,  so  as  to  justify 
it  against  all  criticism  that  it  makes  in  its  lower  forms 
of  observation,  of  reflection,  of  formal  logic,  and  the  un- 
derstanding. This  process  of  the  dialectic  of  thought, 
through  its  own  self-posited  criticism,  through  posi- 
tivism, subjectivism,  idealism,  pantheism,  agnosticism, 
to  its  own  ultimate  assertion  of  the  true  concrete 
Infinite,  wherein  both  God  and  man  have  the  fullest 
reality,  is  necessarily  a  dry  and  prolix  one.  To 
think  exhaustively  is  always  to  think  God  the  ex- 
planation of  all,  though  not  the  pantheistic  all,  for 
the  thinker  remains ;  though  explained  by  God,  he  is 
not  annihilated,  but  realized.  Thought  embraces  all 
— the  totality — God,  man,  and  the  world — in  its  organ- 
ic system.  Each  without  the  other  is  an  abstraction, 
and  thus  unreal  and  false.  In  this,  each  element 
though  dependent,  receives  its  concrete,  full,  inde- 
pendent, free  realization.  The  true  organism  is  a 
unity  of  organisms,  organic  in  all  its  elements.  This 
is  the  system  or  Idea  that  philosophy  has  ever  been 
more  and  more  adequately  apprehending.  Despair 
of  this  is  despair  of  everything  rational.  Despair  of 
any  such  a  final  synthesis  of  all  elements  of  existence 
is  despair  or  doubt  of  the  worth  and  reality  of  any 
partial  syntheses.  This  is  the  goal  of  all  thought, 
but  no  less  is  it  also  the  presupposition  which  under- 
lies and  inspires  all  its  activity,  even  in  its  negative, 
critical,  skeptical,  iconoclastic  phases.  For,  to  use  a 
favorite  maxim  of  Hegel,  to  be  conscious  of  a  limit, 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  133 

of  an  imperfectron,  implies  that  one  is  already  above 
it,  sees  beyond,  and  criticises  the  imperfect  by  a 
more  perfect  idea  or  system.  Thus  skepticism  itself, 
as  well  as  the  refutation  of  all  skepticism,  implies  this 
idea  of  organic  system,  or  the  totality.  A  foot-rule 
implies  infinity.  Though  it  can  not  measure  infinity, 
it  has  its  very  being  in  infinity.  We  perceive  the 
limitations  of  our  thought,  because  we  see  that  our 
thought  is  grounded  in  and  a  part  of  absolute 
thought.  The  central,  inspiring  idea  of  science — 
that  of  the  correlation  of  all  parts  of  the  universe  in 
a  system — goes  part  way  toward  this  ultimate  syn- 
thesis. It  reaches  the  idea  of  cosmos,  as  a  system  or 
totality  of  things,  mechanically  and  necessarily  bound 
together — a  mechanical  universe,  but  not  the  rational 
soul  of  the  universe.  So,  too,  does  formal  logic  essay 
a  synthesis  of  all  elements  of  knowledge,  though  ulti- 
mately reducing  all  to  a  universal  blank  identity,  or 
nonentity.  In  both  these  phases  of  thought  the  idea 
of  relation  and  correlation  fail  to  rise,  as  thought 
finally  insists  upon  doing,  to  the  idea  of  self-relation  ; 
of  relation  that  is  the  activity  of  self-conscious  intelli- 
gence, of  a  totality  that  is  neither  material,  mechani- 
cal, chemical,  nor  vital,  but  that  of  concrete,  Absolute 
Spirit.  In  the  light  of  this  ultimate  category  of 
Thought  all  the  lower  and  inadequate  ones  are  seen 
to  have  their  relative  and  essential  worth.  Man  com- 
prehending it  lives,  moves,  and  has  his  most  true,  free, 
and  real  being  in  it.  Indeed,  any  interpretation  of 
Hegel  which  attributes  to  him  the  denial  of  person- 
ality and  freedom  to  either  God  or  man,  is  not  worth 
the  paper  it  is  written  on.  With  these  prefatory  re- 
marks I  now  propose  to  give  a  brief  exposition  of 
the  dry  and  formal  process  by  which  he  shows  the 


134  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

movement  of  thought  to  this  ultimate  goal,  thereby 
justifying  for  thought,  the  reality  of  the  religious 
consciousness.  He  continues  the  process  of  medi- 
ation in  knowledge  from  the  point  of  observation 
and  reflection,  and  shows  two  things:  i.  That  the 
finite  is  meaningless  without  vital  relation  to  the  Infi- 
nite ;  that  finite  spirit  presupposes  and  is  only  intel- 
ligible in  the  light  of  the  idea  of  the  Infinite  Spirit. 
2.  That  the  true  Infinite  can  not  exist  as  the  non- 
finite,  but  contains  in  its  very  nature  organic  relation 
to  the  finite. 

The  process  of  mediation  in  knowledge  goes  pri- 
marily through  observation  and  reflection.  Observa- 
tion is  empirical,  and  posits  the  Infinite  as  outside  of 
mind,  as  force,  law,  order,  or  cause.  So,  too,  does 
religion  at  this  standpoint  posit  its  infinite  as  an  ex- 
ternal absolute  upon  which  it  is  dependent.  This  ex- 
ternal infinite  limits  us  and  makes  us  finite.  There 
is  no  overlapping  of  the  two  objects.  We  find 
ourselves  thus  limited  on  many  sides,  by  external 
nature,  by  animal  wants,  and  inherited  proclivities. 
We  feel  all  such  limitations  as  foreign  and  hostile, 
preventing  us  from  being  what  we  might  otherwise 
be.  Religion,  however,  leads  us  to  reconcile  our- 
selves with  all  such  limitations,  and  to  declare  that 
all  things  are  ours,  that  God  is  for  us,  and  therefore 
nothing  that  his  providence  surrounds  us  with  can 
be  other  than  helpful  to  us.  Thus,  in  religion,  we 
overcome  and  pass  beyond  such  limits  as  animals 
never  do.  But  mere  observation  does  not  thus  break 
through  the  limits  seen  placed  about  man.  I  am 
only  what  I  am.  All  else  is  another.  I  am  limited 
and  finite,  and  call  the  infinite  the  unlimited.  But 
this  implies  that  the  two,  the  finite  and  the  Infinite, 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  135 

are  mutually  related ;  but  so  related  that  the  finite 
resolves  into  nothingness  before  the  Infinite.  In 
feeling,  this  relation  produces  the  sense  of  depend- 
ence and  of  fear.  But  there  is  also  another  side  to 
this  relation.  I  may  be  finite,  but  I  can  assert  myself 
— be  something.  Thus,  even  the  atheist  may  main- 
tain his  personal  morality,  in  spite  of  all  the  un- 
known infinite  which  limits  him.  God  can  not  be 
known.  Observation  may  sweep  the  heavens  with 
its  telescope  and  not  find  him.  But  we  can  do  with- 
out Him.  We  can  be  men  ;  doing  all  that  in  us  lies 
to  live  honest,  faithful  parents  and  citizens.  We  can 
have  the  religion  of  humanity,  and  finally — 

.  .  .  join  the  choir  invisible 
Of  those  immortal  dead,  who  live  again 
In  minds  made  better  by  their  presence ;  live 
In  pulses  stirred  to  generosity. 
In  deeds  of  daring  rectitude,  in  scorn 
For  miserable  aims  that  end  with  self. 
In  thoughts  sublime  that  pierce  the  night  like  stars. 
And  with  their  mild  persistence  urge  man's  search 
To  vaster  issues. 

This  is  the  loftiest  funeral  anthem  sung  by  Pos- 
itivism—  immortality  of  good  influence  upon  suc- 
ceeding generations,  but  not  with  the  choir  spiritual 
in  the  presence  of  God. 

With  positivism  the  gods  are  gone  away,  to  re- 
turn no  more.  We  may,  indeed,  long  for  their  re- 
turn, but  the  longing  is  a  vain  one.  We  must  be 
content  with  our  finiteness.  The  unknowable  Infinite 
makes  us  finite,  and  also  makes  us  emphasize  our- 
selves as  the  only  real  absolute.  I  may  long  and 
strive  after  the  infinite — the  beyond — but  I  evidently 


136  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

remain  simply  in  my  finitcness.  All  such  stri\ring 
is  my  own  doing.  If  I  apply  such  predicates  as  all- 
wise  and  all-good  to  the  beyond,  the  infinite,  they 
are  only  my  own  productions — exist  in  me  and  not 
in  the  Unknowable — and  have  no  objective  worth. 
I  am  shut  up  within  my  own  finite  limits.  If  I  could 
get  out  into  the  infinite,  I  should  only  thereby  be 
annihilated.  The  infinite,  call  it  by  what  divine  or 
devilish  name  I  please,  exists  only  within  my  finite 
self.  Thus,  in  my  striving  after  the  infinite,  by  which 
I  feel  limited,  I  am  only  limiting  myself.  In  all  this 
/  am.  And  thus  I  negate  the  limiting  infinite.  1 
am,  and  I  am  what  I  am,  and  I  am  what  I  ought  to 
be,  just  as  stone  and  tree  are.  I  am  what  I  am  by 
nature,  and  so  I  am  good.  Evil  is  not  in  me.  Faults 
and  sins  are  only  accidental  and  negative.  This 
much  I  allow  to  evil.  But  I  can  and  do  atone  for 
such  accidental  evil  by  casting  it  away,  denying 
that  it  belongs  to  my  nature.  I  reconcile  myself 
with  myself.     There  can  be  no  other  reconciliation. 

Further,  it  may  be  held,  on  this  standpoint,  that 
the  good  is  just  what  seems  good  to  the  individual. 
To  follow  one's  nature,  to  be  true  to  one's  instincts, 
appetites,  desires,  and  passions,  is  to  be  good.  I 
can  not  sin.  All  that  I  do  I  do  according  to  my 
nature,  and  I  am  by  nature  good.  But  let  us  ex- 
amine more  closely  the  concept  of  the  finite,  and  first 
in  the  popular  sense  of  the  word. 

(«.)  The  Sensuous  Finite. — To  be  finite  is  to  be 
mortal.  Satisfaction  of  appetites  may  momentarily 
lull  the  sense  of  sensuous  limitation.  But  the  appe- 
tite constantly  reappears.  Nothing  but  death  can 
annul  my  finiteness.  Death  is  the  great  liberator — 
the  negation  of  my  sensuous  limitations.     But  death 


The  Vital  Idea  of  Religion,  137 

itself  is  a  negation,  a  manifest  nothing.  In  this  nega- 
tion of  the  finite,  the  Spirit  appears.  Thought  asserts 
itself,  though  only  in  the  form  of  imagination. 

((^.)  Finiteness  from  the  standpoint  of  Reflection. — 
In  reflection  we  pass  out  of  our  isolated,  subjective 
selves.  We  consider  ourselves  in  the  light  reflected 
from  our  relation  to. other  things.  We  are  what  we 
are  in  relation  to  something  else.  Here  the  infinite 
appears.  But  is  is  only  as  a  regressus  ad  infinitiun. 
Any  one  thing  implies  another,  and  this  something 
else ;  and  the  mind  may  thus  lose  itself  in  the  end- 
less succession  of  objects,  without  ever  finding  a 
resting-place — a  progress  toward  an  inaccessible  that 
is  no  more  progress  than  that  of  a  blind  horse  in  a 
tread-mill.  IldvTa  pel.  Mind  as  reflection  or  under- 
standing can  never  reach  the  true  infinite — the  causa 
sui,  which,  however,  is  a  categorical  imperative  to 
mind.  We  are  in  a  world  of  innumerable,  manifold, 
finite  things,  each  separate  and  distinct  from  the 
others.  A  is  A  and  not  B,  C,  etc.,  ad  infinitum.  Our 
knowledge,  at  this  standpoint,  is  simply  that  of  a 
collection  of  facts,  of  particulars  negatively  related. 
This  is  the  lowest  and  yet  the  most  consistent  form 
of  sensationalism  and  positivism.  So  too,  in  empiri- 
cal ethics,  sensual  epicureanism  is  ultimate.  Enjoy 
the  pleasure  at  hand.  Banish  or  lull  the  limit  of  de- 
sire by  gratifying  it.  Catch  the  fleeting,  individual 
pleasure  ;  the  next  and  the  next  will  be  no  more  nor 
other.  There  is  no  totality  for  thought,  no  absolute 
good  for  the  soul.  But  this  knowledge  may  fly  from 
star  to  star,  and  yet  the  flight  must  on  and  on.  Thus 
pleasure  may  satisfy  one  sense  and  then  another  only 
to  find  them  awaken  again — up  and  on  after  another 
pleasure.      Carlyle's    shoe-black    can    not    be    made 


138  •  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

happy  for  more  than  an  houi'  or  two  by  "  the  whole 
finance-ministers  and  upholsterers  and  confectioners 
in  joint-stock  company."  Give  him  oceans  of  Hoch- 
heimer  and  a  throat  like  Ophiiichus,  and  he  still  wants 
more  and  better.  Give  him  half  a  universe,  and  he 
will  immediately  fight  for  the  possession  of  the  other 
half.  But  this  is  the  place  to  merely  indicate,  not 
to  refute  this  standpoint,  which  has  never  been  long 
held  by  men  who  rank  themselves  above  and  not 
below  the  brutes.  Here  the  ideal  of  knowledge  and 
goodness  can  never  be  reached  because  it  is  only  that 
of  a  huge  quantity  instead  of  that  of  the  concrete 
totality.  We  can  heap  monstrous  numbers,  mount- 
ains of  millions,  upon  each  other,  add  world  to  world 
until  time  grows  old,  and  awful  weariness  overcomes 
the  soul,  and  yet  we  are  only  in  the  finite.  Here 
the  infinite  remains  only  a  bigger  finite.  But  we  see 
that,  to  make  this  judgment  of  finiteness,  implies  an 
infinite.  To  be  conscious  of  a  limit  is  virtually  to 
transcend  the  limit — to  see  beyond.  The  finite  is 
that,  which  is  not  infinite,  which  implies  that  the  in- 
finite is  that  which  is  not  finite.  But  at  first  these 
two  appear  as  limiting  each  other,  and  the  infinite  is 
again  reduced  to  a  finite  or  a  limited  thing.  It*  is 
limited  by  the  finite.  It  is  only  everything  except 
the  finite  which  it  is  not.  If  I  define  it  as  everything, 
then  it  swallows  up  the  finite.  But,  however  I  con- 
ceive it,  it  is  still  I  myself  who  thus  conceive  it  and 
give  it  being.  ,  It  is  m)'^  own  product.  Thus  the  Ego 
is  all  that  can  be  affirmed.  This  subjective  Idealism 
may  take  two  forms,  the  empirical  and  the  tran- 
scendental. I  may  either  uninfinitize  or  infinitize  the 
Ego.  I  am  the  measure  of  the  universe.  I  create 
it.     But  I  may  be  only  a  poor,  finite,  sensuous  being. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  139 

The  infinity  which  I  create  may  only  be  an  infinity 
of  thought.  I  create,  but  I  also  swallow  up  in  my 
finite  self  the  whole  universe.  It  is  worth  nothing. 
Chaos,  cosmos,  and  chaos  again.  I  can  never  get 
outside  of  myself,  beyond  my  own  mental  processes 
and  conceptions.  But  I  may  either  deny  or  assert 
the  worth  and  reality  of  myself.  Here  the  concep- 
tion of  the  Ego  gives  the  comparative  worth  to  the 
self-created  world  : 

'Tis  with  our  judgments  as  with  our  watches  :  none 
Go  just  alike ;  yet  each  believes  his  own — 

or,  "  and  no  one  believes  his  own,"  This  last  is  the 
affirmation  of  the  empirical  skeptic.  It  may  take 
the  form  of  mock  humility  or  of  the  current  agnos- 
ticism. I  can  not  know.  I  can  not  even  see  through 
a  glass  darkly.  I  am  a  misologist  and  ultimately  a 
pessimist.  The  Ego  which  creates  and  measures  all 
objects  of  knowledge  is  only  an  empirical,  sensuous 
Ego,  and  its  creations  are  worth  nothing.  But  this 
false  humility  easily  changes  into  false  pride  :  "  Each 
believes  his  own."  "  The  humility  of  the  finite  Ego 
changes  into  the  arrogance  of  godless  self-deifica- 
tion." "The  everlasting  yea"  follows  the  "center 
of  indifference,"  into  which  "  the  everlasting  nay  " 
had  been  precipitated.  Shelley's  Prometheus  Bound 
asserts  his  divinity,  and  defies  the  wrath  of  Jove. 
The  calcined  Ego,  the  caput  vtortimw,  the  pessimistic 
shoe-black  comes  to  realize  and  assert  his  greatness, 
to  find  a  whole  infinite  in  himself  which  he  can  not, 
with  all  his  sophistries,  quite  bury  under  the  finite. 
Thus,  Schopenhauer  is  closed,  and  we  open  Fichte. 
Es  leucJitet  inir  ein,  "  I  see  a  glimpse  of  it."  "  America 
is  here  or  nowhere."     Cosmos  appears  in  all  its  truth 


140  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

and  beauty.  The  finite  and  the  infinite  are  one.  I 
am  that  one.  It  is  not  the  empirical,  egositic  I,  but 
the  absolute  universal  I  that  focuses  itself  in  me.  We 
twain  are  no  longer  two,  but  one.  Fichte,  who  repre- 
sents the  highest  phase  of  this  subjective  idealism, 
indignantly  denies  that  he  means  to  make  the  world 
the  product  of  the  empirical  Ego.  It  is  the  Ego  that 
contains  in  its  essential  nature  the  finite  and  the  in- 
finite.* Fichte  approaches  very  nearly  to  the  true 
philosophical  conception  of  the  essential  relation  of 
the  finite  and  the  Infinite,  as  the  concrete,  organic 
system  of  thought  which  Hegel  calls  the  Idea  (Idee) 
Spirit,  God.  But  mere  subjectivity,  even  though  it 
be  that  of  the  universal  Ego,  can  never  free  itself 
from  abstractions  and  lack  of  objectivity.  Its  unity 
of  the  finite  and  the  infinite  is  one  in  which  neither 
term  gets  full  rights,  and  one  upon  which  no  religion 
is  really  possible.  For  religion  demands  that  its 
God  be  absolute,  self-creative,  self-dependent,  self- 
relating,  and  not  merely  dependent  upon  the  indi- 
vidual. In  fact,  as  we  can  see  historically,  the  high- 
est flight  toward  religion  on  this  standpoint  soon 
falls  back  on  the  lower  phase  of  agnosticism,  epi- 
cureanism, and  pessimism.  The  so-called  left-wing 
Hegelians  (Strauss,  Feuerbach,  Bruno  Baur,  Arnold 
Ruge)  attempted  to  fasten  this  standpoint  upon 
Hegel  himself,  and  soon  reduced  themselves  to  the 
lowest  phase  of  egoistic  materialism.  Only  in  man 
does  God  come  to  consciousness.  It  seems  needless 
to  say  that  it  was  the  logical  atheism  of  this  posi- 
tion that  Hegel  combats  throughout  all  his  works. 


*  Cf.  Fitche's  Science  of  Knowledge,  by  C.  C.  Everett,  D.  D.,  pp. 
99,  253,  268. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  141 

He  combats,  too,  the  higher  phase  of  this  idealism 
which  emphasizes,  as  Fichte  did,  the  God-side  of  the 
content  of  the  individual  consciousness,  saying  that  re- 
ally no  religion  is  possible  on  this  standpoint.  Fichte 
himself,  it  is  true,  lived  and  wrote  under  the  sublime 
consciousness  of  God.  Hegel's  only  contention  is 
that,  in  the  philosophy  of  Fichte,*  the  explication  of 
the  two  sides  of  the  religious  relation  is  false.  He 
insists  upon  passing  outside  of  stibjcctive  idealism,  in 
order  that  God  and  man  may  both  be  truly  appre- 
hended in  the  organic  relation  to  each  other  that 
constitutes  religion.  His  system  is  that  of  absolute 
Idealism,  or  the  identity  of  tJwught  and  reality,  which 
translates  the  whole  experience  into  a  universe  of 
thought.  It  is  only  when  the  infinite  God  is  cog- 
nized as  thought,  or  self-conscious  mind,  as  the  In- 
finite who  manifests  himself  in  the  differences  of  the 
finite  world,  and  yet  is  not  therein  limited  by  some- 
thing outside  of  himself,  that  finite  man  can  be  fully 
and  adequately  conceived. 

He  has  shown  that  the  finite  does  not  get  its  due 
in  the  form  of  immediate  knowledge,  or  in  that  of  re- 
flection, or  the  common  understanding.  What  is  de- 
manded for  thought  is  that  our  knowledge  must  be 
comprehensive  and  coherent,  or  systematic.  Our 
ideas  of  nature,  man,  and  God,  of  the  finite  and  the 
Infinite,  must  not  be  conceived  as  discordant  and 
heterogeneous,  but  as  related  to  each  other  as  neces- 
sary links  of  thought,  so  as  to  constitute  one  self-con- 
sistent system  of  truth.  Hence,  he  passes  to  the 
Rational  consideration  of  the  finite.     Fichte's  position 

*  I  use  Fichte  as  chief  representative  of  this  school,  though  Hegel 
does  not  mention  his  name  in  this  work. 


142  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

of  the  unity  of  the  finite  and  the  Infinite  in  subjective 
self-consciousness  is  the  highest  phase  possible  to 
reflection  as  the  reason  in  understanding.  The  an- 
tithesis discovered  by  the  understanding  has  finally 
been  reduced  to  that  of  abstract  identity.  The  finite 
and  the  Infinite  are  one.  The  God-consciousness  is 
an  indivisible  part  of  my  consciousness.  I  am  naught 
without  it,  but  it  is  also  naught  without  me.  The 
whole  is  subjective,  within  myself.  In  his  Logic, 
Hegel  shows  the  dialectic  working  upon  tJiis  con- 
ception, exposing  new  discords  and  unities  till  the 
ultimate  category  of  Spirit  as  absolute,  self-con- 
scious intelligent  personality  is  reached,  the  steepest, 
loftiest  summit  of  thought  {Die  JwcJiste,  zugescharfste 
Spitze).  Only  with  this  conception  of  the  Infinite 
can  finite  man  be  rightly,  duly,  and  truly  conceived. 
This  is  the  work  of  his  whole  Logic.  But  here  we 
can  only  note  some  of  the  most  apparent  steps  in  the 
process. 

In  the  assertion  of  the  unity  of  the  finite  and  the 
Infinite,  the  finite  has  not  really  been  put  in  abeyance. 
I  may  say,  in  religious  fervor,  I  am  nothing ;  God 
is  all,  and  yet,  philosophically,  I  assert  the  finite  I 
as  the  point  where  the  Infinite  comes  to  conscious- 
ness and  exists.  Such  a  finite  is  the  highest  form  of 
untruth  and  evil.  To  rise  above  this  standpoint  the 
subjective,  finite  individual  must  be  annulled  in  a 
real,  self-existent  absolute,  in  which  alone  he  can 
realize  his  true  being.  This  is  the  standpoint  of 
speculative  Reason,  as  well  as  that  of  Religion. 
Philosophy  only  presents  this  relation  in  the  form  of 
thought ;  while  religion,  which  is  itself  a  sort  of 
naive  instinctive  reason,  presents  it  in  the  form  of 
figurative  conception. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  143 

But  this  highest  conception  of  reason  is  mediated 
by,  passes  through  various  partial  statements.  The 
Ego  relates  itself  to  another,  which  is  seen  to  be 
more  than  a  sensuous,  and  then  more  than  an  ab- 
stract Infinite.  The  demand  is  that  it  be  in  and  for 
itself  existent,  or  the  Absolute,  else  I  have  only  an 
empty,  dead  God.  The  demand  is  that  it  have  ob- 
jective existence,  though  not  that  of  objective,  finite 
thinofs,  else  were  it  finite  itself.  "  But  now  comes 
the  question  as  to  how  the  subject  is  related  iti 
this  infinite  object.  It  is  as  thinking  subject  that 
it  comes  into  relation  with  this  recognized  object. 
Thought  is  the  activity  of  the  universal,  having  a 
universal  as  object.  In  this  case  this  universal  must 
be  the  absolute.  Consequently,  it  is  thought  that 
constitutes  this  relation  with  this  absolute  object. 
We  make  the  transition  from  mere  subjective  to  ob- 
jective thought."  And  we  see  that  it  is  this  absolute 
thought  that  is  prior  to,  creative  of,  and  the  neces- 
sary ground  and  implication  of,  all  finite  thought. 

"  In  thinking — that  is,  in  reflecting  upon  anything 
— I  am  subjective,  have  my  thoughts  about  it ;  where- 
as in  thus  thinking  the  thing  itself,  in  thinking  the 
thought  of  it,  I  withdraw  my  merely  subjective  rela- 
tion to  it  and  enter  into  objective  relation  with  it. 
I  have  annulled  my  subjective  individuality,  and 
raised  myself  to  the  universal  point  of  view.  This 
is  the  same  thing  as  to  think  the  universal  as  my 
object.  I  actually  herein  renounce  the  merely  sub- 
jective point  of  view.  In  humility,  or  confession  of 
my  own  finiteness,  I  enter  the  life  and  activity  of  the 
objective."  *     In  thus  thinking  or  cognizing  the  thing 

*  Hegel's  Philosophic  der  Religion,  p.  190. 
14 


144  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

itself,  or  its  thought,  I  pass  beyond  its  mere  phenome- 
nal form  and  pierce  into  its  essence,  or  the  logical 
conditions  of  its  existence.     Here  I  reach  real  neces- 
sar}''  being,  which  is  no  longer  merely  an  object  for 
me.     It  has  self-necessitated  and  therefore  objective 
existence.     My  thought  is  valid  only  as  it  is  thus 
freed  from  mere  subjectivity  and  finds  itself  anew  in 
the  objective   though    ideal   universe  of   real   exist- 
ences.   All  such  real  being  exists  essentially  sub  specie 
ccternitatis,  and  is  only  thus  truly  known  by  me.     It 
is  to  be  noted  that  the  essential  attribute  of  thought 
is  that  it  is  a  mediating  activity  and  thus  itself  medi- 
ated universality.     We  can  not  follow  closely  this 
dialectic  of  thought  which  forces  it  to  the  universal 
and  absolute  as  its  goal.    Limit  after  limit  is  annulled, 
till  the  true,  objective,  self-limiting  Infinite  is  reached. 
All  our  knowledge  rests  upon  at  least  the  tacit  ac- 
knowledgment of  this  ultimate  standard.     We  only 
know  our  own  knowledge  to  be  subjective  and  finite 
because  we  have  this  infinite,  absolute  truth  by  which 
we  measure  it.     To  be  conscious  of  such  a  limit,  as 
that  of  finiteness    or  subjectivity,  is  virtually  to  have 
already  transcended  this  limit.     In  pure  thought  this 
transcendence  of  such  subjective  limitations  is  clear- 
ly and  definitely  made,  and  we  no  longer  think  as 
mere  individuals,   but  pass   over  and  share  in  uni- 
versal thought  or  reason.     This  universal  thought  is 
not  my  own  subjective  creation,  but  that  which  really 
creates,  sustains,  explains,  and  gives  partial  worth  to 
my  thoughts.     This  presupposition  of  all  knowledge 
is  not  clearly  and  definitely  apprehended  in  all  stages 
of  knowledge.     We  pass  through  stages  when  it  is 
even  suicidally  denied.     But  its  very  denial,  if  it  is 
worth  anything,  appeals  to  it  to  prove  itself.     The 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religio7t.  145 

denial  of  skepticism  is  really  only  the  denial  of  some 
false,  pictorial  abstract  or  logical  concept.  This  it 
denies  only  by  tacit  reference  to  and  affirmation  of  a 
hiofher  and  truer  universal  or  absolute.  It  is  in  its 
very  denial  mediated  knowledge,  or  affirmation  that 
comes  through  the  negation  of  a  negation. 

But  to  turn  to  the  positive  side  again,  we  note 
that  the  mediating  activity  of  thought  may  be  over- 
looked, and  we  suppose  that  we  know  the  Universal, 
or  know  God  immediately.  Really,  however,  this 
intuition  in  the  subject  is  itself  partly  the  result  of 
many  mediations,  and  only  partly  the  result  of  the 
immediate  activity  of  cognition.  Nothing  is  further 
from  Hegel's  thought  and  method  than  pure  a  priori 
thinking.  The  inductive  process  goes  pari  passu 
with  all  thinking,  and  forms  the  mediation  which 
leads  to  higher  views.  The  ^/r/^rz  and  a  posteriori 
methods  are  united  in  every  phase  of  knowing. 
That  is,  there  is  constant  mediation  and  synthesis. 
Hegel  is,  of  all  men,  least  deserving  of  the  reproach 
of  being  a  merely  a  priori,  transcendental  spinner  of 
metaphysical  cobwebs  out  of  nothing  but  his  own 
consciousness.  Mediation  is  the  essential  element  of 
his  dialectic  in  which  the  a  posteriori  vs,  seen  to  be  but 
the  a  priori  in  the  making,  until  the  whole  of  experi- 
ence is  seen  in  its  concrete,  ultimate  form  of  organic 
Totality,  which  looks  before  and  after,  indissolubly, 
because  rationally,  connecting  all.  Thus  he  says  we 
know  God  immediately,  just  as  one  plays  a  very 
difficult  piece  of  music,  instinctively  as  it  were,  as 
the  result  of  the  mediation  of  much  practicing  it 
over  and  over.  The  same  process  of  mediation  also 
results  in  those  habits  which  have  become  a  second 
nature  to  us.     The  discovery  of  America  by  Colum- 


146  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

bus  was  the  result  of  many  actions  and  reflections.* 
The  result  of  many  mediations  is  that  truths  which 
we  know  to  have  been  reached  by  a  highly  compli- 
cated and  prolonged  process  of  study,  present  them- 
selves to  us  finally  as  almost  intuitive.  The  expert 
mathematician  has  ready-made  intuitive  solutions  of 
problems  which  others  can  only  understand  after  a 
long  course  of  explanation.  Thus  mediated  thought 
appears  in  us  as  immediate.  In  worshiping,  God  is 
present  with  me.  The  thought  present  in  this  is 
that  of  God  for  me.  It  is  really  a  definite  form  of 
my  being  as  pure  thinking.  I  love  myself  in  Him, 
and  then  find  myself  again  as  finite  as  distinguished 
from  Him  who  is  the  infinite  fullness  of  which  ocean 
I  am  but  a  drop,  and  yet  a  real  drop,  a  real  finite 
being,  though  only  real  in  Him.  This  finite  is 
much  higher  than  the  abstract  one  reached  in  the 
stage  of  reflection.  This  true  finite  is  seen  to  be  an 
essential  phase  of  the  infinite  in  the  nature  of  God,  so 
that  we  might  say  that  it  is  God  who  finitizes  him- 
self in  us.  But  this  seems  impious.  Yet  it  is  the 
same  as  the  conception  of  God  as  the  Creator  of  the 
world  out  of  nothing  but  himself.  The  world  thus 
becomes  another  than  God  and  seems  to  limit,  to 
finitize  Him.  But  this  is  his  own  ^^//"-limitation.  It 
is  his  world,  having  its  only  real  being  in  him. 
Having  thus  reached  the  true  finite  as  opposed  to  the 
false  one,  we  have  now  to  distinguish  between  the 
true  and  the  false  infinite. 

(c.)  Transition  to  the  Speculative  Idea  of  Religio?i. — 
The  conception  that  we  have  reached  of  the  true 
finite  forces  us  to  rise  to  a  higher  conception  of  the 

*  Hegel's  Philosophie  der  Religion,  p.  igi. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  147 

Infinite.  To  merely  say,  God  is  infinite  and  I  am 
finite,  is  a  very  inadequate  and  false  proposition.  As 
the  finite  is  not  merely  the  non-infinite,  but  has  its 
real  being  in  the  infinite,  we  can  not  conceive  of 
this  infinite  as  an  immobile,  lifeless  non-finite.  The 
two  terms  can  only  be  conceived  as  moments  or  or- 
ganic elements  of  a  process.  They  are  strictly  cor- 
relative terms.  God  is  not  merely  the  infinite  to 
the  exclusion  of  the  finite,  as  the  finite  is  not  merely 
finite  to  the  exclusion  of  the  infinite.  We  may  and 
must  distinguish,  but  can  not  absolutely  separate  the 
two  without  destroying  both.  They  are  parts  of  a 
system,  which  have  no  meaning  when  separated.  In 
fact,  we  may  say  that  we  do  not  know  anything  ex- 
cept as  in  relations  and  ultimately  as  belonging  to  a 
system.  The  center  of  a  circle  is  distinguished  from, 
but  is  meaningless  without  the  circumference,  the 
positive  pole  in  a  battery  without  the  negative,  a 
cause  without  an  effect,  kings  without  subjects,  par- 
ents without  children.  The  eye  is  no  eye  apart 
from  the  body.  "  The  single  members  of  the  body 
are  what  they  are  only  in  and  through  connection 
with  their  unity.  A  hand  when  hewn  off  from  the 
body  is  a  hand  in  name  only,  not  in  fact,  as  Aristotle 
observed."*  We  can  speak  of  many  of  these  relations 
between  external  things  as  necessary — i.  e.,  the  two 
terms  are  so  intimately  bound,  the  one  to  the  other, 
so  mutually  and  profoundly  interpenetrative,  that  the 
changing  or  the  suppression  of  the  one  is  the  chang- 
ing  or  suppression  of  the  other.  The  kind  of  rela- 
tion that  exists  between  things  varies  from  merely 
external,  mechanical,  causal,  chemical,  vital,   to  spir- 

*  Hegel's  Logic,  p.  310. 


148  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

itual  connection.  Each  higher  phase  of  relation  is  a 
mystery  to  the  lower  conception.  Life  is  mysterious 
from  the  point  of  view  of  inorganic  nature,  and  yet 
life  is  higher  and  explains,  while  it  contains  and  trans- 
mutes the  lower.  The  relation  between  parent  and 
child  is  one  of  unity,  of  consubstantiality,  especially 
when  this  relation  takes  the  form  of  mutual  love.  So 
too,  the  terms  finite  and  infinite  are  indefinable  non- 
entities except  as  correlated.  It  is  only  the  action  of 
the  mere  reflective  understanding  that  tries  to  define 
them  as  separate,  and  thus  produces  all  those  dis- 
cords and  antinomies  which  it  can  not  solve. 

Another  indequate  way  of  defining  the  Infinite  is 
to  aHach  to  it  certain  notions  or  predicates  formed 
from  other  material — our  notions  about  God — calling 
them  attributes.  They  are  not  derived  from  the  es- 
sential nature  of  God.  They  are  limited,  and  so 
come  into  collision.  The  Orientals  were  right  in 
their  feeling  that  this  is  not  the  true  way  to  represent 
God.  They  say  that  he  is  "  the  man3'-named,"  and 
yet  not  thereby  defined.  The  true  attributes  of  God 
can  not  be  these  relative  ones,  they  must  be  essen- 
tial* Activity,  Life,  Spirit,  Absolute  Personality, 
are  such  essential  attributes.  He  is  the  living  God 
who  in  his  essential  living  process  creates  and  tran- 
scends the  finite,  and  thus  is  in  organic  relation  to  it. 
Thus  it  might  be  said  that  without  the  world  God 
is  not  God.  That  is,  if  it  were  possible  to  conceive 
a  time  when  all  the  wisdom,  and  goodness,  and 
justice,  and  love  manifested  in  the  world,  lay  dormant 
in  the  Divine  Being,  then  were  he  less  God  than 
he  is  now — the  motionless,  dead  Brahm  of  Oriental 

*  Philosophic  der  Religion,  II,  230. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  149 

conception.  The  truth  of  this  statement,  however, 
can  only  be  seen  in  the  proper  explication  of  the 
Christian  doctrines  of  the  Holy  Trinity  and  the 
Creation.  Plato  and  other  Greek  philosophers  gave 
some  hint  of  it  in  their  doctrine  of  the  limit  {jo  irepa<;). 
Limit  gave  chaos  the  order  of  cosmos,  while  lack  of 
limit  was  lack  of  intelligence,  order,  law.  The  un- 
limited {to  aireipov)  was  the  indefinite,  lawless,  bad. 
"  We  must  free  ourselves  from  the  bugbear  of  the 
opposition  of  the  finite  and  the  Infinite.  This  bug- 
bear is  let  loose  upon  those  who  desire  to  maintain 
that  we  can  know  God  and  have  real  communion 
with  him.  This  is  called  pretentious  arrogance,  and 
much  unction  and  irksome  mock  humility  is  used  to 
decry  it.  Yet  philosophy  as  well  as  religion  main- 
tains this  pretension."  If  we  do  not  slay  this  agnostic 
phantom,  we  degrade  the  Infinite  as  well  as  the  finite ; 
for  it  implies  an  impotence  in  the  Infinite  as  well  as 
in  the  finite.  It  says  that  God  can  not  descend  in 
relations  with  man.  He  must  remain  in  himself  in 
his  powerlessness  to  get  into  the  finite.  "  Every 
relative  disability  may  be  read  in  two  ways  :  A  dis- 
qualification in  the  nature  of  thought  for  knowing 
X,  is  from  the  other  side  a  disqualification  in  the 
nature  of  x  for  being  known.  To  say  that  the  First 
Cause  is  wholly  removed  from  our  apprehension  is 
not  simply  a  disclaimer  of  faculty  on  our  part ;  it  is, 
too,  a  charge  of  inability  against  the  First  Cause."  * 

|acobi  very  wittily  characterized  such  an  absolute 
as  Kant's  unknowable  and  unrevealable  noumcnon,  or 
Ding  an  sich,  as  "  enjoying  a  position  of  otium  aim 
dignitate,  which  is  the  next  thing  to  w«-existence." 

*  Martineau's  Essays,  I,  190. 


1 50  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Thought  as  mere  understanding  can  not  know 
God.  The  faculty  is  inadequate.  It  is  limited  to 
the  field  of  the  finite.  But  the  microscope  need  not 
deny  the  revelations  of  the  telescope.  The  under- 
standing is  not  all  of  man  as  intelligence.  It  lives  in 
a  world  where  every  term  or  product  of  thought  pre- 
serves a  stereotyped  distinction  from  every  other. 
It  analyzes,  separates,  and  defines  everything  and 
only  unites  them  by  abstracting  from  each  its  con- 
crete qualities.  Its  universals  are  mere  abstractions, 
squeezing  the  life  and  characteristics  out  of  every 
particular  embraced.  Indispensable  as  is  its  work, 
great  as  are  its  results — and  no  one  appreciated  the 
greatness  of  modern  Science  more  than  Hegel — it 
becomes  mischievous  and  false  when  it  poses  as  the 
ne  plus  ultra  of  human  thought.  "  Reason,  when  fol- 
lowing the  footsteps  of  the  senses  has  short  wings," 
says  Dante.  When  following  the  understanding  they 
are  not  yet  developed  enough  for  mounting  the  sky. 
The  human  spirit  must  not  and  can  not  restrict  its 
observation  to  the  sphere  of  the  finite.  In  religion 
and  philosophy  there  is  a  higher  kind  of  experience 
claimed.  Observation  should  sweep  this  field  and 
compute  results.  Indeed,  without  accepting  the  tes- 
timony of  the  Spirit  in  this  sphere  also,  the  basis  for 
knowledge  in  all  lower  spheres  is  taken  away,  and 
absolute,  empirical  skepticism  is  the  latent  and  logi- 
cal result.  The  ground  of  religion  can  not  then  be 
foiund  on  the  standpoint  of  external  observation. 
The  observer  must  observe  hiuisclf  as  in  relatioji  to 
the  thing  od'served.  In  religion  and  philosophy  he 
must  therefore  observe  himself  as  essentially  corre- 
lated with  the  Infinite.  This  is  what  speculative  or 
comprehensive   thought  does.      The  observer  here 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  151 

sees  the  finite  and  the  Infinite  in  organic  unity.  He 
himself  is  in  this  unity,  and  sees  it  in  seeing  him- 
self as  thus  essentially  related  to  it.  He  sees  the 
totality  in  comprehensive  view.  This  is  the  stand- 
point of  the  infinite  observation,  and  of  the  Idea,  the 
sphere  in  which  the  true  idea  of  religion  finds  its 
explanation  and  justification. 

^  3.  The  Speculative  Idea  of  Rchgion.— Reason  is  the 
ground  upon  which  alone  religion  is  at  home.  As 
speculative  idea  it  is  the  rational  explication  of  what 
is  involved  in  the  religious  relation  between  God 
and  man.  Reason  {Vcriiunfi)  is  thus  the  faculty  of 
the  Infinite,  as  reason  {Vcrstand)  is  that  of  the  finite. 
The  former  is  the  faculty  of  insight  into  the  life  of 
organisms  permeating,  developing,  and  unifying  all 
parts  so  as  to  make  them  very  and  essential  mem- 
bers of  the  organism.  What  it  thus  grasps  together 
and  sees  to  be  self-developing  from  the  idea  of  the 
thing,  the  latter,  or  the  faculty  of  outsight,  sees  as 
separate,  contingent,  and  contradictory,  at  best  only 
mechanically  related  and  bound  together.  The 
former  sees  the  process  of  the  self-development  of 
the  totality  through  the  forms  of  sense  and  under- 
standing, keeps  its  eye  upon  the  whole  throughout, 
and  finds  the  concrete  whole  at  the  end.  It  sees  the 
idea  produce  the  whole  in  all  its  diversity.  It  sees, 
too,  its  own  self  in  every  phase  of  the  idea.  It  finds 
itself  at  home  everywhere  in  the  intelligent  universe. 
Reason  thus  making  man  at  home,  showing  him  his 
own  larger  self,  in  the  ever-widening  circle  of  experi- 
ence, frees  him  from  all  finite  limitations  and  neces- 
sity, and  brings  him  to  full  self-consciousness.  Hegel 
uses  the  term  consciousness  to  express  the  phenomenal 
side  of   mind    in  knowing  external  things.     Thus  I 


152  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

am  conscious  of,  feel,  see,  know  relations  to  external 
things  not  i'n3'seif.  But  intelligent  spirit  or  reason 
refuses  to  be  a  stranger  or  alien  anywhere  in  the 
intelligent  world.  It  may  "  take  the  wings  of  the 
morning  and  fiy  to  the  uttermost  part  of  the  earth," 
and  even  there  it  finds  only  intelligence,  spirit, 
which  is  its  ozvn  truer  and  larger  self.  The  more  it 
goes  out  of  itself  the  more  it  finds  itself.  Its  heart 
is  restless  until  it  rests  in  God.  In  every  act  of 
conscious  intelligence,  self  finds  itself  more  and 
more  adequately  realized,  and  thus  becomes  self- 
consciousness.  But  the  real  presupposition  and  inspi- 
ration of  all  knowledge  is  not  my  consciousness  of 
myself  as  individual,  limited  by  external  things,  but 
thought,  or  a  self-consciousness,  which  is  beyond  all 
individual  selves.  It  is  the  Absolute  Self-conscious- 
ness, which  the  conscious  life  of  all  finite  minds  im- 
plies, and  in  finding  which  our  consciousness  becomes 
self-consciousness  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word. 

This  comprehension  translates  all  relations  into 
which  we  come  into  j-^-^-relations,  all  determinism 
into  j'r//'-determinism,  all  necessity  into  freedom,  all 
chance  into  Providence,  and  all  Providence  into  in- 
telligence. When  God  is  cognized  as  Him  in  whom 
we  live  and  move  and  have  our  real  being,  when  He 
is  recognized  within  the  soul,  we  come  to  full  self- 
consciousness.  The  Philosophy  of  religion  is  the 
rational  explication  of  this  self-consciousness,  or  of 
the  essential  and  immanent  relation  of  God  and  man. 
I  give  this  exposition  of  the  general  way  in  which 
Hegel  uses  these  two  terms — consciousness  and  self- 
consciousness — as  preliminary  to  a  crucial  paragraph. 
As  it  is  both  difificult  and  pregnant,  I  translate  it  as 
literally  as  possible : 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  153 

We  have  hitherto  used  the  term  consciousness  to  express 
the  phenomenal  side  of  the  spirit,  the  essential  relation  of 
knowing  and  its  object.  In  this  I  am  determined  by  rela- 
tions to  objects.  But  the  essential  of  spirit  is  not  to  be 
merely  in  such  relations.  Such  consciousness  is  the  sphere 
of  the  finite,  and  in  it  everything  is  itself  and  not  another. 
But  Spirit  or  concrete  reason  is  not  merely  such  knowl- 
edge, where  the  being  of  the  objects  is  thus  separated  from 
the  knowledge  itself.  It  does  not  exist  merely  in  relations 
or  under  this  form  of  consciousness.  It  is  in  making  ab- 
straction of  this  relation  that  we  speak  of  the  spirit,  and 
consciousness  then  becomes  a  phase  or  element  in  the  being 
of  spirit.  We  have  thus  an  affirmative  relation  of  the  spirit 
to  the  Absolute  Spirit.  It  is  first  in  this  identity  that  the 
cognizing  spirit  posits  itself  for  itself  in  its  object.  This 
constitutes  spirit  or  reason,  which  is  its  own  object.  Re- 
ligion is  thus  the  relation  of  spirit  or  reason  with  the  Abso- 
lute Spirit  or  Reason.  It  is  only  thus  that  the  spirit  knows 
its  knowledge  (i.  e.,  the  cognizing  spirit  is  the  unity  of  the 
subject  and  its  object).  This  is  not  merely  the  spirit  put- 
ting itself  in  relation  with  the  Absolute  Spirit,  but  it  is  the 
Absolute  Spirit  himself  relating  himself  to  himself  in  that 
which  we  in  consciousness  posited  as  something  separate 
and  distinct.  Thus  jeligion  Js,  in  a  higher  way,  the  Idea 
(Idee)  of  the  Spirit,  who  of  himself  relates  himself  to  him- 
self, or  it  is  the  self-consciousness  of  the  Absolute  Spirit. 
This  contains  consciousness  as  an  organic  element.  Con- 
sciousness as  such  is  finite,  the  knowing  of  an  object  distinct 
from  self.  Religion  is  also  consciousness  (knows  God  as 
external,  transcendent),  and  thus  contains  the  finite  con- 
sciousness, but  contains  it  absorbed  (as  the  tree  contains 
the  seed).  For  the  object  which  the  Absolute  Spirit  knows 
is  himself.  He  is  only  Absolute  Spirit  as  knowing  nothing 
but  himself.  Finiteness  of  consciousness  is  the  result  of 
si)irit  distinguishing  itself  from  its  object.  But  this  is  a 
real  element  of  spirit.     It  is  the  spirit  itself  which  makes 


154  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

this  distinction,  or  posits  itself  as  determined  by  its  object. 
It  is  only  by  this  mediation  (through  consciousness  or 
finite  spirit),  by  which  it  finitizes  itself,  that  it  comes  to 
knowledge  of  itself  or  to  self-consciousness.  Thus  religion 
is  the  knowledge  which  the  Divine  Spirit  has  of  himself, 
through  the  mediation  of  the  finite  spirit.  Consequently,  in 
the  absolute  Idea  (Idee)  religion  is  not  the  work  of  a  man, 
but  it  is  essentially  the  highest  determination  of  the  Abso- 
lute Idea  himself.  .  .  .  The  Absolute  Spirit  in  his  conscious- 
ness is  self-knowing,  self-conscious.  If  he  knew  aught  else, 
he  would  cease  to  be  Absolute  Spirit.  This  makes  his 
knowledge  absolute  truth,  and  the  whole  of  truth.  It  em- 
braces all  the  riches  of  the  natural  and  the  spiritual  worlds. 
It  is  their  sole  substance  and  truth.  In  it  the  truth  of 
everything  exists  as  a  dynamic  element.* 

What  have  we  here  ?  This  question  will  come  to 
every  one  reading  this  quotation  for  the  first  time, 
without  having-  thought  himself  fully  into  Hegel's 
meaning.  It  is  so  different  from  current  conceptions 
of  religion,  that  it  may  be  dismissed  with  a  smile  as 
foggy  metaphysics,  or  at  best  as  pantheism.  That  it 
is  neither,  but  contains  the  ultimate  speculative  com- 
prehension of  absolute  religion ;  that  it  only  puts  in 
rational  form  the  highest  Christian  theology  and  the 
profoundest  Christian  mysticism,  I  shall  endeavor  to 
show  in  brief  manner. 

But,  first,  let  me  epitomize  the  few  remaining 
pages  of  this  section  of  Hegel's  work.  This  demon- 
stration of  the  organic  relation  of  the  Infinite  and 
the  finite  is  the  true  content  of  religion,  the  self- 
necessitated  development  of  thought  starting  from 
the   immediate   content   of   the   religious  conscious- 

*  Philosophie  der  Religion,  vol.  i,  pp.  199-201. 


The   Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  155 

ness.  The  course  of  thought  is  shown  in  another 
way  in  the  Logic.  There  beginning  is  made  with 
mere  being  or  nothing,  and  the  tremendous  labor 
of  thought  is  observed  as  it  develops  the  implicit 
relations  of  each  lower  category  until  absolute  Spirit 
is  reached  as  the  Ultimate — that  is,  as  to  point  of 
departure,  but  really  primal,  implied  in  the  lowest 
category.  Thought  is  thus  seen  to  necessarily  make 
passage  from  7nere  Being,  or  the  finite  world  (Being — 
the  most  abstract  and  general  term  to  express  all 
finite  existence)  to  its  absolute  presupposition,  or 
God.  What  is  reached  in  the  Logic,  as  a  process  of 
thought,  we  found  to  be  held  naively  as  a  moment 
in  the  religious  consciousness  from  which  we  started 
in  the  Philosophy  of  Religion.  What  we  have  now 
reached  is  God  as  the  Absolute  First,  and  the  course 
of  thought  in  the  Logic  is  seen  to  be  the  activity  of 
the  Idea  of  Absolute  Spirit  in  itself.  Mere  being,  the 
finite  world,  is  the  activity  of  this  spirit  positing  an 
object  for  itself,  making  an  "other"  for  itself.  But 
this  "  other  "  moves  itself  back  to  its  source,  its  home. 
It  is  met  more  than  half-way.  Spirit  recognizes  its 
"other "as  itself.  This  activity  constitutes  the  Di- 
vine life:  I,  is  the  Idea  in  itself;  2,  is  its  own  self- 
posited  "  other  "  ;  3,  is  the  denial  that  this  "  other  "  is 
absolutely  an  "  other  "  ;  and  the  recognition  that  "  it " 
is  itself.  This  Divine  self-activity  is  only  adequately 
stated  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Trinity,  which  is 
fully  explicated  in  Part  IIL 

The  doctrine  of  creation,  and  of  the  relation  of 
nature  and  man  to  the  Creator,  is  vitally  connected 
with  that  of  the  triune  nature  of  God.  It  belongs 
to  his  nature  to  create.  Creation  is  God's  positing 
an  "  other  "  which  is  not  an  "  other."  The  creation 
■'"'     "15  '  "■ 


156  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

is  his,  belongs  to  his  being  or  essence.  This  involves 
the  finite  as  his  own  self-posited  object  and  self-reve- 
lation. It  is  necessary  for  God  to  create.  Love,  says 
Hegel,  is  only  another  expression  of  the  eternally 
Triune  God.  Love  must  create  and  love  "  another." 
But,  in  loving  this  "  other,"  God  is  only  loving  him- 
self. 

Spirit  lives  by  difference,  but  still  always  finds 
itself  in  all  its  differences.  Thus  Spirit  is,  to  use 
popular  language,  the  Absolute  Unity  of  the  spiritual 
and  the  natural.  Finite  consciousness,  to  which  God 
appears  as  an  object,  is  itself  only  a  self-posited  phase 
of  the  Divine  activity.  But  as  this  appearance  or 
object,  he  is  appearing  to  himself — coming  unto  his 
own.  The  recognition  that  finite  consciousness  has 
of  God  is,  from  another  point  of  view,  only  God's 
own  self-recognition,  taking  back  this  consciousness 
as  an  element  of  his  own  self-consciousness.  "  God 
was  in  Christ  reconciling  the  world  unto  himself" 
(2  Cor.  v,  19).  The  world  of  finite  spirit  has  only 
truth  and  reality  so  far  as  it  is  thus  annulled  and 
taken  back  into  God.  The  truth  of  all  finite  exist- 
ence is  thus  not  an  immediate  form  of  actuality,  but 
of  ideality,  that  wherein  it  recognizes  itself  and  is  rec- 
ognized as  an  element  of,  as  at-one-with,  the  Absolute 
Spirit.  But  these  two  moments  of  finite  conscious- 
ness, its  annulment  in  its  fulfillment,  may  be  consid- 
ered^ separately.  "" 

In  consciousness  the  Divine  object  appears  as 
phenomenality  or  representation,  on  the  theoretical 
side.  The  practical  side  is  the  fulfilling  annulment 
of  the  separation.  Here  freedom,  subjectivity  as 
such,  enters,  and  we  have  the  process  to  self-con- 
sciousness to  observe.     It  is  this  phase  that  consti- 


The  Vital  Idea  of  Religion.  1 5  7 

tutes  the  Cultiis,  the  field  in  which  atonement  and 
reconciliation  are  achieved. 

C.  Cultus,  or  Public  Worship. 

The  text  of  which  this  section  is  an  explication, 
is  reconciliation  with  God  through  the  double  but 
mutually  involved  action  of  Divine  grace  and  human 
self-sacrifice.  That  is,  it  is  the  death  of  the  old  man 
and  the  birth  of  the  new  man  accomplished  through 
religion  rather  than  through  morality. 

The  first  phase  of  Worship  is  faith,  or  the  drawing 
near  of  the  soul  unto  God.  Formal  faith  comes 
through  external  means,  through  hearing  the  voice 
of  God  in  the  Bible,  creeds,  sermons,  and  services  of 
the  Church.  But  these  must  be  merely  the  means 
for  the  begetting  the  higher  form  of  personal  faith 
which  is  known  as  "  the  testimony  of  the  Spirit." 
Worship  is  a  giving  and  a  receiving,  a  giving  up  of 
self  and  a  receiving  of  God,  that  the  ideal  self  may 
thereby  be  realized.  Morality  can  never  affect  this, 
which  is  the  very  essence  of  religion.  At-one-ment 
of  man  with  God  is  both  fully  realized  and  symbol- 
ized in  the  highest  act  of  religious  worship,  while  in 
morality  there  is  always  that  ineffectual  struggle 
that  St.  Paul  depicts  so  graphically  and  piteously  in 
the  seventh  chapter  of  his  Epistle  to  the  Romans. 

Our  striving  after  living  communion  with  God 
culminates  in  self-surrender  to  him  who  is  mighty 
to  save.  This  is  met  by  the  divine  gift  and  opera- 
tion, which  is  received  and  enjoyed  by  us : 

Worship  is  thus  a  double-sided  activity.  It  is  a  religious 
act  or  sacrifice  on  my  part,  and  the  means  of  the  Divine  act 
of  grace,  a  means  of  imparting  grace  which  I  receive  and 


158  Philosophy  of  Religion, 

enjoy.  God's  act  may  seem  to  overpower  my  freedom,  but 
my  true  freedom  consists  in  the  knowledge  and  will  of  God 
(whose  service  is  perfect  freedom).  And  this  can  only 
come  with  the  surrender  of  my  own  subjective  knowledge 
and  will.  In  this  divine  activity  man  seems  a  passive  mate- 
rial, like  a  stone.  The  divine  grace  is  to  come  to  pass  in  me 
and  through  me.  My  giving  up  myself  and  receiving  divine 
grace  is  my  own  act,  and  at  the  same  time  God's  act,  so 
that  "  it  is  no  longer  I  that  live,  but  God  that  liveth  in  me  " 
(Gal.  ii,  20).  I  have  to  open  myself  to  the  incoming  of 
the  Spirit  in  order  that  I  may  be  spiritual.  This  act  of 
worship  is  at  one  and  the  same  time  my  act  and  God's  act. 
This  paradoxical  truth  of  the  religious  experience  is  cer- 
tainly opposed  to  the  merely  moral  standpoint  of  self-reali- 
zation as  held  by  Kant  and  Fichte.  To  morality  the  good 
is  an  unrealized  something  in  a  God-forsaken  world,  an 
ideal  which  the  categorical  imperative  lays  upon  my  sub- 
jective human  will  to  realize.  Thus  the  circle  of  moral 
activity  is  limited.  In  religion,  on  the  contrary,  the  good, 
the  reconciliation,  is  absolutely  accomplished.* 

I  have  translated  this  page  from  the  section  on 
Cultus,  as  presenting  the  very  core  of  the  Christian 
doctrine  of  salvation,  and  as  illustrating,  as  a  legiti- 
mate outcome,  Hegel's  "speculative  idea  of  religion." 

The  finest  chapter  in  Principal  Caird's  volume  is 
that  in  which  he  interprets  and  illustrates  this  whole 
section  with  incomparable  skill  and  appreciation  (Phi- 
losophy of  Religion,  Chapter  IX).  It  is  the  work  of 
a  disciple  scarcely  less  original  and  subtle  than  that 
of  the  master,  that  I  gladly  refer  to  as  a  type  of  thor- 
ough assimilation  and  independent  interpretation  of 
Hegel. 

*  Philosophic  der  Religion,  vol.  ii,  p.  222. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THEOLOGY,   ANTHROPOLOGY,   AND   PANTHEISM. 

Let  us  now  return  to  the  query  raised  by  the 
passage  quoted  from  Hegel:  What  have  we  here?* 

We  reply  that  we  have — i.  The  highest  form  of 
theology,  justifying  to  thought  in  terms  of  thought  the 
deliverances  of  the  religious  consciousness  of  inspired 
writers  and  of  Christian  saints,  theologians,  and  mys- 
tics of  all  ages. 

2.  We  have  a  First  Principle,  adequate  to  origi- 
nate and  explain  to  thought  in  terms  of  thought  all  the 
phenomena  of  the  world  of  nature  and  finite  spirit 
and  their  fulfilling  implications. 

3.  We  have  not  pantheism. 

I.  First,  we  have  here  the  highest  theology  in 
terms  of  thought.  Religion  is  not  content  until  it 
rises  to  the  lofty  conviction  and  apprehends  the 
working  whereby  God  is  able  to  subdue  all  things 
unto  himself,  "  of  whom  and  through  whom  and  to 
whom  are  all  things."  The  religious  saints  have 
strained  language  to  the  utmost  to  express  this  abso- 
lute wisdom  and  power  and  goodness  of  God.  God 
is,  and  is  to  be,  "  all  in  all."  This  is  the  goal  of  Chris- 
tianity, the  religion  of  reconciliation  and  of  the  con- 
summation of  all  things.     So,  too,  philosophy  is  not 

*  P.  154. 


i6o  Philosophy  of  Religion, 

content  until  it  apprehend  the  ultimate  synthesis  of 
the  totality — God,  man,  and  the  world.     It,  too,  is 
restless  till  it  rests  in  absolute  Thought,  in  absolute 
Personality,  as  the  very  zenith  of  its  self-necessitated 
flight.     Thus  in  philosophy,  whose  whole  object  is  to 
show  reason  in  religion,  religion  finds  its  justification 
from  the  standpoint  of  thinking  consciousness.     Un- 
sophisticated piety  may  have  no  need  of  this.      It 
possesses  the  true  content  in  other  form,  and  may 
fail  to  recognize  it  when  thus  translated  into  terms 
of  thought.     What  is  left  of  my  religion  in  this  phi- 
losophy it  may  ask.     But  this  question  springs  from 
a  misunderstanding  of   the  difference  between  phi- 
losophy and  religion.     They  have  the  same  content, 
but  in  different  form.     The  common  form  of  religion 
is  that  of  feeling  and  representation,  while  philosophy 
is  that  of  thought.      It  is  the  same  content  which 
develops  and  repeats  itself   in  feeling,  imagination, 
and  thought.     But   thought,  thinking  representation, 
thinks  it  into  the  form  of  philosophy  or  theology, 
thus  transforming  it  for  its  own  cognition.     Feeling 
and  imagination  pass  over  and  are  immanent  in  this 
form.     The  philosopher  becomes  neither  unfeeling 
nor  unimaginative.     Thought  does  this  for  itself  and 
also  for  religion,  so  far  as  it  seeks  intellectual  expres- 
sion.    It  may  mean  much  or  nothing  to  the  devout 
soul  as  an  intricate  mathematical  demonstration  may 
mean  much  or  nothing  to  a  pupil.     Every  science 
has  its  own  object,  and  must  have  its  own  disciples. 
Philosophy  has  for  its  object  the  demonstration  to 
thought  in  terms  of  thought  of  the  absolute  synthetic 
unity  of  all  phenomena.     The  reproach,  then,  that  is 
made  against  theology  as  well  as  philosophy,  that 
they  do  not  give  back  religion  in  its  pictorial  form, 


Theology^  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism.  i6i 

is  senseless.  The  "  abstruse  terminology  "  is  needed 
for  higher  conceptions  of  the  rational  speculative 
comprehension  of  what  really  is  in  religion.  Thus 
depicted,  only  "  gray  in  gray,"  religion  may  seem  to 
lack  real  flesh  and  blood  vitality.  But  for  thought, 
the  new  language  interprets  the  new  and  higher 
conceptions,  which  can  not  be  adequately  expressed 
for  it  in  terms  of  the  lower  ones.  Thought  has 
been  forced  to  organically  correlate  what  common 
thought  holds  as  separate  and  distinct.  It  has  been 
forced  to  its  ultimate  presupposition  of  the  organ- 
ic unity  of  the  Infinite  and  finite,  as  absolute  self- 
consciousness.  Hegel's  First  Principle  is  God  as  this 
Absolute  Personality — the  v6T]cn<i  vorja-ea^  of  Aris- 
totle, only  developed  in  concrete  and  systematic 
form : 

The  true  First  Principle,  which  Hegel  knows  under  the 
name  of  Idea  {/dee),  and  Aristotle  calls  vot/o-is  rj  Kaff  avrrjv 
or  evepycui  rj  KaO  avTr]v  (which  the  scholastics  translate  Actus 
Purus),  is  God  as  Self-Conscious  Reason.  Subject  and 
object  of  himself,  Nature  is  his  product  as  creator,  and  the 
world  of  progressive  intelligent  beings  is  his  Image.  This 
statement  is  odious  to  some  who  style  themselves  "  scien- 
tific," for  the  reason  that  they  are  still  obliged  to  be  on  the 
alert  lest  their  dogmatism  fall  back  into  the  mere  implicit 
faith  of  Religion — an  issue  to  be  guarded  against  with  all 
caution.  But  the  strictest  and  severest  logical  procedure, 
followed  out  to  its  result,  will  inevitably  lead  to  this  Con- 
crete First  Principle — the  Recognizing  Reason.  Mechani- 
cal cause  (Matter)  presupposes  dynamical  cause  (Force), 
and  this  again  presupposes  Final  Cause  (the  Ideal  totality) 
as  its  condition  ;  Final  Cause  presupposes  Free  Intelligence 
— self-determining  and  realizing — as  its  condition  ;  and  this 
presupposes  only  itself,  and  hence  all  dialectic  ends  here  at 


1 62  Philosophy  of  Religion, 

the  First  True  and  Concrete,  the  Highest  Principle,  and 
this  is  Personality.* 

Hegel  himself  has  elsewhere  declared  : 

The  highest,  steepest  summit  is  the  Pure  Personality, 
which  alone,  through  the  absolute  dialectic  forming  its  na- 
ture, includes  and  holds  all  in  itself,  for  the  reason  that  it 
elevates  itself  to  Freedom. 

Here  we  have  a  category  that  holds  the  totality 
of  conditions  self-posited,  with  no  external  "other" 
to  condition  it.  Here  the  mechanical  and  fatalistic 
conception  passes  in  ethical  harmony  into  the  high- 
est freedom  of  perfect  self-determination.  At  the 
same  time  it  only  annuls  by  explaining  and  realizing 
all  lower  categories  or  conceptions  as  self-posited 
moments  of  itself.  Its  true  content  is  not  the  ab- 
stract isolated  Personality  of  mere  deism,  but  the 
systematic  whole,  the  parts  of  which  are  falsely 
grasped  as  absolute  fragments  by  the  lower  concep- 
tions of  nature,  law,  and  necessity.  "  The  Absolute 
Idea  may  thus  be  compared  to  the  old  man  who 
utters  the  same  religious  propositions  as  the  child, 
but  for  whom  they  are  pregnant  with  the  significance 
of  a  lifetime.  The  interest  lies  in  the  whole  experi- 
ence." f     Again : 

When  we  hear  the  Idea  spoken  of,  we  need  not  imagine 
something  far  away  beyond  this  mortal  sphere.  The  Idea 
is  rather  what  is  completely  present ;  and  it  is  found  in 
every  consciousness,  although  it  may  be  in  an  indistinct 
and  stunted  form.  We  conceive  the  world  to  ourselves  as 
a  great  totality,  which  is  created  by  God,  and  so  created 

*  Dr.  W.  T.  Harris,  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  October,  1869. 
f  The  Logic,  p.  234. 


Theology^  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism.  163 

that  in  it  God  has  manifested  himself  to  us.  We  regard  the 
world  also  as  ruled  by  Divine  Providence  :  implying  that 
the  division  between  the  parts  of  the  world  is  continually 
brought  back,  and  made  conformable,  to  the  unity  from 
which  it  has  issued.  The  purpose  of  philosophy  has  always 
been  to  know  the  Idea  by  thought ;  and  everything  deserv- 
ing the  name  of  philosophy  has  constantly  been  based  on 
the  consciousness  of  an  absolute  unity,  where  the  under- 
standing sees  and  accepts  only  separation.* 

Again :  "  This  Absolute  Idea  is  the  unity  of  the 
theoretical  (cognitive)  and  the  practical  (willing),  and 
at  the  same  time  the  unity  of  life  with  cognition."  f 
In  this  First  Principle,  then,  we  have  the  absolute 
self-conscious  life  of  reason  and  will — physically  and 
metaphysically  free,  but  morally  necessitated — the 
necessity  of  Divine  Love.  We  have  the  immanent 
Deity — at  home  in  all  his  creation  and  not  merely  the 
supermundane  deity,  the  Deus  ex  machma,  who  can 
only  occasionally  thrust  his  hand  into  the  web  of 
human  affairs  from  behind  the  clouds.  Too  many 
Christians  have  accepted  at  the  hands  of  deists  this 
unethical  conception  of  God.  He  is  "the  fullness 
that  filleth  all  things  "  (Eph.  i,  19),  from  whose  pres- 
ence nor  man  nor  devil  can  escape.  He  is  a  God 
here  and  now,  not  merely  then  and  there.  No  need  to 
go  "  beyond  the  sea "  or  "  up  into  the  heavens  "  to 
find  him,  for  the  "  heaven  of  heavens  "  can  not  con- 
tain him.  He  is  omnipresent,  the  omite  scibile  of  all 
existence. 

Telescope  and  microscope  may  not  find  him,  be- 
cause he  is  so  "  nigh  thee,  even  in  thy  heart  and  in 
thy  mouth." 

*  The  Logic,  p.  306.  f  Ibid.,  p.  321. 


164  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Speak  to  him  thou,  for  he  hears,  and  spirit  with  spirit  can 

meet ; 
Closer  is  he  than  breathing,  and  nearer  than  hands  and  feet. 

He  is  not  merely  something  outside  and  beyond 
our  conscious  feeling  and  thought  of  him.  He  is 
above  but  also  below,  without  but  also  within ;  as 
St.  Hildebert  sings : 

Super  cuncta,  subter  cuncta  ; 
Extra  cuncta,  intra  cuncta  ; 
Intra  cuncta,  nee  inclusus  ; 
Extra  cuncta,  nee  exclusus  ; 
Super  totus,  praesidendo, 
Subter  totus,  sustinendo ; 
Extra  totus,  complectendo, 
Intra  totus  in  complendo. 

The  "heaven  of  heavens"  can  not  contain  him, 
how  much  less  "  this  house  " — the  order,  beauty,  and 
life  of  Nature,  the  constitution  and  capacities  of  the 
human  soul,  all  the  large  movements  of  human  his- 
tory— the   whole    rejoicing    and    groaning    creation 

(/cr/o-t?) — 

.  .  .  the  light  of  setting  suns. 
And  the  round  ocean  and  the  living  air, 
And  the  blue  sky  and  the  mind  of  man. 

"  Is  it  not  effrontery,"  asks  Lotze,  "  to  narrow 
down  the  Spirit  of  the  universe  to  a  series  of  events 
upon  this  planet?"  God  is  not  only  immanent,  he 
is  also  transcendent.  Hegel  holds  with  Aristotle  that 
"  the  world  has  its  principle  in  God,  and  this  princi- 
ple exists  not  merely  as  a  form  immanent  in  the 
world,  like  the  order  in  an  army,  but  also  as  an  ab- 
solute   self-existent    substance,   like   a  general  in   an 


Theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism.  165 

army."*  Only  Hegel  substitutes  for  substance  the 
full  concrete  Christian  conception  of  subject.  Hegel 
never  tires  of  recalling  and  emphasizing  this  most 
vital  distinction  for  Theism.  It  is  that  which  differ- 
entiates his  conception,  as  he  constantly  affirms,  from 
Pantheism,  and  is  absolutely  required  for  proper 
Personality  in  the  Godhead. 

To  doubt  that  Hegel  means  all  that  inspired  writ- 
ers and  Christian  saints  and  theologians  and  mystics 
ascribe  to  God  in  their  most  ecstatic  moments  of 
rapt  devotion,  is  to  doubt  his  plainest,  oft-repeated, 
and  always  implied  assertion.  But  this  is  not  all  that 
Hegel  does.  He  maintains  that  Personality  neces- 
sarily involves  the  triune  nature  of  God.  He  rightly 
regards  the  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Trinity  as  the  vital 
center  of  all  Christian  doctrine — the  essential  truth 
in  the  light  of  which  alone  it  is  possible  to  know 
God  and  to  understand  the  meaning  of  nature  and 
human  history.  It  alone  supplies  all  the  conditions 
requisite  for  the  absolute  free  personality  of  God, 
which  issues  in  his  creation  of  nature,  and  of  man  in 
his  own  image.  Hegel  thus  makes  religion  imma- 
nent in  the  triune  nature  of  God  himself,  finding  in 
the  mutual  interplay  of  the  three  persons  in  the  God- 
head the  absolute  form  of  love,  communion,  atone- 
ment— that  is,  the  essence  of  religion.  This  is  what 
he  means  when  he  says :  "  Thus  religion  is,  in  a 
higher  way,  the  Idea  of  the  Spirit,  who  of  himself 
relates  himself  to  himself,  or  it  is  the  5r//"-conscious- 
ness  of  the  Absolute  Spirit."  From  Divine  Person- 
ality thus  constituted  issues  the  might  of  creative 
love — a  creation  free  and  yet  morally  necessitated  by 

*  Uebervveg's  History  of  Philosophy,  vol.  i,  p.  163. 


1 66  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

the  Divine  love.  Further,  he  says  that  "  Religion  is 
the  knowledge  that  the  Divine  Spirit  has  of  himself, 
through  the  mediation  of  the  finite  spirit."  That  is, 
God  in  loving  man  loves  only  himself.  On  the  other 
hand,  his  children  in  knowing  and  loving  God  are 
only  truly  knowing  and  loving  themselves  —  their 
true  eternal  selves.  Again,  it  may  be  said  our  lov- 
ing God  is  only  God's  loving  himself,  "  reconciling 
the  world  unto  himself,"  taking  back  this  human  love 
and  worship  as  an  element  of  his  own  self-conscious- 
ness. The  two  sides  of  this  truth  may  be  thus  stated 
in  paradoxical  form,  without  swamping  the  true  Per- 
sonality of  either  God  or  man,  and  at  the  same  time 
repelling  that  separation  that  is  sometimes  conceived 
to  exist  between  these  organic  elements  in  the  divine 
life  and  creation.  Hegel's  language  here  can  easily 
be  paralleled  by  that  of  numberless  sainted  writers. 

To  Part  III  also  belongs  the  vindication  by  Hegel 
of  all  the  vital  Christian  conceptions  and  doctrines 
concerning  God,  his  attributes,  creation,  revelation, 
and  his  Church.  I  have  said  enough  to  show  that 
Hegel  does  not  ascribe  less  to  God  than  the  pro- 
foundest  theologians  and  devoutest  saints.  The  con- 
tention, however,  is  likely  to  be  that  he  ascribes  too 
much  to  God — that  his  Absolute  absorbs  and  destroys 
personality,  freedom,  and  immortality.  Jealousy  for 
man's  place  and  worth  may  ignorantly  attack  Hegel's 
conception  of  God.  Thus  Prof.  Seth  seems  to  fall 
back  from  Hegel's  lofty  ontology  because  it  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  antiquated  conception  of  freedom 
held  by  Libertarians,  Pelagians,  and  Arminians.  "  I 
have,"  he  says,  "  a  center  of  my  own — a  will  of  my 
own,  which  no  one  shares  with  me  or  can  share — a 
center  which  I  maintain  even  in  my  dealings  with 


Theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pa^itheism.  167 

God  himself."  God  is  warned  not  to  tread  upon  the 
holy  ground  of  the  individual  will  without  first  put- 
ting off  his  shoes. 

The  English  Hegelians  prefer  to  call  themselves 
Neo-Kantians,  followers  in  "  the  path  opened  out  by 
Kant,  and  further  explored  by  Kant's  successors," 
especially  by  Hegel.  Some  of  the  younger  members 
of  the  school  published  a  volume  of  Essays  in  Philo- 
sophical Criticism,  dedicated  to  the  memory  of  Thomas 
Hill  Green,  the  leader  of  the  Oxford  circle,  with  a  pref- 
ace by  Prof.  Edward  Caird,  of  Glasgow.  Without  ex- 
ception they  all,  as  well  as  older  members  of  the  same 
school,  like  Principal  Caird  and  Prof.  W.  Wallace, 
attribute  this  profound  Theism  to  Hegel.  Mr.  R.  B. 
Haldane  has,  however,  so  far  lapsed  from  Philosophy 
into  Kantian  Agnosticism  as  to  criticise  Hegel  and 
Prof.  Green  for  having  any  ontology  and  theology 
in  their  system.  He  esteems  "  the  teaching  us  how 
to  criticise  our  categories  "  to  be  the  chief  and  last- 
ing work  of  Hegel.  Kant  was  right  in  "  declining 
to  identify  the  logical  unity  of  thought  with  a  divine 
or  creative  self,"  and  Hegel  was  wrong  in  making 
this  identification,  though  "  he  was  under  no  greater 
necessity  of  making  the  identification,"  or  '*'  to  iden- 
tify this  ideal  with  Divine  Existence."  But  he  did  do 
so,  as  also  did  Prof.  T.  H.  Green.  Instead  of  confin- 
ing the  work  to  mere  criticism  of  the  categories,  they 
did  "  transform  the  theory  of  knozuledge  into  a  meta- 
physic  of  existence,  or  absolute  Philosophy,  in  which 
a  transcendental  Self,  which  for  this  theory  has  no 
meaning  except  as  the  implicate  of  all  experiences  is 
first  hypostatized  into  an  Absolute  Subject  and  pres- 
ently into  an  Absolute  Caused  "  But,"  says  Haldane, 
criticising  this,  "  all  that  is,  is  for  knowledge  " — not 
16 


1 68  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

either  for  an  individual  or  an  Absolute  Subject.  All 
that  can  be  done,  he  affirms,  is  to  stick  to  the  criti- 
cal method  and  criticise  our  categories.  But  knowl- 
edge can  not  be  for  nobody,  nor  can  criticism  of  the 
categories  be  aught  but  arbitrary  and  fanciful  with- 
out some  standard  of  comparison.  Prof.  Erdmann, 
the  venerable  orthodox  exponent  of  Hegel,  well  says, 
*'  The  problem  of  all  Science — i.  e.,  to  recognize  Rea- 
son in  the  different  spheres — can  be  solved  only  when 
one  knows,  first,  what  Reason  is,  and,  secondly,  how 
to  find  it "  ;  *  and  affirms  that  Hegel  identifies  Rea- 
son with  the  creative  self-conscious  subject  God. 

Prof.  Seth,  who  now  criticises  Hegel's  and  Green's 
Theism  from  the  standpoint  of  individualism  (i.  e., 
knowledge  is  for  somebody  for  the  individual  and  de 
intellectibus  non  dispiitandnni),  says  that  "  surely  He- 
gel's system  was  to  its  author  from  beginning  to  end 
an  ontology  or  metaphysic  of  existence,"  and  "  Hegel 
would  have  contemptuously  tossed  aside  any  theory 
that  professed  to  do  less."  Criticism  of  categories  is 
not  the  whole  of  philosophy,  and  it  shirks  its  true 
task  if  it  does  not  in  some  way  identify  thought  and 
Being.  If  the  Self-conscious  Subject  of  Hegel  is  the 
ultimate  category  of  thought,  then  we  must  use  it  as 
our  best  key  to  the  ultimate  nature  of  existence  as  a 
whole.  As  Mr.  D.  G.  Ritchie  says,  "  If  the  theologi- 
cal question  has  to  be  raised,  and  it  can  not  well  be 
avoided,  the  Idealist  may  at  least  claim  the  same 
right  to  use  the  name  of  God  for  the  ultimate  princi- 
ple of  the  universe,  which  is  assumed  by  every  hot- 
gospeller,  who  talks  about  God  as  he  might  do  about 
*  the   man   in   the   next  street.' "     Certainly,  as  Mr. 

*  Erdmann's  Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  vol.  ii,  p.  559. 


Theology,  Anthropology,  a7id  Pa^itheism.  169 

Ritchie  suggests,  the  Idealism  of  Hegel  seems  at 
least  to  render  explicable,  as  no  other  theory  does, 
why  some  of  the  world's  greatest  minds  have  held 
certain  theological  doctrines,  which,  though  to  the 
logic  of  "common  sense,"  they  appear  as  senseless 
ravings,  can  assimilate  any  results  that  Science  may 
attain  and  yet  make  explicable  the  most  mystical 
theology.  Such  a  theory  is  at  least  as  worthy  of 
consideration  as  Deism,  Agnosticism,  or  Materialism. 

Prof.  Seth,  we  have  recently  quoted  *  as  protest- 
ing against  Hegel  for  ascribing  too  much  to  God,  in 
his  lofty  ontology.  He  betrays  a  jealousy  of  God 
rather  than/br  God.  He  is  jealous  for  his  own  indi- 
viduality, not  for  human  personality  as  personalized 
by  God,  which  is  really  Hegel's  conception.  He 
warns  God  off  from  that  inviolable  holy  ground  of 
the  subjective  individual  self. 

11.  In  noticing  this  objection,  we  turn  to  our  sec- 
ond point.  We  have  here  a  First  Principle  adequate 
to  originate  and  explain  to  thought,  in  terms  of 
thought,  the  world  of  nature  and  finite  spirit,  and 
their  fulfilling  implications.  We  may  omit  reference 
to  nature,  and  only  consider  the  place  accorded  or 
left  to  man  under  Hegel's  view  of  God. 

No  one  that  I  have  ever  read  maintains  so  stanchly 
as  Hegel  the  full,  rich,  eternal  content  of  human  per- 
sonality. But  no  one  wars  more  strenuously  than 
he  does  against  the  one-sided  subjective  and  abstract 
individualism  so  prevalent  in  the  eighteenth  century, 
which  is  even  to-day  the  bane  of  much  philosophy 
and  sectarian  Christianity.      His  whole  philosophy 


*  Cf.  the  English  quarterly,  Mind,  Nos.  1,  lii,  liii,  for  these  references 
to  Haldane,  Ritchie,  and  Seth. 


170  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

may  be  said  to  be  a  protest  against  such  atomic  in- 
dividualism as  makes  objective  catholic  truth  impos- 
sible, and  lands  its  upholders  in  agnosticism  and 
pessimism.  His  whole  conception  of  the  true  con- 
crete qualitative  Infinite  as  opposed  to  the  abstract 
quantitative  one,  of  the  organic  relation  of  the  true 
Infinite  and  finite,  is  as  much  to  vindicate  and  real- 
ize the  infinite  capacity  of  man,  as  it  is  to  give  the 
Infinite  real  concrete  fullness  of  being.  The  Infi- 
nite is  the  necessary  presupposition  of  the  finite,  in 
relation  with  which  it  alone  can  have  and  realize  its 
being.  Seth's  contention,  however,  seems  to  be  for 
the  mere  independent  individual,  apart  not  only  from 
the  Infinite  but  also  apart  from  relation  to  the  social 
organism.  All  reality  and  all  knowledge,  he  says,  is 
for  the  individual  self,  not  for  the  universal  self  or 
consciousness,  which  he  calls  merely  a  logical  ab- 
straction. "  Each  self  is  a  unique  existence,  which 
is  perfectly  impervious,  if  I  may  so  speak,  to  other 
selves — impervious  in  a  fashion  of  which  the  impene- 
trability of  matter  is  a  faint  analogue."  But  denying 
a  social,  and  finally  a  universal  reality,  involves  all 
our  experience  in  a  contradiction.  Such  a  principle 
of  unity,  such  an  all-embracing  reality,  is  at  least 
necessary  to  any  cosmos  of  science  or  philosophy  of 
man.  Grant  for  the  moment  that  it  is  a  fiction  of 
thought.  It  is  at  least  a  necessary  fiction — one  with- 
out which  all  thought  is  impossible.  Such  is  the  ver- 
dict of  all  philosophical  theory  of  knowing.  Kant's 
Transcendental  Ego  may  be  denied  real  existence, 
but  its  necessity  for  thought  can  not  even  be  ques- 
tioned. To  deny  that  we  can  ever  get  out  of  our 
selves,  or  that  anything  outside  of  our  impervious 
selves  can  get  into  us,  is  to  deny  that  we  can  in 


Theology,  Anthropology ,  aiid  Pantheism.   171 

thought  transcend  our  own  individuality  and  enter 
into  a  world  of  real  reality  that  embraces  and  binds 
together  all  thinkers  and  all  objects  of  thought.  The 
real  presupposition  of  all  knowledge  is  not  the  indi- 
vidual's subjective  consciousness,  but  a  thought  or 
self  -  consciousness,  which  is  beyond  all  individual 
thought,  which  thinks  in  and  through  individuals — a 
thought  which  can  not  be  a  mere  subjective  notion 
or  conception,  but  which  carries  with  it  the  proof  of 
its  own  necessary  existence  or  reality. 

The  maintenance  of  sheer  individuality  may  avoid 
Pantheism,  and  then  arbitrarily  posit  a  Deus  ex  ma- 
china  which  individualism  soon  reduces  to  the  great 
Unknown  and  Unknowable,  and  ends  in  Agnosticism. 
It  is  true  that  the  reality  and  worth  of  the  individual 
must  be  stanchly  maintained  as  the  Alpha  and  Omega 
of  ethics.  Free  self-conscious  action,  but  regulated 
by  infinite  absolute  law  instead  of  arbitrary  subject- 
ive caprice,  is  the  very  heart  of  morality.  Any  the- 
ory which  makes  man  to  be  determined  by  any  arbi- 
trary external  non-congenial  power,  or  that  reduces 
him  to  a  mere  cog  in  a  huge  machine  that  must  move 
when  and  how  and  whither  the  crank  turns,  can  not 
be  too  strongly  condemned. 

But  here  the  term  personality  is  much  more  ap- 
propriate and  significant  than  the  term  individuality. 
An  individual  is,  strictly  speaking,  an  undividable, 
inseparate  atom.  Individuus  is  the  Latin  for  the 
drofio^  of  Democritus.  But  there  is  no  such  thing 
within  man's  knowledge.  Even  Seth  acknowledges 
that  "the  mere  individual  is  a  fiction  of  philosophic 
thought"  and  "an  abstraction  of  logic."  Individu- 
ality, says  Bain  also,  consists  in  "a  conflux  of  gen- 
eralities."    We   can  no  more  conceive  of   such  an 


1 72  Philosophy  of  Religion, 

individual  man,  "  who  has  not  sucked  at  the  breast 
of  the  universal  Ethos,"  without  ancestry  and  social 
relations,  than  we  can  conceive  of  a  tree  without  soil 
and  air  and  light.  The  so-called  individual  is  a  whole 
complex  of  hereditary  and  environing  elements,  held 
together  in  one  consciousness,  which  itself  is  as  dif- 
ferentiated as  these  elements.  The  whole  precedes 
and  environs  all  such  individuals.  They  are  only  of 
absolute  value  as  thus  participant  in  an  intelligent, 
social,  and  rational  world.  It  is  not  the  actual  but 
the  ideal  individual  that  is  of  worth.  It  is  this  ideal 
individual  which  appears  not  as  something  ready 
made,  but  something  which  develops  by  living  into 
the  larger  life  about  it ;  not  something  isolated  and 
opposed  to  the  world  and  humanity,  but  that  which 
receives  them  into  its  own  circle,  loses  its  own  life  in 
them,  in  order  to  live  its  own  life.  Subjective  indi- 
vidual freedom  from  all  limits  and  relations  really 
means  inability  to  act  at  all.  Freedom  in  vacuo  is 
motionless.  Forms  of  activity  are  objective.  The 
individual  must  go  out  of  himself  to  be  himself.  De- 
nuded of  external  limits,  relations,  and  duties,  he  is 
without  form  and  void.  So,  too,  there  is  no  merely 
individual  self-consciousness.  Even  in  his  simplest 
act  of  consciousness,  not-self  is  one  of  the  factors. 
Consciousness  overlaps  both  the  ego  and  the  non-ego. 
An  eternal  omnipresent  not-self  is  necessary  to  real 
self-consciousness.  Altruism  is  complemental  to  ego- 
ism. Both  are  parts  of  every  self-conscious  individ- 
ual's life.  Shut  up  the  individual  from  others,  and 
he  finds  no  '  other  "  to  nourish  his  own  life.  He  must 
have  at  least  some  low  sky  against  which  to  strike 
his  sublime  head,  in  order  to  know  that  he  has  a  head. 
But  man,  as  such  a  progressively  realizing  self,  is 


Theology y  Anthropology ^  and  Pantheism,   i  ^2t 

differentiated  from  the  abstract  individual  by  being 
a  person.  A  person,  at  least,  is  the  quality  of  being 
an  object  to  itself  in  relation  to  other  persons  and 
things.  He  finds  himself,  is  at  home  in  all  the  larger 
life  about  him.  A  native-born  Robinson  Crusoe  on 
his  island  might  be  an  individual,  he  could  not  be  a 
person.  Society  is  to  the  person  what  language  is  to 
thought.  Unus  homo  niillus  homo.  '  Multiply  your 
relations,  and  you  increase  yourself;  minimize  them, 
and  you  dwarf  even  to  annihilation.  It  is  in  the  ob- 
jective ethical  world  of  social  relations  of  family,  so- 
ciety, state,  and  church,  that  the  individual  attains 
ethical  personality.  He  is  relatively  complete  only  in 
this  social  life.  Man  is  by  nature  not  an  individual, 
but  a  social  being  (iroXtTtKov  ^oov),  and  can  realize  his 
personality  only  because  it  is  as  social  that  he  realizes 
himself.  To  live  his  own  life,  he  must  live  the  life 
which  is  not  merely  his  own,  and  yet  is  most  em- 
phatically his  own.  The  individual  must  die,  in  order 
that  the  person  may  live  in  an  organism  of  persons. 
The  external  duties  to  family,  neighbors,  and  state 
are  his  own  duties ;  the  welfare  of  these  is  his  own 
welfare.  Living  for  others  is  the  highest  form  of 
living  by  others.  Die  to  live  is  the  ultimate  law  of  all 
life.  The  objective  social  laws  exist  as  an  external 
■must,  as  forced  necessities  to  the  individual,  while  to 
the  person  they  exist  as  a  personal  categorical  imper- 
ative. The  person  is  autonomous,  gives  these  ethical 
laws  to  himself.  Thus  the  subjective  penetrates  and 
lives  in  the  objective,  the  individual  in  the  relatively 
universal.  Enthusiasm  of  humanity  is  enthusiasm  for 
self,  and  self-realization  is  labor  for  the  welfare  of 
humanity.  Thus  the  largest  altruism  is  the  truest 
egoism,  and  genuine  self-culture  is  genuine  philan- 


174  Philosophy  of  Religio7i. 

thropy.  The  egoistic  individual  does  not  thus  rec- 
ognize and  interpret  all  external  obligations  to  family 
and  neighbors  as  his  duties,  does  not  impose  them 
upon  himself,  while  the  ethical  person  does.  Apart 
from  the  fulfillment  of  these  duties,  the  person  knows 
that  he  is  not  himself.  Mere  selfish,  individual  pleas- 
ure becomes  real  self-denial  to  the  larger  self  of  per- 
sonality. We  know,  in  theory  at  least,  how  we  might 
thus  realize  ourselves,  by  transcending  while  fulfilling 
the  relations  of  narrower  spheres,  until  we  enter  the 
largest  cosmopolitan  life  of  humanity  and  become  the 
thoroughly  socialized  person.  Prof.  Green  says  very 
finely  that  we  have  reached — 

that  stage  in  which  the  educated  citizen  of  Christendom 
is  able  to  think  of  the  perfect  life  as  essentially  conditioned 
by  the  exercise  of  virtues,  resting  on  a  self-sacrificing  will, 
in  which  it  is  open  to  all  men  to  participate,  and  as  fully  at- 
tainable by  one  man,  only  in  so  far  as  through  those  virtues 
it  is  attained  by  all.  In  thinking  of  ultimate  good  he 
thinks  of  it,  indeed,  necessarily  as  perfection  for  himself ; 
as  a  life  in  which  he  shall  be  fully  satisfied  through  having 
become  all  that  the  spirit  within  enables  him  to  become. 
But  he  can  not  think  of  himself  as  satisfied  in  any  life 
other  than  a  social  life,  exhibiting  the  exercise  of  self-deny- 
ing will,  and  in  which  "  the  multitude  of  the  redeemed," 
which  is  all  men,  shall  participate.  He  has  other  faculties, 
indeed,  than  those  which  are  directly  exhibited  in  the  spe- 
cifically moral  virtues — faculties  which  find  their  expression 
not  in  his  dealings  with  other  men,  but  in  the  arts  and 
sciences,  and  the  development  of  these  must  be  a  necessary 
constituent  in  any  life  which  he  presents  to  himself  as  one 
in  which  he  can  find  satisfaction.  But  "  when  he  sits  down 
in  a  calm  hour,"  it  will  not  be  in  isolation  that  the  develop- 
ment of  any  of  these  faculties  will  assume  the  character  for 
him  of  ultimate  good.     Intrinsic  desirableness,  sufficiency 


Theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism.  175 

to  satisfy  the  rational  soul,  will  be  seen  to  belong  to  their 
realization  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  constituent  in  a  whole  of 
social  life,  of  which  the  distinction,  as  a  social  life,  shall  be 
universality  of  disinterested  goodness.* 

The  individual  personality  is  thus  realized  rather 
than  destroyed  by  large  social  limitations.  And  yet 
the  person  is  only  relatively  realized  or  complete, 
even  in  his  most  perfect  organic  relations  w^ith  them. 
His  ideal  still  flies  before.  His  spirit  forces  him  to 
transcend  even  these  lofty  forms  of  the  finite,  and 
rise  to  the  Infinite  and  Absolute.  He  has  a  potential 
infinitude  as  his  ideal  capacity,  and  the  highest  pos- 
sible merely  human  social  life  gives  him  only  a  rela- 
tive infinitude.  He  is  not  complete  in  any  or  all  of 
them.  It  is  Carlyle's  shoe-black  again  with  his  infi- 
nite craving,  "  wanting  God's  infinite  universe  alto- 
gether to  himself."  It  is  Alexander  sighing  for  more 
worlds  to  conquer.  It  is  the  illimitable  limit  that 
the  human  spirit  posits  for  its  god  Terminus.  And  to 
be  conscious  of  a  limit  is  to  be  already  beyond  it, 
and  to  claim  this  beyond  as  its  native  inheritance. 
But  his  self-realization  in  these  spheres  which  threaten 
to  limit  and  ingulf  the  individual  may  help  us  to 
understand  how  the  finite  is  not  absorbed  and  de- 
stroyed by  relation  to  the  Infinite  and  Absolute  First 
Principle  that  Hegel  proposes.  More  than  this,  it 
may  be  said  that  the  spirit's  transcendence  of  them 
is  through  and  by  means  of  them.  Or,  to  put  it  from 
the  other  side,  they  are  the  media  of  the  divine  im- 
manence in  the  finite  spirit.  Through  them  God 
descends  to  man,  and  through  them  man  ascends  to 
God.  He  can  realize  himself  in  them  only  so  far  as 
he  sees  that  they  are  such  media.     And  he  can  only 

*  Prologomena  to  Ethics,  p.  414. 


176  Philosophy  of  Religion, 

transcend  them  and  rise  to  the  Infinite  by  using  them 
as  media.  "  If  a  man  say,  I  love  God,  and  hateth 
his  brother,  he  is  a  liar :  for  he  who  loveth  not  his 
brother  whom  he  hath  seen,  how  can  he  love  God 
whom  he  hath  not  seen  ?  " 

Man  then  realizes  his  personality  in  and  through 
the  social  spheres.  But  the  highest  conception  of 
humanity,  abstracted  from  God,  and  the  most  com- 
plete identification  with  its  life  that  one  can  make, 
still  has  a  limit,  and  forces  the  fiight  of  the  spirit  into 
the  beyond.  Man  can  only  be  relatively  complete  as 
an  organic  member  of  the  most  perfect  form  of  so- 
cial organism.  It  is  in  art,  religion,  and  philosophy, 
not  as  separate  from  but  immanent  in  and  through 
all  these  spheres,  that  the  finite  spirit  recognizes  and 
attains  its  full  consummation  in  its  unity  with  the 
Absolute  First  and  Final  Principle  of  the  universe. 
Man  is  never  absolutely  an  independent  individual — 
never  a  little  god  by  himself.  Man  is  man  only  as 
he  is  reconciled  and  united  with  God.  This,  it  is  to 
be  noted,  is  not  the  individual,  but  the  social  man — 
"  till  we  all  come,  unto  a  full-grown  man,  unto  the 
measure  of  the  stature  of  the  fullness  of  Christ." 
Not  in  separation  from  God,  not  in  opposition  or 
rebellion  against  God,  but  in  living  organic  union 
with  him,  can  social  man  become  perfect.  The  indi- 
vidual is  organic  to  a  larger  life  in  the  family,  and 
that  to  a  larger  life  in  civil  society,  and  that  to  a 
larger  life  in  the  nation,  and  that  to  a  larger  life  of 
humanity  in  universal  history,  each  sphere  taking 
up  into  itself  while  transcending  the  lower  one.  But 
that  which  takes  up  and  transcends  all  these  spheres, 
and  which  is  their  eternal  presupposition  and  life, 
is  the  life  of  God  in  the  mind  and  heart  of  social 


Theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism.  177 

man.  The  whole  progress  into  this  completeness 
is  "  a  progress  in  the  consciousness  of  freedom." 
This  is  a  progress  in  man's  consciousness  of  God, 
learning  that  God's  "  service  is  perfect  freedom," 
because  learning  that  the  will  of  God  is  the  perfect 
law  and  real  content  of  perfect  human  will.  The 
perfect  man,  the  true  head  of  the  race,  could  say  no 
more  nor  less  than  "  Lo,  I  am  come  to  do  thy  will, 
O  God." 

The  apostles  speak  of  Christians  being  "  partakers 
of  the  Divine  nature"  and  "  partakers  of  his  holiness," 
and  "the  temple  of  the  living  God,"  as  "dwelling  in 
God  and  God  in  them."  They  never  speak  of  the 
true  life  of  men  other  than  our  Saviour  did,  that  is, 
as  being  in  intimate  organic  union  with  the  Father 
and  the  Son  through  the  Holy  Spirit.  Christ's 
prayer  to  the  Father  was  that  they  might  all  be 
"  one  in  us,"  "  even  as  we  are  one." 

That  is,  the  Christian  conception  of  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  personality  of  men  is  based  upon  organic 
union  with  the  Personality  of  God.  Deistic  concep- 
tions may  lower  this  genuine  Christian  view,  but 
true  philosophy  absolutely  vindicates  and  maintains 
it.  The  presupposition  of  intelligent,  moral  man 
attaining  unto  completeness  of  personality,  is  the 
perfect  Personality  of  the  Absolute  Reason,  or  God. 
Hegel's  First  Principle  is  thus  adequate  to  originate 
and  explain  and  fulfill  the  personality  of  finite  spirits. 
All  the  language  of  Scripture  and  devotion,  and  of 
mystical  and  of  Catholic  theology  unfalteringly  as- 
cribes man's  redemption,  regeneration,  and  sanctifi- 
cation  to  the  work  of  Divine  Grace.  God  is  all,  and 
man  nothing  without  God.  We  pray  God  for  the 
"  spirit  to  think  and  do  such  things  as  are  right,"  be- 


178  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

cause  "  we  can  not  do  anything  that  is  good  without 
thee,"  and  "  that  by  thy  holy  inspiration  we  think 
those  things  that  are  good,  and  by  thy  merciful  guid- 
ing may  perform  the  same."  In  all  this  there  is  no 
thought  of  the  loss  of  our  own  personality  through 
the  overshadowing  almightiness  of  God,  or  through 
his  breaking  through  our  impervious  selves  and  ab- 
sorbing all  into  himself.  Yet  we  recognize  "  the 
eternal  purpose  "  revealed  in  Christ  to  be  that  "  God 
may  be  all  in  all."  In  this  consummation  we  are 
confident  of  our  own  cojtipletion  in  him,  "  perfect  as 
our  Father  in  heaven  is  perfect,"  because  we  are  in- 
dissolubly  one  with  him. 

Thus  all  the  teaching  of  Scripture,  of  theology, 
and  the  language  of  devotion  is  open  to  the  same 
jealousy  of  individualism  that  has  been  manifested 
toward  Hegel's  First  Principle.  In  fact,  his  First 
Principle,  and  the  correlate  doctrine  of  the  organic 
unity  of  the  Infinite  and  the  finite,  are  but  the  intel- 
ligent expression  in  terms  of  thought  for  thought  of  the 
very  heart  and  life  of  Christianity.  And  it  is  so  pro- 
fessedly. This  is  fully  established  in  Part  III,  where 
he  explicates  the  Christian  religion  as  the  absolute 
and  ultimate  religion  for  man.  Dr.  E.  Mulford,  a 
profound  theologian  as  well  as  a  profound  student  of 
Hegel,  says,  "  I  believe  that  Hegel  himself  may  be 
taken  at  his  word,  and  instead  of  being  a  pantheist 
or  panlogist,  or  whatever  may  be  the  last  word  in- 
vented to  define  his  position,  he  has  sought  the  rec- 
onciliation of  philosophy  with  Christian  truth  and 
life."  *  The  coming  of  God  into  man,  his  breaking 
into   the   individual's    impervious   self,   means   larger 

*  Article  on  F.  D.  Maurice,  Scribner's  Magazine,  September,  1872. 


Theology y  Anthropology ^  and  Pantheism.  179 

freedom,  fuller  life,  and  more  perfect  personality  for 
man.  It  gives  him  that  life  of  the  spirit  which  raises 
man  above  the  categories  of  death  and  absorption. 

No  one,  I  affirm,  attributes  a  larger,  fuller,  or  more 
eternal  content  to  the  finite  spirit  than  Hegel  does. 
His  First  Principle  is  adequate  to  this  perfection  of 
the  individual,  because  it  is  identical  with  the  God 
St.  Paul  preached  to  the  Athenians,  as  "  not  far  from 
every  one  of  us ;  for  in  him  we  live  and  move  and 
have  our  being  "  ;  implying,  also,  that  God  lives  and 
moves  and  has  his  being  in  us.  God  is  all  in  all,  and 
yet  finite  spirit  is  perfected  in  him.  That  which 
God  creates,  redeems,  and  sanctifies,  he  reconciles 
and  receives  unto  himself.  The  wisdom  and  love 
and  goodness  he  realizes  in  man  are  not  a  foreign 
"other"  to  his  own  nature.  This  is  what  Hegel 
means  by  these  sentences  in  the  passage  previously 
quoted :  "  Religion  is  not  merely  the  spirit  putting 
itself  in  relation  with  the  Absolute  Spirit,  but  it  is 
the  Absolute  Spirit  himself  relating  himself  to  him- 
self";  "it  is  the  knowledge  which  the  Divine  Spirit 
has  of  himself  through  the  mediation  of  the  finite 
spirit";  it  is  "God's  own  self-consciousness,"  "his 
own  self-recognition."  God  owns  his  own.  In  that 
knowledge  of  him  which  is  our  eternal  life,  in  that 
love  of  him  which  he  creates  in  our  hearts,  we  may 
surely  say  that  he  knows  and  loves  himself.  Deism 
may  put  up  impervious  barriers  between  God  and 
man ;  but  God,  in  his  self-revelation  to  man,  and  man 
in  his  devout  communion  with  his  Father,  breaks 
them  down  as  figments  of  the  mere  understanding. 
"  It  is  God  himself  that  worketh  in  us,  both  to  will 
and  to  do  of  his  good  pleasure,"  and  when  it  is  done 
it  is  his  own.  We  work  out  our  own  righteousness 
17 


i8o  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

by  letting  God  work  his  righteousness  into  us.  And 
yet  in  all  this  we  are  living,  growing,  and  developing 
true  personality.  Dr.  Mulford  says,  with  Hegel, 
that  "  there  is  in  personality  the  highest  that  is  within 
the  knowledge  of  man.  It  is  the  steepest  and  loftiest 
summit  {die  hoechste  zugeschacrfste  spitze,  says  Hegel) 
toward  which  we  move  in  our  attainment."  *  Dr. 
Mulford  goes  on  to  speak  of  personality  in  God  and 
man  in  Hegel's  own  spirit.  The  personality  of  God 
is  the  same  in  substance  as  it  is  in  man,  only  it  is  in- 
finite, and  is  revealed  that  man  may  rise  into  infinite 
and  everlasting  life.  The  personality  of  man  has  its 
ground  in  that  of  God,  and  through  it  God  reveals 
himself  to  man  and  communes  with  him.  No  hylo- 
zoic,  protoplastic,  unanthropomorphic  unknown  some- 
thing as  the  ground  of  all  things  and  of  all  men, 
can  offer  any  ground  of  communion  between  itself 
and  man.  Lotze  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  "  perfect 
personality  is  to  be  found  only  in  God,  while  in  all 
finite  spirits  there  exists  only  a  weak  imitation  of  per- 
sonality." Hegel  would  criticise  this  as  not  allowing 
enough  reality  to  human  personality,  which  indeed 
advances  into  fuller  and  stronger  life  in  and  through 
the  God-given  social  relations  and  institutions  of  the 
world.  But  its  relations  to  these  institutions  and  to 
God  himself  in  and  through  them  are  not  merely 
external.  The  relation  of  one  person  to  another  is 
not  between  but  in  them.  The  relation  of  parent  to 
child  is  more  than  that  of  one  member  of  a  physical 
orsfanism  to  another  member.  *'  The  self-communi- 
cation  of  the  Infinite  Spirit  to  the  soul  of  man  is  such 
that  man  is  conscious  of  his  relation  to  a  Conscious 

*  The  Republic  of  God,  p.  22. 


Theology,  Anthropology ,  and  Pantheism.   i8i 

Being,  who  is  in  eternal  perfection  all  that  man  has 
it  in  him  to  be.  .  .  .  He  is  a  Being  in  whom  we  exist ; 
with  whom  we  are  in  principle  one ;  with  whom  the 
human  spirit  is  identical,  in  the  sense  that  he  is  all 
which  the  human  spirit  is  capable  of  becoming." 
These  are  the  words  of  Prof.  T.  H.  Green,*  whom 
Seth  criticises  for  holding  Hegel's  view  of  Person- 
ality. I  have  elsewhere  f  shown  Green's  position, 
and  gladly  repeat  it  here. 

Prof.  Sidgwick,  in  a  polemically  critical  review 
of  Green's  Ethics  in  Mind,  No.  XXXIV,  character- 
izes it  as  the  "  one  about  which  our  ethical  discussion 
is  likely  for  some  time  to  turn,"  and  its  author  as  one 
who  '^  never  wrote  for  victory.''  This  is  the  highest 
praise  generously  accorded  by  one  whom  Green 
criticises  very  keenly  in  his  volume.  I  lay  it  down 
after  a  studious  reading,  with  a  profound  regard  for 
the  moral  fervor  and  for  the  deeply  religious  spirit 
that  pervades  it  throughout,  as  well  as  for  the  philo- 
sophical breadth  and  acumen  and  the  close  and  pow- 
erful reasoning  it  maintains  from  first  to  last ;  thank- 
ful for  the  ethical  tonic  it  has  given  as  well  as  for  the 
interpretation  and  comprehension  of  ethical  experi- 
ence which  it  contains.  Its  enthusiasm  for  human 
perfection,  or  well-being,  in  its  most  catholic  sense, 
too,  is  nourished  by  the  most  unwavering  faith  that 
man  is  not  the  orphaned  child  of  an  absent  Unknow- 
able. Theism  is  the  vital  breath  that  animates  the 
whole.  I  take  it  as  the  highest  type  of  theistic  as 
well  as  philosophical  ethics  to-day.  I  can  not  at- 
tempt even  an  exposition,  much  less  a  criticism  of 

*  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  pp.  197,  349. 

f  Theistic  Ethics,  The  Church  Review,  October,  1887. 


1 82  Philosophy  of  Religion.  . 

the  whole  volume,  which  is  too  compact  to  admit  of 
abridging  without  marring.  I  can  only  indicate  his 
leading  principles  and  results.  It  is  another  of  those 
books  which  would  "  be  much  shorter  if  it  were  not 
so  short,"  which  could  be  more  easily  and  lucidly 
expanded  than  condensed. 

The  lamented  author  died  five  years  ago.  He  is 
generally  referred  to  by  the  Scottish  philosophers  as 
the  "  recognized  leader  of  Hegelianism  at  Oxford." 
Hegel  never  wrote  on  the  subjective  side  of  the 
ethical  question.  He  presents  his  ethical  doctrine 
in  his  Philosophic  des  Rechts  on  its  objective  side, 
as  realized,  in  the  customary  morality  of  family,  com- 
munity, and  especially  in  that  of  the  state,  the  high- 
est manifestation  of  universal  reason  in  the  sphere  of 
practice.  Kant,  on  the  other  hand,  emphasized  the 
formal,  subjective  good-will  as  the  essence  of  moral- 
ity. Green's  volume  also  deals  with  the  subjective 
side,  and  is  an  exposition  of  the  development  of  this 
side  through  Fichte  to  Hegel. 

He  maintains  that  a  metaphysic  of  morals  is  both 
possible  and  necessary,  as  the  proper  foundation  of 
every  system  of  ethics.  The  reahty  of  the  ideas  of 
freedom  and  duty  can  only  be  maintained  by  a  meta- 
physic that  makes  man  to  be  something  more  than  a 
derivative  product  of  mere  nature.  If  we  can  not 
demonstrate  a  ineta-xi-aXwrQ,  for  man,  we  can  have  no 
moral  science  other  than  the  natural  history  of  how 
men  do  act,  not  how  men  ought  to  act.  For  "  it  is 
obvious  that  to  a  being  who  is  simply  the  result  of 
natural  forces,  an  injunction  to  conform  to  their  laws 
is  unmeaning."  Hence,  "  at  the  risk  of  repelling 
readers  by  presenting  them  first  with  the  most  diffi- 
cult and  least  plausible  part  of  his  doctrine,"  he  be- 


Theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism.  183 

gins  with  the  exposition  of  the  mctapJiysic  of  morals. 
The  metaphysic  of  anything,  we  may  say,  is  the  con- 
ditions implied  in  its  being,  it  is  the  total  environment 
which  its  existence  presupposes,  the  totality  of  those 
relations  which  its  own  analysis  and  interpretation 
imply  and  demand,  the  larger,  truer  self  that  does 
not  appear  at  first  glance  to  the  naked  physical  eye. 
Such  a  metaphysic  or  meta-na.tura.1  basis  there  must 
be  for  Ethics.  As  merely  one  of  the  natural  sciences, 
it  would  cease  to  be  possible.  No  historical  research 
into  sub-human  and  pre-moral  conduct,  coupled  with 
laws  of  physical  evolution,  can  afford  an  explanation 
of  mental  and  moral  phenomena.  Back  of,  beneath, 
immanent  in  (/lera)  all  things  physical,  there  is  that 
by  virtue  of  which  they  are  their  larger  self.  What 
is  the  metaphysics  of  man,  mental  and  moral  ?  An- 
swered plainly  in  a  word,  it  is  God.  Man  alone 
does  not  create  his  own  universe,  does  not  exist 
alone — there  is  not  far  from  every  one  Him  in  whom 
alone  one  can  live  and  move  and  have  any  real 
being.  Proof  of  this,  in  the  common  sense  of  the 
word,  is  out  of  place.  But  it  is  the  only  concep- 
tion that  enables  u§,  reflecting  on  our  moral  and  in- 
tellectual experience  conjointly,  to  put  the  whole 
cosmos  of  experience  together,  and  understand  how 
(not  wh}')  we  are  and  do  what  we  consciously  are 
and  do. 

This  theistic  conception  is  the  only  key  that  fits 
into  all  the  wards  of  the  complicated  lock  of  life. 
Such,  and  the  correlated  doctrine  of  God  making 
man  in  his  own  image,  is  the  result  of  the  first  two 
books  of  this  volume,  translated  out  of  the  technical 
form  of  the  text.  But  I  will  let  the  author  speak  for 
himself.    The  First  Book  answers  the  question,  "Can 


184  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

the  knowledge  of  nature  be  itself  a  part  or  product 
of  nature?"  or,  otherwise  stated,  "What  conditions 
on  the  part  of  consciousness  are  implied  in  the  fact 
that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  knowledge  ?  "  The  re- 
ply to  this  gives  the  metaphysics  of  knowledge,  and 
consists  in  an  analysis  of  knowledge  itself.  He  goes 
straight  through  the  hysteron-protcron  of  empiricism, 
and  the  absolutely  irrational  subjective  Idealism  and 
its  correlated  Agnosticism  of  Kant,  to  the  Absolute 
Idealism  of  Theism. 

There  is  no  unknowable  Ding  an  Sich,  nor  any 
mere  matter  in  the  universe.  The  synthesis  in  man's 
consciousness,  which  we  call  knowledge,  implies  and 
demands  an  absolute  consciousness. 

Our  consciousness  has  a  history  bounded  by  time 
apparently.  "  But  this  apparent  state  of  the  case  can 
only  be  explained  by  supposing  that  in  the  growth 
of  our  experience,  in  the  process  of  our  learning  to 
know  the  world,  an  animal  organism  which  has  its 
history  in  time  gradually  becomes  the  vehicle  of  an 
eternally  complete  consciousness  "  (p.  72).  Again  : 
"  The  attainment  of  knowledge  is  only  explicable  as 
a  reproduction  of  itself,  in  the  human  soul,  by  the 
consciousness  for  which  the  cosmos  of  related  facts 
exists — a  reproduction  of  itself,  in  which  it  uses  the 
sentient  life  of  the  soul  as  its  organ."  Man's  brain 
differs  from  that  of  animals,  because  it  is  organic  to 
knowledge,  and  so  is  not  affected  by  any  processes 
of  evolution,  or  empirical  history  by  which  his  phys- 
ical existence  has  been  developed.  "  If  there  are 
reasons  for  holding  that  man,  in  respect  of  his  animal 
nature,  is  descended  from  *  mere '  animals — animals 
to  whom  the  functions  of  life  and  sense  were  not 
organic  to  the  eternal  or  distinctively  human  con- 


Theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism.  185 

sciousness  —  this  does  not  affect  our  conclusion  in 
regard  to  the  consciousness,  of  which,  as  he  now  is, 
man  is  the  subject ;  a  conclusion  founded  on  analysis 
of  what  he  now  is  and  does  "  (pp.  T],  87) — that  is,  we 
may  add — 

A  man's  a  man  for  a'  that. 

"  God  is  the  Eternal  Spirit  or  self-consciousness 
subject,  which  communicates  itself,  in  measure  and 
under  conditions,  to  beings  who  through  that  com- 
munication become  spiritual.  He  is  a  Being  in 
whom  we  exist ;  with  whom  we  are  in  principle 
one ;  with  whom  the  human  spirit  is  identical  in  the 
sense  that  he  is  all  which  the  human  spirit  is  capable 
of  becoming."  This  is  distinctly  the  Christian  doc- 
trine of  God,  the  Creator,  breathing  into  man  the 
breath  of  mental  and  moral  as  well  as  of  physical 
life.  General  readers  will  not  care  for  a  reproduc- 
tion of  the  close,  sustained,  analytical,  and  philo- 
sophical arguments  by  which  he  reaches  this  pro- 
nounced theistic  conception,  and  I  would  advise 
them  to  omit  this  First  Book,  which  he  himself  char- 
acterizes as  likely  to  repel  readers. 

In  Book  Second  he  takes  up  the  Metaphysics  of 
moral  action  in  the  same  method.  "  What  are  the 
conditions  on  the  part  of  consciousness  implied  in 
the  fact  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  morality  ?  " 

We  find  our  moral  activity,  like  our  mental,  con- 
ditioned by  sensational  elements,  inextricably  inter- 
woven with  physical  instincts,  animal  impulses,  wants, 
and  desires.  But  an  animal  want  is  not  the  whole  of 
man's  moral  motive.  It  runs  into,  or  rather  is  taken 
up  by,  a  self-conscious  subject,  making  it  a  wanted 
object  for  self. 

"  It  only  becomes  a  motive,  so  far  as  upon  the 


1 86  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

want  there  supervenes  the  presentation  of  the  want 
by  a  self-conscious  subject  to  himself,  and  with  it  the 
idea  of  a  self-satisfaction  to  be  attained  in  filling  the 
want "  (p.  93). 

"  It  is  this  consciousness  which  yields,  in  the  most 
elementary  form,  the  conception  of  something  that 
should  be,  as  distinct  from  that  which  is  "  (p.  92). 

He  defines  a  motive  to  be  "an  idea  of  an  end, 
which  a  self-conscious  subject  presents  to  itself,  and 
which  it  strives  and  tends  to  realize,"  which  he  main- 
tains is  sufficient  to  differentiate  moral  action  from 
natural,  necessitated,  physical  activity.  One  can  be 
said  to  be  determined  by  his  desires  onl}'  so  far  as  he 
cojiscioiisly  makes  them  his  objectSy  or  seeks  his  self-satis- 
faction in  them  When,  for  example,  Esau  sells  his 
birthright,  an  animal  want  conditions  his  motive,  but 
the  motive  itself  is  his  idea  of  himself  as  finding  his 
good  in  the  satisfaction  of  the  animal  want.  Other- 
wise he  would  not  be  responsible.  It  is  this  identifica- 
tion of  himself  with  the  animal  want,  this  making  it  his 
good,  that  constitutes  it  his  strongest  motive,  and  at 
the  same  time  makes  him  responsible.  He  has  said 
to  himself,  that  will  satisfy  me,  that  is  good,  thereby 
constituting  freely  the  strongest  motive  and  deter- 
mining himself.  The  good  which  one  thus  chooses 
is  always  comparative.  This  formal  freedom  will 
not  become  real  freedom  till  the  ends  or  goods  in 
which  self-satisfaction  is  sought  are  such  as  can  really 
satisfy  the  perfect  man.  The  real  nature  of  any  act 
of  will  thus  depends  upon  the  nature  of  the  object 
which  one  chooses  as  his  good,  and  this  choice  de- 
pends upon  the  character  of  the  chooser.  All  moral 
action  thus  is  the  realizing  of  the  good,  better,  best 
self  within  us.     We  thus  mold  circumstances,  wants, 


Theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism.  187 

and  impulses.  Esau  chose  a  good,  but  not  a  better 
nor  the  best.  All  this  seems  implied  in  Green's  ex- 
position, though  not  explicitly  stated.  And  this  im- 
plies the  privative  or  comparative  view  of  sin — the 
choice  of  an  inferior  good. 

This,  too,  must  be  taken  in  connection  with  his 
metaphysic  of  morality,  which  is  that  of  an  eternal 
self-conscious  subject,  which  makes  the  processes  of 
animal  life  and  impulse  organic  to  a  reproduction  of 
itself,  which  reproduction  is  qualified  and  limited  by 
the  nature  of  those  processes,  but  which  constitutes 
free,  self-conscious-  subjects — sons  of  God  made  in 
his  own  image. 

Indeed,  "  alike  as  in  God,  as  communicated  in 
principle  to  men,  and  as  realizing  itself  by  means 
of  that  communication  in  a  certain  development  of 
human  capacities,  the  idea  can  have  its  being  only 
in  a  personal — i.  e.,  a  self-objectifying — consciousness" 
(p.  203). 

The  more  man  realizes  his  personality  the  nearer 
he  approaches  God,  and  the  better  God  can  recog- 
nize and  love  himself  in  those  thus  made  perfect  in 
his  image.  This  realization  we  have  seen  is  through 
the  secular  institutions  of  the  Spirit.  Through  them 
man  pierces  beyond  them  to  the  perfect  Personality. 
Such  relation  to  the  Divine  Personality  gives  life 
and  freedom.  God's  law  is  recognized  by  man  as 
his  own  law.  Nature,  a  Universiim,  and  Unknown,  can 
never  relate  itself  to  man  so  as  to  give  this  free- 
dom. Ultimately  fear  and  despair  result  from  all 
such  conceptions  of  "  the  power  not  ourselves."  The 
individual  may  exalt  himself  to  promethean  or  satanic 
might  and  majesty ;  he  may  reach  the  acme  of  human 
culture  and  of  power  over  nature,  and  )'et  the  outly- 


1 88  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

ing,  overshadowing  of  something  simply  infinite  will 
finally  crush  his  spirit  and  wring  out  the  pessimistic 
exclamation,  "Vanity  of  vanities,  all  is  vanity." 
With  Prometheus  he  may 

Suffer  woes  which  hope  thinks  infinite,  and 
Defy  power  which  seems  omnipotent ; 

but  he  will  still  be  bound  till  his  spirit  faints  and 
quails,  and  he  becomes  the  despairing  pessimist  or 
the  servilely  superstitious  man.  Such  is  the  outcome 
of  every  "  age  of  Augustus  "  of  the  Eclair cissemcnt, 
die  Aufklaerung  2i.ndi  the  eighteenth-century  rational- 
ism, so  far  as  merely  human,  and  divorced  from  con- 
scious relations  with  God.  Such,  too,  will  be  the 
outcome  of  modern  culture  and  science  so  far  as 
divorced  from,  or  failing  to  recognize,  the  Divine 
Personality  as  the  Spirit 

.  .  .  that  impels 
All  thinking  things,  all  objects  of  all  thought, 
And  rolls  through  all  things. 

Unless  "  the  power  not  himself "  is  personal,  he  can 
not  have  that  confident  congenial  relation  with  it, 
that  is  essential  to  free,  ethical  self-determination  and 
to  "the  blessed  hope  of  everlasting  life." 

With  Hegel,  Personality  is  the  ground  of  all 
things,  the  head  and  heart  of  the  universe,  in  which 
alone  human  intelligence  and  love  and  culture  are 
possible  and  valid.  Through  these  he  rises  above 
the  finite,  and  holds  communion  with  the  Infinite 
Power  not  himself.  In  and  through  them  as 
media  he  comes  face  to  face  with  God,  and  enters 
the  life  immortal  and  personal.  Beyond  and  about 
him  is  the  life  of  God  which  he  recognizes  as  his 


Theology^  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism.  189 

life,  even  as  God  recognizes  his  life  as  His  own. 
Thus  it  is  impossible  to  speak  of  the  personality  of 
God  or  man  without  speaking  of  both. 

Philosophy  thus  comprehends  for  thought  what 
reliafion  holds  in  its  heart.  It  thinks  its  creed  in 
terms  of  thought,  and  thus  itself  becomes  religious. 
Thinking  is  worshiping.  Completed  thought  com- 
pels reverence  before  the  august  Personality  which 
it  reaches  as  its  ultimate  attainment  and  recognizes 
as  its  primal  and  sustaining  source.  In  this  Part 
First,  thought  is  thinking  only  or  chiefly  the  first 
article  of  the  Creed  :  "  I  believe  in  God  the  Father 
Almighty,  Maker  of  heaven  and  earth."  In  Part 
Third,  Hegel  shows  us  thought  thinking  all  the  other 
articles  of  the  oecumenical  creeds,  following  in  the 
lines  of  the  Church's  great  "saints  of  the  intellect  as 
well  as  of  the  heart."  Full  justification  of  his  Philos- 
ophy of  Religion,  therefore,  can  not  be  evinced  until 
proper  exposition  of  that  part  be  made  in  a  Second 
Scries  of  Studies. 

Some  Christians  will  not  need,  and  some  will  not 
care  to  have,  their  creed  thus  thought  into  an  organic, 
systematic,  and  absolutely  necessary  whole.  But 
those  who  are  asking  for  the  reason  of  the  faith  can 
not  rest  in  the  reasons  which  current  apologetics 
give,  or  on  the  tiltima  ratio  ecclesicB,  until  these  rea- 
sons and  this  authority  are  vindicated  by  the  reason 
of  absolute  thought  and  authority.  Philosophy 
may  show  the  inadequateness  of  modern  evidences 
and  of  church  authority  on  its  way  to  a  point 
whence  it  can  return  and  reinstate  them  as  valid 
evidences  and  authority,  giving  the  reason  of  these 
reasons  and  the  authority  of  this  authority.  But 
we  have  thus  far  seen,  at  least,  the  point  of  view,  the 


190  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

spirit  and  method,  by  which  Hegel  vindicates  the 
nceessity  of  religion  as  the  very  heart  of  thought. 
Let  me  go  over  once  again  the  central  station  of  this 
conception  of  the  universe  as  thought — this  Wcltan- 
scJiatning. 

I  can  indicate  the  point  of  view  of  his  interpre- 
tation of  the  universe  no  better  than  by  saying  that 
its  key-word  is  organic  unity,  as  opposed  to  merely 
arbitrary  or  mechanical  relations  of  the  great  objects 
of  knowledge — God,  man,  and  the  world,  as  set  forth 
in  empirical  philosophy,  common  logic,  and  deistic 
theology.  In  place  of  the  abstract  principle  of 
identity  and  contradiction,  by  means  of  which  one — 

The  parts  in  his  hand  he  may  hold  and  class, 
But  the  spiritual  link  is  lost,  alas  ! — 

there  is  given  the  principle  of  organic  unity,  which, 
without  losing  the  identity  of  the  objects,  also  pre- 
serves them  from  the  annihilation  that  would  other- 
wise be  effected  by  their  differences.  Shelley  has 
delicately  expressed  the  sentimental  side  of  this  truth 
in  his  Love's  Philosophy  : 

The  fountains  mingle  with  the  river 

And  the  rivers  with  the  ocean, 
The  winds  of  heaven  mix  forever 

With  a  sweet  emotion  ; 
Nothing  in  the  world  is  single  ; 

All  things,  by  a  law  divine, 
In  one  another's  being  mingle — 

Why  not  I  with  thine  ? 
See,  the  mountains  kiss  high  heaven, 

And  the  waves  clasp  one  another; 
No  sister  flower  would  be  forgiven 

If  it  disdained  its  brother  ; 


Theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism.   191 

And  the  sunlight  clasps  the  earth, 
And  the  moonbeams  kiss  the  sea — 

What  are  all  these  kissings  worth, 
If  thou  kiss  not  me  ? 

Philosophy  rules  out  the  subjective  idealism  and 
pantheism  of  an  absolute  identity  of  all  objects,  as 
well  as  their  empirical  separation  by  absolute  differ- 
ences. For  philosophy  requires  that  subject  and 
object  be  distinct.  The  physical  universe  is  not  all 
in  the  eye  of  the  beholder,  but  is  a  real  object  of 
intelligence.  Man  is  not  identical  with  nature,  nor 
God  with  man.  But  the  reality  that  each  possesses 
is  that  which,  in  spite  of  differences  and  distinctions, 
is  of  the  same  kith  and  kin  in  all.  The  resolute 
maintenance  of  this  is  a  distinguishing  mark  of  what 
we  may  term  both  English  and  American  Hegelians. 
The  personality  of  God  and  man,  and  the  objective 
reality  of  the  world,  are  strenuously  maintained  by 
them  all. 

Modern  philosophy  takes  its  start  in  the  science 
of  knowing,  and  passes  from  knowing  to  being. 
How  can  we  know  ?  Let  us  go  back  and  begin  anew 
from  this  point.  This  the  great  fundamental  prob- 
lem of  Philosophy,  connected,  as  it  is,  inseparably 
and  organically  with  the  problem  of  Being.  What  is 
it  for  a  man  or  for  any  thing  to  be  ?  What  is  being  ? 
Is  reality  the  object  of  knowledge?  It  is  naught 
unless  we  can  know,  unless  we  can  experience  its 
reality.  Knowing  is  thus  the  key  to  being.  But  how 
is  knowledge  possible?  How  can  we  know?  It 
seems  a  very  simple  question  to  ask,  How  do  I 
hiow  ?  What  is  knowledge,  and  how  do  I  come  by 
it?  What  is  its  relation  to  the  subject  and  object  of 
knowledge  ?  What  part  of  knowledge  is  supplied 
18 


192  Fhilosophy  of  Religion. 

by  external  objects  ?  What  part  does  man  supply  ? 
What  is  the  relation  between  the  two  factors  and 
the  result  called  knowledge?  Is  it  an  unknown 
tertium  quid,  compounded  of  two  other  unknowns? 
We  are  familiar  with  the  answer  of  English  Empiri- 
cism, of  which  Hume's  absolute  skepticism  as  to  any 
knowledge  is  the  logical  result.  The  current  Ag- 
nosticism is  but  this  skepticism  apotheosized.  The 
subject  and  object,  and  their  synthesis,  are  inherently 
unknowable.  Isolated  as  they  are  in  time  and  space, 
in  no  living  relation,  as  the  theory  holds,  nothing  can 
bring  them  together  in  other  than  a  merely  mechani- 
cal relation,  and,  therefore,  no  synthetic  judgments 
a  priori,  are  possible  or  valid.  We  are  familiar,  too, 
in  a  popular  way,  with  Kant's  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem. That  gives  the  reverse  and  isolated  side  of 
concrete  experience,  and  thus,  only  reaching  Agnos- 
ticism by  a  more  intellectual  route,  mind  and  matter, 
God  and  nature,  man  and  all  objects  of  possible 
knowledge,  according  to  both  the  empirical  and  the 
transcendental  solutions,  are  isolated,  and  can  only 
be  brought  into  a  mechanical  relation  h  toute  force. 
They  are  inherently,  or  as  to  their  natures,  unre- 
lated. They  form  a  loose  aggregate,  not  an  organic 
whole.  Theist,  deist,  and  skeptic  alike,  on  either 
of  these  solutions,  can  give  no  rational  science  of 
knowledge,  and  so  can  apprehend  no  reality,  no  real 
being. 

But,  in  order  to  any  knowing  or  known  being, 
the  subject  and  object  must  be  in  organic  rela- 
tion—  must  have  something  in  common,  and  live 
together.  Intelligence  must  be  an  energy  in  con- 
nection with  energetic  reality.  The  mind  is  not 
simply  like  a  piece  of  blank  paper  upon  which  ob- 


Theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism.  193 

jects  impress  themselves,  which  is  the  favorite  figure 
of  sensationalists.  The  mind  is  active  in  receiving 
and  unifying  those  impressions.  Nor,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  all  objects  of  knowledge  chaotic  unintel- 
ligence,  which  the  synthesizing  power  of  the  mind 
forces  into  the  strait-jacket  of  categories,  to  which 
these  objects  stand  in  an  attitude  of  indifference  or 
rebellion.  The  idealist's  solution,  too,  fails.  Appeal 
must  be  taken  to  experience,  to  the  full  content  of 
consciousness.  But  this  experience  is  other  and 
greater  than  either  sensationalist  or  idealist  allows. 
Subject  and  object  are  both  in  consciousness  in  the 
act  of  knowing.  They  are  not  indifferent  to  each 
other.  Their  coming  together  is  neither  accidental 
nor  arbitrary.  The  rather  they  are  complemental 
and  inseparable.  Each  implies,  and  is  most  intimately 
one  with  the  other.  The  object  becomes  object  only 
as  it  becomes  part  of  the  subject,  for  all  experience 
is  that  of  self-consciousness.  Again,  the  subject  be- 
comes subject  only  as  it  merges  itself  in  its  object, 
for  all  consciousness  is  also  objective  consciousness. 
Thus  the  fundamental  relation  of  subject  and  object 
in  the  process  of  knowing  is  one  that  can  only  be 
called  organic,  or  the  relation  of  particular  to  par- 
ticular through  the  organic  identification  of  both  in 
the  universal.  It  is  a  relation  of  life,  of  living  sub- 
ject and  living  object,  in  and  through  a  Universal, 
which  (as  God)  gives  life  and  light  to  all  reality. 
Neither  are  they  mere  space-occupying  atoms,  nor 
are  they  merely  sensible  entities  or  nonentities,  me- 
chanically separated  from  each  other.  They  actively 
unite  in  one,  and  yet  keep  themselves  differentiated 
from  each  other.  Knowing  is  thus  a  unifying  pro- 
cess.    The  subject,  to  use  a  sensible  analogy  for  a 


194  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

spiritual  process,  passes  over  and  loses  itself  in  its 
object,  and,  finding  its  larger  self  in  the  object,  it 
passes  back  to  its  subjective  starting-point.  Only  in 
this  way  can  the  subject  be  aware  of  or  know  its 
object,  or  itself  as  its  own  object.  In  losing  its  life 
in  the  object,  the  subject  finds  its  own  fuller  life ; 
wherever  it  goes  it  is  still  "  at  home."  The  more  it 
goes  out  of  itself,  the  fuller  experience  and  wider 
wisdom  it  requires.  The  undifferentiated  subject 
would  be  a  blank  nonentity.  Nothing  intelligible 
is  alien  to  the  knowing  subject.  Its  object,  or  its 
"  other,"  is  always  larger  than  itself.  In  every  act 
of  conscious  intelligence,  self-consciousness  finds  it- 
self reflected,  or  rather  realized.  It  is  an  intercom- 
munion of  mind  with  reason,  spirit  with  spirit.  The 
knowing  agent  thus  finds  himself  set  in  the  midst 
of  an  intelligible  world  of  which  he  is  a  part.  The 
forms  of  his  intelligence  are  the  forms  of  the  world's 
existence.  He  is  both  the  interpreter  and  the  in- 
terpretation of  nature.  Hieroglyphics  as  strange  as 
chaos  have  finally  been  deciphered,  because  they 
contained  intelligence.  Otherwise  they  would  never 
have  been  more  than  the  scratches  of  a  lion  upon 
the  rocks.  Man  can  only  decipher  a  riddle  that  holds 
a  meaning,  contains  thought.  Intelligence  subjective 
finds  its  larger  self  in  intelligence  objective,  both 
being  organically  articulated  as  members  of  absolute 
intelligence.  This  last  is  not  merely  an  inference 
from,  but  it  is  an  implicit  content  of,  concrete  ex- 
perience. Reason,  both  subjective  and  objective,  is 
personal.  It  is  not  only  that  of  the  individual  man, 
but  of  man  as  a  race.  Nor  is  it  only  of  sense-con- 
ditioned man.  It  exists  independently  of  all  knowing 
men.     But,  as  it  can  exist  only  in  self-conscious  per- 


Theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pajitheism.  195 

sonality,  it  exists  in  Absolute  Spirit.  All  concrete 
experience  is  the  apprehension  of  objective  con- 
sciousness by  subjective  consciousness.  Both  have 
their  reality  in  organic  synthesis.  Thought  within 
finds  thought  without.  The  microcosmic  deity  within 
finds  its  macrocosmic  Deity  without.  Man  geome- 
trizes  and  finds  the  diagrams  writ  large  by  another 
hand  in  nature.  He  finds  God  speaking  to  him,  and 
God  finds  him  intelligent  to  his  intelligent  self-reve- 
lations. 

But  man's  intelligence  is  not  creative  but  rather 
recreative  ;  not  an  absolutely  independent  center  but 
the  planet  of  a  central  Sun.  Absolute  intelligence 
existed  before  he  began  to  have  self-conscious  intelli- 
gence, in  which  alone  can  his  own  live  and  move 
and  have  its  being. 

The  finite  self-consciousness  involves  and  reveals  its 
dependence  on  an  absolute  self-consciousness  which,  j)ro- 
visionally,  we  can  only  call,  in  agreement  with  philosophy 
and  religion,  the  self-consciousness  of  an  Absolute  and 
Divine  Spirit.* 

This  passage  from  a  knowing  agent  to  intelligent 
Absolute  Being  is  inevitable.  Knowing  implies  real 
being.  The  self-conscious  intelligence  of  man  im- 
plies the  absolute  intelligence  —  God.  Thus  the 
problem  of  knowing  lands  us  in,  and  is  identical  with, 
the  problem  of  being,  and  only  ideally  distinguish- 
able from  it.  The  spirituality  of  Absolute  Being — 
which  is  the  presupposition  of  Religion  —  is  the 
attainment  of  Philosophy.  Philosophy  only  comes 
to  analyze,  and  redemonstrate,  or  point  out  this  re- 
ality, livingly  possessed   by  Religion.      Thought  is 

*  Prof.  George  S.  Morris,  Philosophy  and  Christianity,  p.  56. 


196  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

prior  to  being  with  us.     Being  is  prior  to  thought  in 
us.      But,  absolutely  considered,  there   is   unity  of 
thought  and  being.     But  it  is  not  our  own  individual 
thought  and  being  that  are  absolute  and  identical. 
But  the  absolute  object  of  our  intelligence,  the  unity 
of  being  which  our  every  act  of  knowing  implies,  is 
that  of  Absolute  Spirit.     The  real  presupposition  of 
all  knowledge  is  not  my  own  consciousness  of  myself 
as  an  individual,  but  thought  or   self-consciousness 
which  is  beyond  all  individual  selves,  which  is  the 
unity  of  all  thinkers  and  all  objects  of  thought.    That 
universal  Self-consciousness,  which  the  conscious  life 
of  all  finite  minds  implies  and  on  which  it  is  based,  is 
Absolute  Spirit — God.     We  know  only  in  part,  but 
are  known  w  toto  by  the  Absolute  Intelligence.    What 
man  is  by  his  self-conscious  personality  imperfectly, 
that  God  is  infinitely,  perfectly,  independently.    Man's 
intelligence  can  thus  extend  in  ever-widening  circles 
over  the   universe  without  ever  missing   its  larger 
image.     Wherever  it  goes  it  is  still  at  home.     With 
increasing  intelligence,  he  loses  his  sense  of  isolation, 
and  ceases  to  feel  a  stranger  anywhere  in  the  world. 
Nothing  true  is  foreign  to  him,  but  all  reality  is,  as 
it  were,  bone  of  his  bone  and  flesh  of  his  flesh.     In 
all  its  discoveries,  in  Science,  Art,  and  Religion,  it 
discovers  itself.     So  of  all  revelation — it  is  a  revela- 
tion of    intelligence  to    kindred    intelligence  for  its 
enlargement.     Thus  too  God,  as  Absolute  Spirit,  is 
everywhere  at  home  in  the  universe,  and  the  Deistic 
conception,  which  has  had  so  pernicious  currency  in 
Christian  thought,  is  no  longer  tenable.     Our  Father 
in  heaven  is  also  our  Father  on  earth,  his  footstool. 
Within  the  inmost  closet  of  our  heart  he  is  as  much 
on  his  throne  as  on  fiery  Sinai. 


Theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism.  197 

The   Scriptures   represent   the   Christian   life   as 
most    intimately   and    indissolubly   bound    up    with 
knowledge.      To  know  God  is  eternal  life.     This  is 
real  spiritual  knowledge,  and  differs  from  the  merely 
individual   and    relative.      St.    Paul    says,  "  I    know 
nothing  by  myself,"  and  declares  that  "  we  are  not 
sufficient  of  ourselves  to  think  anything  as  of  our- 
selves."    In  Christianity,  as  in  Philosoph}^  the  Uni- 
versal is  the  category  of  living  reality.      The  indi- 
vidual subject  must   "  lose  his  life "  in  that  of  the 
Universal,  in  order  "  to  find  it."      Christian  knowl- 
edge is  realized  only  through  a  participation  in  God's 
truth  through  organic  union  with  the  Logos.     It  is 
to  be  begun,  continued,  and  ended,  not  in  mechanical 
or  a  pantheistic   process  of  evolution,  but  in  God. 
God  is  the  Author  of  all  our  true  thinking,  doing,  be- 
ing.    It  is  only  by  his  holy  inspiration  that  we  think 
those  things  that  are  good.    Thus  all  true  knowledge 
is  of  the  nature  of  revelation.     Thus,  too,  no  revela- 
tion can  be  merely  mechanical — the  presentation  of  a 
foreign  topic,  previously  undreamed  of  and  unlonged 
for.     For  all  revelation  is  in  form  and  kind  of  self- 
revelation — the  revelation  of   intelligence  to  intelli- 
gence.    In  all  true  knowledge,  either  philosophic  or 
religious,  one  knows  only  one's  own  larger  self,  and 
in  all  one's  findings  finds  that  same  larger  self.     Only 
as  we  know  God,  and  are  partakers  of  the  Divine 
Intelligence,  is  this  larger  self  graciously  bestowed 
upon  us  as  the  precondition  of  true  and  eternal  ex- 
istence.    The  voice  of  God  is  the  voice  of  man — that 
is,  of  man  according  to  his  true  nature  and  intent. 
The  perfect  man  was  the  God-man,  Jesus  Christ.     He 
is  the  perfect  revelation  of  living  truth.     This  reve- 
lation may  not  be  completely  apprehended  by  us,  in 


198  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

all  its  details,  but,  in  its  substance,  it  must  be  intelli- 
gible to  us.  Jesus  must  be  our  elder  brother,  as  well 
as  our  unquestioned  master.  Unrealized,  the  Eternal 
Son  had  yet  ever  been  "the  light  of  the  world." 
Misunderstood,  or  even  verbally  denied,  the  Christ 
is  yet  to-day  the  light  of  all  true  knowledge.  It  is 
the  revelation  of  intelligence  to  intelligence.  "  In- 
telligence must  find  its  own  larger  lineaments  pre- 
figured in  every  dogma."  For  true  and  proper  man, 
no  truth  is  or  can  be  essentially  mysterious,  nor  could 
any  revelation  of  such  be  either  made  or  received  by 
intelligence.  I  gladly  bear  witness  to  the  pregnant 
significance  of  Dr.  Mulford's  views  of  Revelation  in 
his  Republic  of  God,  commending  them  for  a  studi- 
ous perusal  to  all  possessing  a  thoughtful  interest  in 
the  subject.  Hegel's  theory  of  true  knowing  and 
real  being  should  prevent  any  hasty  conclusion  from 
his  words  to  a  vulgar  rationalism,  which  he  opposes 
as  strenuously  as  any  of  us  could  wish.  His  whole 
philosophy  is  a  protest  against  the  individualism  of 
so-called  free  thought.  It  is  only  as  our  individuality 
increases  and  develops  into  personality,  by  entering 
into  the  larger  life  in  religion,  society,  and  art,  only 
as  we  become  organically  one  with  these  larger  forms 
of  intelligence,  only  as  Deus  7tos  personat,  that  w^e  are 
able  to  think  anything  truly.  But  the  same  philoso- 
phy is  no  less  a  strenuous  rebuttal  of  all  sorts  of 
Agnosticism,  scientific,  philosophical,  and  religious. 
It  is  because  our  experience  is  a  fragment  of  a  living 
organic  whole,  that  we  may  read  in  it  the  law  and 
nature  of  the  whole.  Now,  "  I  know,"  though  only 
in  part.  When  my  union  with  the  Divine  Spirit 
becomes  perfect,  "  then  shall  I  know,  even  also  as  I 
am  known." 


Theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism.  199 

Against  such  (Christian)  reason,  the  epithets  of 
rationalism  and  naturalism  are  only  ignorantly  and 
vainly  hurled.  Such  views  are  as  vitally  supernatu- 
ral and  hyperrational  as  any  thoughtful  Christian  can 
maintain.  They  consist  most  kinly  with  a  super- 
natural naturalism.  The  Divine  element  is  asserted 
as  the  presupposition  of  all  true  experience.  God 
is  transcendent  no  less  than  immanent.  The  Deistic 
conception  w^hich  has  been  so  largely  regnant  in 
English  apologetics  set  the  natural  and  the  super- 
natural over  against  each  other  as  almost  contra- 
dictory opposites.  The  canon  of  formal  logic  that 
"  A  is  not  non-A,"  being  applied,  there  resulted 
either  a  low  naturalism  or  a  merely  mechanical 
supernaturalism  of  sheer  brute  power  to  interfere 
and  direct  as  from  without  and  above.  But  true  ex- 
perience denies  that  man  and  the  world  are  naturally 
isolated  from  God,  strangers  and  foreigners  to  him 
in  their  essential  being  and  activity.  Against  such 
conceptions  Hegel's  most  trenchant  criticisms  are 
directed.  His  Philosophy  of  Religion  is  not  all  spun 
out  of  a  priori  elements.  He  claims  to  do  nothing 
but  to  think  the  creed,  to  comprehend  religious  ex- 
perience. 

Religion,  he  says,  is  spirit  thinking  naively,  while 
philosophy  is  the  same  spirit  passing  beyond  this  im- 
mediate apprehension  of  vital  truth  and  through  the 
bewildering  skepticism  raised  by  the  reflective  or 
critical  understanding  when  it  attempts  to  analyze 
and  think  together  again  this  content  of  feeling  and 
representation,  to  th.Q  speculative  comprehension  of  the 
same  content.  It  presents  the  content  intelligized  for 
the  intellect.  Thinking  this  content,  it  attains  to  the 
ultimate  and  everywhere  vitalizing  idea  of  religion, 


200  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

and  then  proceeds  to  re-read  religious  experience  in 
the  light  and  under  the  necessary  forms  of  this  idea. 
In  Part  III  Hegel  identifies  his  philosophy  with 
Christianity,  and  seeks  to  "  rehabilitate  genuine  Cath- 
olic dogma"  after  the  iconoclasm  of  the  Aufklaerung. 
He  died,  says  one,  with  the  firm  conviction  that  he 
had  established  eternal  peace  between  theology  and 
the  wisdom  of  the  world  ;  and  this,  too,  he  sought  not 
in  the  way  of  eviscerating  Christianity  of  its  divine 
claims  and  content,  nor  in  the  way  of  weak  rational- 
izing away  from  dogma  all  that  was  offensive  to  the 
cultured  rationalism  {Aufklaerung)  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  He  believed  firmly  in  the  necessity  of  posi- 
tive dogmatic  theology.  He  is  said  to  have  seriously 
blamed  Tholuck  for  his  lack  of  zeal  in  defending  the 
doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  Certainly  no  one  could  ask 
for  more  explicit  maintenance  of  the  Church  as  the 
Keeper  of  the  Keys  and  the  guardian  of  the  truth  in 
the  shape  of  Catholic  dogma  than  that  which  he 
gives  in  Part  HI.  The  Church  is  "  the  realm  of  the 
Holy  Spirit,"  and  thinks  the  gospel  into  the  form  of 
valid  and  authoritative  creed  and  dogma. 

And  now  our  third  reply  to  the  query  (p.  154) 
What  have  we  here  ? 

HI.  We  have  not  Pantheism. 

It  seems  scarcely  necessary  to  add  to  what  we 
have  already  said  as  to  Hegel's  maintenance  of  both 
the  Divine  and  human  personality.  The  pantheism 
which  is  the  '*  peculiar  and  just  horror  of  the  relig- 
ious mind  "  is  that  ontology  which  ascribes  no  proper 
personality  to  either  God  or  man.  Hegel's  philos- 
ophy is  not  pantheism.  If  further  argument  were 
needed,  it  might  be  put  in  the  ad  hominem  form.  If 
Hegel  was  a  pantheist,  then  also  was  St.  John :  "  In 


Theology,  Anthropology y  and  Pantheism.  201 

the  beginning  was  the  Word,  .  .  .  without  him  was 
not  anything  made  that  was  made."  His  life  is  "  the 
light  of  men  .  .  .  that  lighteth  every  man  that  cometh 
into  the  world."  Then  also  was  St.  Paul  a  pantheist: 
"  In  him  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being." 
Then  also  was  the  Psalmist,  vainly  trying  to  flee  away 
from  God,  a  pantheist.  Then  also  was  Isaiah  a  pan- 
theist :  "  We  are  the  clay  and  thou  our  potter." 
Then  also  was  Jeremiah  a  pantheist :  "  I  am  a  God  at 
hand,  saith  the  Lord,  and  not  a  God  afar  off.  Do 
not  I  fill  heaven  and  earth  ?  saith  the  Lord."  Then 
also  was  Christ  himself  a  pantheist:  "That  they  all 
may  be  one  .  .  .  eveti  as  zue  are  one  .  .  .  /  in  them 
and  thou  in  me,  that  they  may  be  made  perfect  in 
one." 

Nearly  every  great  saint  of  the  intellect  and  heart 
in  the  Church  can  thus  be  accused  of  pantheism.  St. 
Augustine  writes  thus : 

To  call  upon  Him  I  must  call  Him  into  myself.  ...  Is 
there,  then,  O  Lord  my  God,  any  room  so  spacious  in  me 
that  can  contain  Thee  ?  Or  can  the  heaven  and  the  earth 
which  Thou  hast  made  .  .  .  contain  Thee  ?  Or  is  it  so,  that 
since  nothing  that  is  could  be  without  Thee,  therefore  what- 
ever is  must  contain  Thee  ?  Since,  therefore,  I  also  am,  why 
do  I  ask  that  Thou  come  into  me,  who  could  have  no  being, 
if  Thou  wert  not  in  me  ?  For  I  am  not  now  so  low  as  hell, 
and  yet  Thou  art  even  there  also.  Therefore  I  should  not 
be,  O  my  God,  I  should  not  be  at  all  if  Thou  wert  not  in  me, 
or  rather  I  should  not  be  if  I  wert  not  in  Thee,  of  whom  all 
things,  by  whom  all  things,  and  in  whom  are  all  things.  It  is 
even  so,  O  Lord,  it  is  even  so.* 

The  Platonic  Bishop  Synesius  sang  thus  : 

*  St.  Augustine's  Confessions,  vol.  i,  p.  2. 


202  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Thou  art  the  begetting 

And  the  begotten. 

Thou  art  the  illumining 

And  the  illumined. 

Thou  art  the  manifest — 

And  the  hidden — hid  by  thy  glories. 

One  and  yet  all  things  thou. 

One  in  thyself  alone, 

And  throughout  all  things  one. 

The  mediaeval  mystic  Eckhart,  founder  of  the 
large  school  of  religious  thinkers  of  whom  Tauler  and 
the  author  of  the  Theologica  Germanica  were  chief 
representatives,  writes  thus  :  "  God  and  /  are  one  in 
knowing.  The  eye  whereby  I  see  God  is  the  same 
eye  whereby  he  seeth  me.  Mine  eye  and  the  eye  of 
God  are  one  eye,  one  vision,  one  knowledge,  and  one 
love.  .  .  .  God  has  become  man  that  I  might  become 
God."  And  yet  he  maintains  that  in  this  union  with 
God  our  personality  is  restored  to  its  true  person- 
ality by  becoming  active  in  and  with  the  personal 
God! 

St.  Gregory  the  Great  ascribes  all  to  God.  He 
says: 

God  dwelleth  within  all  things.  He  is  outside  all  things, 
above  all  things,  beneath  all  things,  above  by  power,  be- 
neath by  sustentation,  outside  by  magnitude,  within  by  sub- 
tility ;  ruling  above,  containing  below,  encompassing  with- 
out, penetrating  within.  Nor  is  He  higher  in  one  part,  lower 
in  another,  nor  abiding  outer  in  one  part  and  inner  in  an- 
other, but  one  and  the  same  in  his  entirety,  everywhere  sus- 
taining by  ruling,  ruling  by  sustaining,  penetrating  by  en- 
compassing, encompassing  by  penetrating ;  and  whenceso- 
ever  He  is  ruling  above,  thence  He  sustains  below ;  and 
whence  He  outwardly  encompasses,  thence  He  inwardly 


theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pantheisin.  203 

fills  ;  ruling  above  without  unrest,  sustaining  below  without 
toil,  piercing  noiselessly  within,  encompassing  outwardly 
without  extension. 

The  language  of  lofty  theology  and  of  deep  devo- 
tion is  almost  invariably  that  of  what  may  be  stigma- 
tized as  pantheism,  if  that  term  be  used  without  criti- 
cism and  proper  definition.  Whose  books  of  devotion 
are  the  companions  of  devout  souls,  books  that  we 
iiee  to  in  hours  of  spiritual  conflict  and  ecstatic  rapt- 
ure ?  They  are,  after  the  Psalms  and  Isaiah  and  St. 
John,  the  volumes  of  Tauler  and  De  Sales,  Thomas  a 
Kempis,  Fenelon,  and  William  Law — men  who  had  no 
jealousy  of  their  God,  but  who  would  gladly  empty 
themselves  that  He  might  fill  them.  This  argument 
ad  hommein  will  come  home  to  every  one  who  has 
ever  felt  the  thrill  of  genuine  devotion,  who  has  ever 
been  on  the  Mount  of  Transfiguration,  who  has  ever 
felt  the  Everlasting  Arms  beneath  him  and  the  Infi- 
nite Love  within  him.  Yes,  we  are  all  pantheists  in 
moments  of  our  most  exalted  devotion  and  thought. 

But  what  is  pantheism  ?  What  multitude  of  sins 
this  ambiguous  term  has  been  used  to  cover !  "  One 
of  the  first  uses  of  this  word  is  by  Toland  in  the  Pan- 
theisticon  (a.  d.  1720),  where,  however,  it  has  its 
ancient  polytheistic  sense.  It  is  a  little  later  that  it 
passes  from  the  idea  of  the  worship  of  the  whole  of 
the  gods  to  the  worship  of  the  entire  universe  looked 
at  as  God."  *  Since  then  it  has  been  one  of  the  con- 
secrated terms  of  theological  polemics.  Bayle's  vig- 
orous criticism  of  pantheism  amounted  to  about  this, 
that  pantheism  so  diffuses  God  that  he  is  as  much  in 
an  ass  as  in  an  angel ;  and  that  vulgar  method  is  often 

*  A.  S.  Farrar,  Critical  History  of  Free  Thought,  p.  414. 
19 


204  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

vulgarly  used  to-day,  based  upon  a  supposed  ety- 
mology of  the  word  Pan,  all,  and  Theos,  God.  The 
all  is  God.  He  is  the  quantitative  sum  total  of  all 
things.  This  is  atheistic  pantheism  ;  but  the  emphasis 
may  be  put  upon  the  other  part  of  the  word,  and  for 
Pantheism  we  have  Pan///mw — that  is,  God  is  all,  the 
only  reality,  all  things  being  evanescent  nonentities. 
This  is  acosmic  pantheism,  as  Hegel  styles  Spinoza's 
system.  This  form  is,  at  least,  anti-materialistic.  Its 
first  principle  may  be  so  impersonal  as  to  exclude 
all  religion,  or  it  may  rise  to  theistic  or  even  Chris- 
tian content  and  become  what  we  may  call  personal 
pantheism,  as  with  Eckhart,  Schleiermacher,  Male- 
branche,  and  Berkeley. 

But  even  where  the  First  Principle  is  made  per- 
sonal, God  may  be  conceived  as  "  all  in  all  "  in  a 
way  hostile  to  human  personality  and  immortality. 
The  emphasis  may  be  placed  upon  the  physical  attri- 
butes of  omnipotence  rather  than  upon  the  ethical 
ones  of  love  and  righteousness,  so  that  the  souls  that 
He  has  made  fail  and  shrivel  up  before  hira  (Isaiah 
Ivii,  i6).  The  Calvinism  of  Jonathan  Edwards  cer- 
tainly is  open  to  the  charge  of  such  unethical  per- 
sonal pantheism.  It  is  only  a  relatively  higher  form 
than  impersonal  pantheism,  which  yields  only  emana- 
tion cycling  back  to  primal  source.  Pantheism  be- 
comes ethical  theism  only  when  it  develops  its  first 
principle  from  impersonal  Substance  or  Force  or 
Will  into  the  personal  form  of  Self-conscious,  loving 
intelligence ;  but  then  it  is  no  longer  obnoxious  pan- 
theism. It  might  better  be  termed  hyper-deism.  It  is 
that  of  Jeremiah  :  "  I  am  a  God  at  hand,  saith  the 
Lord,  and  not  a  God  afar  off.  Do  not  I  fill  heaven 
and  earth  ?  "     Immanence  is  added  to  transcendence. 


Theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism.  205 

On  the  one  hand,  God  is  conceived  as  eternally  per- 
fect, self-communicating-,  and  self-participating  love 
and  communion  in  his  Triune  nature.  On  the  other 
hand,  creation  is  conceived  as  the  free  act  of  Divine 
love  morally  necessitated  and  the  incarnation  as  the 
goal  and  summit  of  this  creation. 

Far  more  vital  significance  is  thus  given  to  the 
doctrine  of  the  Fatherhood  of  God  and  the  sonship  of 
man,  created,  redeemed,  and  sanctified  in  his  image — 
made  perfect  as  he  is  perfect.  God  is  in  no  wise  lim- 
ited by  the  increasing  number  of  his  dear  children. 
Neither  are  they  made  less  in  thus  growing  into  his 
perfection.  As  they  become  perfect,  God  recognizes 
himself  in  them,  and  their  complete  self-determination 
completes  his  self-consciousness.  It  is  Hegel's  asser- 
tion that  the  self-consciousness  of  man  is  the  comple- 
tion of  the  Divine  Self-consciousness  that  gives  any 
seeming  likeness  of  his  ontology  to  pantheism.  This 
has  been  interpreted  to  mean  that  God  first  comes  to 
consciousness  in  man,  that  He  passes  from  an  uncon- 
scious state  to  consciousness  first  when  finite  creatures 
become  conscious.  This  is  obnoxious  pantheism.  It 
is  the  doctrine  of  Schopenhauer  and  of  some  of  the 
left-wing  Hegelians,  who  did  not  pretend  to  say  that 
it  was  Hegel's  teaching,  but  what  he  ought  to  have 
taught.  None  but  either  ignorant  or  willful  perver- 
sion of  Hegel's  thought  and  express  words  can  at- 
tribute to  him  this  atheism  of  making  God  to  be  self- 
conscious  only  in  finite  consciousness.  Neither  is  the 
kindred  charge  that  he  makes  mere  finite  spirit  Divine 
or  one  with  Deity  true.  This  horrible  distortion  of 
Hegel's  thought  was  made  by  Strauss  and  Feuerbach. 
To  maintain  as  they  did  that  the  empirical  ego — the 
natural  man — is  divine   or  spiritual,  is  as  far  from 


2o6  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Hegel's  as  from  St.  Paul  thought.*  No  man  is  divine 
or  spiritual,  but  man  as  man  is  made  capable  of  the 
Divine.  But  this  capacity  can  only  be  realized  by 
the  refining  away  the  rubbish  of  the  natural  man 
through  an  age-long  labor  under  divine  education. 
"  Die  to  live  "  is  the  command  to  the  old  man  and  the 
promise  to  the  new  man.  In  so  far  as  this  is  realized 
in  man,  God  is  conscious  of  himself  in  spirits  infini- 
tized  into  his  own  image,  and  man  attains  conscious- 
ness of  his  own  true  self  in  God.  This  is  implicitly 
realized  in  true  religion,  in  which  man  has  this  reality 
through  justification  by  faith,  so  that  God  can  love 
and  own  him  as  his  own  flesh  and  blood.  God  and 
man  are  not  side-by-side  beings,  nor  are  they  confus- 
edly mixed  and  identified.  Hegel's  conception  avoids 
the  deistic  separation  and  the  pantheistic  confusing 
together  of  God  and  man.  Prof.  Pfleiderer  says  that 
this  "  is  not  only  the  most  correct  interpretation  of 
the  Hegelian  philosophy,  but  is  right  in  itself.  This, 
I  think,  is  beyond  doubt"  (Religions- Philosophic, 
vol.  i,  p.  590). 

Obnoxious  pantheism  is  an  exotic  in  Occidental 
thought.  It  is  at  home  in  the  Orient.  Oriental  pan- 
theism is  justly  the  horror  of  our  religious  mind.  In- 
stead of  making  God  the  spiritual,  ethical  unity  of 
all  things,  it  makes  him  either  the  quantitative  sum 
total  of  them  or  denies  any  reality  to  them.  In 
either  way  it  makes  far  too  little  of  the  place  and 
worth  and  destiny  of  men.  Consciousness  is  con- 
ceived as  a  temporary,  finite,  unsubstantial  phase  of 

*  "When  man  is  said  to  be  divine,  or  the  mere  finite  spirit  as  natural 
spirit  identified  with  God,  this  is  sheer  pantheism.  The  Church  declares 
that  only  through  the  death  of  the  natural  man  can  he  be  united  with 
God"  (Philosophie  der  Religion,  vol.  i,  p.  211). 


Theology,  Anthropology^  and  Pantheism.  207 

the  immobile  Brahm  or  of  the  blind  Will  of  the  Uni- 
verse. 

Hegel's  doctrine  is  that  God  is  eternally  self-con- 
scious and  can  never  be  other  than  self-conscious.  It 
has  nothing  to  do  with  time.  It  is  the  **  form  of  eter- 
nity." Men's  consciousness  rises  to  this  as  they  rec- 
ognize God  as  their  Father,  and  his  will  as  their  own 
will.  Their  consciousness  of  him  becomes  jr//"-con- 
sciousness.  They  are  complete  in  him,  God  having 
reconciled  them  unto  himself,  the  ultimate  purpose  of 
his  creating  them  being  to  reflect  and  complete  his 
eternally  complete  self-consciousness  in  them.  Until 
man  reaches  this  perfection  he  is  not  himself.  He  is 
bad  by  nature  and  good  through  grace,  prevenient, 
circumambient,  permeating,  and  sanctifying  ;  bad  as 
merely  conscious  and  opposed  to  God,  good  as  his 
self-consciousness  is  completed  in  his  perfect  recon- 
ciliation with  God.  Evil  is  an  essential  element  of 
mere  consciousness,  and  "  the  prodigious  labor  of  the 
world's  history  "  is  the  progress  of  man,  through  Di- 
vine grace,  into  the  freedom  of  self-determination, 
making  God's  will  his  will,  thus  realizing  self-con- 
sciousness and  completing  God's  self-consciousness 
or  perfect  reflection  of  himself  in  his  sons.  Here 
Hegel  as  well  as  Christianity  is  transcendental  as  re- 
gards the  world  of  time  and  sense.  Both  carry  us  out 
of  and  above  the  temporal  and  visible  to  the  eternal 
and  invisible.  Both  look  upon  man  sub  specie  ceterni- 
tatis. 

Hegel's  doctrine  of  the  creation,  as  springing  from 
the  love  in  the  triune  nature  of  God,  involves  a  re- 
lation to  humanity  which  may  be  called  a  natural  or 
an  essential  tendency  to  incarnation.  Here  he  gives 
the  Scotist  view.     This  tendency  became  actualized 


2o8  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

in  the  man  Christ  Jesus,  the  true  organic  head  of 
humanity.  Hegel  considers  the  incarnation  as  the 
central  doctrine  of  Christianity  on  its  temporal,  his- 
torical side,  as  he  considers  the  doctrine  of  the  Holy 
Trinity  the  central  one  on  the  Godward  side.  He 
also  explicates  the  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the 
Church,  in  the  perfecting  of  its  members  as  a  body, 
realizing  in  them  God's  reconciliation  of  the  world  to 
himself  in  Christ.  Here  "  the  important  element," 
he  says,  "is  the  certitude  of  the  individual  subject  of 
its  own,  infinite,  unsensuous  essence,  knowing  himself 
to  be  infinite,  eternal,  and  immortaV  (ii,  312).  The 
Holy  Spirit  is  the  immanent  life  of  God  in  the  Church 
militant  working  toward  a  transcendent  life  in  the 
Church  triumphant.  Pantheism  has  no  place  for  per- 
sonal immortality.  But  Hegel's  Philosophy  gives 
the  most  exalted  conception  of  the  place,  worth,  and 
destiny  of  immortal  mortals.  Dciis  nos  personat  now 
and  forever.  With  Hegel  personality  is  immortality. 
It  is  the  end  of  the  journey  toward  God,  to  such 
realized  self-consciousness  that  God  can  say,  "  In  you 
I  am  well  pleased,  I  am  reflected  in  you."  Hegel 
extols  the  Egyptians  for  having  so  profoundly  con- 
ceived the  thought  of  immortality.  Dr.  W.  T.  Harris 
says,  "  It  is  a  profound  mystery  to  us  how  any  one  can 
express  a  doubt  as  to  Hegel's  belief  in  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul,  for  this  may  be  considered  to  be 
the  subject-matter  of  Hegel's  entire  philosophy." 
He  accounts  for  such  doubts  by  the  fact  that  "  Hegel 
is  known  more  through  the  traditions  of  his  oppo- 
nents than  by  faithful  study  of  his  own  works " 
(Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  v,  88).  Hegel 
is  always  engaged  with  showing  what  is  immortal 
and  what  is  not  immortal  throughout  the  universe, 


Theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism.  209 

and  that  is  concrete  personality.  He  maintains  that 
immortality  is  a  quality  of  mind  which  is  already 
present  and  need  not  first  be  mediated,  as  it  also  can 
not  be  destroyed,  by  death.  Of  course,  he  does  not 
allow  that  we  can  form  any  valid  picture-conception 
of  the  conditions  of  our  existence  after  death.  He 
would  reply  as  St.  Paul  did  to  the  query,  "  With  zvhat 
body  do  they  come?''  "  Thou  fool''  (i  Cor.,  xv,  36). 
Goeschel  is  rightly  considered  as  the  best  exponent 
of  Hegel's  own  contention  that  philosophy  is  the 
same  in  content  as  evangelical  Christianity.  He 
published  a  volume  on  "  The  Proofs  of  the  Soul's 
Immortality "  (translated  in  the  Journal  of  Specu- 
lative Philosophy,  xix,  xx),  from  which  I  quote  only 
one  passage : 

This  concept  of  soul-permeated  corporeality  has,  how- 
ever, its  presupposition  in  Personality ;  this  Personality  we 
have  recognized  as  the  concrete  concept  of  Spirit;  only  in 
the  light  of  this  concept  is  the  body  transfigured  and  trans- 
parent. This  transparent  corporeality  in  its  final  analysis 
is  the  obedience  of  the  body  to  the  soul  in  the  spirit — an 
obedience  which  is  free,  because  identical  with  that  which 
determines  it.  The  final  consummation  is  the  obedience  of 
the  creation  toward  God  in  God.  Therefore,  it  has  been 
said  that  all  the  paths  of  God  end  in  corporeality. 

The  "  non  omnis  nioriar  "  of  pagan  hope  is  changed 
into  the  Christian  assurance  of  the  resurrection  of 
the  body  "  in  incorruption,"  "  in  glory,"  ''  in  power," 
"  a  spiritual  body,"  though  "  flesh  and  blood  can  not 
inherit  the  kingdom  of  God  "(i  Cor.  xv,  42-50). 

As  opposed  to  modern  enlightenment,  which 
deems  God  freedom  and  immortality,  dreams  of  chil- 
dren and  uncultured  men,  we  read  in  every  part  of 


2IO  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Hegel  these  words  of  ..Novalis  :  "  Philosophy  can 
bake  no  bread ;  but  she  can  procure  for  us  God, 
freedom,  and  immortality." 

Such  pantheism  is  Hegel's  in  common  with  the 
Catholic  saints  of  head  and  heart  of  all  ages.  Such 
pantheism  is  far  higlier  Christian  theism  than  that  of 
the  mechanical  deism,  which  too  commonly  masquer- 
ades as  orthodoxy,  deceiving  and  belittling  its  own 
self  and  its  disciples.  Surely  this  gospel,  according 
to  Hegel  and  the  saints,  is  far  higher  than  the  gospel 
according  to  both  Mansel  and  Spencer. 

Deistic  orthodoxy  is  temporarily  compatible  with 
that  "  sober,  common  sense,  unemotional,  anti-myste- 
rious type  of  religion  that  soon  dies  of  dry-rot,  not 
being  rooted  in  the  soil  of  the  immanent  Deity.  True, 
vital,  exalting  and  impulsive  religion  always  needs 
the  incoming  and  indwelling  of  that  higher  pantheism 
of  the  immanent  Holy  Spirit." 

Hegel  called  his  philosophy  that  of  Absolute  Ideal- 
ism. He  was,  like  St.  John,  a  born  Platonist,  and,  like 
St.  Paul,  a  converted  Aristotle.  "  The  idealis  the  real, 
and  the  real  is  the  ideal."  Dr.  Erdmann  calls  it 
Panlogism. 

Hegel  has  been  criticised  for  over-emphasizing 
the  thought,  the  X0709  in  all  things,  and  for  not  empha- 
sizing sufficiently  the  elements  of  will  and  love.  But 
he  conceives  all  thought  as  the  voluntary  outgoing  of 
Love  on  its  return  to  Love  : 

Denn  das  Leben  ist  die  Liebe, 
Und  des  Lebens  Leben  Geist. 

God  is  Love  in  all  his  works.  Hegel  read  this 
immanent  Love  into  the  form  of  thought  (X0709)  as 
identical  with  real  being  (6V).     All  such  thinking  be- 


Theology y  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism.  211 

gets  the  loftiest  and  purest  emotion.  Intellectual 
ecstasy  merges  into  ecstatic  union  with  the  Divine — 
intellectual  comprehension  of  the  incomprehensible 
love  of  God  humbles  and  exalts  us  infinitely. 

If  Jacobi's  reading  of  Kant's  moral  argument  for 
the  existence  of  God  could  raise  sufficient  emotion 
to  bring  on  a  violent  fit  of  palpitation  of  the  heart, 
surely  the  study  of  Hegel — of  nearly  every  one  of 
his  works — will  both  humble  and  exalt  the  soul  with 
floods  of  devotion,  and  wing  its  flight  heavenward, 
as  do  both  St.  John  and  that  Christian  before  Christ, 
Plato.  Nor  can  one  doubt  that,  with  Hegel  himself, 
this  work  of  thinking  the  thoughts  of  God  after  him 
was  a  genuine  act  of  devotion.  These  are  his  own 
(spoken)  words :  Das  Dcnkcn  ist  aiich  wahrcr  Gottcs- 
dienst. 

Note. — I  have  elsewhere  (p.  64)  referred  to  these  pregnant  words  as 
possibly  legendary.  I  have  since  had  it  on  good  authority  that  Hegel's 
wife  vouched  for  their  genuineness.  He  was  a  good  German  churchman, 
but  not  a  constant  church-goer.  Frau  Hegel  once  remonstrated  with 
liim  for  not  attending  public  service  more  regularly,  instead  of  spending 
so  much  time  at  intellectual  work.  He  replied  with  unaffected  serious- 
ness, "  Thinking  is  also  genuine  worship," 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE   METHOD   OF   COMPARATIVE   RELIGION. 

Comparative  Religion  would  have  seemed  su- 
perlative blasphemy  to  Christians  of  the  early  part 
of  this  century.  To-day  it  is  recognized  as  one  of 
the  sciences  which  is  most  fruitful  in  its  aids  to  faith. 
It  is  not  yet,  however,  entirely  free  from  elements  of 
irreverence  and  skepticism.  In  fact,  the  most  subtle 
attempt  to  desupernaturalize  Christianity — to  reduce 
it  to  a  merely  natural  though  lofty  product  of  the 
religious  spirit  of  man — comes  from  this  source  and 
sharpens  its  weapons  upon  its  material.  This  is  one 
of  the  chief  forms  of  attack  that  apologetics  must 
face  to-day. 

The  historical  method  of  investigation,  which, 
applied  to  the  New  Testament  writings  ofttimes  to 
destroy  their  genuineness  and  authenticity,  has  re- 
sulted in  such  fruitful  triumphant  Christian  scholar- 
ship— this  same  method  is  now  applied  to  the  study 
of  all  religions,  ofttimes,  too,  in  the  interest  of  skep- 
ticism. We  believe  that  it  is  already  resulting  in 
most  fruitful  scientific  and  philosophical  vindication 
of  Christianity  as  emphatically  the  revealed  Religion. 
Skepticism  here,  as  so  often,  leads  the  way  into  new 
fields.  Christian  scholars,  sometimes  trembling,  fol- 
low to  claim  all  the  new  truth  discovered  and  to  lay 
it  at  the  feet  of  Jesus.     Thus  this  investigation,  this 


The  Method  of  Comparative  Religioji.  213 

study  of  the  great  religions  of  the  world,  becomes  a 
department  of  apologetics.  The  supernatural  char- 
acter of  Christianity  is  to  be  vindicated  by  argu- 
ments that  come  from  the  historical  investigations 
and  comparison  of  the  religions  of  the  world. 

A  slight  sketch  of  the  rise  and  progress  of  this 
work  may  be  of  interest,  and  also  show  that  Chris- 
tian scholars  and  missionaries  have  been  most  help- 
ful in  the  work,  it  having  been  closely  connected  with 
the  kindred  science  of  comparative  philology. 

We  might  begin  with  the  Renaissance  and  the 
Reformation.  The  first  of  these  revived  knowledge 
of  classical  literature  and  made  men  thoroughly  fa- 
miliar with  the  religion  of  Greece  and  Rome.  The 
latter  gave  the  spiritual  impulse  and  the  intellectual 
freedom  which  have  been  at  the  root  of  all  modern 
progress.  Another  century  saw  the  dawning  knowl- 
edge of  the  great  religions  of  the  East,  obtained 
through  travelers,  missionaries,  and  commercial  in- 
tercourse. It  was  this  faint  knowledge  that  was 
sufficient  to  lead  the  freethinkers  of  France  to  sug- 
gest the  setting  up  of  Buddha,  Confucius,  Zoroaster, 
and  Mohammed  as  rivals  to  the  founder  and  apostles 
of  Christianity.  Every  noble  doctrine  and  moral 
excellence  was  attributed  to  the  Oriental  religions. 
Voltaire  very  naively  attributed  the  superiority  of 
the  Chinese  in  morals,  philosophy,  and  general  cult- 
ure to  their  ignorance  of  Christianity.  Nothing  else 
was  needed,  to  put  an  end  to  all  the  miseries  and 
disputes  of  his  day,  but  the  adoption  of  the  Chinese 
religion  throughout  Europe. 

In  the  latter  part  of  the  eighteenth  century  (1783), 
Sir  William  Jones  began  the  real  work  of  revealing 
the  great  literatures  of  the  East.     His  was  the  envi- 


214  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

able  vocation  of  adding  a  whole  continent  of  litera- 
ture to  Western  wealth.  A  born  philologist  and 
lover  of  truth,  like  a  young  knight-errant,  his  enthu- 
siasm rose  to  the  level  of  his  wonderful  linguistic 
capacity.  About  the  same  time  (1771)  Anquetil  du 
Perron,  whose  spirit  and  work  were  no  less  enthusi- 
astic and  much  more  romantic,  opened  to  Europe 
the  treasures  of  Persian  literature.  These  leaders 
have  ever  since  had  devoted  followers,  profiting  by 
all  the  modern  means  of  investigation.  Then  Protes- 
tant missionaries,  who,  however,  had  been  anticipated 
by  Romish  missionaries,  began  the  accumulation  of 
an  enormous  amount  of  ethnological  and  philologi- 
cal material ;  missionary  dictionaries,  grammars,  and 
translations  gave  the  apparatus  for  the  study  of  many 
unknown  languages.  French,  Danish,  and  German 
scholars  in  an  illustrious  succession  have  labored  on 
the  same  continent  of  learning. 

The  discovery  of  the  Rosetta  stone  in  1799  was 
the  key  which  Champollion  used  for  unlocking  the 
vast  religious  literature  of  Egypt,  therewith  opening 
the  door  to  a  library  of  monuments  and  papyri  in 
myriads  of  volumes.  A  very  romantic  and  impress- 
ive outcome  of  the  study  of  Persian  literature  is  that 
the  modern  disciples  of  Zoroaster — the  Parsees  of 
India — were  first  furnished  with  the  meaning  of  their 
own  sacred  books  through  the  labors  of  European 
learning.  Until  1859  their  language  of  worship  was 
an  unknown  tongue.  On  the  publication  of  Spiegel's 
translation,  a  wealthy  Parsee  gentleman,  living  in 
England,  had  it  rendered  into  English  and  sent  to 
his  fellow-worshipers  for  use  in  Bombay.  In  fact, 
the  whole  course  of  these  twin  s'tudies — comparative 
philology   and    religion  —  would    make   volumes  of 


The  Method  of  Comparative  Religion.  215 

thrilling  romance.  The  result  is,  that  we  have  a 
large  and  scientific  material  for  the  appreciative  and 
comparative  study  of  the  faiths  of  the  world.  This, 
too,  is  now  made  accessible  through  the  editing  by 
Max  Miiller  of  The  Sacred  Books  of  the  East  in 
twenty-four  volumes.  But,  with  all  this,  and  abun- 
dantly more  material,  the  task  of  judging  justly  these 
foreign  religions  is  a  difficult  one.  The  personal 
equation  comes  in  here,  as  elsewhere,  to  the  prejudice 
of  just  comparison  and  truthful  appreciation.  This  is 
seen  in  the  three  methods,  or  stages  of  method,  of 
this  study,  which  we  may  style  the  eighteenth-century 
Christian  view,  the  old  skeptical  view,  and  the  new 
scientific  and  Christian  view. 

I.  The  eighteenth-century  view  was  that  all  the 
religions  of  the  world  except  Judaism  and  Chris- 
tianity were  false  religions,  the  result  of  wickedness, 
priestcraft,  delusion,  fanaticism,  or  quackery.  All 
other  religions  were  disparaged,  that  the  Christian 
apologist  might  the  better  exalt  and  prove  the  super- 
natural origin  of  Christianity.  This  a  priori  view 
did  not  encourage  a  proper  study  of  them.  Indeed, 
in  its  special  pleadings,  the  evils,  rather  than  the 
truths,  were  eagerly  sought  for  in  them.  The  rigid 
line  of  distinction  between  the  converted  and  the 
unconverted  in  Christendom  was  extended  into  the 
classification  of  all  religions  as  "  Natural  and  Re- 
vealed," "  False  and  True,"  or  "  Paganism  and  Chris- 
tianity." Christianity  was  the  wholly  true,  and  hea- 
then religions  were  the  wholly  false.  They  could 
not  be  considered  as  having  any  Divine  significance. 
They  were  worse  than  no  religion.  They  were  cor- 
rupt, superstitious,  and  the  offspring  of  fraud  and 
delusion.  The  utmost  allowed  to  them  was  the  ut- 
20 


2 1 6  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

terly  perverted  and  darkened  light  of  a  primeval 
revelation.  This  preconceived  theory  held  that  all 
false  religions  were  corruptions  of  the  Jewish  re- 
ligion or  offshoots  of  a  perfect  primeval  revelation, 
which  had  come  down  from  heaven  ready  made  for 
perfectly  developed  man.  But,  all  remnants  of  that 
having  utterly  disappeared,  there  was  nothing  true  in 
them,  and  no  true  faith  exercised  by  their  believers. 

II.  The  eighteenth-century  skeptics  cheerfully  ac- 
quiesced in  ascribing  the  origin  of  these  religions  to 
delusion  and  fraud,  only  going  further  and  placing 
Christianity  in  the  same  category.  But  this  view  of 
the  origin  of  Christianity  by  skeptics  and  of  all  other 
religions  by  Christians  has,  I  believe,  once  for  all  been 
abandoned.  The  relation  of  priestcraft  to  religion 
is  found  to  be  that  of  statecraft  to  nations — not  that 
of  creating,  but  that  of  created.  Carlyle  utters  this 
fervid  protest  against  the  theory  of  quackery  in 
reference  to  paganism  and  every  other  virile  ism : 
"  Quackery  and  dupery  do  abound  ;  in  religions, 
above  all  in  the  more  advanced,  decaying  stages  of 
religions,  they  have  fearfully  abounded  ;  but  quackery 
was  never  the  originating  influence  in  such  things; 
it  was  not  the  health  and  life  of  such  things,  but  their 
disease,  the  sure  precursor  of  their  being  about  to 
die.  Let  us  never  forget  this.  It  seems  to  me  a 
most  mournful  hypothesis,  that  of  quackery  giving 
birth  to  any  faith  even  in  savage  men.  Quackery 
gives  birth  to  nothing ;  gives  death  to  all  things. 
We  shall  not  see  into  the  true  heart  of  anything,  if  we 
merely  look  at  the  quackeries  of  it,  if  we  do  not  re- 
ject the  quackeries  altogether  as  mere  diseases  and 
corruptions."  In  the  same  spirit  he  retorts  upon 
those  who  claim  that  Mohammedanism  owed  its  tri- 


The  Method  of  Co^nparative  Religion.  217 

umph  solely  to  the  sword,  "  But  where  did  it  get  its 
sword?'''  Faith  forged  its  sword  and  was  the  inspi- 
ration of  its  first  armies. 

Scholarly  skepticism  soon  gave  up  this  flimsy,  un- 
worthy, and  irreverent  view  of  Voltaire,  and  began 
the  course  which  we  may  represent  as  these  three 
stages:  i.  That  of  looking  for  the  good,  true,  and 
beautiful  elements  in  all  pagan  religions.  2.  That  of 
tracing  the  origin  and  growth  of  all  religion  to  the 
lowest  forms  extant — finding  its  ultimate  source  in  the 
sensuous  needs,  the  timidity,  and  terror  which  char- 
acterize the  most  barbarous  tribes,  so  as  to  cast  dis- 
credit upon  it  in  all  its  later  forms.  3.  Its  latest  and 
best  phase,  which,  while  finding  the  source  of  all 
religions  in  its  lowest  forms,  generously,  sometimes 
genuinely,  maintains  that  its  real  value  is  not  to  be 
determined  by  its  empirical  origin  or  by  the  accidents 
of  its  outward  history,  but  by  its  own  inherent  worth 
— by  that  to  which  it  developed  from  very  humble 
beginnings,  m.aking  sacred  anthologies,  bestowing  an 
ignorant  admiration  upon  them  in  place  of  the  sweep- 
ing condemnation  of  Christian  writers ;  seeking  thus 
to  depress  Christianity  the  rather  by  exalting  them 
to  its  level,  or  at  least  maintaining  that  Christianity  is 
nothing  more  than  a  synthesis  of  the  good  and  also 
of  some  of  the  evils  of  all  previous  religions.  Evolu- 
tion can  do  as  great  things  for  man's  religion  as  it 
can  for  man  himself.  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer's  arti- 
cle* on  "Religion;  a  Retrospect  and  Prospect,"  is 
the  best  statement  of  this  phase  of  the  modern  skep- 
tical view.  He  deliberately  proposes  the  Ghost-the- 
ory origin  of  religion,  and  follows  through  its  various 

*  The  Nineteenth  Century,  1884. 


2 1 8  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

stages  of  evolution  even  to  the  far-off  future  millen- 
nium of  the  agnostic  absolute  religion.  The  man's 
ghost,  or  double,  is  at  first  "  equally  material  with  the 
original."  This  is  gradually  dematerialized  or  dean- 
thropomorphized  into  the  present  conceptions  of  God, 
which  process  is  to  go  on  until  all  conception  is 
destroyed,  and  the  idea  sublimated  in  the  unknow- 
able, unnamable  something  or  nothing  which  the 
coming  agnostic  man  will  nevertheless  worship  as 
truly  and  devoutly  as  his  barbarous  gnostic  progeni- 
tor worshiped  fetiches. 

III.  This  brings  us  to  what  we  may  call  the  mod- 
ern Christian  scientific  method.  We  might  call  it 
the  Christian  view  of  organic  evolution.  It  is  Spen- 
cer's evolution  minus  its  materialism  and  plus  a 
Divine  Evolver.  It  is  the  Hegelian  evolution  of  the 
free  personality  of  both  God  and  man.  It  is  that  of 
organic  evolution,  with  all  that  the  adjective  organic 
signifies,  and  with  all  the  primary  and  continuous  in- 
volution that  every  evolution  implies.  We  may  ac- 
cept the  fact  that  the  method  of  organic  evolution  is 
the  method  of  the  nineteenth  century.  We  may  be 
thankful  for  its  merit,  and  use  and  baptize  it  with  the 
Spirit  of  Him  whose  is  all  truth.  We  start,  then, 
from  the  basis  of  the  Christian  consciousness,  which 
has  been  formed  by  the  facts  of  historical  Christianity, 
applied  and  inwrought  by  the  Holy  Spirit  through 
the  Christian  centuries.  It  is  the  view  of  the  Divine 
indwelling  in  the  whole  historical  evolution  conduct- 
ing it  to  its  conclusion.  Its  view-point  of  the  faiths 
of  the  world  is  that  of  the  Divine  education  of  the 
race — the  evident  Providence  in  history.  This  fruit- 
ful idea,  broached  by  Lessing,  and  anglicized  by 
Bishop   Temple,   though    hooted   at    by    Orthodox, 


The  Method  of  Comparative  Religion.  219 

Evangelical,  and  Tractarian,  is  now  regnant.  But  it 
is  not  wholly  modern.  It  was  the  cherished  view  of 
the  fathers  of  the  Alexandrian  school.  Clement, 
who  Neander  says  was  the  founder  of  the  true  view 
of  history,  opposing  those  who  condemned  all  pagan- 
ism as  wholly  false,  declared  that  all  the  good  in 
heathen  religions  "  must,  therefore,  be  included  with 
all  the  rest  in  God's  plan  of  education  for  the  human 
race  "  ;  that  Greek  philosophy  as  well  as  the  Jewish 
religion  was  a  positive  preparation  for  Christianity. 
Speaking  of  the  progressive  steps  in  the  Divine  edu- 
cation of  humanity,  he  represents  the  Logos  as  the 
Bdo%  Traiharfoyyof;,  declaring  :  "  All  men  belong  to  him, 
some  with  consciousness  of  what  he  is  to  them, 
others  as  yet  without  it ;  some  as  friends,  others  as 
faithful  servants,  others  barely  as  servants."  The 
doctrine  of  the  whole  school  was  that  God  had  re- 
vealed himself  to  all  nations  by  his  Logos,  Chris- 
tianity being  his  highest  revelation,  or  a  pleroma. 
Even  earlier,  Justin  Martyr  employed  this  view  for 
setting  forth  Christianity  as  the  central  point,  where 
all  the  hitherto  scattered  ra)'S  of  the  Godlike  in 
humanity  converge — the  absolute  religion,  in  which 
all  that  has  thus  far  been  fragmentary  and  rent  piece- 
meal, is  brought  together  into  a  higher  unity,  and  for 
comparing  all  the  partial  and  alloyed  revelations  of 
the  X070?  7rpo(f)opLKo<i  with  the  full  and  unalloyed  reve- 
lation of  the  absolute,  Divine  Logos  in  Christ.  Thus 
early,  then,  we  find  the  science  of  comparative  re- 
ligions starting  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Christian 
consciousness.  Thus  the  method  of  comparison  was 
one  of  the  apologetic  tactics  of  the  Greek  Fathers 
of  the  Church.  And  the  standard  of  comparison  was 
the  Christian  consciousness.      The  comparative  re- 


220  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

ligious  content  of  every  pagan  religion  was  its  frag- 
ment of  the  pleroma  of  Christianity. 

We  may  well  accept  this  revived  Christian  method 
in  this  study.  This  method  may  be  called  a  priori — 
a  philosophy  rather  than  a  science.  But  it  is  both. 
For  no  science  is  without  its  metaphysical  element, 
its  intellectually  vivifying  principle,  even  if  it  be  so 
bathetic  as  the  philosophy  of  the  Unknowable. 

Let  us,  however,  turn  aside  to  notice  briefly  this 
method  on  its  inductive  side.  The  scientific  study 
of  religion  consists  in  observation  of  facts,  compari- 
son of  views,  induction  of  principles  and  verification 
of  these  principles  from  the  course  of  history,  and, 
finally,  the  connected  synthesis  of  all  these  results  in 
a  supra-scientific  view — in  a  Philosophy  of  Religion — 
though  this  term  may  be  objected  to  by  both  skeptic 
and  Christian.  Certain  phenomena  are  by  general 
consent  classified  as  religious.  These  are  to  be  noted, 
and,  when  occurring  in  different  bodies  of  people,  to 
be  compared  with  each  other,  to  see  what  they  are, 
wherein  they  agree,  and  where  they  differ.  It  is 
primarily  a  department  of  natural  history.  All  re- 
ligious facts  are  to  be  noted,  whether  enshrined  in 
the  form  of  myths,  legend,  story,  dogma,  ritual,  or 
life.  All  its  visible  or  historic  phenomena  are  to  be 
collated.  Then  comparison  inevitably  follows  —  a 
comparison  of  the  sacred  books,  the  teaching  about 
God,  duty,  immortality,  prayer,  sacrifice,  and  life. 
It  is  to  study  these  facts  dispassionatel}^  to  aim  at 
doing  justice  to  all  phases  of  this  manifestation  of  the 
human  spirit — to  study  them  in  the  spirit  of  a  judge, 
rather  than  that  of  the  special  pleader.  This  precludes 
the  supposition  that  any  form  of  religion  is  wholly 
false.     It  demands  that  we  take  an  interest  in  the 


The  Method  of  Coinparative  Religion.  221 

study  of  each  one  of  them — an  interest  that  is  sure 
to  come  and  increase  with  continued  study.  It  de- 
mands a  hospitable  mind,  that  esteems  ever3'thing 
human  of  interest.  But  thus  science  must  pass  on 
from  this  analytic  to  its  synthetic  stage.  Deeply 
impressed  by  the  fact  that  man  is  eminently  and 
everywhere  a  religious  being — that  the  highest  and 
truest  history  of  any  nation  or  age  is  the  history  of 
its  religion — the  student  of  this  science  unavoidably 
finds  himself  trying  to  generalize  definitions  of  re- 
ligion, God,  revelation,  that  are  either  implicit  or 
explicit  in  all  religions.  From  Religions  he  passes  by 
synthesis  to  Religion,  and  then  turns  back  upon  his 
previous  study  to  read  the  laws  of  its  development — 
to  read  its  course  either  as  a  progressive  Divine  reve- 
lation and  education,  or  as  the  necessary  dialectic  of 
the  idea.  Development  of  some  kind  is  assumed  by 
all.  We  may  call  it  the  nineteenth-century  postulate 
in  regard  to  all  life  and  institutions.  It  is  the  phi- 
losophy that  underlies  its  science,  the  metaphysic  of 
all  its  physics.  Thus  all,  Christian  or  skeptic,  are 
led  unavoidably  from  the  mere  science  of  Religion 
to  a  Philosophy  of  Religion,  which  indeed  is  im- 
plicit, and  vitalizes  its  every  form  as  a  science. 

But  the  contest  with  the  skeptic  is  not  here,  as  it 
is  not  with  the  facts  collated  and  classified  by  the 
science.  Indeed,  we  may  go  further,  and  yet  not  be 
at  the  real  issue.  All  comparison  both  presupposes 
and  produces  a  standard  of  comparison.  That  stand- 
ard we  may  say  is  Christianity,  and  not  be  challenged 
by  any  one.  All  grant  that  Christianity  is  the  highest 
and  best  form  of  religion — the  standard  of  comparison 
for  measuring  all  others.  Christ  is  formally  at  least 
invited  to  the  highest  seat  in  the  world's  Pantheon. 


22  2  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Before  noticing  more  at  length  the  method  and 
its  results,  we  may  briefly  indicate  the  crucial  point, 
whence  issues  in  theory  the  life  or  death  of  all  re- 
ligion. 

It  is  when  we  ask,  What  is  religion,  what  its  cause, 
subject-matter,  worth,  reality,  and  final  end  ?  Skep- 
tics say  in  fact,  though  often  in  most  graceful  and 
euphemistic  periphrasis,  that  it  is  wholly  an  illusion, 
beneficent  or  baleful,  a  necessary  product  or  a  para- 
sitic excrescence  of  human  life.  The  question.  What 
is  religion  ?  must  and  will  be  asked  ;  and  to  be  an- 
swered it  must  pass  through  the  laboratory  of  science 
and  the  crucible  of  philosophic  intelligence.  Has  it 
an  imperishable  substance  of  reality,  or  are  its  visible 
forms  only  held  up  by  the  sand-ropes  of  illusion, 
prejudice,  and  ignorance?  Has  it  concrete  reality, 
or  is  it,  as  with  Herbert  Spencer,  only  apotheosized 
ignorance  ?  And  thus  it  merges  into  the  larger  ques- 
tion, which  includes  that  of  the  reality  of  all  our 
knowledge — into  the  ultimate  philosophic  question  of 
knowing  and  being.  The  answer  divides  thinkers  to- 
day into  the  two  schools  of  skepticism  and  faith,  of 
total  agnosticism  and  of  partial  but  real  gnosticism, 
without  which  God,  the  world,  science,  and  philoso- 
phy are  dead,  and  the  inexplicable  puppet  man  ought 
to  cease  to  think,  speak,  and  be.  Silence  unutter- 
able is  the  only  becoming  companion  of  ignorance 
absolute. 

But  leaving  agnosticism,  which  has  no  defense,  no 
root  or  ground  in  the  universe,  we  take  the  other 
philosophical  view  of  Natural  Realism,  or  of  the  real- 
ity of  knowing  and  being,  in  a  concrete  organic  nexus 
of  living  relations.  Being,  knowledge,  life,  all  of 
these   imply   and    may  best    be    viewed    under   the 


The  Method  of  Comparative  Religion.  223 

method  of  development — the  process  of  vital,  or- 
ganic,  progressive  relations. 

We  may  be  told  that  we  have  only  finite  knowl- 
edge and  being.  But  real  answer  is  made  when  we 
show  that  our  finite  portions  are  not  isolated,  but 
that  they  are  in  organic  connection  with  their  correl- 
ative, infinite  and  absolute  being  and  knowledge — 
that  man  and  man's  history  have  never  been  isolated 
from  his  other  infinite  side  of  being,  that  his  connec- 
tion with  Absolute  Spirit  has  been  as  real  and  con- 
tinuous as  his  connection  with  the  earth — that  in  God 
all  men  have  lived  and  moved  and  had  their  quantum 
of  real  being.  The  mechanical  isolation  of  God,  the 
world,  and  man,  the  complete  and  essential  separation 
of  concrete  man  from  Absolute  Spirit,  of  his  self-con- 
sciousness from  the  element  of  God-consciousness,  this 
old,  barren,  mechanico-logical  view,  which  is  respon- 
sible for  much  intellectual  skepticism,  can  no  longer 
be  held.  Real  logic  is  found  to  be  a  process,  and  is 
manifested  in  all  life  and  not  in  the  forms  of  the  syl- 
logism. Man's  being  and  knowledge  are  processes 
in  organic  relation  to  God.  These  relations  are  im- 
plicit in  every  man's  life,  but  come  into  the  conscious 
experience  gradually.  We  need  not  reply  to  the  ex- 
clamation, "■  What  an  assumption ! "  when  it  is  that 
which  alone  gives  reality  to  anything;  when  it  is 
positively  given  in  self-consciousness  and  its  implica- 
tions. 

It  is  in  this  implicit  organic  relation  of  man  with 
God  that  we  find  the  root  of  religion.  From  this  we 
may  educe  a  definition  of  religion  and  trace  its  con- 
scious  evolution  or  "  coming  to  itself,"  in  the  histor- 
ical life  of  the  race,  with  which  it  is  conterminous. 

We  may  briefly  define  religion  as  the  conscious 


2  24  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

relation  of  man  to  God.  We  may  amplify  this  and 
say  that  it  is  the  process  of  man's  coming  to  full  real- 
ization of  the  implicit  relations  of  his  own  conscious- 
ness— the  process  of  man's  feeling  after  God  and  find- 
ing him,  in  whom  all  live  and  who  is  not  far  from, 
but  in  organic  relation  with,  every  one  of  his  own 
ofTspring,  though  they  worship  Him  ignorantly.  It  is 
the  surrender  of  the  partial,  isolated  self  to  its  truer 
self — the  striving  after  real  life  in  conscious  identity 
of  mind  and  will  with  the  Divine,  that  the  old,  false, 
fragmentary  self  may  no  longer  live  but  give  place 
to  the  realization  of  the  perfect  life — its  native  dower, 
its  forfeited  birthright.  It  is  the  truest  life  of  man 
in  communion  with  God,  attempts  after  which  give 
various  expression  to  that  latent  consciousness  of  an 
Infinite  Being  and  Life  which  is  bound  up  with  man's 
very  nature  as  a  rational  and  spiritual  being. 

But  all  this  definition  gives  only  one  side,  and  that 
the  finite  side,  of  the  religious  relation.  If  we  are  in 
organic  relation  with  God  and  seek  to  realize  this,  if 
we  seek  after  the  living  God,  it  is  no  less  true  that 
God  seeks  after  us  his  offspring,  seeks  to  manifest  his 
part  of  the  vital  relation,  to  reveal  himself  unto  us. 
He  does  not  sit  in  the  inaccessible  heavens  and  watch 
us  vainly  striving  to  fall  upward  to  his  feet.  God  is 
not  foreign  to  man  his  creature — his  wisdom  and  love 
are  in  vital  relation  with  him,  for  of  him,  and  through 
him,  and  in  him  are  all  things.  If  man's  spiritual 
nature  can  only  fulfill  or  realize  itself  in  union  with 
God,  there  must  be  some  vital  relation  of  God  with 
man.  Of  an  organic  relation,  all  parts  are  vital ;  and 
this  is  the  truth  slighted  alike  by  deist  and  pantheist 
and  many  professedly  Christian  writers  upon  the 
philosophy  of  religion. 


The  Method  of  Comparative  Religion.  225 

Combining  the  two  sides,  we  may  better  define 
religion  as  the  reciprocal  communion  of  God  and  man. 
It  is  the  product  of  this  double  attempt  to  realize  this 
organic  relation.  But  its  Godward  side  is  its  deep- 
est and  strongest — God  striving  to  so  manifest  him- 
self to  us  that  we  may  know,  love,  and  live  in  him. 
Revelation-  is,  therefore,  a  constituent  of  all  religion, 
and  is  an  historic  process  as  well  as  man's  side  of  re- 
ligion— a  process  that  includes  the  revelation  to  pri- 
meval man,  the  continuous  natural  revelation  through 
nature,  history,  conscience,  and  life,  and  all  special 
revelations — all  manifestations  of  the  infinite  Divine 
side  of  man's  environment. 

This  definition  of  religion  is  the  product  of  the 
study  of  the  various  religions,  and  in  turn  the  test  to 
try  the  measure  and  worth  of  each  and  its  place  in 
the  progressive  development.  That  there  has  been 
an  organic  development  of  religion  the  Christian 
much  more  than  the  skeptic  is  bound  to  hold.  That 
there  has  been  a  providential  control  of  the  religious 
experience  of  mankind  means,  too,  that  there  has 
been  an  order  of  progress — "  first  the  blade,  then  the 
ear,  afterward  the  full  corn  in  the  ear."  The  relig- 
ious experience  of  the  world,  followed  intelligently 
through  its  historic  manifestations,  gives  us  the  stages 
of  this  evolution,  of  what  was  from  the  beginning  in- 
volved in  man's  destiny  or  true  nature.  At  any  step 
in  any  phase  of  this  experience  we  may  put  this 
measuring  test.  How  much  divine  light  and  love  and 
how  much  human  response  to  it  is  to  be  found  here  ? 
We  may  begin  at  the  lowest  recorded  stage,  though  we 
may  never  begin  at  the  ultimate  origin,  which  neither 
tradition  nor  historic  research  can  penetrate,  and 
trace  its  course  to  its  fullness.     But  this  does  not  im- 


2  26  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

ply,  and  research  docs  not  show,  that  this  process  is 
identical  with  the  successive  phenomena  of  religious 
history  of  particular  races  or  with  the  chronological 
order  in  which  the  various  religions  have  succeeded 
each  other.  The  colligation  of  facts  is  only  the  pri- 
mary step  in  the  science  of  religion.  Then  comes 
interpretation,  or  the  finding  of  intelligence,  order, 
progress — the  eliciting  the  hidden  presence  of  rational 
relations,  of  an  objective  reason,  of  God's  activity — 
in  the  collated  and  compared  religious  facts  of  the 
world.  Every  science  starts  with  the  presupposition 
that  its  subject-matter  is  intelligible,  that  there  is  rea- 
son or  thought  in  it  which  it  seeks  to  exegete.  The 
student  of  the  religious  experience  of  mankind  makes 
only  the  same  presupposition.  He  traces  the  steps 
of  this  intelligence  by  viewing  his  material  in  the 
light  of  the  definition  of  essential  religion,  and  by 
comparison  with  it  he  determines  the  relation  of  the 
various  religions  to  each  other. 

This  gives  him  the  true  classification  of  religions 
instead  of  the  prejudiced  classification  of  "  natural 
and  spiritual,"  or  the  arbitrary  and  inadequate  divis- 
ion into  "polytheistic  and  monotheistic."  Passing 
by  all  external  and  arbitrary  resemblances,  which  oft- 
times  are  most  wonderful,  and  all  differences,  which 
ofttimes  are  only  dialects  of  expression,  we  ask,  to 
what  extent  each  religion  fulfills  or  realizes  the  fun- 
damental idea  of  religion  ?  The  answer  determines 
the  moment  in  the  process  that  each  represents ;  and 
the  working  out  of  the  answer  is  the  task  of  the  com- 
parative study  of  religions  involving  a  detailed  ex- 
amination of  the  religions  of  the  world.  The  labors 
in  this  work  have  been  abundant.  Dr.  J.  Freeman 
Clarke,  in  his  sympathetic  study  of  The  Ten  Great 


The  Method  of  Comparative  Religion.  227 

Religions,  gives  a  good  bibliography  on  this  science. 
It  is  sufficient  to  refer  to  his  list  of  authors  and  works, 
including  those  given  in  the  preface  of  Part  II  of  this 
valuable  work. 

To  this  definition  and  method  of  religion,  two 
objections  will  be  raised.  The  first  is  that  the  idea 
of  an  organic  development  of  religion  reduces  it  to  a 
merely  natural  growth  and  gives  no  assurance  of  its 
objective  truth.  This  arises  from  the  materialism 
and  the  pantheism  that  have  largely  but  wrongly 
claimed  the  method  as  their  own.  With  them  there 
is  no  place  for  the  free  personality  of  God  and  of 
man.  It  becomes  merely  a  physical  or  a  metaphysical 
process  of  necessary  development.  But  to  yield  the 
method  to  these  now  almost  united  views,  is  neither 
wise  nor  right.  The  organic  unity  of  the  free  per- 
sonality of  God  and  of  man  leads  to  an  organic  de- 
velopment of  this  relation  in  historic  processes  which 
are  neither  merely  physical  nor  metaphysical,  but 
are  concrete  freedom.  We  have  risen  far  above  the 
old  theological  antinomy  between  God's  sovereignty 
and  man's  freedom.  The  solution,  or  rather  the 
comprehension,  of  this  antinomy  is  essentially  also 
that  of  this  question  of  an  organic  development  of 
religion.     It  is  identical  with  it. 

The  second  objection  to  this  method  will  come 
from  its  implying  an  essential  relation  between  Chris- 
tianity and  other  religions  —  an  incorporation  of 
Christianity  into  the  unity  of  the  idea  and  the  history 
of  religion.  This  objection  is  overstated  when  it  is 
asserted  that  this  view  reduces  Christianity  to  the 
level  of  other  religions,  or  at  least  implies  that  it  is 
the  result  of  their  synthesis.  But  this  it  need  not 
and  does  not  imply.     Christianity  is  easily  diflferenti- 


2  28  PJiilosophy  of  Religion. 

ated  from  other  religions  even  under  this  method, 
as  the  absolute  religion,  in  the  sense  of  being  the 
perfect  realization  of  the  idea  which  underlies  and 
gives  significance  to  all  others.  All  Christians  claim 
that  Christianity  stands  in  organic  connection  with 
Judaism,  both  being  parts  of  a  gradually  developing 
system,  and  draw  from  this  one  of  the  strongest 
arguments  for  the  Divine  origin  of  Christianity. 
But  can  we  refuse  to  extend  this  connection  in  some 
degree  to  other  religions  ?  If  the  heathen  nations 
were  subject  to  a  providential  training,  if  God  was 
in  their  history  in  any  degree,  as  all  grant,  is  not 
this  relation  essentially  granted?  Rome's  work  of 
the  unification  of  mankind  and  Greece's  work  of  phi- 
losophy have  indeed  always  been  allowed  to  come 
into  this  organic  connection,  but  only,  as  it  were,  by 
a  side  door.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Greeks  and 
Romans  were  found  more  ready  to  receive  Chris- 
tianity than  were  the  Jews.  It  was  this  that  startled 
the  apostle  St.  Paul,  who  soon  came  to  recognize  a 
true  seeking  and  finding  through  an  ignorant  wor- 
ship of  God  underneath  their  superstition.  It  will 
not  do  to  eviscerate  his  speech  on  Mars'  Hill  by 
pronouncing  it  "  a  masterpiece  of  ingenuity  and  elo- 
quence."    He  believed  what  he  said. 

Indeed,  the  extending  of  this  connection  to  others, 
besides  Judaism,  only  strengthens  the  argument  for 
the  Divine  origin  of  Christianity.  Not  only  Judea, 
but  the  whole  world,  becomes  a  theatre  for  prepara- 
tion for  it,  the  whole  order  of  human  history  pointing 
to  Christ,  who  was  the  true  *'  desire  of  all  nations." 
Philosophy  demands  this,  and  much  more  does  the- 
ology ;  for  the  doctrine  of  God,  as  Light  and  Love, 
without  whose  notice  not  even  a  sparrow  falls  to 


The  Method  of  Co77iparative  Religion.  229 

the  ground,  necessitates  us  to  take  it,  and  thus  to  read 
the  history  of  all  religions  as  the  record  of  his  mani- 
festation and  of  man's  very  imperfect  apprehension 
and  acceptance.     God  can  not  be  wholly  banished 
from  any  human  history.    Christian  apologists  to-day 
point  out  how  Christianity  meets  "  the  unconscious 
longings  of  heathendom,"  and  trace  anticipations  of 
Christian  doctrine  and  guesses  at  truth  in  pre-Chris- 
tian religions.     It  is  even  allowed  that  their  vitality 
came  from  some  lingering  elements  of  a  primeval 
revelation.    It  is  also  pointed  out  that  Christ  came  "  in 
the  fullness  of  times."     Divine  Providence  is  allowed 
to  have  made  external  preparations  for  his  advent, 
such  as  the  facilities  that  the  Roman  Empire  and  the 
Greek  language  afforded  for  the  diffusion  of  Chris- 
tianity.    But,  as  another  has  said,  "  It  is  surely  not 
a  less  reverential  view,  to  trace  a  deeper  preparation 
in  the  movements  of  men's  minds,  in  the  convergence 
of  manifold  spiritual  tendencies,  in  the  gradual  dis- 
cipline of  the  human  consciousness  for  the  reception 
of  the  universal  religion,"  and  in  the  gradual  human 
apprehension  of  Divine  truth  in  the  various  religions. 
It  is  a  shallow  and  irreverent  conception  which  re- 
gards all  pre-Christian  seeking   after  God,  and  all 
pre-Christian  seeking  of  God  after  men,  as  abortive 
experiments,  the  outcome  being  utter  failures  and 
worse   than   no   religion,  and  their  preparation  for 
Christianity  merely  negative.     The  method  of  com- 
parative  religion    will    not   admit    this   conception. 
Neither  will  it  admit  nor  does  it  involve  the  conces- 
sion that  there  is  nothing  more  in  Christianity  than 
a  synthesis  "  of    pre-existing   elements,   or   that   its 
originality  consists  simply  in   the   reproduction,  in 
collective  form,  of  ideas  contained  in  the  religious, 


230  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

philosophical,  and  ethical  systems  of  the  ancient 
world."  In  reply  to  such  a  conception  of  Chris- 
tianity, Dr.  John  Caird*  has  well  said  that  "it  is  not 
more  historically  improbable  than  it  is  inconsistent 
with  the  true  idea  of  organic  development,  which  is 
absolutely  antagonistic  to  any  such  a  notion  as  that 
Christian  doctrine  is  a  mere  compound  of  Greek, 
Oriental,  and  Jewish  ingredients.  To  apply  the 
ideal  of  development  to  human  history  is  by  no 
means  to  find  in  the  old  the  mechanical  or  efficient 
cause  of  the  new.  For,  in  organic  development,  the 
new,  though  presupposing  the  old,  involves  the  in- 
troduction of  a  wholly  original  element  not  given  in 
the  old.  Hence  we  are  not  to  conceive  that  Chris- 
tianity could  be  elaborated  out  of  pre  -  Christian 
religions  and  philosophies,  any  more  than  that  life 
could  be  elaborated  out  of  inorganic  matter.  But 
the  connection  of  Christianity  with  the  past,  which 
we  here  assert,  is  a  connection  which  at  the  same 
time  involves  the  annulling  and  transmuting  of  the 
past  by  a  new  creative  spiritual  force.  To  assert  it, 
therefore,  is  to  hold  that  Christianity  neither  borrows 
nor  reproduces  the  imperfect  notions  of  God,  be 
they  pantheistic,  dualistic,  or  anthropomorphic,  in 
which  the  religions  of  the  old  world  had  embodied 
themselves.  In  the  light  of  this  idea  we  can  perceive 
these  imperfect  notions  yielding  up,  under  the  trans- 
forming influence  of  Christianity,  whatever  elements 
of  truth  lay  hid  in  them,  while  that  which  was  arbi- 
trary and  false  falls  away  and  dies.  Thus,  whatever 
elements  of  truth,  whatever  broken  and  scattered 
rays  of  light  the  old  religions  contained,  Christianity 

*  Philosophy  of  Religion,  pp.  354,  355. 


The  Method  of  Comparative  Religion.  231 

takes  up  into  itself,  explaining  all,  harmonizing  all, 
by  a  Divine  alchemy  transmuting  all — yet  immeasur- 
ably transcending  all — *  gathering  together  in  one  all 
things  in  heaven  and  earth  '  in  its  *  revelation  of  the 
mystery  hid  from  ages '  the  revelation  of  One  who 
is  at  one  and  the  same  time  Father,  Son,  and  Spirit 
— *  above  all,  through  all,  and  in  all.'  " 

Indeed,  it  is  not  without  supposing  the  human  race 
to  have  been  annihilated  and  a  new  race  created,  out 
of  all  connection  with  the  former,  as  the  recipient  of 
Christianity,  that  we  can  think  of  it  other  than  as 
being  essentially,  organically  related  with  the  whole 
antecedent  course  of  man's  religious  life.  This  meth- 
od does  not  prejudge  either  how  much  or  how  little 
real  movements  of  the  process  are  found  in  any 
of  the  pre-Christian  religions.  It  does  not,  indeed, 
assert  a  priori  that  Christianity  is  the  absolute  re- 
ligion, the  pleroma,  which  fulfills  all  religions  as  it 
does  Judaism,  with  something  infinitely  above  them, 
though  implicit  in  the  lowest.  But  this  we  may  say 
is  a  result,  granted  by  all,  of  a  fair  comparison — a 
result,  too,  from  its  fulfilling  the  definition  given  of 
religion.  Being  the  concrete  idea  of  religion,  it  thus 
becomes,  like  it,  the  standard  of  comparison.  Nor 
can  it,  as  the  absolute  religion,  be  divorced  from  its 
historical  origin.  The  facts  of  the  Apostles'  Creed 
will  ever  continue  to  be  the  basis  of  its  special  apol- 
ogy. For  comparative  religion  is  all  in  the  air,  when 
it  leaves  the  concrete  historical  basis,  at  any  moment 
of  the  process.  But  being,  in  its  historical  manifes- 
tation, the  absolute  religion  —  that  is,  the  perfect 
realization  of  the  idea  which  underlies  and  gives 
significance  to  all  religions  —  Christianity  becomes 
the  concrete  standard  of  comparison.     We  thus  pass 


232  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

from  the  assertion  that  Christianity  can  not  be  fully 
understood  unless  viewed  as  an  organic  relation  to 
ethnic  religions,  to  the  assertion  that  these  can  only  be 
understood  when  viewed  in  relation  to  Christianity — 
that  Christianity  is  the  only  religion,  from  which,  and 
in  relation  to  which,  all  other  religions  may  be  viewed 
in  an  impartial  and  truthful  manner,  and  their  signifi- 
cance as  steps  in  the  process  of  the  revelation  of  the 
ideal  and  true  relations  of  God  and  man  be  appreciated. 
Wherever  there  is  any  religion  there  is  some  revela- 
tion. In  the  absolute  religion  there  is  perfect  revela- 
tion, which  subsumes  all  previous  revelations  and  pass- 
es on  to  special  revelation,  in  the  whole  historic  setting 
of  the  Incarnation — the  perfect  union  of  God  and  man. 
The  implications,  inferences,  illustrations,  and  the 
present  results  of  the  application  of  this  method  in 
the  study  of  the  "  faiths  of  the  world,"  are  as  innu- 
merable as  they  are  interesting.  But  notice  of  these 
is  the  work  not  of  an  article  or  series  of  articles,  but 
the  appropriate  task  of  the  great  science  of  compara- 
tive religion.  These  indeed  are  as  interesting  as  the 
statement  of  the  method  may  seem  dull.  But  the 
method  is  necessary  to  the  attainment  of  the  best  and 
truest  results  of  the  science.  A  false  method  is  culti- 
vated in  this  science  which  yields  anti-Christian  and 
even  atheistic  inferences — which  issues  not  in  life  but 
death.  But  this  is  due  to  false  method,  not  to  the 
real  character  of  the  study  itself,  which  is  a  realm  of 
human  experience  demanding  study.  For  the  sci- 
ence is  an  overwhelming  demonstration,  not  only  that 
man  was  made  for  religion,  but  also  of  the  perfect  re- 
ligion for  which  he  was  made,  and  which  was  made 
for  him — realized  and  being  realized  for  him  as  briefly 
set  forth  in  the  creeds  of  the  Church. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

CLASSIFICATION     OF    THE     POSITIVE     (PRE-CHRISTIAN) 
RELIGIONS. 

The  previous  essay  on  the  Method  of  Compara- 
tive Religion  was  written  before  I  had  read  Hegel 
on  this  topic.  It  may,  however,  be  fairly  styled 
Hegelian  in  method  and  spirit.  Hegel  makes  ex- 
tended notice  of  the  various  positive  {bestimmte)  re- 
ligions in  his  Philosophy  of  History,  translated  in 
Bohn's  Library.  In  his  Philosophie  der  Religion  he 
devotes  a  large  part  (Part  II)  to  an  explication  of 
these  religions.  After  having  worked  out  the  general 
idea  {Begriff)  and  content  of  religion  (Part  I),  he  turns 
to  the  study  of  the  various  inadequate  forms  in  which 
this  idea  has  been  embodied.  He  notes  what  part, 
member,  or  moment  of  the  true  idea  of  religion  each 
one  of  the  great  world  religions  embodies — how  each 
one  of  them  dimly  perceives  and  emphasizes  some 
isolated  element  of  the  idea,  or  rather  how  the  idea 
itself  embodies  itself  in  these  inadequate  forms.  His 
method  and  work  have  been  of  the  greatest  value, 
really  the  inspiration  and  guiding  method  of  all  that 
has  recently  been  accomplished  in  the  study  of  re- 
ligions. Moreover,  as  both  Prof.  Max  Muller  and 
Prof.  Sidgwick  affirm,  the  present  predominance  of 
the  historical  method  in  all  departments  is  largely  due 
to  the  influence  of  Hegel.     This  must  not  be  inter- 


234  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

preted  to  mean  that  Hegel  was  merely  an  empiri- 
cist, or  that  his  Science  of  Religion  was  merely  a  Sci- 
ence of  Religions,  but  only  as  abating  the  charge  that 
he  was  wholly  an  a  priori  expositor.  He  first  grasped 
the  fundamental  idea  of  religion  through  the  Chris- 
tian conception  of  it,  then  watched  the  dialectic  pro- 
cess by  which  this  idea  determined  itself  in  various 
forms,  and  illustrated  these  forms  by  their  corre- 
sponding external  or  positive  manifestations. 

The  Science  of  Religicfis  has  gathered  and  classi- 
fied very  much  additional  knowledge  of  these  various 
positive  religions,  which  would  modify  his  use  of  them 
as  illustrations  of  the  vioments  of  the  idea.  This  is  es- 
pecially true  of  the  lower  forms,  or  iViz/wr^-religions, 
while  his  characterization  of  the  Greek,  Jewish,  and 
Roman  religions  remains  wonderfully  significant.  He 
would  have  admitted  that  the  Science  of  Religions 
must  modify  the  descriptive  or  illustrative  portions 
of  the  Science  (Philosophy)  of  Religion,  while  he 
would  deny  that  it  could  change  its  method — i.  e., 
that  of  the  self-explication  of  the  idea  of  religion. 
This  idea  is  absolute,  and  is  itself  a  living  process  of 
self-explication  or  of  organic  development,  entering 
the  world  of  time  and  space  and  embodying  itself  in 
various  historical  forms,  but  always  with  immanent 
finality,  present  in  the  lowest  forms  and  gradually 
advancing  through  more  adequate  ones  till  it  reaches 
that  of  Christianity. 

A  merely  empirical  study  of  the  various  religions, 
tracing  them  back  to  their  historical  origins,  never 
adequately  apprehends  them.  It  is  merely  dealing 
with  the  temporary  and  accidental  elements  of  the 
idea  beneath  which  is  their  true  reality.  This  idea  is 
the  organic  relation  of  God  and  man.     As  Aristotle 


Classification  of  the  Positive  Religions.  235 

long  ago  announced,  the  true  first  cause  is  the  final 
cause  of  each  and  of  all  that  is.  The  idea  is  implicit 
in  and  uses  all  the  merely  empirical  causes  for  its 
own  purpose.  The  historical  origin  is  alwaj^s  itself 
caused  by  the  idea.  Living  thought  is  immanent  in, 
and  truly  causal  of  all,  that  exists  and  develops.  It 
is  not  only  true  that  whatever  is  must  be  transmuted 
into  thought  before  we  can  know  or  understand  it, 
but  it  is  also  true  that  without  thought  was  nothing 
made  and  nothing  exists  that  does  exist. 

The  thought  of  things  is  their  reality.  We  know 
them  when  we  have  brought  them  into  our  system  of 
thought.  The  thought  of  the  architect  is  the  reality 
of  the  cathedral  rather  than  its  stones  and  mortar. 
So,  too,  the  mere  stones  and  mortar — the  wood,  hay, 
and  stubble — that  form  so  large  a  part  of  every  posi- 
tive religion,  including  historical  Christianity,  are  not 
the  real  foundation  or  the  gold,  silver,  and  precious 
stones  which  the  fire  eternal  that  trieth  all  things 
temporal  shall  find  enduring.  The  real  cause  or  ori- 
gin of  all  religions  is  not  the  empirical  antecedents 
and  surroundings  of  its  historical  appearance,  but  the 
idea  {Begriff)  of  religion  itself  in  the  mind  of  the  Abso- 
lute Idea  (Idee).  The  last  in  time  is  first  in  thought, 
the 

one  far-off  divine  event 
To  which  the  whole  creation  moves. 

The  study  of  religions  is  too  often  the  ineffectual 
search  for  their  temporal  sensible  origins.  But  Phi- 
losophy seeks  for  the  origin  of  these  origins,  for  their 
essential  ideal,  vital,  creative  origin  in  thought,  of 
which  they  are  only  moments  or  representations  of 
its  moments.  Thought,  while  identical  with  real  be- 
ing, is   also    prior  to   the   sensible,  positive,  inade- 


236  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

quate  forms  of  real  being.  Temporal  evolution  only 
evolves  the  involved  idea.  The  involved  vital  idea 
the  rather  evolves  itself.  Any  other  conception  of 
evolution  is  both  blindly  fatalistic  and  chaotic.  All 
the  empirical  conditions  of  the  plant  do  not  explain 
its  origin  and  growth.  It  grows  according  to  its  idea. 
Man  may  have  historically  developed  from  lower 
forms  of  sensible  existence — from  protoplasm — but  he 
is  now,  or  rather  is  now  being,  developed  according 
to  his  idea  and  not  according  to  the  idea  of  a  plant  or 
an  animal.  He  is  a  man  "  for  a'  that  and  a'  that,"  and 
not  an  anthropoid  ape.  Thus,  too,  no  form  of  religion 
is  explicable  by  all  the  empirical  origins  and  condi- 
tions that  history  may  discover.  The  history  of  re- 
ligion presupposes  and  finds  the  idea  of  religion 
throughout. 

The  various  positive  religions  are  the  self-posited 
determinations  or  differences  of  one  and  the  same 
idea ;  and  the  Philosophy  of  religion  is  the  Science, 
the  intelligent  recognition  of  the  idea  in  its  various 
self-posited  differences.  The  various  religions  are 
sensible  representations  of  these  different  moments 
of  the  idea.  We  may  say  that  actual,  historical  Chris- 
tianity is  the  sensible,  positive  form  or  illustration  of 
the  absolute  religion.  We  may  decline  to  affirm  that 
historical  Christianity,  as  a  positive  form  of  religion, 
is  identical  with  the  absolute  or  revealed  religion. 
It  is  the  representation  in  positive  form  of  the  abso- 
lute religion.  Its  idea  is  the  idea  of  religion ;  but  in 
no  time  or  place  or  form  has  it  been  identical  with 
it.  This  is  simply  the  Christian  view  of  the  Church 
on  earth  as  being  the  Church  militant,  looking  for- 
ward to  its  final  realization  as  the  Church  triumph- 
ant.    It  is  only  saying  that  the  Christianity  of  men 


Classification  of  the  Positive  Religions.  237 

has  always  been  profoundly  inferior  to  the  Chris- 
tianity of  Christ.  The  Christianity  of  any  age,  of 
any  sect,  of  the  Catholic  Church  of  all  ages,  is  inade- 
quate to  its  idea.  In  idea  it  is  the  absolute,  the  revealed^ 
the  ultimate  religion.  In  its  actual  realization  of  its 
idea,  it  is  still  seen  in  the  process  of  development, 
with  all  the  distortions  and  limitations  which  all  his- 
torical development  implies. 

So  it  may  be  said  of  the  various  positive  religions. 
They  are  not  only  inadequate  to  the  idea,  but  they  are 
also  inadequate  representations  of  the  subordinate 
phases  or  moments  of  the  idea  which  they  illustrate. 
The  method  of  the  self-explicating  idea  is  an  illumi- 
nating, revealing  torch  that  we  may  carry  with  us  as 
we  dig  among  the  ruins  of  antique  religions.  It  is  a 
key  to  their  ciphers  that  renders  them  intelligible. 
The  thought  of  God  and  of  man's  relation  to  him  is 
the  soul  and  key  of  all  religion.  Christianity  is  ulti- 
mate and  absolute  in  its  idea  of  real  organic  union 
between  Personality  and  personalities,  and  thus  be- 
comes the  standard  of  comparison  by  which  to  meas- 
ure and  grade  the  phase  of  truth  and  error  in  all 
others.  This  standard  of  comparison  is  the  idea  of 
Christianity,  and  not  its  actual,  positive  manifestation 
in  either  Romanism  or  Protestantism.  There  have 
been  phases  of  both  these  positive  forms  so  very  in- 
adequate to  the  idea  of  religion  as  to  repel  wise  men 
from  the  East  in  quest  of  a  nobler  religion  than  their 
own.  Thus  it  has  been  possible  for  an  educated  man 
to  write,  "  Why  I  am  a  Buddhist,  and  not  a  Chris- 
tian." Thus  it  has  been  possible  for  Japanese  study- 
ing Christianity  in  London  to  return  home  and  ad- 
vise against  its  adoption,  because  inferior  to  Bud- 
dhism in  good  works.    But  the  Christianity  of  Christ 


238  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

is  sublimely  superior  to  that  of  men.  It  is  the  idea  of 
Christianity  that  is  absolute  and  ultimate,  and  so  the 
standard  of  comparison. 

There  are  different  methods  used  in  the  study  of 
religions  to-day.  There  are  two  correct  methods, 
the  historical  and  the  philosophical,  and  two  false  ones 
which  are  perversions  of  the  true  ones.  Mere  empiri- 
cism is  the  exaggeration  and  caricature  of  the  histori- 
cal, and  abstract  ideology  of  t\iQ  philosophical  method.* 

The  empirical  method  studies  religions  as  a  branch 
of  natural  history  of  human  weakness.  It  compiles 
masses  of  information  as  to  the  positive  forms  that 
religion  has  assumed  in  cultus,  dogma,  and  practice 
at  different  times  and  places.  It  tries  to  get  back  to  an 
<7r-religion,  and  trace  the  growth  of  the  human  mind 
to  ;w-religion  as  a  progress  into  freedom.  This  is  a 
perversion  of  the  historical  method,  which  also  starts 
from  the  phenomena  of  religion,  but  seeks  to  trace 
through  them  both  an  intellectual  and  moral  progress. 

No  human  institution  ever  dropped  ready  made 
from  heaven.  Everything  has  grown,  developed. 
Even  the  Ten  Commandments  had  a  history,  and  there 
were  \i\s,tor\c?X  preparationes  evangeliccB  for  the  advent 
of  Christ.  The  various  stages  of  the  growth  and 
development  of  religion  are  searched  out,  and  the 
successive  environments  which  have  coaxed  or  forced 
the  rude  germ  into  higher  forms  are  noted.  One 
phase  is  compared  with  another.  Goethe's  famous 
maxim  as  to  languages  is  appropriated,  and  reads, 
"  He  who  knows  one  religion  only,  knows  none." 
Each  is  related  to  the  others — springs  out  of  them 
either  by  force  of  kinship  or  of  hostility : 

*  Cf.  Bluntschli,  Theory  of  the  State,  p.  5. 


Classification  of  the  Positive  Religions.  239 

All  are  needed  by  each  one, 
Nothing  is  fair  or  good  alone. 

Too  often  the  historical  method  contemplates  all 
creeds,  and  holds  none ;  but  often  it  is  thoroughly 
penetrated  by  the  philosophical  method,  and  becomes 
its  supplementing-  and  correcting  handmaid. 

On  the  other  hand,  abstract  ideology,  a  priori 
theory,  doctrinaire  conceptions  scorn  the  empirical 
and  historical  and  evolve  all  from  within.  They  only 
ape  while  caricaturing  the  philosophical  method. 

This  true  method  seeks  the  real,  the  rational  in  the 
actual.  The  ideal  side,  the  moral  and  spiritual  life 
of  the  positive  historical  forms,  engages  its  attention. 
It  is  concrete  thinking,  uniting  together  ideas  and 
facts.  It  looks  before  and  after,  and  seeks  the  indis- 
soluble organism  of  thought,  the  Logic  of  all  life.  It 
can  not  move  without  history.  But  it  gives  history 
its  philosophy.  It  interprets  facts  and  history,  but 
is  not  overwhelmed  by  the  mere  mass,  nor  confused 
by  the  manifold  complexity  that  these  afford. 

Such  is  the  method  of  Hegel  in  his  study  of  the 
Positive  religions.  Having  tried  to  comprehend  the 
idea  of  religion  and  its  necessity,  he  proceeds  to  in- 
terpret the  mass  of  information  gathered  by  em- 
piricism and  the  historical  method,  in  the  light  of 
this  living,  self-differentiating,  and  self-unifying  idea. 
He  follows  the  history  of  religion  as  the  vital  organic 
evolution  of  the  idea  in  positive  forms,  asking  what 
element  of  religion  each  religion  represents,  in  order 
to  give  to  each  one  its  comparative  philosophic  con- 
tent. The  idea  of  religion  as  the  reciprocal  com- 
munion of  God  and  man  may  be  viewed  from  either 
side.    On  the  oiie  side,  we  have  men  so  created  by  God 


240  Philosophy  of  Religi07i. 

"  that  they  should  seek  the  Lord,  if  haply  they  might 
feel  after  him  and  find  him,  though  he  be  not  far 
from  every  one  "  of  his  offspring.  On  the  other 
hand,  we  have  God  seeking  men,  loving  and  coming 
"  unto  his  own,"  lightening  "  every  man,"  pleading 
with  men,  laboring  with  the  might  of  omnipotent 
love  to  bind  his  children  in  organic  union  with  him- 
self. On  the  one  hand,  we  have  man  seeking  to  find 
his  true  self  in  God,  to  become  complete  in  him ;  to 
come  to  the  full,  self-conscious  personality  of  a  son 
of  God.  On  the  other  hand,  we  have  God  seeking 
to  find  himself,  to  realize  himself,  to  complete  his 
self-consciousness  by  reconciling  men  unto  himself, 
that  he  "  may  be  all  in  all."  Religion  is  thus  God's 
effort  to  reveal  himself  to  men  so  as  to  win  them  to 
himself  in  love,  and  man's  effort  to  receive  and  live 
by  this  revelation. 

This  gives  the  essential  basis  for  the  classification 
of  all  forms  of  religion.  Ask  of  each  one  as  we  find 
it  in  history,  how  has  God  been  able  to  reveal  himself 
to  men  through  it,  and  how  has  it  enabled  men  to  ap- 
proach, love,  honor,  and  obey  God  ?  How  has  each 
one  realized  this  idea  of  religion  ?  What  conception 
of  God  does  each  one  supply  ?  And  then,  is  there- 
traceable  through  them  all  a  progressively  more  ade- 
quate conception  of  God  and  realization  of  the  zdea  of 
religion  ?  Is  there  an  organic  development  of  the 
manifestations  of  the  idea,  corresponding  to  the  in- 
herent essential  phases  of  the  idea  itself  ?  Is  there  a 
common  element  or  life  running  through  them  all, 
from  the  lowest  to  the  highest,  ever  dying  to  old  con- 
ceptions to  live  in  new  and  higher  ones,  until  Chris- 
tianity appears  as  the  manifestation  of  the  full  con- 
tent of  the  idea,  the  manifestation  of  the  Absolute  re- 


Classification  of  the  Positive  Religions.  241 

ligion  that  absorbs,  annuls  in  fulfilling  and  transcend- 
ing all  the  partial  attempts  of  God  and  man  at  living, 
loving,  organic  and  eternal  union  ?  All  these  ques- 
tions Hegel  would  undoubtedly  answer  in  the  affirm- 
ative. His  conception  of  religion  demands  it,  and 
his  treatment  of  religions  implies  it. 

Before  giving  his  classification  of  religions  I 
wish  to  note  (i)  some  implicit  corollaries ;  and  (2) 
some  other  classifications  of  the  religions  of  the 
world  : 

I.  A  history  of  religions  is  the  necessary  subject- 
matter  of  a  philosophy  of  religion,  and  a  philosophy 
of  religion  is  necessary  for  any  Science  of  Compara- 
tive Religions.  Religion  is  as  old  as  man  qua  man. 
It  is  an  implicit,  essential  part  of  his  nature.  It 
assumes  local  and  temporary  forms ;  is  modified  by 
climate,  geography,  and  race.  It  is  sometimes  allied 
with  the  most  inhuman  barbarities,  and  sometimes 
with  transcendent  ethical  life.  Philosophy  interprets 
the  religion  there  is  in  all  these  diverse  manifesta- 
tions. It  measures  their,  content  by  the  idea  of  re- 
ligion. The  Science  of  comparative  religion  can  not 
move  a  step  without  the  aid  of  Philosophy.  It  tells 
Science  what  phenomena  are  religious,  gives  the 
standard  of  comparison,  and  helps  to  interpret  and 
classify  them.  It  is  to  this  science  what  mathematics 
is  to  astronomy,  making  it  to  be  more  than  a  mere 
mnemonic  tabulation  of  religious  phenomena.  It 
really  gives  to  the  current  theory  of  evolution  the 
imperfect  method  which  it  uses.  It  contributes 
the  idea  of  organic  development,  which  evolution, 
however,  uses  in  an  empirical  and  mechanical  way. 
For  this  follows  at  best  the  analogy  of  a  physical 
organism  even    in  its  study  of  spiritual  organisms. 


242  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

It  debases  the  spiritual  necessity  of  self-determina- 
tion to  the  physical  necessity  of  external  compul- 
sion, and  thus  vitiates  all  its  results.  Such  is  the 
central  vice  of  the  method  used  by  Spencer  and  the 
whole  school,  in  the  study  of  man,  social,  ethical,  and 
religious.  The  doctrine  of  Evolution  is  no  longer  in 
the  air.  It  is  in  everything.  It  has  come,  seen,  and 
conquered  large  realms  of  knowledge,  and  has  come 
to  stay.  It  has  come  to  modify  many  traditional 
conceptions  of  God,  man,  and  the  world.  Hence  the 
need  that  it  be  rightly  conceived  and  applied. 

Spencer's  evolution  may  well  be  styled  Hegel's 
philosophy  turned  upside  down,  or  an  inverted  pyra- 
mid. Hegel  starts  from  spirit  and  traces  its  movement 
away  from  and  back  to  itself  throughout  creation. 
Spencer  starts  from  the  matter  or  force  unknowable, 
but  is  forced  onward  in  ever-increasing  nearness  to 
spirit.  But  he  is  always  cramped  and  confined  by 
his  non-spiritual  starting-point,  and  never  raises  man 
above  the  form  of  the  sphinx — half  brute,  half  human 
— spirit  struggling  to  tear  itself  loose  from  nature 
without  more  than  partially  succeeding.  In  the  study 
of  religions  his  school  agrees  with  Heraclitus  that 
"  Religion  is  a  disease,  though  a  noble  disease."  It 
finds  religion  at  the  cradle  of  every  nation,  and  agnos- 
tic philosophy  at  its  grave.  Hegel  finds  religion  as 
essential  to  man  as  man.  No  religion,  no  man — mere 
brute.  Perfect  religion,  perfect  man  —  the  Son  of 
God.  Between  these  two  are  the  diverse  forms  of 
religion  in  organic  relation,  culminating  in  the  incar- 
nation as  the  manifestation  of  the  idea  of  absolute 
and  perfect  religion.  There  is  a  progressive  reve- 
lation, and  a  progressive  reception  of  it,  and  not  a 
mere  progress  out  of  religion. 


Classificati07i  of  the  Positive  Religions.  243 

Such  a  philosophic  conception  is  necessary  to  be- 
get that  true,  tolerant,  and  sympathetic  study  of  the 
lowest  forms  of  religion.  This  tolerance  springs  from 
confidence  in  spirit  working  everywhere  to  its  ulti- 
mate self-conscious  realization.  It  does  not  fault  the 
seed  because  it  is  not  the  tree,  or  the  uncomely  parts 
of  the  body  because  they  are  not  the  comely  parts. 
It  seeks  to  recognize  the  place  and  worth  of  each 
element  of  the  spiritual  idea  struggling  back  to  spirit, 
person  to  Person.  A  famous  utterance  of  Lincoln  may 
justly  be  adapted  so  as  to  characterize  Hegel's  spirit 
in  the  study  of  religions  :  "  With  malice  toward  none, 
with  charity  toward  all,  with  firmness  in  the  right  as 
God  gives  us  to  see  the  right,  let  us  strive  "  to  gather 
up  and  synthesize  the  element  of  truth  in  every  relig- 
ion, in  the  unity  of  the  Holy  Spirit  and  in  the  bonds  of 
peace.  He  who  knows  but  one  religion,  knows  none ; 
and  he  who  knows  the  ultimate  one  rightly,  knows 
all  others  as  absorbed,  annulled,  transmuted,  con- 
stituent elements  of  it.  So  to  study  them  is  to  find 
them  convincing  evidences  of  Christianity,  evidences 
of  that  Power  which  is  not,  and  which  is,  ourselves 
working  throughout  the  ages  to  reveal  and  realize 
our  divine  kinship — sonship.  This  is  "the  mystery 
which  in  other  ages  was  not  fully  made  known  to  the 
sons  of  men."  Only  in  "  the  fullness  of  times  "  are  all 
things  seen  to  be  gathered  together  in  one  in  Christ, 
and  Gentiles  recognized  as  fellow-heirs  and  of  the 
same  body. 

No  need,  then,  to  depress  pre-Christian  religions 
in  order  to  exalt  Christianity.  No  need  to  mini- 
mize the  light  which  lighteth  every  man.  No  need 
to  fear  to  recognize  "  every  good  gift  and  every 
perfect  gift  as  from  above."     No  need  to  fault  Justin 


244  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Martyr  for  attributing  inspiration  to  the  Sibyl,  or 
Clement  of  Alexandria  for  drawing  no  distinction 
in  kind  between  the  inspiration  of  the  sacred  writers 
and  that  which  he  believed  to  have  been  imparted  to 
the  great  Greek  philosophers.  No  need  to  decline 
to  see  the  testimonium  animcs  Jiattiralitcr  Christianice 
in  the  great  and  good  of  all  religions.  No  need  to 
deny  the  "  light  that  shineth  in  a  dark  place,  until 
the  day  dawn  and  the  day-star  arise."  Better  say, 
with  Clement  and  Origen,  that  the  night  of  paganism 
had  its  stars  to  light  it,  and  that  they  called  to  the 
morning  star  that  stood  over  Bethlehem  ;  that  God 
has  never  forsaken  or  ceased  to  be  the  God  of  the 
heathen.  No  need  to  use  the  theological  fiction  of 
a  primitive,  supernatural,  and  perfect  revelation  of 
which  all  forms  of  paganism  are  but  the  corruptions. 
Such  a  theory  is  not  only  without  biblical  founda- 
tion, but  is  also  disproved  by  all  the  results  of  his- 
torical and  scientific  study,  as  well  as  being  a  priori 
unlikely.  It  assumes  that  man  was  naturally  un-re- 
ligious,  and  that  religion  must  be  implanted,  ready- 
made,  and  perfect  from  without.  As  well  assume 
that  language  and  art  and  science  and  social  institu- 
tions were  thus  imparted  by  a  primitive  revelation. 
Better  say  that  man  is  by  nature  religious,  seeking 
after  the  Lord  as  the  Lord  seeks  after  him.  No  need 
to  make  the  Jews  the  only  nation  not  forsaken  by  the 
Lord.  Grant  them  all  their  special  privileges  and 
attainments,  but  do  not  refuse  to  recognize  the  divine 
training  of  other  nations  for  the  advent  of  the  perfect 
religion  to  fulfill  all  things — Jewish  and  Gentile — in 
the  fullness  of  times.  Study  them  all  as  "  landmarks 
on  the  road  humanity  has  followed  in  its  return  to 
God  who  awaits  it — rather  let  us  say  to  the  God  who 


Classificatio7i  of  the  Positive  Religi07is,  245 

comes  to  meet  it."  *  History  and  science,  as  well  as 
philosophy,  emphasize  the  essential  unity  and  soli- 
darity of  the  religious  consciousness  in  man.  The 
formations  of  the  great  religions  of  the  world  repre- 
sent great  crises  of  religious  experience — the  work 
of  Infinite  love  and  patience  being  continually  tried 
by  the  failure  to  fully  reveal  itself  in  winsome  form 
to  its  own  offspring  : 

They  are  but  broken  lights  of  thee, 
And  thou,  O  Lord,  art  more  than  they. 

The  Divine  Spirit,  the  great  Oversoul,  has  always 
borne  witness  in  the  under-souls  of  all  flesh.  To  deny 
this  seems  to  be  as  positive  atheism  and  inhumanity 
as  the  dead  ancestor  or  ghost  theory  of  the  origin  of 
religion. 

As  opposed  to  the  false,  unscientific  views  spring- 
ing from  the  theological  bias,  the  eighteenth-century 
rationalists  had  also  their  false  and  unscientific  theory 
and  classification.  They  abstracted  some  supposed 
rational  truths  from  concrete  religious  phenomena 
and  labeled  them  natural  religion.  All  else  they  de- 
cried as  superstition  or  the  invention  and  tool  of 
priestcraft  and  statecraft.  This  was  later  followed 
by  another  reaction  against  the  theological  classifica- 
tion into  true  and  false  religions,  and  all  religions 
were  regarded  as  equally  true.  Similarities  and  re- 
semblances were  sought  for  and  diversities  ignored. 
Sacred  anthologies  were  made  from  the  ethnic  Bibles 
to  show  that  all  religions  were  nearly  equally  good — 
Jehovah,  Jove,  and  Lord,  were  different  names  for  the 
same  God.     Happily,  all  these  unscientific  views  and 

*Pressense,  The  Religions  before  Christ,  p.  13. 


246  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

classifications  are  now  effete.  One  would  as  soon 
think  of  classifying  nations  or  languages  as  true  and 
false  or  as  natural  and  unnatural  or  as  all  equally 
good. 

Hegel  has  thus  censured  this  last  view :  "  In 
every  religion  there  is  a  Divine  presence,  a  Divine 
relation  ;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  because  it  is  a 
religion  it  is  wholly  good.  We  must  not  fall  into  the 
lax  conception  that  the  content  is  of  no  importance, 
but  only  the  form  "  (Philosophy  of  History,  p.  204). 

2.  All  modern  classifications  of  religions  may  be 
termed  Jiistorico-scientific,  largely  leavened  with  the 
philosophical  element.  Max  Miiller  contends  for  the 
ethnological  classification,  following  that  of  language, 
into  the  Aryan,  Semitic,  and  Turanian.  Prof.  A.  Re- 
ville  adopts  the  severely  criticised  classification  of 
PolytJieistic  and  Monotheistic,  including  under  the  first 
all  but  Judaism,  Christianity,  and  Islamism  (History 
of  Religions,  p.  98).  Prof.  J.  Freeman  Clarke  follows 
the  classification  of  religions  into  that  of  Tribal,  Eth- 
nic, and  Catholic.  Prof.  Kuenen  confines  his  attention 
to  National  {Ethnic)  and  Universal  {Catholic)  (The  Hib- 
bert  Lecture,  1882,  p.  3). 

Prof.  W.  D.  Whitney  classifies  them  into  National 
and  Individual,  or  race  religions  and  those  proceeding 
from  an  individual  founder.  The  principle  of  the 
one  is  nature,  that  of  the  other  is  ethics.  The  former 
are  generally  local  and  the  latter  catholic.  By  all 
students  there  is  an  effort  to  give  a  morphological  cX^.^- 
sification.  Prof.  Pfleiderer  gives  the  classification  into 
(i)  Naturistic,  Ethnic,  and  Catholic.  Prof.  C.  P.  Tiele 
includes  all  under  the  same  morphological  classifica- 
tion as  Prof.  Whitney — i.  e.,  Nature  religions  and 
^MzV^/ (Individual)  religions,  though  previously  pro- 


Classification  of  the  Positive  Religions.  247 

posing  and  using-  the  following  classification  :  {a)  An- 
imism ;  ip)  Polytheistic  national  religions  ;  {c)  Nomis- 
tic  religions,  founded  on  a  law  or  sacred  writings  ; 
and  {d)  Universal  or  world  religions  which  start  from 
principles  and  maxims.* 

From  all  these  we  may  generalize  the  following  as 
the  accepted  Jiistorico-scientific  classification  of  relig- 
ions. It  leaves  the  primitive  C/;r-religion  to  psychol- 
ogy and  philosophy  to  determine.  That  is /rr-histor- 
ic.  (i)  Nattirism,  including  animism,  fcticJiism ;  (2) 
Tribal ;  (3)  Ethnic  ;  and  (4)  Catholic  religions.  In  no 
department  has  the  modern  historical  method  been 
more  faithfully,  ardently,  and  resultfuUy  applied  than 
to  this  study  of  religions.  With  glad  mind  and  heart 
have  its  students  found  this  study  of  man  in  his  re- 
ligious activity  the  most  intensely  interesting  and  re- 
warding. Man  is  by  nature  a  religious  being.  Such 
is  the  verdict  of  its  research.  Starting  as  mere  em- 
pirical positivism,  collecting  and  tabulating  religious 
phenomena,  the  Science  of  Religions  has  come  to  find 
a  vital  current  throbbing  organically  throughout  the 
essential  unity  and  solidarity  of  the  religious  con- 
sciousness of  man.  It  has  found,  like  all  other  sci- 
ences of  human  activity,  that  it  can  not  tarry  in  the 
realm  of  mere  physics  ;  that  its  physics  implies  a  met- 
aphysics ;  that  there  is  everywhere  present  a  differ- 
entiating and  synthesizing  tinivcrsal,  which  both  cre- 
ates and  interprets  the  mass  of  particular  religious 
phenomena.  In  other  words,  it  finds  religion  as  the 
union  of  man  and  God  to  be  an  organic  development, 
member   bound  to  member,  each  stage    containing 

*  Cf.  Tide's  History  of  Religions  and  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  arti- 
cle Religion. 


248  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

while  annulling  and  transforming  the  lower  and  less 
perfect  ones,  and  all  living  realized  and  contained  as 
organic  members  in  the  ultimate  and  true  religion — 
that  is,  each  and  all  are  viewed  in  the  light  of  the 
fundamental  idea  of  religion,  and  this  means  that  the 
Science  of  Religions  has  unavoidably  been  led  to  rec- 
ognize that  it  is  really  the  philosophy  of  religion  that 
has  been  inspiring  and  guiding  its  study  to  its  richest 
results.  Thus,  the  historical  process  of  religion,  its 
evolution  in  historical  conditions,  is  seen  to  be  a 
process  of  thought,  an  unfolding,  self-explication  of 
the  idea  of  religion. 

This  brings  us  to  Hegel's  philosophico-scientific  clas- 
sification which  he  gives  in  the  division  {Einthcilung)  of 
the  positive  religions.*  This  classification  begins  with 
the  idea  of  religion  and  follows  the  logical  develop- 
ment of  this  idea  as  illustrated  and  manifested  in  the 
positive  religions,  each  one  being  recognized  as  a  mo- 
ment or  element  of  the  idea  itself.  All  other  classi- 
fications are  external  and  mechanical.  This  classifi- 
cation is  the  movement,  the  act  itself  of  thought,  of 
the  idea  which  differentiates  and  reunites  its  differ- 
ences in  their  organic  unity.  It  is,  indeed,  only  be- 
cause any  one  religion  is  a  difference,  a  member  of  a 
unity,  that  it  can  be  classified.  If  it  has  nothing  in 
common  with  other  religions,  if  it  is  a  difference  out- 
side of  religion,  if  it  is  totally  a  false  religion,  then  it 
is  an  ottteast  from  all  classification.  Every  religion 
included  in  the  classification  must  realize  and  express, 
however  faintly,  the  idea  of  religion.  Religion  is  the 
mutual  relationing  of  God  and  man.  The  idea  of  God 
is  fundamental  and  fontal.    Reconciliation  or  vital  re- 

*  Philosopliie  der  Religion,  vol.  i,  pp.  255-262. 


Classification  of  the  Positive  Religions.  249 

lationship  is  the  motive  of  all  religions,  with  how- 
ever much  extraneous  matter  this  central  motive 
may  be  allied.  Each  one  is  a  specialization,  a  more 
or  less  imperfect  manifestation  of  the  idea  of  religion, 
which  is  only  finally  and  fully  realized  in  Christian- 
ity. Christianity  is  the  true  and  perfect  religion,  not 
because  it  excludes  all  others,  but  because  it  includes 
them.  It  came  to  destroy  by  fulfilling  them  all — by 
filling  up  their  poor  little  conceptions  with  the  full- 
ness of  the  truth. 

The  lowest  savage  is  a  man.  He  manifests  the 
idea  of  man.  The  idea  is  in  him,  making  him  as 
much  of  a  man  as  he  is ;  but  he  is  not  perfect  man, 
not  the  fully  manifested  idea  of  man.  Only  in  the 
God-man  is  the  idea  of  man  and  of  religion  fully 
realized.  At  first  man  is  only  implicitly  man,  and 
religion  is  only  implicitly  religion,  according  to  its 
idea.  It  is  of  the  earth  earthy.  The  implicit,  un- 
developed form  of  the  idea  is  like  all  undeveloped  or- 
ganisms— homogenous.  Hence  the  lowest  form  of 
religion  is  that  of  nature-religion.  Here  the  conscious- 
ness has  not  yet  distinguished  its  object  from  its  sen- 
suous self.  The  object  is  immediate  and  identical  with 
its  sensuous  self.  The  manifold  indeterminate  objects 
of  nature  are  worshiped.  The  subject  has  not  yet  dis- 
tinguished himself  from  his  own  sensuous  existence. 
When  this  step  is  taken,  when  the  idea  enters  its  first 
stage  of  differentiation,  the  subject  also  distinguishes 
the  essence  of  nature  from  its  sensuous  form.  God 
becomes  transcendent.  Hegel  thus  makes  the  dis- 
tinction between  w^/z^r^-religions  and  the  religion  of 
spiritual  individuality  the  center  of  his  classification. 
Otherwise  stated,  this  distinction  is  that  of  substan- 
tiality and  subjectivity  in  God.     He  distinguishes  all 


250  Philosophy  of  Religion, 

pre-Christian  religions  by  this  antithesis  (i)  Nature- 
religions  and  (2)  Religions  of  spiritual  individuality,  be- 
tween which  he  places  a  class  of  religions  ift  transition 
to  spiritual  individuality. 

I.  Nature-religions  comprise  : 

{a.)  Immediate  sensuous  religion,  the  magic  and 
witchcraft  of  savages. 

{b.)  The  disruption  of  the  religious  consciousness 
in  itself.  Here  the  subject  still  considers  himself  as 
a  natural  sensuous  existence,  but  opposes  to  himself 
a  substance  or  essence  of  nature.  He  is  nothing : 
nature  as  substance  is  all.  But  this  implied  eleva- 
tion above  the  merely  natural  is  not  fully  developed. 
Consequently,  we  have  a  mingling  of  the  natural  and 
spiritual,  as  seen  in — 

{a')  The  religion  of  measure  of  temperate  conduct, 
secular  life — the  Chinese. 

{b'.)  The  Religion  of  Phantasy,  of  inebriate  dream- 
life — Brahmanism.  This  is  a  pantheism  of  imagina- 
tion rather  than  of  thought.  This  leads  to  universal 
deification  of  the  objects  of  nature.  Its  mythology  is 
a  wild  extravagance  of  fancy.  Brahm  is  anything 
and  everything  and  nothing. 

{c'.)  The  religion  of  Being-in-itself,  or  of  self-involve- 
ment. The  all  is  nothing,  and  man  must  make  him- 
self nothing  by  his  own  might  in  order  to  become 
this  all,  this  nothingness.  Buddhism  is  the  return  of 
the  negative  spirit  upon  itself.  The  man  Buddha  is 
its  ideal  and  becomes  its  God  in  place  of  the  essence 
of  external  nature,  the  Substance  of  Brahmanism  ;  but 
it  is  the  Buddha  who  has  universalized  himself  into 
that  quiescence  which  can  only  come  when  all  indi- 
vidual desires  and  aims  and  the  thralldom  of  things 
of  time  and  sense  are  renounced  as  evil. 


Classificati07t  of  the  Positive  Religions.  251 

(r.)  This  contest  between  the  natural  and  the  spir- 
itual leads  to  the  contest  of  subjectivity.  Pantheism 
is  falling  before  the  increasing  consciousness  of  the 
individual.  Yet  the  spirit  has  not  yet  subjugated  the 
natural. 

Under  this  we  have  three  forms : 

{p!^  Parseeism,  the  religion  of  the  Persians.  This 
is  dualism,  or  the  antithesis  of  light  and  darkness.  Its 
god  has  yet  the  form  of  a  natural  object,  or  rather  of 
a  formless  object — Light.  The  principle  of  this  tran- 
sition is  that  the  Universal  Essence  which  we  recos:- 
nized  in  Brahm  now  becomes  perceptible  to  con- 
sciousness and  acquires  a  positive  import  for  man. 
Man,  too,  becomes  free,  separate  from  the  universal, 
though  a  partaker  in  that  essence ;  but  darkness  is 
yet  a  felt  power  warring  against  the  good  and  to  be 
warred  against  by  men.  The  world  has  not  yet  been 
reduced  to  unity ;  but  the  conflict  has  begun,  and 
with  this  begins  strictly  the  world-history  which  is 
to  culminate  in  perfect  freedom.  "  In  contrast  with 
the  wretched  hebetude  of  spirit  which  we  find  among 
the  Hindoos,  an  exhilaration  of  spirit  meets  us  in  the 
Persian  conception."  Spirit  emerges  from  its  substan- 
tial unity  with  nature  as  found  among  the  Hindoos. 

{b'>j  The  religion  of  Pain — that  of  the  Phoenicians 
and  Syrians. 

(^'.)  The  religion  of  Enigma — the  Egyptian.  He- 
gel regards  the  Sphinx  as  the  symbol  of  the  Egyp- 
tian spirit.  Spirit  has  still,  as  it  were,  an  iron  band 
around  its  forehead.  It  does  not  attain  to  free  con- 
sciousness of  its  existence.  This  is  its  problem,  its 
enigma.  But  in  its  doctrine  of  immortality,  which 
first  appeared  among  the  Egyptians,  is  involved  the 
inherent  infinitude  of  spirit. 
23 


252  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

II.  Religions  of  freedom,  or  of  spiritual  individual- 
ity. These  rise  above  nature  in  the  thought  of  a 
Final  Cause  : 

(«.)  Of  the  absolute  might  and  wisdom  of  the  one 
God,  who  made  nature,  and  consecrated  from  among 
the  nations  one  to  his  exclusive  service.  Among  the 
Jews  we  find  the  spiritual  entirely  purified  and  freed 
from  nature ;  the  pure  product  of  thought.  This 
forms  the  separation  between  the  East  and  the  West. 
We  pass  clear  from  Substance  to  Subject.  "  Spirit 
descends  into  the  depths  of  its  own  being,  and  recog- 
nizes the  abstract  fundamental  principle  as  the  Spir- 
itual. Nature  is  now  depressed  to  the  condition  of  a 
mere  creature,  and  Spirit  now  for  the  first  time  oc- 
cupies the  chief  place.  God  is  known  as  the  Creator 
of  all  men,  as  he  is  of  all  nature,  and  as  Absolute 
Causality."*  Spirit  is  all,  nature  is  merely  external 
and  undivine.  Spirit,  which  had  hitherto  been  dis- 
honored, here  first  attains  its  due  dignity.  But,  like 
all  protestantism,  it  goes  too  far.  "  Nature  is  undei- 
fied,  but  not  yet  understood."  At  a  more  advanced 
stage  only  can  the  Idea  recognize  itself  in  this  alien 
form  of  nature.  But  true  rriorality  and  righteous- 
ness now  for  the  first  time  make  their  appearance. 
And  yet  the  severe  religious  ceremonial  hampers 
the  concrete  freedom  of  the  individual.  Absolute 
Spirit  is  not  yet  fully  revealed,  and  hence  concrete 
individual  personality  can  not  fully  realize  itself  in 
the  Absolute.  Hence  the  lack  of  a  belief  in  the  im- 
mortality of  the  soul.  It  is  the  patriarchal  family, 
the  nation,  which  is  of  substantial  and  imperishable 
worth. 

*  Philosophy  of  History,  p.  203. 


Classificatio7i  of  the  Positive  Religions.  253 

((^.)  The  religion  of  the  free  cultivation  of  individ- 
ual perfection — that  of  the  Greeks. 

(r.)  The  religion  of  universal  political  dominion — 
that  of  the  Romans. 

Hegel  also  characterizes  these  three  thus :  {a>^ 
The  Jewish — the  religion  of  sublimity,  {b^j  The 
Greek — the  religion  of  Beauty,  (r.)  The  Roman — 
the  religion  of  prosaic  conformity  to  an  end.  "  The 
prose  of  life  appears  here." 

The  study  of  religions  since  Hegel's  day  undoubt- 
edly compels  considerable  change  to  be  made  in  the 
characterization  that  Hegel  gives  of  some  of  them. 
But  it  does  not  change  or  invalidate  the  method, 
which  can  readily  adapt  itself  to  any  amount  of  new 
information  as  to  religious  phenomena.  The  idea 
passes  through  these  phases,  and  is  indifferent  as  to 
just  what  one  religion  shall  represent  any  one  phase. 
They  are  all  inadequate  to  the  idea.  They  are  all 
false  so  far  as  they  claimed  finality,  and  all  true  so  far 
as  they  embodied  and  illustrated  any  phase  of  the 
idea.  They  failed  and  died,  as  everything  imperfect 
must;  but  in  and  through  them  the  human  spirit 
had  been  educated  beyond  them,  and  prepared  for 
the  full  revelation  of  Absolute  Concrete  Spirit  in — 

III.  The  Christian  religion,  in  which  the  idea  at- 
tains its  adequate  reality.  This  is  the  last,  the  high- 
est, the  ultimate,  the  religion  of  the  perfect  at-one- 
ment  of  the  human  spirit  with  the  Absolute  Spirit. 
It  is  the  religion  of  truth,  because  in  it  spirit  has 
spirit  for  its  object.  It  is  the  religion  of  freedom,  be- 
cause in  it  the  "  other "  of  both  God  and  man  has 
been  transformed  into  phases  of  self-consciousness. 
Through  the  incarnation  in  Jesus  Christ  the  union  of 
the  Divine  and  human  spirit  has  been  accomplished, 


254  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

the  goal  of  creation  attained.  God  is  recognized  as 
concrete  personal  Spirit,  only  when  he  is  known  as 
triune.  "  This  new  principle  is  the  axis  on  which  the 
history  of  the  world  turns.  This  is  the  goal  and  the 
starting-point  of  history."  But  this  only  appears 
"  when  the  fullness  of  the  time  was  come  "  (Gal.  iv,  4). 
The  mystery  of  preceding  stages  was  now  "  made 
known  unto  the  sons  of  men  that  in  the  fullness  of 
times  he  might  gather  together  in  one  all  things  in 
Christ,  both  which  are  in  heaven  and  which  are  on 
earth,  and  that  the  Gentiles  should  be  fellow-heirs 
in  the  same  body  "  (Eph.  i,  10,  and  iii,  5,  6).  Thus 
Christianity,  as  the  Absolute  and  the  Revealed  relig- 
ion, is  the  truth  of  all  which  preceded  it,  and  in  vital 
organic  relation  with  them.  Such  is  the  conception 
of  Hegel.  He  first*  attempted  this  unification  of  all 
religious  phenomena  in  history,  and  a  permeation  of 
them  by  one  principle  and  one  method.  However 
much,  1  have  already  said,  his  characterization  of  va- 
rious religions  as  illustrations  or  manifestations  of 
phases  of  the  one  essential,  vital  idea  may  have  to  be 
corrected  by  new  information  as  to  the  history  of 
these  religions,  his  method  and  principle  seem  to  be 
ultimate. 

Christianity  contains  the  fully  developed  and  S}^- 
thesized  elements  of  truth  of  all  preceding  religions. 
Not  one  of  them  was  absolutely  false.  All  were  in- 
complete— some  as  rudimentary  as  the  lowest  form 
of  organic  matter  is  compared  with  man.  All  had 
their  roots  in  the  needs  of  humanity  estranged  from 
God,  yet  seeking  after  him  who  has  never  been  far 

*  Puenjer  says  that  Hegel's  is  the  first  complete  system  of  a  philoso- 
phy of  religion  (History  of  Christian  Philosophy  of  Religion,  p,  2). 


Classification  of  the  Positive  Religions.  255 

from  every  one  in  seeking  after  them.  All  have 
contributed  to  the  education  of  the  race,  though 
often  temporarily  contributing  to  the  degradation  of 
some  parts  of  it.  It  is  not  necessary  to  overlook  this 
debasing  side  of  religion,  when  allied  with  crime, 
war,  persecution,  sensuality,  and  arrogance.*  And 
it  is  necessary  to  pronounce  all  imperfect  ones  false 
when  they  arrogate  perfection  to  themselves.  But 
it  is  also  necessary  to  seek  for  the  vital  kernel  that 
animates  them  both  for  good  and  evil,  to  discover 
the  living  root  whence  they  have  sprung,  whose  dis- 
tortion forms  their  evil ;  to  find  the  phase  of  the 
idea  of  religion  that  they  represent,  and  to  trace  their 
slow  modifications  by  which  they  perish  only  to  sur- 
vive as  subordinated  elements  of  a  larger  phase ;  to 
find  fragments  of  truth,  dismembered,  partial,  and 
dying  in  the  effete  religions  of  humanity,  and  true 
religion  in  none  of  them.  It  is  also  necessary  to 
trace  how  they  die  as  systems  to  live  as  members  of 
a  larger  system  ;  to  trace  the  lineage  and  genealogy 

*  "  Religion  builds  by  turns,  and  fires  the  world — in  its  pureness  the 
ornament  and  strength  of  society,  in  its  perversion  the  scandal  and 
scourge  of  nations.  It  supplies  the  first  rudiments  of  society  ;  it  fore- 
casts the  social  destination  of  man  ;  leader  in  all  progress  ;  vanguard  of 
all  stability  ;  source  of  revolutions  the  most  prevailing  ',  champion  of  the 
boldest  adventures ;  pioneer  more  eager  than  commerce  ;  explorer  more 
patient  than  science.  Religion  is  acknowledged  the  mistress  of  arts. 
She  reared  the  temples  that  make  Egypt  venerable,  and  the  marbles  that 
made  Greece  renowned.  While  gratefully  acknowledging  the  multifold 
service  of  the  great  benefactress,  we  can  not  forget  that  religion  has  been 
the  worker  of  evil.  No  agent  that  has  wrought  in  earthly  scenes  has 
been  more  prolific  of  ruin  and  wrong.  The  wildest  aberrations  of  hu- 
man nature,  crimes  the  most  portentous,  the  most  devastating  wars,  per- 
secutions, hatred,  wrath,  and  bloodshed,  more  than  have  flowed  from 
all  sources  besides,  have  been  its  fruits  "  (Hedge,  Ways  of  the  Spirit, 
p.  36). 


256  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

of  each  new  one  containing  these  elements ;  to  trace 
the  continuous  vital  idea  that  lives  and  increasingly 
realizes  itself  in  and  through,  thus  annulling  and 
fulfilling  them. 

Each  member  is  worthy  of  study,  though  not  of 
equal  worth.  One  is  truer,  more  adequate  than 
another.  One  may  be  a  vessel  unto  dishonor,  another 
one  unto  honor.  Both  the  historical  method  and  the 
theory  of  evolution  yield  their  best  results  from  being 
vitalized  with  this  philosophical  conception  of  move- 
ment by  affirmation,  negation,  and  absorption  of  the 
old  into  the  new.  It  is  on  stepping-stones  of  dead 
ancestors  that  we  rise  to  higher  things,  and  have  an 
inheritance  to  preserve,  increase,  and  transmit.  A 
philosophy  of  religion  should  aim  at  finding  the  logic 
of  the  life  of  the  religious  consciousness  in  all  phases 
of  its  manifestations,  stripping  off  the  external,  acci- 
dental elements  and  expressing  in  terms  of  thought 
the  process  of  development,  the  ultimate  kernel  of 
each,  after  the  chemistry  of  time  has  dissipated  the 
unessential  circumstances.  The  stages  in  the  evolu- 
tion may  seem  to  some  to  follow  each  other  by  acci- 
dent or  by  mechanical  necessity.  Each  one  is  utterly 
refuted.  Truth  is  nowhere,  even  in  part.  Truth  is 
not  living,  vitalizing  all.  The  result  is  a  museum  of 
the  aberrations  of  the  human  spirit,  a  pantheon  of 
dead  gods. 

When  any  living  organic  progress  is  thus  denied 
to  the  history  of  religion,  its  study  becomes  the  most 
comfortless  and  disheartening.  It  asks  the  profane 
question  of  Pilate,  "What  is  truth?"  It  answers 
with  the  equally  profane  words  of  Macaulay,  "  Who 
are  the  wisest  and  best,  and  who  is  to  be  the  judge 
of   that?"     It  banishes  life,  love,  spirit,  God  from 


Classification  of  the  Positive  Religions.  257 

the  world.  It  turns  cosmos  into  chaos.  But  phi- 
losophy is  thought,  reading  living,  loving,  thought 
everyw^here,  especially  in  religious  phenomena.  It 
is  the  reading  of  the  dialectic  of  love,  annulling,  ab- 
sorbing, fulfilling  its  inadequate  forms  toward  the 
goal  of  adequate  form  and  self-revelation.  It  reads 
God  in  religious  history.  Because  it  sees  God  fully 
revealed  in  the  Christian  religion,  it  can  also  see 
him  faintly  revealed  and  apprehended  in  the  lower 
forms  which  Christ  annulled  and  fulfilled  "  in  the 
fullness  of  times." 

Christianity,  though  the  highest  and  ultimate  form 
of  this  organic  development,  is  not  merely  an  ex- 
ternal summation  of  the  preceding  ones.  It  is  not 
merely  a  "golden  thesaurus"  of  the  best  elements 
in  all  of  them.  Though  every  petition  in  the  Lord's 
prayer,  and  ever}'-  sentence  of  the  sermons  of  our 
Lord  on  the  mount  and  in  the  temple  and  valleys 
and  on  the  sea,  could  be  found  in  the  Bibles  of 
other  religions,  yet  would  Christianity  be  other  and 
greater.  No  such  artificial  patchwork  could  faintly 
resemble  the  living  coherent  organism  of  Chris- 
tianity. A  mausoleum  for  ghosts  might  thus  be 
constructed,  but  not  a  living  temple  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  for  living  worshipers.  It  is  in  no  such 
merely  mechanical  way  that  Christianity  contains 
and  fulfills  all  preceding  religions.  We  may  grant 
all  the  valuable  results  obtained  by  Bauer  and  his 
school  in  the  study  of  the  origins  of  Christianity. 
We  may  thankfully  accept  all  the  moral,  religious, 
and  intellectual  elements  that  they  show  to  have 
been  waiting  in  the  great  alembic  of  the  Roman 
Empire  at  the  advent  of  Christ,  and  yet  maintain 
that  the  new   life  is  beyond  the  analysis   of  histor- 


258  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

ical  chemistry,  as  all  life  is  beyond  the  formula  of 
chemistry. 

The  originality  of  the  character  and  work  of 
Christ  is  the  most  easily  maintained  of  historical 
theses.  Genealogy,  environment,  the  invention  of 
loving  disciples,  genius,  mythology,  it  is  not  too 
much  to  say  that  all  these  have  confessedly  failed  to 
account  for  "  the  great  surprise  of  history,"  whom 
"  all  men  seek."  Reverently  speaking,  he  was  a  pro- 
vincial man,  born  in  the  smallest  nation,  and  among 
the  narrowest  people,  never  traveled  as  a  "  citizen  of 
the  world,"  never  read  universal  history,  nor  studied 
the  classics  of  the  Gentiles,  and  yet  he  was  neither 
Jew  nor  Greek  nor  Roman,  but  man.  Nor  was  he 
the  mere  copy  of  any  Messianic  idea,  Jewish  or  Gen- 
tile. Nor  was  he  the  creation  of  loving  disciples.  As 
Theodore  Parker  was  forced  to  say,  it  would  take  a 
Jesus,*  to  forge  a  Jesus  ;  or,  as  another  puts  it :  "■  We 
know  that  they  could  not  have  originated  it,  as  we 
know  that  Peter  could  not  have  chiseled  out  of  mar- 
ble the  beauty  of  the  Apollo  Belvidere,  or  Paul  have 
painted  that  wonder  of  art,  the  Sistine  Madonna,"  f 
All  the  world  wondered  and  still  wonders  at  that  man, 


*  The  whole  passage  from  Parker  is  worth  recalling :  "  Consider 
what  a  work  his  words  and  deeds  have  wrought  in  the  world.  Remem- 
ber that  the  greatest  minds  have  seen  no  further,  and  added  nothing 
to  his  doctrine  of  religion,  that  the  richest  hearts  have  felt  no  deeper  and 
added  nothing  to  the  sentiment  of  religion,  have  set  no  loftier  aim,  no 
truer  method  than  his,  of  perfect  love  to  God  and  man.  Measure  him 
by  the  shadow  he  has  cast  into  the  world — no  !  by  the  light  he  has  shed 
upon  it.  Shall  we  be  told  such  a  man  never  lived,  the  whole  story  is  a 
lie  ?  Suppose  that  Plato  and  Newton  never  lived.  But  who  did  their 
wonders,  and  thought  their  thoughts?  It  takes  a  Newton  to  forge  a 
Newton.     What  man  could  have  fabricated  Jesus.     None  but  Jesus." 

f  Rev.  Newman  Smythe,  Old  Faiths  in  New  Lights,  p.  225. 


Classification  of  the  Positive  Religions.  259 

the  goal  of  creation.  Yet  it  is  possible,  nay  necessary, 
to  hold  this  doctrine — of  Christ  as  incarnate  God — 
and  at  the  same  time  to  connect  Christianity  or- 
ganically with  all  preceding  religions  and  cultures. 
Hegel  affirms  not  only  the  necessity  of  the  incarna- 
tion as  the  completion  of  the  creative  purpose,  but 
also  maintains  that  it  was  accomplished,  and  could 
occur  only  once  for  all,  in  the  man  Christ  Jesus.* 

Thought  will  not  stop  short  of  this  conception  of 
the  organic  development  of  religion,  including  all 
forms  of  its  manifestation.  And  Christianity  is  not 
degraded  but  exalted  by  this  view  which  makes  it 
the  culmination  of  the  development,  the  complete 
ideal  realization  of  what  religion  is.  It  is  only  when 
the  figure  of  the  mechanical  development  of  a  physi- 
cal organism  is  used  in  place  of  that  of  a  spiritual 
organism,  that  we  can  rightly  object  to  it.  The  time 
has  passed  when  it  was  considered  derogatory  to 
man  to  trace  his  physical  antecedents  to  lower  forms 
of  life.  We  speak  of  man  as  a  microcosm,  contain- 
ing in  transmuted  form  all  phases  of  lower  physical 
existence.  But  he  is  a  man  for  all  that,  and  not  a 
stone,  or  tree,  or  animal.  It  is  only  so  far  as  he  has 
yet  the  elements  of  the  lower,  untransformed  in  him, 
that  we  find  him  degraded.  If  he  has  yet  a  stony 
heart,  a  wooden  head,  and  merely  animal  motives  and 
aims,  he  is  like  a  miniature  sphinx,  an  imbruted  man. 

We  trace  the  growth  of  architecture  through  a 
succession  of  crude  conceptions  manifested  in  rude 
forms,  till  the  great  architect  appears  who  annuls 
and  fulfills  all  lower  conceptions  in  giving  birth  to 
the    ideal   cathedral   embodied   in   stone.      Without 

*  Philosophy  of  History,  p.  337. 


26o  Philosophy  of  Religion, 

them  he  and  his  work  could  not  appear.  No  human 
thing  drops  ready-made  from  the  skies,  not  even 
Christianity  itself.  Christ  did  not  first  become  "  the 
light  of  the  world  "  eighteen  centuries  ago.  Christ 
is,  and  is  not,  the  great  surprise  of  history.  The  sur- 
prise would  be  greater  if  he  had  not  come  in  the  full- 
ness of  times  to  fulfill  the  constitutional  Christ-want 
of  humanity.  The  incarnation  is  not  unnatural  nor  ac- 
cidental. It  was  natural  and  necessary,  considering 
the  nature  of  God  and  his  creative  idea.  It  is  the  com- 
pletion of  the  self-necessitated  creation  and  revelation 
of  the  triune  God.  And  completion  implies  a  begin- 
ning and  a  process.  First,  this  is  seen  in  the  earthly 
life  of  Jesus.  He  who  was  "  the  first-born  of  every 
creature,"  "  the  beginning  of  the  creation  of  God," 
was  incarnate,  and  "  was  made  man,"  thus  showing 
that  "  the  finite  is  capable  of  the  infinite, "and  the  in- 
finite of  the  finite,  or  that  Divinity  involves  humanity. 
Yet  this  was  a  mediated  process,  begun  in  the 
kcnosis,  completed  in  the  plerosis  of  Christ,  "  And 
Jesus  increased  in  wisdom  and  stature,  and  in  favor 
with  God  and  man  "  (St.  Luke  ii,  52).  The  grow- 
ing union  of  God  and  man  begun  at  the  nativity 
was  only  completed  in  the  ascension  and  session  at 
the  right  hand  of  God  the  Father.  The  whole 
mediation  of  his  three-and-thirty  years  of  life  in 
organic  relation  with  humanity  in  family  and  civil 
and  religious  relations  and  genealogy  reaching  back 
to  "  Adam  which  was  the  son  of  God  "  (St.  Luke  iii, 
38),  was  essential  to  his  being  made  perfect  man. 
He  grew,  increased  in  wisdom,  confessed-  his  ignorance 
of  "  that  day  and  that  hour"  (St.  Mark  xiii,  32).  His 
temptations,  trials,  sorrows,  passion,  and  death  were 
real  and  human,  and  only  through  them  the  comple- 


Classification  of  the  Positive  Reiigio7is.  261 

tion,  or  the  excarnation,  the  return  process  occurs. 
There  is  no  degradation,  but  the  realization  of  genu- 
ine ethical  divine-human  love,  in  all  this.  The  degra- 
dation would  only  have  been  if  Jesus  had  stopped  in 
any  one  of  these  stages  of  his  ethical  humiliation,  if 
he  had  not  passed  through  them  all  triumphantly, 
increased  by  means  of  them  into  the  measure  of  per- 
fect man. 

Again,  it  is  necessary  to  regard  the  incarnation  as 
a  process  from  the  Godward  side.  His  coming  must 
be  viewed  as  the  fulfillment  of  a  supernatural  order, 
the  consummation  of  the  Divine,  self-necessitated 
creation.  Immanent  Divine  Love,  a  conception  only 
possible  with  the  Christian  doctrines  of  God's  triune 
nature,  is  the  source  and  motive  spring  of  all  crea- 
tion, a  creation  which  must  go  on  till  love  returns 
home,  and  God  be  all  in  all.  God  so  loved  that  he 
created  the  world,  and  "  so  loved  the  world  that 
he  must  give  his  only-begotten  Son."  "  God  is 
love."  "  Now  we  see  only  in  part,"  but  we  see  the 
essential  principle  immanent  in  his  creation,  in  the 
light  of  which  we  must  try  to  spell  out  its  working 
in  the  tangled  mass  of  phenomena. 

This  ideal  truth  of  creation  we  seek,  then,  to  read 
in  the  religious  history  of  mankind,  as  its  unbroken 
organic  life  and  Logos.  All  admit  this  organic  con- 
nection of  the  Christian  with  the  Jewish  religion. 
How  can  we  hesitate  to  extend  the  connection  to  all  ? 
How  can  we  decline  the  additional  "  aids  to  faith  " 
and  "  evidences  of  Christianity  "  thus  afforded  by  the 
scattered  rays  of  the  light  which  is  always  self-im- 
parting love  ?  Nay,  how  can  we,  without  heresy 
against  both  the  gospel  and  thought,  seek  to  exalt 
Christianity,  which  is  not  envious,  by  depressing  all 


262  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

dimmer  perception  of  the  light?  The  solidarity  of 
man  in  sin  and  salvation  is  a  chief  topic  in  St.  Paul's 
preaching  of  the  gospel  to  Jew  and  Gentile.  The 
essential  Christ,  the  new  Adam,  is  throughout  human 
history  to  be  seen  beneath  the  debased  image  of  God 
in  the  first  Adam.  This  was  the  conception  of  Chris- 
tianity of  the  Greek  fathers.  Justin  Martyr  says: 
"  We  are  taught  that  Christ  is  the  first-born  of  God, 
and  we  have  shown  above  that  he  is  the  Word,  of 
whom  the  whole  human  race  are  partakers.  And 
those  who  lived  according  to  Reason  are  Christians, 
even  though  accounted  atheists,  such  as,  among  the 
Greeks,  Socrates  and  Heraclitus,  and  those  who  re- 
sembled them,  and  .of  the  barbarians  (Jews)  Abraham, 
Ananias  and  Azarias,  Misael  and  Elias,  and  many 
others  ;  from  going  through  the  list  of  whose  names 
and  actions,  knowing  that  it  would  be  tedious,  I  now 
beg  to  be  excused."  * 

We  are  familiar  with  Clement's  view  of  the  Logos 
as  the  universal  Divine  pedagogue  in  the  cosmopoli- 
tan school  of  all  nations.  One  quotation  out  of  many 
specially  significant  ones  must  be  given :  "  In  the 
whole  universe  all  the  parts,  though  differing  from 
one  another,  preserve  their  relation  to  the  whole.  So, 
then,  the  barbarian  (Jewish)  and  Hellenic  Philosophy 
have  torn  off  a  fragment  of  eternal  truth  from  the 
theology  of  the  ever-living  Word  {Logos).  And  he 
who  brings  together  again  the  separate  fragments 
and  makes  them  one,  will,  without  peril,  contemplate 
the  perfect  Word,  the  truth."  f 

As  immanent  Deity,  constitutionally  and  organic- 
ally related  to  humanity,  the  Logos  was,  to  a  certain 
extent,   universally   incarnate    or  immundate,   "  the 

*  Apology,  i,  chap.  xlvi.  f  Stromata,  vol.  i,  chap.  xiii. 


Classification  of  the  Positive  Religions,  263 

Lamb  slain  from  the  foundation  of  the  world."  Jesus 
is  the  Christ,  the  absolute  man,  the  perfect  union  of 
God  and  man,  who  comprises  the  prius  and  posterius 
of  all  history  in  himself  in  an  absolute  and  unique 
manner.  The  incarnation  is  meaningless,  and  would 
have  been  impossible,  without  this  organic  relation 
to  the  religious  consciousness  and  experience  of  man 
both  before  and  after.  Yet  after  and  before  there 
are  elements  of  unwisdom,  unrighteousness,  and  in- 
humanity connected  with  this  work  of  the  essential 
Christ.  Only  in  him,  the  man  Christ  Jesus,  was 
perfection  realized.  We  demur  to  associating  Chris- 
tianity with  the  debasing  superstitions  of  false  re- 
ligions. If  the  Christ  were  such  a  puritan,  he  might 
demur  to  associating  his  name  with  many  phases  of 
historical  Christianity.  Principal  Caird  has  well 
said,  as  to  this  aversion  to  the  idea  of  the  organic 
connection  of  Christianity  with  previous  religions  : 
"  The  real  ground  for  humiliation  is  not  in  the  fetich- 
ism  out  of  which  religion  is  said  to  have  sprung,  or  in 
the  childish  supersititions  and  irrational  observances 
that  have  been  the  accidents  of  its  history ;  but  rather 
in  the  element  of  fetichism  and  unreason  that  often 
still  clings  to  it,  in  the  admixture  of  magic  which  still 
deforms  its  worship,  and  the  remains  of  meaningless 
and  irrational  dogma  which  still  corrupt  its  faith."  * 

Jesus  Christ  was  the  perfect  realization  of  the  re- 
ligious idea.  But  after,  as  well  as  before  him,  I 
have  said,  we  have  not  the  perfect  realization  of  re- 
ligion. And  yet  we  do  not  read  Church  history  as 
profane.  We  call  the  Catholic  Church  holy.  We 
believe  in  God  in  history,  and  in  the  Divine  guid- 
ance of  the  Holy  Spirit.     We  decline  any  puritanical 

*  Philosophy  of  Religion,  p.  344. 
24 


264  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

conception  of  Christianity  as  heretical  and  schismati- 
cal,  because  it  denies  this.  Both  the  evangelical  and 
the  Anglo-Catholic  reversion  to  earlier  forms  are  equal- 
ly uncatholic,  only  different  phases  of  the  same  denial 
of  the  guidance  of  the  Holy  Spirit  and  of  the  pres- 
ence of  the  Logos  in  all  subsequent  universal  history. 
But  all  such  work  betrays  the  utmost  artlessness 
of  unhistorical  and  unphilosophical  comprehension. 
True  Catholicism  receives,  digests,  and  transmutes 
into  present  belief,  all  that  which  has  been  believed 
"  everywhere,  always,  and  by  all,"  in  a  far  wider  and 
truer  sense  than  Vincent  of  Lerinus  meant.  The 
kingdom  of  heaven — the  ideal  society  of  Jesus — was 
likened  by  its  divine  Founder  himself  "  to  a  seed  that 
a  man  should  cast  into  the  ground,  which  groweth  up 
he  knoweth  not  how,  because  the  earth  bringeth  forth 
fruit  of  herself."  He  who  made  the  seed  made  also 
the  fertile  earth  into  which  he  casts  it,  so  that  the 
seed  can  not  retain  its  primitive,  undeveloped  form, 
but  must  spring  up  and  take  nutriment  and  form 
from  earth  and  air,  first  as  the  blade,  then  as  the  ear, 
and  after  that  as  the  full  corn  in  the  ear.  So  Chris- 
tianity is  the  result  of  the  incarnate  Logos  and  the 
earth  of  secular  life  into  which  it  was  cast.  The  two 
can  not  be  separated.  They  have  been  divinely 
given  as  elements  of  an  organic  process.  Pagan  and 
Jewish  conceptions  of  the  kingdom  and  its  Divine 
service,  Greek  philosophic  conception  of  its  intel- 
lectual content,  Roman  conception  of  its  law  and 
order  and  manifold  other  human  institutions  and 
conceptions,  were  the  earth  prepared  to  receive  this 
seed.  Christian  history  has  been  the  history  of  this 
growth  of  the  original  implicit  force  of  the  seed  in 
its  earth  and  air  energizing  and  modifying  environ- 


Classification  of  the  Positive  Religions.  265 

ments,  the  history  of  the  Church,  or  of  the  gospel  in 
secular  life.  Each  generation  takes  up  the  past,  but, 
instead  of  receiving  it  mechanically,  it  transmutes  it 
into  the  fuller  corn  of  the  ear.  This  is  the  logic  of 
Christian  history,  the  infinite  cunning  of  Reason  that 
develops  we  know  not  how,  through  apparently  most 
uncongenial  environments.  All  the  conceptions  of 
God,  of  the  Christian  religion  and  Church,  diverse 
and  discordant  as  they  are,  must  be  elements,  assimi- 
lated not  mechanical,  of  our  truest  conceptions  to-day. 
The  history  of  Christianity  is  not  intelligible  apart 
from  a  divine  government  of  its  necessarily  organ- 
ized form  of  secular  life — the  Church.  Its  immanent 
logic  is  the  ruling  Logos  that  is  a  vital,  self-realizing 
principle,  that  assumes  and  then  transcends  increas- 
ingly adequate  expressions  of  its  own  life.  This  is 
the  dogma  of  the  guidance  of  the  Church  by  the 
Holy  Spirit.  The  instrumentality  of  Greek  philoso- 
phy in  introducing  or  formulating  the  Nicene  sym- 
bol is  no  sufficient  ground  for  asserting  that  it  is  for- 
eign to  Christianity.  No  more  are  the  influence  of 
Jewish  or  pagan  conceptions  of  religion  and  the  Ro- 
man conception  of  organized  law  and  authority  sufifi- 
cient  grounds  for  asserting  that  the  ecclesiastical  and 
sacramental  development  of  Christianity,  to  which 
they  so  largely  contributed,  are  utterly  foreign  to  the 
spirit  of  the  gospel.  All  these  are  but  the  prepared 
ground  through  which  the  Spirit  manifests  increas- 
ingly the  full  concrete  logic  of  the  divine  life  on 
earth.  Christianity  was  never  intended  to  be  ab- 
stract, all  in  the  air,  remote  from  the  secular  sphere 
of  life.  But  in  the  historic  life  of  its  Founder  and  in 
the  historic  life  of  the  Spirit,  which  is  a  quasi-?,Q,cv\'3ir 
incarnation  in   the  Church,  it  appears  as  the  most 


266  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

concrete  manifold  life  of  which  men  can  conceive. 
And  puritanical  criticism,  of  whatever  type,  is  of 
such  a  one-sided,  abstract  character  that  it  can  not 
be  accepted.  We  no  longer  conceive  of  or  argue 
about  the  soul  as  an  abstract  unity.  We  know  soul 
as  the  unity  of  body  and  spirit.  So  we  know  Chris- 
tianity as  its  Founder  meant  us  to  know  it,  as  the 
union  of  the  Logos  and  secular  life — never  yet,  indeed, 
perfect  in  its  manifestations,  but  moving  toward  the 
most  full  concrete  life  of  which  humanity  is  capable. 
The  true  continuity  of  Christian  thought  is  wider  and 
deeper  than  that  of  either  Greek  or  Latin  conception. 
The  nineteenth  century  conceptions  of  God,  Christian- 
ity, and  the  Church  are  only  catholic  and  in  the  line 
of  the  logic  of  history  as  they  receive  and  transmute 
all  previous  partial  conceptions,  and  thus,  as  heir  of  all 
the  ages,  gain  the  richer  and  fuller  life  of  the  Spirit. 

This  is  the  true  way  of  reading  Church  history, 
to  read  the  sacred  immanent  in  the  secular,  to  see 
the  leaven  leavening  the  whole  lump,  to  see  the 
progressive  reincarnation  of  the  perfect  man  in  the 
whole  of  his  redeemed  humanit3^  Christianity  is  a 
life,  permeating  and  inspiring  the  good  in  the  whole 
range  of  the  secular  life ;  and  yet  all  is  not  good, 
and  all  good  is  not  equally  good.  We  rejoice  to  see 
Christ  preached  in  any  and  all  ways,  and  to  recog- 
nize his  presence  and  power  in  all  the  truly  human 
secular  institutions  and  pursuits,  as  well  as  in  that 
form  of  his  kingdom  organized  for  specific  religious 
services,  the  Church — the  most  divine,  as  far  as  it 
is  the  most  genuinely  human  secular  institution." 


*  Cf.  Canon  Freemantle's  Bampton  Lecture,  1883,  p.  299,  and  Mul- 
ford's  Republic  of  God,  p.  169. 


Classificatioji  of  the  Positive  Religions.  267 

This  has  been  the  way  of  the  Spirit,  and  the 
method  of  the  Logos  in  history  after  his  incarnation 
and  excarnation.  We  decline  to  profane  the  history 
of  his  kingdom  come,  need  we,  dare  we  ungenerously 
profane  the  history  of  his  kingdom  coming?  The 
world  was  made  by  him,  and  he  was  in  the  world, 
preparing,  educating  humanity,  Gentiles  and  Jews, 
for  his  advent  in  visible  incarnate  form.  That  view 
which  represents  the  preparation  of  the  world  for 
his  advent  to  have  been  merely  negative,  all  the 
seeking  after  God  to  have  been  in  vain,  is  certainly 
an  unchristian  and  untheistic  view,  denying  the  love 
of  God,  seeking  after  and  going  out  to  meet  his  re- 
turning prodigals ;  denying  his  education  of  the  world 
to  have  had  any  results,  and  evaporating  all  mean- 
ing in  the  expression  "  in  the  dispensation  of  the  full- 
ness of  times."  The  Scribes  and  Pharisees  murmured 
at  him  for  holding  communion,  eating  and  drinking 
with  publicans  and  sinners.  The  irony  of  his  reply 
should  enter  our  souls,  when  we  shrink  from  ac- 
knowledging his  adumbrated  presence  in  all  pre- 
Christian  religions  :  "  They  that  be  whole  need  not  a 
physician.  .  .  .  Go  ye  and  learn  what  that  meaneth, 
I  will  have  mercy  and  not  sacrifice."  And  when  we 
seek  to  exalt  Christianity  by  our  righteous  deprecia- 
tion of  other  religions,  we  surely  will  hear  his  words 
to  other  Scribes  and  Pharisees  :  "  He  that  is  without 
sin  among  you,  let  him  first  cast  a  stone  at  them." 
The  marvel  and  the  mystery  to  us  is,  not  that  we  find 
so*  much  good  in  them,  so  great  results  of  the  divine 
education,  but  that  we  find  so  little.  But,  little  as  it 
is,  we  ascribe  it  to  the  one  essential,  persistent,  or- 
ganic light  and  life  of  men. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  ABSOLUTE   RELIGION. 

In  Part  III  Hegel  gives  first  the  metaphysics  of 
the  Absolute  Religion,  and  secondly  the  speculative 
view  of  Christianity  as  the  revealed,  positive,  or  his- 
torical form  of  this  perfect  religion.  I  present  the 
larger  part  of  it  chiefly  as  a  translation  of  the  text. 
The  first  eight  pages  is  a  full  translation.  This  may 
only  serve  with  some  to  show  how  useless  a  literal 
translation  of  Hegel  is,  how  much  it  needs  to  be  re- 
translated in  the  form  of  expository  and  critical  para- 
phrase. With  others,  it  will  lead  to  an  appreciation 
of  the  severely  scientific  procedure  of  Hegel's  thought 
and  to  a  study  of  the  original.  I  may  add  that  Mr. 
Louis  F.  Soldan  gives  an  excellent  literal  translation 
of  this  part.* 

We  have  now  reached  the  perfect  religion,  that  in  which 
the  idea  of  religion  has  been  fully  realized.  We  have  pre- 
viously defined  religion  as  God's  Self-consciousness,  This 
self-consciousness  of  God  is  to  be  distinguished  from  finite 
consciousness,  God  knows  himself  in  a  consciousness  which 
is  distinct  from  himself ;  but  this  differs  from  finite  con- 
sciousness by  being  implicitly  God's  own  consciousness.  Fur- 
ther, it  is  also  explicitly  God's  own  consciousness,  being  con- 
scious of  its  own  identity  with  God  through  its  negation  of 

*  The  Journal  of  Speculative  Pbliosopliy,  vols,  xv,  xvi. 


The  Absolute  Religio7i.  269 

finiteness.  God  distinguishes  himself  from  himself  so  as  to 
be  his  own  object,  and  yet  remains  absolutely  identical  with 
himself  in  this  distinction.  That  is,  God  is  Spirit.  This 
constitutes  the  content  of  religion.  This  perfect  idea  is  now 
realized.  Consciousness  knows  this  content,  and  knows 
itself  as  inextricably  bound  up  with  it.  It  is  a  phase  of  the 
process  of  the  Idea  of  God  himself. 

The  finite  consciousness  knows  God  only  so  far  as  God 
knows  himself  in  it.  God  as  spirit  recognizes  himself  in  the 
spirit  of  his  Church — that  is,  in  the  spirit  of  those  who  re- 
vere him.  In  this  perfect  religion  we  have  the  revelation  of 
God.  He  is  no  longer  an  unknown  Being  afar  off,  for  he 
has  acquainted  man  with  himself,  and  that  not  merely 
through  external  history  but  in  his  consciousness.  This  is 
the  religion  of  the  revelation  of  God,  since  he  knows  him- 
self in  the  finite  spirit.  He  is  absolutely  manifest.  Such 
is  the  present  relation.  We  have  seen  in  the  positive  (pre- 
Christian)  religions  how  this  cognition  of  God  as  free  Spirit 
was  still  burdened  with  finite  limitations.  It  was  the  work 
of  the  Spirit  to  overcome  these  limitations.  We  have  seen 
in  these  pre-Christian  religions  how  the  misery  and  pain  re- 
vealed the  nugatory  character  of  these  limitations  to  con- 
sciousness, and  thus  formed  the  subjective  preparation  for 
the  consciousness  of  Spirit  as  an  absolutely  free  and  there- 
fore Infinite  Spirit. 

(y4.)  First,  let  us  notice  the  general  character  of  this 
sphere. 

The  absolute  religion  is  (i)  manifest  {pffenhare)  religion. 
But  religion  is  manifest  only  when  it  has  become  an  object 
to  itself  according  to  its  idea,  free  from  finite  objectivity. 
That  is,  religion  according  to  its  general  idea,  is  conscious- 
ness of  the  absolute  essence.  But  all  consciousness  distin- 
guishes. So  we  have  here  the  two,  consciousness  and  abso- 
lute essence  ;  and  primarily  these  two  are  external  to  each 
other,  and  thus  finite.  And  so  consciousness  cognizes  ab- 
solute essence  only  as  something  finite  and  not  what  it  is,  in 


2  70  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

truth.  God  himself  is  consciousness,  distinction  of  himself 
in  himself.  But  as  consciousness  he  gives  himself  as  object, 
is  himself  his  own  double,  and  thus  annuls  all  limitation. 

We,  on  the  contrary,  always  have  two  things  in  our  con- 
sciousness, which  are  related  to  each  other  as  finite  and  ex- 
ternal. But  if  religion  comprehends  itself,  then  the  content 
and  the  object  of  religion  are  themselves  the  totality.  That 
is,  it  is  consciousness  related  to  its  own  essence,  the  cogni- 
tion of  essence  as  itself,  and  not  as  another.  Thus  Spirit  is 
the  object  of  religion.  In  it  there  are  no  longer  two — con- 
sciousness and  its  object — but  one ;  that  is,  religion  which 
is  filled  with  itself,  which  is  revealed.  The  object  is  not 
another,  but  Spirit,  self-knowing  essence.  Here  for  the  first 
time  Spirit  becomes  the  object  and  content  of  religion,  and 
spirit  exists  only  for  spirit. 

This  is  the  abstract  determination  of  this  Idea  (Idee), 
or  religion  is,  in  fact,  the  Idea*  For  the  Idea  in  the  philo- 
sophical sense  is  the  idea  which  has  itself  for  an  object.  It 
has  determinate  existence,  reality,  objectivity,  which  is  no 
longer  merely  internal  or  subjective,  but  which  has  objecti- 
fied itself.  But  this  self-objectification  is  at  the  same  time 
a  return  into  itself.  So  far  as  we  call  the  idea  the  aim,  it  is 
the  realized,  the  accomplished  idea,  and  thus  objective. 

The  object  which  religion  has  for  itself  is  its  own  exist- 
ence, the  consciousness  of  its  own  essence.  It  is  therein 
objectified.  It  now  has  real  existence,  whereas  it  was  at 
first  merely  subjective  idea.  The  absolute  religion  is  the 
revealed  religion,  having  itself  for  its  content 

This,  too,  is  the  perfect  religion  which  has  spirit  for  it- 
self, which  has  become  objective  in  itself — that  is,  the  Chris- 
tian religion.  The  universal  and  the  individual  spirit,  the 
finite  and  infinite,  are  inseparably  combined  in  it.  Their 
absolute  identity  constitutes  this  religion  and  its  content. 

*  Note  the  distinction  between  idea  (Begriff)  and  Idea  (Idee),  which 
signifies  the  Absolute  Idea. 


The  Absolute  Religion:  271 

Instead  of  abstract  substance,  we  have  the  concrete 
Absolute  Subject,  making  itself  known  to  finite  spirit.  Yet, 
this  is  but  a  phase  (moment,  a  dynamic  element)  of  uni- 
versal spirit,  and  thus  the  latter,  even  in  this  separation, 
returns  into  itself  undivided. 

Ordinarily  theology  has  for  its  aim  the  cognition  of  God 
as  something  purely  objective,  absolutely  separate  from  the 
subjective  consciousness,  like  the  sun  or  any  other  external 
object.  But  the  idea  of  the  absolute  religion,  on  the  con- 
trary, has  to  do  with  religion  itself,  rather  than  with  these  ex- 
ternal elements.  The  unity  of  the  representation  which  we 
call  God,  or  the  Absolute  Subject,  is  the  object-matter  of 
absolute  religion. 

Many  to-day  profess  that  the  chief  thing  is  to  have  relig- 
ious life,  to  be  pious,  thus  making  the  object  of  little  im- 
portance. In  fact,  they  say  that  the  object,  God,  can  not 
be  really  known.  The  chief  concern  is  our  own  subjective 
piety.  But  even  this  standpoint  contains  an  important 
advance  in  recognizing  the  validity  of  its  infinite  element 
— the  subjective  consciousness  of  the  individual.  In  fact, 
this  cognition  of  the  absolute  worth  of  the  individual  may 
be  said  to  be  the  great  attainment  of  our  day.  Individual 
subjectivity  is  a  very  essential  determination  of  religion. 
But  it  must  be  asked  how  this  determination  has  come 
about. 

Upon  this  we  may  offer  the  following  remarks  :  Religion, 
in  the  determination  of  consciousness,  is  so  conditioned 
that  her  content  flies  ahead,  and  thus  seemingly  remains  a 
foreign  object.  From  the  standpoint  of  consciousness,  any 
and  every  content  that  religion  may  have,  seem  to  be  for- 
eign. Even  when  the  content  is  accepted  as  revealed,  it 
remains  for  us  an  external  affair.  Such  a  conception  of 
religion,  as  something  that  can  not  be  cognized,  but  only 
passively  received  by  faith,  leads  also  to  the  subjectivity  of 
feeling,  which  is  the  end  and  result  of  the  worship  of  God. 
Thus  the  standpoint  of  consciousness  is  not  the  only  one. 


272  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

The  worshiper  sinks  himself,  with  his  whole  heart  and  de- 
votion and  will,  in  the  object  of  his  worship.  In  the  height 
of  his  devotion  he  has  annulled,  or  rather  absorbed  and 
realized  into  unity,  the  separation  which  exists  at  the  stand- 
point of  consciousness. 

But  this  annulment  of  separation  may  then  be  conceived 
as  something  foreign,  as  the  divine  grace  or  mercy  to  which 
a  man  can  only  passively  submit.  Against  this  separation 
is  turned  the  determination  that  makes  religion,  or  man's 
subjective  feeling,  the  chief  thing.  His  will  is  only  God's 
will.  In  him  these  two  are  inseparate.  In  other  words, 
then,  the  subject  is  throughout  the  whole  matter  the  real 
and  essential  relation.  Thus  the  subject,  the  individual,  is 
raised  to  an  essential  element.  Along  with  this  comes  the 
freedom  of  spirit,  which  it  has  so  restored  that  there  is  no 
place  where  it  does  not  find  itself.  The  idea  of  the  absolute 
religion  implies  the  objectivity  of  religion,  though  the  con- 
sciousness of  this  idea  does  not.  In  the  form  of  this  con- 
sciousness, where  piety  is  held  to  be  the  main  thing,  and  the 
object  of  religion  of  little  knowledge  or  matter,  there  is  a 
lack  of  content  and  objectivity. 

But  it  is  the  prerogative  of  truth  that  knowledge  finds  its 
absolute  content  in  religion.  At  this  standpoint,  however, 
the  content  appears  only  in  a  stunted  form.  It  is  contin- 
gent, finite,  and  empirically  limited.  Hence  a  certain  re- 
semblance to  that  of  the  age  of  the  Roman  Empire.  The 
subject  is  indeed  conceived  as  infinite,  but  as  the  abstract 
infinite,  and  hence  limited  and  finite.  Here  freedom  is  only 
such  as  allows  a  world  beyond  to  exist.  It  is  a  longing 
which  denies  the  distinctions  of  consciousness,  and  thus 
rejects  the  most  essential  element  of  spirit,  leaving  nothing 
but  spiritual  subjectivity. 

Religion  is  the  spirit's  knowledge  of  itself  as  spirit ;  this 
is  not  substantial  but  subjective  knowledge.  Subjective 
consciousness  does  not  know  this  limitation  of  its  knowl- 
edge.   It  finds  this  abstract  infinite  as  involved  in  its  feeling 


The  Absolute  Religion.  273 

of  its  own  finiteness.  It  takes  it  as  the  absolute  though 
abstract  ground  of  its  own  finite  actuality.  It  is  rather  a 
feeling  of  longing  for  the  inexplicable  beyond  ( Yenseits). 

The  absolute  religion,  on  the  other  hand,  contains  this 
category  of  subjectivity,  or  of  infinite  form,  which  does  not 
differ  much  from  the  category  of  substance.  Here  the  in- 
finitely substantial  subjectivity  makes  an  object  and  content 
for  itself.  In  this  content  the  finite  subject  is  again  dis- 
tinguished from  the  infinite  object,  God  as  Spirit,  dwelling 
apart  by  himself,  or  not  dwelling  as  a  living  spirit  in  his 
Church,  is  only  looked  upon  as  a  one-sided  limitation,  as  an 
external  object. 

The  absolute  religion  is  the  idea  (Begriff)  or  notion.  It 
is  the  idea  of  the  absolute  Idea  (Idee)  in  its  perfect  realiza- 
tion. Here  we  have  spirit  as  the  reality  which  exists  for 
spirit,  which  has  spirit  for  its  object,  and  therefore  this  re- 
ligion is  the  revealed  religion  :  God  reveals  himself.  Reve- 
lation means  this  judgment  of  infinite  form  which  can  deter- 
mine itself  and  be  for  another.  This  self-manifestation 
belongs  to  the  essence  of  spirit  itself.  A  spirit  that  does 
not  manifest  itself  is  not  spirit. 

We  say,  God  has  created  the  world.  The  act  is  looked 
upon  as  a  completed  act,  which  could  not  happen  again,  or 
as  something  that  might  or  might  not  have  happened.  Thus 
we  say  that  God  might  or  might  not  have  revealed  himself. 
But  all  such  predications  are  arbitrary  and  accidental,  and 
do  not  belong  to  the  idea  of  God.  For  God  as  spirit  is 
essentially  this  self-revelation.  He  does  not  create  the 
world  only  once.  He  is  eternally  creating,  eternally  reveal- 
ing himself,  eternally  working.  This  is  the  conception  and 
the  definition  of  God. 

Revealed  religion  which  manifests  spirit  to  spirit  is  thus 
the  religion  of  spirit.  It  does  not  lock  itself  out  from  an- 
other which  is  only  temporarily  foreign  to  itself.  God  him- 
self creates  the  other  and  abrogates  it  by  fulfilling  it.  It  is 
the  nature  of  spirit  to  be  its  own  phenomenon.     This  is  its 


2  74  Philosophy  of  Religio7i. 

very  deed  and  life,  to  manifest  itself  to  itself.  What  is  it 
that  reveals  God,  we  may  exclaim,  if  it  be  not  his  own  self- 
revelation  ?  He  reveals  the  infinite  form.  Absolute  sub- 
jectivity is  that  which  characterizes  itself  by  the  positing  of 
distinctions,  of  content.  He  thus  reveals  his  power  to  cre- 
ate these  distinctions  in  himself.  He  gives  and  retakes. 
Thus  it  is  revealed  that  he  is  for  another.  This  is  the 
characteristic  of  revelation. 

2.  This  religion  which  is  manifest  to  itself  is  also  called 
the  revealed  (geoffenbart)  religion.  This  means,  on  the  one 
hand,  that  it  has  been  revealed  by  God  to  man,  and  on  the 
other  that  it  is  revealed  in  the  sense  of  being  bestowed  upon 
man  by  a  power  outside  of  himself.  In  this  last  sense  it  is 
also  z2\\q.^  positive  religion. 

But  what,  we  may  ask,  do  we  mean  by  this  conception 
of  positive  ? 

Absolute  religion  is  certainly  positive  in  the  sense  that 
everything  existing  for  consciousness  is  something  externally 
objective  to  it.  Everything  must  come  to  us  in  an  external 
way.  Thus  the  sensuous  is  positive  ;  and  everything  spir- 
itual comes  to  us  in  the  same  way  as  first  finite  or  historical, 
and  then  as  spiritual.     All  such  external  spirituality  is  positive. 

The  laws  of  liberty  as  posited  in  social  codes  show  us  a 
higher  and  purer  spirituality.  Though  this  is  of  the  nature 
of  pure  spirituality,  it  comes  to  us  in  the  first  place  exter- 
nally as  instruction,  education,  or  doctrine.  It  is  thus  medi- 
ated and  certified  to  us.  The  laws  of  society  and  of  the 
state  are  also  positive.  They  meet  us,  they  are  for  us,  they 
are  valid.  They  have  not  merely  such  kind  of  existence 
that  we  can  ignore  them,  but  such  as  are  subjectively  essen- 
tial.    They  are  the  real  laws  of  our  true  selves. 

When  we  comprehend  and  find  it  rational  that  crime 
should  be  punished,  we  can  say  that  it  is  both  valid  and  es- 
sential for  us  not  only  because  it  is  positive  law,  but  also 
because  it  has  internal  validity  in  our  reason  as  something 
essential  because  rational. 


The  Absolute  Religio7t.  275 

Being  positive  does  not  make  it  irrational  and  unnatural. 
The  laws  of  freedom  have  always  a  positive  side  ;  they  are 
manifested  in  external  contingent  reality.  Laws  must  be 
limited  ;  and  in  placing  limits  to  the  quality  and  the  quan- 
tity of  penalty,  we  have  this  external  element. 

The  positive  element  can  not  be  omitted  in  penal  laws  ; 
but  in  this  there  is  something  not  rational.  Thus,  in  pro- 
nouncing penalty,  a  round  number  is  generally  taken.  Rea- 
son can  not  apportion  the  exactly  just  penalty.  Whatever 
is  purely  and  arbitrarily  positive  is  irrational.  To  a  certain 
extent  it  must  be  limited  in  a  way  that  is  not  primarily  ra- 
tional. 

This  is  also  a  necessary  side  of  revealed  religion.  It 
comes  in  a  historical  or  externally  manifest  way.  This  opens 
the  way  for  the  positive  and  contingent  element — that  is,  it 
might  be  manifest  in  this  or  in  that  historical  way.  The 
merely  external  always  admits  the  purely  positive  or  con- 
tingent. 

But  we  may  distinguish  between  the  purely  and  the 
formally  positive.  The  law  of  freedom  may  be  formally 
positive ;  but  it  is  more  than  this.  It  is  really  valid,  not 
simply  because  it  happens  to  prevail,  but  because  it  is  the 
characteristic  of  our  own  rationality.  Thus,  too,  religion 
has  a  positive  element  in  its  didactic  side ;  but  it  must  not 
stop  here  with  the  merely  positive  and  thus  remain  a  mere 
matter  of  memory  or  of  imagination. 

In  regard  to  the  verification  of  religion,  its  external  posi- 
tive element  must  testify  to  the  truth  of  the  religion,  must 
seem  to  be  the  ground  of  its  truth.  Sometimes  this  verifica- 
tion has  the  form  of  the  purely  positive.  Such  are  miracles 
and  witnesses  when  given  as  proof  of  the  divinity  of  the  one 
proclaiming  these  revelations  and  of  his  having  taught  such 
and  such  doctrines. 

Miracles  are  sensible  changes  in  the  sensuous  world,  per- 
ceived through  the  senses.  Perception  of  them  is  itself  sen- 
suous, and  as  such  is  their  positive  side.  This  side  of  them, 
25 


276  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

it  is  said,  furnishes  a  verification  for  the  sensuous  man  ;  but 
this  is  only  the  beginning  of  a  verification,  an  unspiritual 
verification,  by  means  of  which  alone  the  spiritual  can  never 
be  verified. 

But  this  side  of  miracles  is  not,  Hegel  asserts,  to 
be  over-emphasized.  When  it  is,  then  the  under- 
standing insists  upon  trying  to  explain  them  in  some 
natural  way,  and  so  to  really  explain  them  away. 
But  reason  as  such  refuses  the  verification  which  the 
merely  positive  or  external  part  of  miracles  offers. 
Spirit  can  only  accept  spiritual  verification  of  spir- 
itual things.  This  is  the  doctrine  of  the  testimony  of 
the  Spirit.  Christ  himself  rejects  miracles  as  a  true 
criterion  of  truth.  At  the  last  day  he  will  reject 
many  who  come  saying  that  they  have  done  many 
miracles  in  his  name  '^  (Matt,  vi,  22).  The  evidence 
of  the  spirit  may  sometimes  be  very  indefinite.  In 
studying  history  we  find  our  spirit  strangely  moved 
and  won  by  what  appears  as  noble,  sublime,  moral, 
and  divine.  But  it  may  also  take  more  definite  and 
intellectual  form,  depending  upon  the  activity,  the 
insights,  and  the  self-consistency  of  our  thought.  It 
may  take  the  form  of  intellectual  or  of  moral  max- 
ims,, forming  the  causal  principles  of  our  rational 
activity. 

There  are  many  degrees  of  spiritual  need  and 
culture.  But  the  highest  need  of  the  human  mind  is 
true  thought,  which  transcends  merely  sympathetic, 
maximatical,  and  inferential  evidence.  This  highest 
form  of  the  testimony  of  the  spirit  is  philosophy. 
Here  the  conception  {idea),  purely  as  such,  develops 
the  truth  out  of  itself.  And  in  this  thinking  develop- 
ment of  the  truth  the  spirit  cognizes  its  necessity, 
and  consistency.    The  necessary  is  the  self-consistent. 


The  Absolute  Religion.  277 

and  the  self-consistent  is  the  necessary.  It  is  the 
absolutely  rational,  as  contrasted  with  the  vulgar 
rationalism  of  the  understanding.  But  we  can  not 
expect  all  men  to  apprehend  the  truth  in  the  philo- 
sophical or  speculative  way.  As  we  have  said,  the 
testimony  of  the  spirit  is  as  manifold  as  the  needs 
and  culture  of  men.  Thus  we  find  many  men  in 
that  stage  of  development  that  conviction  comes  to 
them  from  their  confidence  and  belief  in  external 
authority.  At  this  stage  miracles  have  their  worth, 
and  Christ  recognized  it.  Many  believed  on  him  for 
his  miracles'  sake.  They  awakened  the  conviction  of 
sympathy.  They  touched  the  heart.  But  the  heart 
and  feeling  of  man  are  not  the  same  as  of  the  animal. 
It  is  always  the  heart  of  a  thinking  man.  It  is  a 
thinking  heart.  And  so  religion  of  the  heart  can  not 
be  divorced  from  thinking.  Christian  doctrines  may 
be  stated  in  a  very  positive  external  way  in  the  Bible. 
But  when  spirit  gives  its  testimony  for  them,  it  is  in 
man's  innermost  nature.  They  become  harmonious 
with  his  spirit,  his  thinking,  his  reason.  They  find 
him,  satisfy  him,  his  spirit,  and  so  are  believed.  As 
a  thinking  being,  however,  he  can  not  stop  at  this 
point,  but  must  proceed  to  further  thoughts  and  re- 
flections about  them.  This  leads  to  theology  or  to 
the  philosophical  comprehension  of  the  truths  of  re- 
ligion. And  this  is  the  highest  form  of  the  testimony 
of  the  Spirit. 

It  is  perfectly  true  that  the  Bible  is  itself  sufficient 
for  some  men,  and  makes  them  very  good  and  re- 
ligious. But  they  are  not  thinking  Christians,  not 
theologians.  Mere  quoting  of  Scripture  does  not 
make  one  a  theologian,  else  were  the  devil  one.  In 
fact,  very  few  Christians  refrain  from  explaining  and 


278  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

interpreting  holy  Scripture.  And  the  main  point  is, 
whether  interpretation,  their  reflective  thought  about 
it,  is  correct  or  not. 

It  is  of  no  avail  to  say  that  all  their  inferences 
and  explanations  are  based  upon  the  Bible  ;  that  their 
theology  is  biblical  theology.  This  is  a  favorite  ex- 
pression with  the  school  of  Ritschl  in  Germany  to- 
day, which  professedly  discards  all  speculative  inter- 
pretation of  Scripture,  such  as  the  doctrine  of  the 
holy  Trinity,  of  the  atonement,  and  of  the  person  of 
Christ,  For  as  soon  as  we  make  any  formal  and  con- 
nected statement  of  Bible  truths,  we  do  so  with  cer- 
tain intellectual  forms  and  mental  presuppositions. 
Thus,  the  purest  form  of  biblical  theology  gives  us  the 
contents  of  the  Bible  in  the  form  and  the  mode  of 
current  thought.  Thus,  there  is  as  much  imposition 
as  there  is  exposition  in  all  such  theology.  But  it 
is  further  to  be  noted  that  the  very  words  of  the 
Bible,  as  the  utterance  of  the  Spirit,  are  rational 
words,  and  connected  in  the  form  of  thinking,  not 
merely  diverse  and  scattered  leaves  of  a  thought- 
less Sibyl.  The  biblical  theologians  of  the  middle 
ages  found  the  utterance  of  the  Spirit  in  the  Bible 
to  be  in  the  thought  relations  of  formal  logic.  The 
spirit  spoke,  according  to  Aristotle,  and  it  might 
have  spoken  according  to  much  less  true  form, 
as  some  biblical  theologians  to-day  would  fain  have 
it  do. 

There  can  be  no  theology  without  philosophy, 
and  when  it  turns  against  philosophy  it  is  either  un- 
conscious that  it  uses  it,  or  else  it  deceitfully  chooses 
to  use  some  arbitrary,  accidental,  antique,  or  modern 
form  of  thinking.  But  all  such  arbitrary  thinking 
is  to  be  disparaged.     Pure,   catholic,  self-consistent 


The  Absolute  Religion.  279 

thought  is  to  be  demanded.  This  is  only  to  be  found 
in  the  purely  speculative,  in  the  self-explication  of 
the  Idea.  The  Bible  is  the  utterance  of  the  Idea. 
The  Logos  gives  it  form  and  meaning  and  life.  The 
mere  letter,  or  the  letter  interpreted  by  any  acci- 
dental, arbitrary,  or  sectarian  presuppositions,  fancies, 
or  philosophies,  killeth.  The  spirit  of  man  in  receiv- 
ing the  truths  of  the  Bible,  can  not  be  passive  and 
mechanical.  It  grasps  and  knows  them  by  thought- 
activity,  according  to  various  concepts,  categories, 
and  principles.  Some  thus  get  more  and  some  less, 
for  some  grasp  with  lower  categories  and  concep- 
tions. But  all  must  do  some  thinking  in  order  to 
obtain  anything  —  even  those  biblical  theologians, 
who,  in  their  exegetical  activity,  imagine  that  they 
are  purely  receptive.  Unconsciously  surrendering 
themselves  to  arbitrary  and  accidental  presupposi- 
tions of  finite  thought,  these  theologians  to-day  deny 
the  very  fundamental  doctrines  of  Christianity.  The 
whole  school  of  Ritschl  thus  deny  the  presence  and 
the  activity  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  work  of  the 
thought  of  catholic  Christianity.  What  they  deny 
now,  it  was  the  work  of  philosophy  under  Hegel  to 
maintain  and  preserve. 

In  considering  Christianity  Hegel  proposes  to 
begin  in  the  opposite  way.  Instead  of  beginning 
with  the  external  and  historical,  he  sets  out  from 
the  idea  (BegrifT)  of  Christianity.  This  historical 
study  he  presupposes  as  a  necessary  requisite  to 
his  present  work,  and  he  no  more  undervalues  it 
than  the  most  humble  and  simple-minded  disciple 
of  Christ.  He  does  not  propose  to  evolve  Chris- 
tianity out  of  nothing  but  his  own  subjective  con- 
sciousness.    For  him  it  is  revelation  done  in  history, 


28o  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

and  wrought  into  the  hearts  and  minds  of  men 
through  the  external  media  of  Bible,  Church,  and 
sacraments. 

But,  presupposing  all  this,  he  proposes  to  examine 
and  to  comprehend  the  thought-process,  the  logic, 
the  idea  thus  revealed  and  received.  It  is  a  study 
of  the  forms  of  this  thought-activity  in  receiving 
Christianity.  Consciousness  is  directed  toward  the 
course  of  the  categories  or  concepts  in  such  activity, 
toward  such  thinking  as  has  verified  and  known  itself 
through  a  discrimination  between  essential  and  ac- 
cidental, between  finite  and  rational  categories  of 
thought. 

3.  Thus  absolute  religion  is  the  religion  of  truth  and 
freedom.  The  spirit  is  for  spirit,  and  is,  therefore,  its  own 
presupposition.  We  begin  with  the  spirit  as  subject,  which 
is  the  eternal  intuition  of  itself,  and  is,  therefore,  compre- 
hended only  as  a  result  or  end.  This  capacity  of  being 
both  subject  and  object  is  the  truth  of  real  spirit ;  and 
this  is  also  the  idea  and  the  absolute  Idea  of  spirit.  It  is 
truth.  Absolute  religion  is  also  that  of  freedom.  Abstractly, 
freedom  is  the  relation  to  something  external  that  is  not 
strange  or  hostile  It  conciliates  this  external  object,  recog- 
nizing it  as  an  element  of  its  true  self.  Such  reconciliation 
is  freedom,  as  that  of  God  in  Christ  reconciling  the  world 
unto  himself  (2  Cor.  v,  19).  But  each  one  of  these  (recon- 
ciliation, truth,  and  freedom),  being  an  activity,  is  a  general 
process,  and  can  not,  therefore,  be  expressed  in  a  single 
proposition  without  being  one-sided  and  therefore  untrue. 
The  chief  conception  is  that  of  the  unity  of  the  divine  and 
human  nature.  God  has  become  man.  This  unity  is,  in 
the  first  place,  only  implicit  or  potential.  But  it  is  also 
eternally  being  actualized.  This  progressive  free  reconcili- 
ation only  takes  place  because  of  the  inherent  potential 
unity  of  the  divine  and  human.     This  unity  has  sometimes 


The  Absolute  Religion,  281 

been  conceived  as  an  abstract  identity — e.  g.,  as  the  sub- 
stance of  Spinoza.  But  with  us  the  unity  is  that  of  sub- 
jectivity or  Spirit  which  eternally  actualizes  itself,  makes 
man  in  his  own  image  and  freely  reconciles  the  estranged 
world  to  himself. 

This  conception  of  God,  the  absolute  Idea  (Idee),  as  the 
absolute  truth,  is  the  result  of  all  philosophy.  It  is  both 
the  real  logic  of  thought,  and  also  the  logic  observed  in  the 
concrete  world.  We  can  better  express  it  by  saying  that 
in  the  absolute  Idea^  or  the  philosophic  conception  of  God, 
we  behold  nature  and  life  and  spirit  as  organic  members. 
Each  one  is,  as  it  were,  a  mirror  reflecting  this  Idea,  so  that 
it  appears  therein  as  particularized  or  as  a  process,  thus 
manifesting  its  unity  in  difference. 

In  nature  religions  God  is  conceived  of  as  some  alien 
natural  object.  The  absolute  religion  contains  this  stand- 
point, but  only  as  a  transitory  element.  In  the  second 
form  of  religion,  styled  the  religion  of  spiritual  individu- 
ality (that  of  the  Jews,  the  Greeks,  and  Romans),  spirit 
also  remains  limited  finitely.  Consciousness  has  become 
self-consciousness.  But  its  object  is  conceived  as  absolute 
power.  The  one,  the  limiting  one,  is  only  abstract  power, 
which  is  not  yet  recognized  as  akin  to  the  worshiper.  (In 
the  words  of  a  modern  writer,  who  occupied  the  same 
standpoint,  it  is  "  the  power  in  us,  not  ourselves,  that  makes 
for  righteousness.") 

But  the  power  and  its  necessity  are  conceived  in  an 
abstract  way,  and  hence  the  degeneracy  into  finite  forms  of 
many  gods.  It  is  only  in  the  third  and  final  form  that  we 
have  that  religion  of  freedom  and  self-consciousness  which 
is  at  the  same  time  conscious  of  the  concrete  reality  of 
God,  as  not  merely  above,  beyond,  outside,  almighty,  and 
arbitrary,  but  as  the  Father  of  all  spirits.  With  such  self- 
consciousness,  abstract  necessity  gives  place  to  concrete 
freedom.  Spirit  is  everywhere  at  home.  "  Not  my  will, 
but  thy  will  be  done,"  becomes  the  glad  aspiration  of  every 


282  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

spirit  who  has  grasped  this  conception  of  God.  That  will 
is  none  other  than  the  law  of  the  perfect  life  for  man,  and 
not  the  arbitrary  imposition  by  an  almighty  task-master  of 
laws  out  of  all  genial  relation  to  the  nature  of  man. 

(^.)  The  metaphysical  idea,  or  concept  of  the  Idea 
of  God. 

By  the  metaphysical  idea  of  God,  Hegel  means 
the  absolute  Idea  which  realizes  itself  from  within — 
that  is.  Spirit.  But  this  implies  the  unity  of  concept 
and  reality,  of  thought  and  being.  This  is  really  the 
ontological  proof,  so  called,  of  the  existence  of  God. 
In  this  section  Hegel  discusses  the  validity  of  it  as 
given  by  Anselm,  and  also  the  non-validity  of  Kant's 
famous  criticism  of  it.  But  his  examination  of  this 
argument  is  so  abstruse,  that,  in  place  of  reproducing 
it,  I  shall  attempt  to  give  the  main  points  at  issue 
in  the  discussion  of  this  proof  to-day,  in  the  spirit  of 
Hegel. 

He  does  not  for  a  moment  allow  that  there  can 
be  any  ybr/«^/ demonstration  of  the  existence  of  God. 
With  him  this  is  ever3''where  itself  the  principle  of 
the  demonstration  of  every  kind  of  existence.  Form- 
al logic  may  logomacize  and  cheat  itself  into  the  be- 
lief that  it  has  performed  the  demonstration,  while 
really  its  truth  is  assumed  in  the  very  terms  of  the 
demonstration.  The  existence  of  God  is  the  neces- 
sary precedent  and  postulate  of  all  human  thought 
of  God.  It  is  the  primal  truth,  the  Logos  of  all  truth. 
Induction  from  the  external  world  and  deduction 
from  finite  psychological  notions  are  equally  futile 
in  trjdng  to  reach  at  the  end  of  syllogisms  that 
which  is  really  the  life  of  all  syllogisms.  Hegel, 
however,  recognizes  the  difficulty  of  grasping  the 
profound  truth  involved  in   this   argument  when  it 


The  Absolute  Religion.  283 

is  attempted  by  the  mere  understanding-,  the  faculty 
of  the  finite.  At  this  standpoint  we  have  the  idea  or 
conception  of  God,  and  then  we  have  the  conception 
of  behig  as  different  from  and  in  no  vital  relation 
with  it.  The  problem,  then,  is  to  effect  a  union  be- 
tween them,  to  mediate  some  way  between  the  two, 
so  that  the  thought  of  God  shall  develop  itself  into 
existence. 

The  understanding  takes  hold  of  the  problem 
thus :  The  thought  of  God  is  made  the  starting-point. 
Then  this  is  dehned  as  including  the  whole  of  reality. 
Then  being-  or  existence  is  affirmed  to  be  a  reality ; 
whence  follows  the  conclusion  that  being  belongs  to 
the  thought  of  God,  the  total  of  reality.  The  thought 
or  conception  that  ive  have  in  our  minds  of  the  most 
perfect  or  the  most  real  Being,  ens  realissirmim,  must 
have  the  attribute  of  existence,  else  we  can  conceive 
of  a  more  perfect  being,  which  is  contrary  to  our  defi- 
nition. The  conclusion  is  from  thought — that  is,  from 
our  subjective  conception  of  God  to  his  actual  exist- 
ence. It  is  no  wonder  that  the  understanding  has 
barely  framed  this  syllogism  before  it  proceeds  to  de- 
molish it.  Kant's  refutation  of  this  form  of  it  is  clas- 
sically final.  He  affirms  that  from  our  notion  or 
thought  of  God  his  existence  can  never  be  inferred. 
For  existence  is  one  thing,  and  our  conception  an- 
other. Anybody  can  build  castles  in  the  air,  but  no 
logic  can  give  them  actual  existence.  Anybody  can 
imagine  a  hundred  dollars  in  his  pocket,  but  by  no 
sophistry  can  he  from  this  notion  get  a  hundred 
actual  dollars  in  his  pocket.  Any  merchant  may 
add  numberless  naughts  to  his  cash  accounts  with- 
out being  able  to  thereby  increase  his  wealth. 
These  last    two  illustrations  arc  the  famous  ones  of 


284  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Kant.*  Hegel  remarks  that  the  unexampled  favor 
and  acceptance  which  attended  Kant's  criticism  of 
this  proof  was  undoubtedly  due  to  the  illustration  he 
made  use  of.  But  the  illustration  seems  perfectly 
valid  against  this  argument  when  forced  into  the 
syllogism  of  the  understanding. 

From  the  conception  of  the  most  perfect  Being, 
logic  can  deduce  the  conception  of  his  actual  existence, 
but  it  can  not  deduce  the  objective  reality.  From 
the  conception  of  the  most  wealthy  man,  logic  can 
deduce  the  conception  of  thousands  of  dollars  in  his 
purse,  but  can  never  deduce  an  actually  existing  rich 
I  man  with  these  actual  dollars  in  his  pocket.  Nothing 
can  be  more  obvious  than  that  actual  existence  c?iX\  not 
be  deduced  from  the  conccptioii  of  existence.  "  And 
nothing,"  says  Hegel,  "  can  be  pettier  in  knowledge 
than  this."  But  can  it  even  be  imagined  that  such  pro- 
found thinkers  as  Augustine  and  Anselm  should  have 
framed  an  argument  so  easy  of  refutation  ?  The  fool 
who  in  his  heart  disbelieves  in  God  could  not  more 
satirically  make  mock  proof  of  his  existence  than  by 
such  a  form.  These  men  were  fools  neither  in  heart 
nor  in  head. 

Hegel  also  criticises  Kant  for  applying  the  term 
idea  to  things  like  a  hundred  dollars,  saying  that  this 
"  may  not  unfairly  be  styled  a  barbarism  of  language." 
Indeed,  it  is  claimed  by  Anselm,  as  well  as  Hegel, 
that  the  thought  or  idea  of  God  is  unique,  unlike  any 
merely  subjective  conception.  This  idea  of  God 
involves  his  existence.  It  is  the  unity  of  thought  and 
existence  that  constitutes  the  idea  of  God.     Anselm's 

*  Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  Meiklejohn's  translation,  pp.  368- 
370. 


The  Absolute  Religion.  285 

statement  of  the  argument  asserts  this.  It  begins  by 
asserting  that  God  is  the  most  perfect  Being,  who 
can  not  be  conceived  not  to  exist,  though  everything 
else  besides  can  be  conceived  not  to  exist.*  God  is, 
he  says.  No  proof  is  offered  by  him  of  God's  exist- 
ence. It  is  asserted,  as  that  of  which  it  is  impossible 
for  Reason  not  to  conceive.  God  is,  and  is  the  most 
perfect  Being,  and  therefore  he  is  more  than  a  mere 
idea  or  thought.  "  God  transcends  all  conception," 
continues  Anselm,  and  therefore  he  can  not  be  a 
mere  conception  in  the  intellect  of  man.  "  God  is 
before  all  things,  and  beyond  all  things,"  he  con- 
tinues. How  much  greater,  therefore,  than  any  mere 
notion  of  him  in  the  head  of  man  !  "  God  is  the  only 
7iccessary  Being,  he  is  the  whole,  the  absolute,  the  only 
God,"  continues  Anselm.  How  different  all  this  is 
from  the  argument  of  straw  that  Kant  so  triumph- 
antly demolishes !  He  accepts  the  catholic  faith  of 
all  the  wise  and  good  of  all  time  instead  of  evolving 
a  mere  subjective  conception  from  his  own  head. 

God  is.  Even  the  fool  presupposes  him,  in  the 
very  act  of  setting  forth  the  denial  of  him.  But  he 
is,  therefore,  more  than  any  mere  conception  of  him. 
Anselm  is  only  arguing  for  the  highest  possible  con- 
ception of  God,  which  is  that  he  is  not  merely  a 
product  of  the  human  mind,  or  the  conclusion  of  a 
formal  syllogism.  There  is  no  question  of  deducing 
his  Being  from  man's  idea  of  him.  The  presupposi- 
tion is  always  that  of  the  unity  of  the  idea  and  the 
existence  of  God.  It  is  the  unity  of  the  idea  and 
being   that   constitutes    the    catholic   conception   of 

*  Anselm's  Proslogium,  translation  in  the   Bib.  Sacra,  vol.  viii,  and 
Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  vol.  xv. 


286  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

God.  This,  however,  must  not  be  taken  as  maintain- 
ing that  God's  existence  is  exactly  identical  with  your 
or  my  conception  of  him.  For  Anselm  argues  that 
God  is  greater  than  all  (human)  conception  or  idea 
of  him.  It  is  the  idea  or  thought,  which  is  before, 
beyond,  in  and  constitutive  of  the  thought  of  all 
thinkers  and  all  objects  of  thought.  It  is  the  idea  of 
the  absolute  self-conscious  intelligence,  upon  which 
our  whole  conscious  life  is  based,  without  which  no 
thought,  no  thinker,  and  no  object  of  thought,  would 
exist. 

Such  is  the  thought  of  Anselm  and  others  on 
this  argument.  We  may  add  that  nothing  could  be 
further  from  this  great  thought  than  the  attempt  to 
prove  God  to  have  such  external,  objective,  spatial 
existence  as  a  tree,  a  house,  or  a  man.  Such  a  poor 
anthropomorphic  and  deistic  conception  of  God  has 
scarcely  any  kinship  with  the  idea  of  God  we  have 
been  considering.  We  may  only  too  gladly  yield  to 
its  critics  that  it  does  not  imply  God's  existence  as 
one  among  other  finite  existences.  In  asserting  his 
existence,  as  implied  in  his  idea,  we  are  not  taking 
for  our  measure  the  conception  of  existence  in  the 
sense  of  empirical  reality,  but  in  the  sense  of  thought, 
the  most  real  of  all  reality,  extra-temporal  and  extra- 
spatial,  and  yet  creative  of  time  and  space,  immanent 
in  these  conditions  under  which  we  think  in  a  limited 
way.  It  is  not  the  idea  of  God  dwelling  remotely 
in  the  same  space  conditions,  and  only  making  occa- 
sional visitations  to  other  parts  of  space  to  create  and 
reveal.  But,  if  he  did  not  create  in  time  and  space, 
he  did  create  with  them,  and  since  then  reveals  him- 
self under  these  self-imposed  conditions  of  ethical 
love.     It  is  this  divine  immanence  that  enables  us  to 


The  Absolute  Religion.  287 

reach  the  idea  of  him,  and  guarantees  a  relative  iden- 
tity even  between  our  thought  and  real  being.  The 
very  nature  of  everything  finite  is  an  inequality 
between  its  idea  and  its  actual  existence  in  time  and 
space.  The  same  is  true  of  all  finite,  subjective  con- 
ceptions. It  is  a  senseless  distortion  to  sa}'  that  phi- 
losophy affirms  their  identity  with  being. 

Das  Wissen  ist  Geist.  It  is  not  absolute,  and  yet  it 
is  not  wholly  false.  Painful  toil  and  gradual  process 
mark  the  advance  of  our  thought  to  more  adequate 
reality.  The  implicit  faith  of  all  activity  of  our 
thought  is  that  there  is  a  common  ground  between 
the  ov  of  the  external  world  and  our  \0709.  This  is 
the  source  of  all  confidence  and  work,  and  even  of 
our  sanity.  Science  could  not  and  would  not  move 
a  step  without  this  presupposition.  Philosophy  in- 
terprets the  basis  of  this  faith  into  that  Ontology  which 
makes  this  common  ground  to  be  Infinite  Spirit  that 
is  the  real  and  absolute  unity  of  Thought  and  Being. 
Sense  conditioned,  we  go  beyond  sense,  because  both 
ourselves  and  sensuous  nature  are  grounded  in  the  su- 
persensuous,  the  metaphysical,  the  immanent  Divine. 

God  is  the  w^/^^physics  (/xera,  in  the  midst  of)  of 
man  and  nature.  The  agreement  between  ideal 
(rational)  laws  of  thought  and  the  real  laws  or  con- 
tent of  existence  is  a  fact  of  experience.  And  the 
only  way  to  account  for  this  agreement  is  the  pre- 
supposition of  a  common  ground  of  both,  in  which 
thought  and  being  not  only  agree  but  are  identical. 
This  thought  is  the  real  ground  of  the  external  world 
and  of  our  thought.  That  our  finite  thought  can 
know  reality  partially,  see  it  through  however  opaque 
a  glass  you  please,  is  explicable  only  by  this  thought. 

This   is  the  real    meaning  and  the  vitally  practical 
26 


288  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

significance  of  the  ontological  argument.  It  is  only 
the  scientific  statement  of  the  faith  or  reason  of 
humanity.  Underneath  us  and  the  world  are  the 
everlasting  arms.  We  live  and  move  and  have  our 
being,  mental  and  moral,  as  well  as  physical,  in  him, 
and  He  lives  and  moves  and  has  real  being  in  us. 
This  external  self-conscious  Idea  involved  ivith  all 
existence,  is  the  ground  of  its  own  progressive  re- 
production into  higher  likeness,  in  human  thought. 
God  is  all  that  the  human  spirit  is  capable  of  becom- 
ing, through  aeons  of  learning  under  the  Divine  Peda- 
gogue. He  is  the  ethical  cause  of  our  God-conscious- 
ness, by  which  we  perceive  his  "  eternal  power  and 
Godhead "  in  the  universe,  and  rise  to  higher  and 
purer  conceptions,  as  he  speaks  to  us  "  fragmentarily 
and  multifariously." 

"  In  thy  light  we  shall  see  light "  is  philosophy's 
confession,  as  well  as  that  of  religion.  "  This  argu- 
ment is  one  latent  in  every  unsohisticated  mind, 
and  it  recurs  in  every  philosophy,  even  against  its 
wish  and  without  its  knowledge — as  may  be  seen 
in  the  theory  of  immediate  faith."  * 

(C.)  Hegel  makes  the  following  division  of  the 
whole  topic  of  the  Absolute  religion  :  "  The  absolute 
eternal  Idea  (Idee)  is — 

"  I.  God  in  and  for  himself  in  his  eternity  before 
the  creation  of  the  world  and  outside  of  the  world. 

"2.  Creation  of  the  world.  This  created  world 
divides  itself  into  the  two  sides  of  physical  nature 
and  of  finite  spirit.  This  is  primarily  posited  as 
alien  and  external  to  God.  But  it  belongs  to  the 
very  essence  of  God  that  he  reconcile  this  to  himself. 

*  Hegel's  Logic,  p.  287. 


The  Absolute  Religion.  289 

The  Idea,  having  dirempted  itself,  must  lead  back  this 
separated  element  to  itself  as  its  truth. 

"  3.  Tjiis  process  of  reconciliation  is  the  work  of 
the  Holy  Spirit  in  his  Church." 

"  These  are  not  external  divisions  that  we  make, 
but  the  course  of  the  activity,  of  the  developed  life 
of  the  Absolute  Spirit  itself.  This  is  its  eternal  life, 
its  divine  history,  which  we  must  consider  in  each 
of  the  three  forms." 

In  regard  to  place  or  space  we  may  say  that  the 
first  is  divine  history  outside  of  the  world,  spaceless ; 
the  second  is  in  the  world,  or  God  in  perfect,  definite 
existence ;  the  third  is  within,  in  the  Church,  which 
is  at  first  in  the  world,  but  elevating  itself  to  heaven, 
having  heaven  already  in  itself — that  is,  full  of  active 
good-will. 

The  same  distinction  may  also  be  applied  to  this 
divine  history  in  regard  to  time.  It  is  timeless,  and 
then  passes  through  the  time  relations  of  past,  pres- 
ent, and  future,  into  the  eternal  now.  "  Throughout 
the  whole  it  is  the  Idea  of  God  as  divine  self-revelation, 
that  we  have  to  consider." 

Man  can  not  demonstrate  the  Being  of  God,  but 
God  can  and  does  from  his  essential  nature  reveal 
himself  to  man.  First,  he  reveals  himself  as  being 
perfect  in  and  by  himself,  as  pure  spirit,  thought, 
reality.  This  is  the  realm  of  the  Father.  Secondly, 
he  reveals  himself  as  the  Son  in  the  world,  under  the 
conditions  of  empirical  history.  But  through  this 
historical  form  the  spirit  in  man  sees  the  divine  his- 
tory, the  manifestation  of  God  himself.  This  forms 
the  transition  to  the  realm  of  the  Spirit,  in  which  the 
process  of  reconciliation  is  embodied  in  the  form  of 
worship. 


290  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

"  We  must,  moreover,  distinguish  throughout  how 
the  Idea  is  in  these  three  forms  for  the  idea,  or  per- 
fect comprehension,  and  how  it  appears  in  our  men- 
tal representations  of  it,  in  our  picture-thought,  or 
image  conception.  For  religion  is  universal.  The 
idea  of  God  is  not  only  manifest  to  the  man  of  cult- 
ured scientific  thought,  for  philosophers,  but  also  to 
those  who  know  only  in  the  more  popular,  unsci- 
entific form  of  imaginative  conceptions.  It  has,  in- 
deed, necessary  characteristics  which  are  inseparable 
from  this  form  of  knowledge." 

The  preceding  pages  of  this  chapter  are  chiefly  a 
translation,  without  attempt  at  exposition,  of  Hegel's 
Introduction  to  Part  III,"^  with  the  exception  of  the 
paragraphs  on  the  ontological  proof.  It  is  scarcely 
just  to  give  this  without  accompanying  exposition. 
It  is  scarcely  just  to  stop  with  this  abstract  intro- 
duction to  the  most  interesting  part  of  the  whole  work, 
consisting  of — I.  The  Construction  of  the  Chris- 
tian Doctrine  of  the  Holy  Trinity.  2.  The  Doctrine 
of  the  Person  and  Work  of  Christ.  3.  The  Realm  of 
the  Holy  Spirit,  or  the  Formation,  Function,  and  Au- 
thority of  the  Church.  I  shall,  therefore,  conclude 
with  a  very  brief  re'sum^oi  this  Part,  which,  however, 
is  worthy  of  large  amplification  and  illustration. 

Absolute  Spirit,  as  identical  with  all  real  being, 
is  both  the  goal  and  the  origin  of  all  thought.  As 
Spirit,  God  is  self-conscious.  Self -consciousness  is 
not  simple  but  complex.  Subject,  object,  and  sub- 
ject-object are  essential  and  distinguished  elements 
in  all  consciousness.  God  is  Actus  Purus.  But  pure 
activity  has  its  phases  or  moments.      Before  all  time 

*  Pp.  191-223. 


The  Absohde  Religion.  291 

God  in  and  for  himself  eternally  begets  his  only-be- 
gotten Son,  and  recognizes  himself  in  his  Son,  as 
the  Son  does  himself  in  the  Father.  This  reciprocal 
relation  of  identity  in  difference  is  the  Spirit.  "  The 
Holy  Spirit  is  eternal  love.  Love  is  a  distinction  of 
two,  who  yet  are  not  distinguished  for  each  other. 
This  perceiving,  this  feeling,  this  cognizing  of  unity 
is  love."  * 

The  Trinity  is  a  mystery  and  a  contradiction 
when  the  mere  understanding  looks  at  it.  It  comes 
up  with  its  categories  of  finitude,  counts  one,  two, 
three,  and  says  they  can  not  possibly  be  but  one. 
Two  persons  can  not  be  one  person.  But  the  doc- 
trine of  the  Trinity  is  that  this  threefold  Person  is 
but  One,  each  person  being  posited  as  an  organic 
moment  or  element  of  the  One  Absolute  Personality. 
The  abstract  personality  of  each  of  these  moments 
must  not  be  retained  in  their  separation,  else  we  have 
Tritheism.  The  whole  is  an  eternal,  immanent  pro- 
cess, "  a  play  of  self-sustenance,  the  assurance  of  self- 
existence.''  Very  rude  forms  of  this  conception  are 
found  in  Oriental  religions.  Also  in  Greek  philoso- 
phy, especially  that  of  Alexandria,  we  find  forms  in 
which  this  idea  has  fermented. 

The  conception  of  the  creation  of  the  world  is 
essentially  related  to  the  Triune  conception  of  God. 
Creation  is  a  free  movement,  an  immanent  distinc- 
tion in  the  Idea,  and  not  an  act  done  once  for  all.  It 
is  the  self-posited  "other"  of  God,  the  principle  of 
antithesis  of  self -objectivity  in  God.  Hegel  sub- 
sumes under  this  category  or  moment  of  the  Divine 
self-activity  {a)  nature,  {U)  man,  and  {c)  Christ.     From 

*  Vol.  ii,  p.  227. 


292  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

the  Divine  standpoint  the  whole  process  is  an  inter- 
play of  love,  an  activity  of  self-conscious  life.  From 
the  human  standpoint,  this  activity  in  the  temporal 
sphere  shows  "  all  the  seriousness  and  pain  and  labor 
and  patience  of  the  difference,"  struggling  back  after 
reunion  with  its  source.  From  this  standpoint  the 
full  emphasis  is  placed  upon  the  element  of  differ- 
ence. This  includes  the  creation,  the  whole  groan- 
ing and  travailing  of  the  creation  in  sin  and  misery, 
redemption,  and  reconciliation  of  the  world  to  God. 
It  includes  the  whole  process  which  pertains  to  the 
incarnation,  as  the  summit  of  creation,  and  its  result- 
ing church  militant  merging  into  the  church  tri- 
umphant, when  the  Son  *'  shall  have  delivered  up 
the  kingdom  to  God  .  .  .  and  also  himself  be  subject 
unto  him  who  did  put  all  things  under  him,  that  God 
may  be  all  in  all,"  and  the  emphasis  be  placed  upon 
the  restored  unity — the  love  of  the  whole  process. 

Hegel's  profound  conception  of  sin  and  redemp- 
tion is  barely  hinted  at  in  such  brief  r^siimd  of  his 
pregnant  sentences. 

As  related  to  God,  man  is  bad  by  nature,  and 
must  be  born  again.  As  related  to  nature  and  his 
environment  he  is  unhappy,  and  needs  the  reconcili- 
ation which  can  only  come  with  restored  son-ship. 
He  must  become  fully  conscious  of  both  his  sin  and 
his  misery  before  the  atonement  can  be  mediated  by 
the  incarnation.  Consciousness  of  this  is  also  fol- 
lowed by  consciousness  of  total  inability  to  regain 
his  lost  estate.  Mere  morality  and  civilization  are 
inadequate  to  the  task  of  healing  the  breach.  '*  This 
is  the  profoundest  depth  "  {die  tiefste  Tiefe).^ 

*  Vol.  ii,  p.  270. 


The  Absolute  Religion.  293 

Evil,  as  embracing  sin  and  misery,  is  the  inade- 
quacy of  man  to  his  ideal,  and  his  inability  to  reach 
his  ideal  by  his  own  efforts.  This  drove  men  to  seek 
help  from  inadequate  gods,  and  then  again  to  self- 
help  in  philosophy.  All  this  result  of  the  co-working 
of  God  with  the  human  spirit  was  attained  in  his 
schooling  of  the  race  until  "the  fullness  of  times." 
The  Roman  Empire  at  the  advent  is  analogous  to 
a  place  of  birth,  and  its  pain  is  like  the  travail  throes 
of  another  and  higher  spirit.  The  need  was  felt, 
and  "the  desire  of  nations"  came  in  form  adequate 
to  the  need,  as  he  had  ever  been  coming  unto  and 
seeking  men  according  to  their  receptive  capacity, 
thus  schooling  them  for  the  ultimate  perfect  revela- 
tion of  reconciling  love  in  the  incarnation.  The  hith- 
erto co-working  of  God  with  man  came  to  birth- 
throes  in  the  incarnation,  "  the  axis  on  which  the  his- 
tory of  the  world  turns.  It  is  the  goal,  and  at  the 
same  time  the  true  starting-point  of  history.* 

Hegel  affirms  in  the  strongest  terms  not  only  the 
necessity  of  the  incarnation,  but  the  necessity  of  its 
taking  place  once  for  all  in  one  special  man.  It  can 
occur  but  once,  and  is  absolutely  unique,  thus  differ- 
ing from  the  Oriental  conception  of  Avatars. 

Christ  was  not  merely  a  great  man,  or  a  great 
moralist,  but  absolutely  the  incarnate  Son  of  God, 
beyond  all  human  categories.  Even  the  conception 
of  him  as  the  one  sinless  man  is  inadequate.f  The 
God-man  is  the  only  proper  definition,  as  given  by 
the  Church.  To  the  mere  understanding  this  is 
as  monstrous   and    contradictory  a    combination  as 

*  Philosophy  of  History,  p.  331. 

f  Vol.  ii,  pp.  283-287,  and  Philosophy  of  History,  p  337. 


294  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

that  of  the  sphinx.  If  we  make  absolute  and  endless 
distinction  between  divine  and  human  spirit,  this 
term  is  monstrous.  But  "  Christ  calls  himself  the 
Son  of  God  and  the  Son  of  man.  This  must  be  taken 
literally,"  *  as  it  can  be  only  when  we  do  not  posit 
absolute  incongruity  and  non-kinship  of  the  nature 
of  man  with  that  of  God.  Miracles  may  lead  the 
way  to  the  recognition  of  Jesus  as  the  Son  of  God, 
but  they  are  relative  and  subordinate  evidence  to 
that  of  the  witness  of  one's  own  spirit.  Son  of  Di- 
vine love,  he  manifested  this  love  to  his  fellow-men. 
This  love  begets  answering  love.  Disciples  and 
crowds  of  needy  ones  gather  about  him.  "  God  was 
in  Christ  reconciling  the  world  unto  himself." 

But  the  reconciliation  is  yet  to  be  worked  out  in 
men  and  humanity.  On  the  God  ward  side  "  it  is 
finished  "  once  for  all.  "  Thou  hast  put  all  things  in 
subjection  under  his  feet."  On  the  manward  side 
"  we  see  not  yet  all  things  put  under  him  (i.  e.,  man). 
But  we  see  Jesus  crowned  with  glory  and  honor " 
(Hebrews  ii,  8,  9).  This  accomplished  reconciliation 
is  the  basis  of  the  Christian  community.  But  it  is 
known  or  fully  realized  only  after  the  outpouring 
of  the  Holy  Spirit.  Not  till  then  could  his  disci- 
ples read  his  earthly  life  and  passion  aright.  He 
was  made  man.  Humanity  is  his  kin.  His  death 
shows  "  that  he  was  god-man,  the  God  who  had  hu- 
man nature,  even  unto  death.f  "  With  his  death  be- 
gins the  return  movement  ;  for  God  maintains  and 
preserves  himself  in  this  process,  and  Christ's  death 
is  only  the  death  of  death.  He  arises  again  to  life 
and  ascends  to  the  right  hand  of  God,  thus  showing, 

*  Vol.  ii,  p.  294.  f  Ibid.,  p.  298. 


The  Absolute  Religion.  295 

in  most  marked  way,  the  dignity  and  worth  and  the 
identity  of  human  nature  with  the  Divine  nature."  * 
With  his  ascension  comes  the  outpouring  of  the  Spirit 
— not  till  then  could  his  disciples  "  see  Jesus  crowned 
with  glory  and  honor,"  as  the  pledge  that  they  also 
should  be  crowned  with  glory  and  honor.  Not  till 
then  could  they  read  the  divine  in  the  human  life  of 
Christ  and  apprehend  the  mighty  power  of  his  love. 
It  was  expedient  that  he  go  away  out  of  sensuous 
form,  that  the  Spirit  might  make  his  abode  in  the 
midst  of  them  to  the  end  of  the  world.  "  The  Holy 
Ghost  was  poured  out  over  the  disciples  and  became 
their  immanent  life.  From  that  moment  they  went 
forth  joyfully  as  a  church  into  the  world,  in  order  to 
elevate  it  to  a  universal  church."  f  "  The  Church  is 
a  real,  present  life  in  the  spirit  of  Christ." 

Hegel's  view  of  the  authority  of  the  Church  is  the 
modern  one  of  the  dignity,  worth,  and  adequacy  of 
the  utterances  of  the  religious  consciousness  of  the 
ethical  aristocracy  of  the  community,  as  opposed  to 
subjective,  capricious,  and  very  unbalanced  views  of 
individuals.  His  whole  view  of  the  moral  {sittliche), 
as  embodied  in  the  customs  and  laws  of  the  ethical 
institutions  of  family,  state,  and  church,  is  militant 
against  extreme  individualism.  A  man  has  no  right 
to  make  a  brand-new  conscience  for  himself.  He  is 
bound  to  enlighten  and  educate  it  by  the  cultured 
conscience  of  the  community,  and  thus  be  able  to 
take  his  part  in  the  frequent  reformations  and 
enlargement  of  this  communal  conscience.  Thus 
Catholicism,  without  the  constantly  purifying  and 
progressive    Protestant   principle,  is  sectarian  ;   and 

*  Vol.  ii,  p.  300  and  foot-note.  t  Ibid.,  p.  316. 


296  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Protestantism,  without  its  organic  relation  with  the 
Catholic  past,  is  also  sectarian. 

The  Christian  consciousness  is  being  gradually 
guided  and  educated  into  all  truth  by  the  immanent 
Holy  Spirit.  "  It  is  important  that  the  Christian 
religion  be  not  limited  to  the  literal  words  of  Christ 
himself.  It  is  in  the  apostles  that  the  completed  and 
developed  truth  is  first  exhibited.  This  complex  of 
thought  unfolded  itself  in  the  Christian  community 
in  the  midst  of  the  elements  of  the  environing  Roman 
Empire."  *  The  leaven  working  in  the  whole  lump 
and  its  environments  exegetes  its  own  content  as  the 
Faith.  "  It  is  clear  that  the  community  produces  this 
Faith.  It  is  not  merely  the  mechanical  sum  of  Christ's 
own  words — not  merely  the  collocation  of  the  words 
of  the  Bible,  but  the  product  of  the  Church.  It  is 
the  interpretation  of  these  words,  and  of  the  merely 
external  history  of  Christ  by  the  Spirit,  in  the  degree 
to  which  he  is  able  to  enlighten  the  Christian  com- 
munity." t  "  The  existence  of  the  Church  consists  in 
its  perpetual  becoming.  This  is  grounded  in  the  na- 
ture of  Spirit  to  eternally  cognize  itself,  to  divide  it- 
self in  the  finite  sparks  of  individual  members,  and 
then  to  gather  itself  out  of  this  finitude  and  compre- 
hend itself  again.  Thus  the  Christian  consciousness 
becomes  divine  self-consciousness  in  progressively 
adequate  forms."  :j:  The  spirit  which  is  poured  out  is 
but  the  incipient  impulse  to  its  fuller  realization.  The 
mediation  takes  place  in  the  subjective  experience  of 
individuals  in  the  social  community. 

Dogma  is  inevitable  and  necessary.     "  The  real- 

*  Philosophy  of  History,  p.  341. 

f  Vol.  ii,  p.  328.  X  Ibid.,  p.  330. 


The  Absolute  Religion.  297 

ized  communion  of  worshipers  is  what  we  call  in 
general  the  Church."  It  is  self-sustaining,  self-propa- 
gating, self-defining,  and  authoritative  through  the 
power  and  wisdom  of  the  indwelling  Spirit.  Its 
positing  of  dogma  is  an  essential  activity  of  the 
Church.  It  is  a  thinking  as  well  as  a  loving  and 
practical  communion.  It  thinks  the  contents  of  the 
gospel  narratives  and  of  the  Christian  sentiment 
into  the  form  of  the  Faith.  "  Dogma  is  necessary, 
and  must  be  taught  as  valid  truth."  It  is  the  work 
of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  thinking  power  of  the 
educated  Christian  consciousness.  This  doctrine 
must  be  preserved  and  taught.  This  makes  the  min- 
istry an  essential  institution  of  the  Church.  Mere 
feeling  or  subjective  certitude  can  form  no  bond  of 
unity.  "  For  the  community  (of  believers)  is  only 
possible  through  definite  church  teaching.  Each 
individual  has  his  own  feelings,  and  sentiments,  and 
views  of  the  world.  This  form  does  not  answer  for 
spirit  which  wishes  to  know  hozv  it  is  contained 
therein."  * 

He  maintains  the  Church's  doctrine  of  the  sacra- 
ments. The  subject  is  born  into  this  community  of 
life  and  doctrine  in  baptism.  "  The  Eucharist  is  the 
central  point  of  the  doctrine  of  Christianity,  and  the 
highest  act  of  worship.  While,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
constant  preservation  of  the  Church  (which  is  at  the 
same  time  the  uninterrupted  creation  of  itself)  is  the 
continued  repetition  of  the  life,  passion,  and  resur- 
rection of  Christ  in  the  members  of  the  Church,  this, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  expressly  accomplished  in  the 
sacrament  of  the  Lord's  Supper."f     He  maintains  the 

*  Philosophic  der  Religion,  vol.  ii,  p.  353.  f  Ibid.,  p.  338. 


298  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Lutheran  view  of  the  Eucharist  against  the  unspirit- 
ual  Roman  and  the  «^«-spiritual  Zwinglian  recollec- 
tion view,  or  that  of  prosy  rationalism.  "  There  is  no 
transubstantiation,  except  such  a  one  as  annuls  the 
external,  and  makes  the  presence  of  God  strictly  a 
spiritual  one,  demanding  the  faith  of  the  communi- 
cant as  an  essential  condition."  * 

Throughout  this  Part,  his  polemic  against  the  con- 
ception of  God  as  a  great  Being,  dwelling  at  a  dis- 
tance from  the  world  which  he  has  made  and  re- 
deemed, almost  ceases.  This  gives  place  to  his  con- 
structive work  of  resetting  all  the  doctrines  of  the 
Church  in  the  light  of  the  immanence  of  God  the 
Holy  Spirit.  The  Trinity,  the  Divinity  of  our  Lord, 
the  atonement,  and  immortality,  are  all  as  explicitly 
taught  as  by  any  theologian,  and  indeed  in  the  very 
spirit  and  method  of  the  greatest  teachers  of  the  early 
Greek  theology,  as  well  as  of  Anselm  and  Aquinas. 
Especially  profound  and  exhaustive  is  his  explication 
of  the  doctrines  of  sin  and  of  the  atonement,  being 
implicated  with  the  whole  scheme  of  doctrine  begin- 
ning with  the  Trinity,  and  ending  only  with  the  ulti- 
mate form  of  the  kingdom  of  God. 

Through  both  dogma  and  worship  the  Spirit  is 
spreading  abroad  and  realizing  the  love  of  Christ  in 
the  hearts  of  men,  thus  extending  his  kingdom.  The 
leaven  is  leavening  the  whole  lump.  "  This  actuali- 
zation of  the  spiritual  into  universal  reality  contains, 
at  the  same  time,  the  transformation  and  the  reforma- 
tion of  the  Church."  f  It  meets  and  annuls  by  real- 
izing itself,  in  the  hostile  world  of  {ci)  the  hearts  of 
men,  {B)  the  rationalism  of  the  reflective  understand- 

*  Vol.  ii,  p.  340.  f  Ibid.,  p.  340. 


The  Absolute  Religion.  299 

ing-,  {c)  thoug-ht,  reconciling  all  to  itself.  In  the  Phi- 
losophy of  History  (p.  341)  he  explicates  in  a  slightly 
different  form  this  mediating  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
in  "reconciling  the  world  unto  himself,"  thus  gradu- 
ally hallowing  the  secular. 

There  is  a  double  attitude  toward  the  world:  i. 
The  two  are  antagonistic.  The  world  is  hostile.  2. 
The  world  supplies  the  intellectual  media  for  the 
work  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  interpreting  the  content 
of  the  faith  and  in  formulating  it  into  doctrinal  sym- 
bols. It  also  supplies  the  media  for  his  work  of 
organization.  Let  us  take  this  latter  first :  (2.)  The 
chief  element  in  the  formulating  of  the  doctrinal  sym- 
bols was  supplied  by  the  previous  development  of 
philosophy.  Alexandria  had  become  the  meeting 
and  mingling  point  of  thought  of  the  East  and  the 
West.  Philosophy  had  become  religious,  working 
at  the  problem  of  the  bridge  between  man  and 
God.  How  can  the  Infinite  descend  to  the  finite, 
and  how  can  the  finite  rise  to  the  Infinite?  Here 
the  doctrine  of  the  Logos  had  its  first  rise.  Spirit  is 
A0709.  "  Here  speculative  thinking  attained  those 
abstract  ideas  which  are  likewise  the  fundamental 
purport  of  the  Christian  religion "  (p.  342).  Both 
the  heresies  and  the  developing  catholic  doctrine 
sprang  largely  from  current  philosophical  concep- 
tions. The  heresies  manifested  the  inadequacy  of 
philosophy  to  the  content  of  Christianity ;  and  this 
content,  on  the  other  hand,  forced  philosophy  to  a 
fuller  development.  Heresy  chose  now  the  mono- 
theistic and  now  the  pantheistic  element  in  Chris- 
tianity, and  the  Church  said  nay  to  every  such  one- 
sided  apprehension  of    its   content,  and  maintained 

its   completeness   against  them    all.      Prof.    Edward 
27 


300  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

Caird  *  attributes  this  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit  "  to 
the  healthy  instinct  of  Christendom,  that  repelled  any 
attempt  to  mutilate  its  life." 

It  was  only  gradually  that  it  could  create  out  of 
existing  philosophical  conceptions  a  philosophy  ade- 
quate to  its  content.  "  In  the  Nicene  Council  was 
ultimately  established  a  fixed  confession  of  faith  to 
which  we  still  adhere  ;  this  confession  had  not,  in- 
deed, a  speculative  form,  but  the  profoundly  specula- 
tive is  most  intimately  interwoven  with  the  manifes- 
tation of  Christ  himself.  The  profoundest  thought 
is  connected  with  the  personality  of  Christ — with  the 
historical  and  external.  And  it  is  the  very  grandeur 
of  the  Christian  religion  that,  with  all  this  profundity, 
it  is  easy  of  comprehension  in  its  outward  aspect  by 
our  consciousness,  while,  at  the  same  time,  it  sum- 
mons us  to  penetrate  deeper.  It  is  thus  adapted  to 
every  grade  of  culture,  and  yet  satisfies  the  highest 
requirements."  f 

Now,  (i)  as  to  its  attitude  to  the  world  of  organ- 
ized secular  life.  The  Divine  reconciliation  takes 
place  in  the  hearts  of  individuals  in  a  community. 
This  community  becomes  "  a  particular  form  of  secu- 
lar existence,  occupying  a  place  side  by  side  with 
other  forms  of  secular  existence.  The  religious  life 
of  the  Church  is  governed  by  Christ ;  the  secular  side 
is  left  to  the  free  choice  of  the  members  themselves. 
Into  this  kingdom  of  God  organization  must  be  intro- 
duced. There  is  a  necessity  of  a  guiding  and  teach- 
ing body  distinct  from  the  spirit-pervaded  community. 
Those  who  are  distinguished  for  talents,  character, 
piety,  learning,  and  culture  in   general,  are  chosen 

*  The  Philosophy  of  Kant,  p.  22.  |  Philosophy  of  History,  p.  344. 


The  Absolute  Religion.  301 

as  overseers  {VorstcJierii)!'  *  To  this  intelligent  body 
of  overseers,  the  spirit  comes  in  a  revealed  and  ex- 
plicit form,  while  in  the  mass  of  the  community  it  is 
only  implicit.  This  body  becomes  thus  an  autJiority 
in  spiritual  as  well  as  in  the  secular  affairs  of  the 
community.  This  distinction  gives  rise  to  an  ecclesi- 
astical kiyigdom  in  the  kingdom  of  God.  But,  how- 
ever necessary,  this  is  not  ultimate.  Concrete  free- 
dom is  not  yet  fully  realized  for  the  community.  As 
yet  all  are  not  free,  do  not  recognize  the  authority  as 
congenial  and  self-imposed.  It  is  yet  an  external  and 
partly  arbitrary  and  so  non-rational  authority.  The 
realization  of  this  real  freedom  and  the  rationally 
valid  authority  of  authority  is  a  long  process  through 
the  ecclesiastical  tyranny  of  the  middle  ages.  For, 
besides  this  authority  over  the  consciences  of  men, 
we  find  the  Church  assuming  authority  over  secular 
interests. 

Soon,  too,  priestly  consecration,  though  begin- 
ning as  the  official  recognition  in  specially  appoint- 
ed overseers  of  that  authority  and  divinely  impart- 
ed knowledge  which  was  implicitly  recognized  in 
the  universal  priesthood  of  all  Christian  believers, 
changes  its  democracy  into  an  aristocracy.  This 
formed  one  of  the  iron  rods  for  the  terrible  discipline 
of  the  middle  ages,  resulting  in  the  grand  denial  of 
this  tyranny  in  the  Reformation,  which,  instead  of 
breaking  or  marring  the  unity  and  life  of  the  Church, 
only  manifested  it  in  higher  form,  in  more  essential 
unity  with  its  Divine  head.  The  merely  ecclesiasti- 
cal supremacy  over  the  minds  and  institutions  of  men 
had  served  its  mission.     It  had  educated  the  world 

*  Philosophy  of  History,  p.  344. 


302  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

into  freedom,  of  which  the  Reformation  was  the 
voice.  In  the  ethical  life  of  the  family  and  state,  as 
well  as  in  the  Church,  the  reconciliation  of  religion 
with  the  world  is  accomplished.'^  Humanity  now  at- 
tains the  consciousness  of  a  real  internal  harmoniza- 
tion of  spirit,  and  a  good  conscience  in  regard  to  sec- 
ular existence.  In  this  there  is  no  revolt  against  the 
Divine  or  sacred,  but  the  realization  of  that  better 
subjectivity  which  recognizes  the  Divine  in  its  own 
being ;  which  is  imbued  with  the  true  and  the  good, 
and  labors  for  their  attainment  in  the  kingdom  of 
God  on  earth  (secular).  But  this  realization  is  not 
actualized  immediately.  The  Reformation  sets  free 
subjectivity,  which  does  not  universally  attain  rational 
liberty  at  once.  Abstract  liberalism  and  rationalism 
assert  themselves.  The  French  Revolution  was  the 
manifestation  of  the  former;  the  Atifklaerung,  the 
Ecclaircissement  and  English  Rationalism  of  the  latter. 
The  Spirit  has  further  work  to  do  to  make  the  secular 
life  the  positive  and  definite  embodiment  of  the  spirit- 
ual kingdom,  and  to  reconcile  human  thinking  to  it- 
self. Mere  rationalism  results  in  agnosticism,  and 
pessimism  thinks  its  reflective  thought  out.  But,  in 
its  expiring  moment,  the  Spirit  re-enters  to  restore  to 
fuller  life.  Spirit  itself  is  thinking  that  can  sympa- 
thize with  all  the  infirmities  of  human  thinking,  that 
is  in  it  all,  coaxing  and  forcing  it  to  full  concrete 
cognition.  Through  this  work  of  the  Spirit  in  phi- 
losophy, the  content  of  Christianity  is  restored,  re- 
habilitated, and  justified  to  thought.  Religion  must, 
for  thinking  men  to-day,  ground  itself  upon  a  sub- 
stantial and  necessary  content  of  truth.     Its  ration- 

*  Philosophic  der  Religion,  vol.  ii,  p.  344. 


The  Absolute  Religion.  303 

ality,  in  the  speculative  sense  of  the  word,  must  be 
vindicated. 

This  is  the  work  of  Philosophy.  Abstract  think- 
ing- of  rationalism  and  no -thinking  of  pietism  de- 
stroy or  acknowledge  no  content,  no  objective 
truth.  Subjective  individualism,  withdrawing  to 
the  height  of  its  infinity,  reduces  all  intellectual  and 
ethical  content  to  its  own  creation.  Everybody 
has  his  oiun  God,  his  own  Christ,  his  own  truth,  his 
oivn  good ;  they  are  but  ins  own  creations.  Philoso- 
phy contains  their  objective  reality.  Its  "  objective 
standpoint  alone  is  capable  of  giving  the  testimony  of 
Spirit  in  a  cultured  and  thinking  manner,  and  is  con- 
tained in  the  better  class  of  dogmatism  of  our  times. 
This  standpoint  is,  therefore,  that  of  the  justifica- 
tion of  religion,  especially  of  the  Christian  and  true 
religion.  It  cognizes  the  content  according  to  its  ne- 
cessity, according  to  its  reason,  and,  in  the  same  w^ay, 
it  cognizes  the  forms  in  the  development  of  this  con- 
tent. We  have  inspected  these  forms,  namely :  the 
phenomenal  manifestation  of  God,  the  image -con- 
ception for  the  sensuous,  and  the  spiritual  conscious- 
ness, which  has  attained  universality  or  thought,  the 
complete  development  of  the  Spirit."* 

Thinking  that  has  broken  into  religion,  at  first 
occupies  a  questioning  and  then  a  hostile  attitude  to- 
ward the  figurate-conception,  and  then  toward  the 
doctrinal  form  of  religion.  Religion  takes  refuge  in 
emotion,  renouncing  the  understanding  of  its  content. 
But  then  the  holy  Church  has  no  longer  a  bond  of 
community  and  collapses  into  sects ;  or,  its  teachers 
may  say.  Do  not  entertain  these  questionings,  and 

*  Vol.  ii,  p.  351. 


304  Philosophy  of  Religion, 

then  they  are  solved.  But  when  I  begin  to  think,  I  am 
compelled  to  have  them ;  I  can  not  put  them  aside  ; 
and  the  necessity  of  answering  them  rests  upon  the 
necessity  of  having  them.  "  Thinking  that  has  thus 
commenced  never  ceases;  it  persists  and  makes  the 
heart,  heaven,  and  the  cognizing  spirit  empty  and 
void.  The  religious  content  then  takes  refuge  in 
the  idea.  Here  it  must  receive  its  justification,  and 
thinking  must  conceive  itself  as  concrete  and  free ; 
it  must  hold  the  differences  not  as  merely  positive 
and  external,  but  must  let  them  go  freely  from  itself, 
and  thereby  recognize  the  content  as  objective."* 

Philosophy  has  for  its  aim  the  cognition  of  truth, 
of  God,  for  he  is  the  absolute  truth.  Light  commu- 
nicates itself.  "  Whoever  says  that  God  can  not  be 
cognized  says  that  God  is  envious,  and  he  is  not  in 
earnest  in  believing  in  God,  no  matter  how  much  he 
talks  about  him.  Rationalism,  that  vanity  of  the  un- 
derstanding, is  the  most  violent  opponent  of  philoso- 
phy ;  it  is  offended  when  philosophy  points  out  the 
presence  of  reason  in  the  Christian  religion,  when  it 
shows  that  the  testimony  of  the  Spirit  of  truth  is  the 
revealed  religion.  In  philosophy,  which  is  theology, 
the  whole  object  is  to  show  reason  in  religion."  f 

"  In  philosophy,  religion  finds  its  justification 
from  the  standpoint  of  thinking  consciousness.  Un- 
sophisticated piety  has  no  need  of  this ;  it  receives 
truth  upon  external  authority,  and  finds  satisfaction 
and  reconcihation  by  means  of  this  truth.  In  faith 
there  is  already  the  true  content,  but  it  still  lacks  the 
form  of  valid,'  necessary  thought.  This  speculative 
thought  is  the  absolute  judge  before  whom  the  con- 

*  Vol.  ii,  p.  351.  f  Ibid.,  p.  353. 


The  Absolute  Religio7i.  305 

tent  of  religion  must  verify  and  justify  itself."  *  The 
charge  of  placing  philosophy  above  religion  is  false, 
for  it  has  no  other  content  than  religion.  It  only  puts 
it  in  the  form  of  necessary  thought  to  save  those  who 
are  losing  it  through  mere  reflective  thought  or 
rationalism.  It  thinks  through  and  above  this  abort- 
ive rationalism.  It  is  Christian  philosophy  or  the- 
ology. It  acknowledges  that  its  content  is  the  Chris- 
tian religion.  Prof.  Morris  thus  distinguishes  be- 
tween reflective  and  philosopJiical  thought : 

There  is,  indeed,  a  so-called  "  reason,"  the  "  supersedure  " 
of  which  is  an  indispensable  condition,  not  only  of  spiritual 
salvation,  or  of  the  entrance  into  the  heart  of  true  religion, 
but  also  of  the  very  existence  of  a  truly  positive  and  substan- 
tial philosophy  itself.  To  this  truth  the  whole  history  and  the 
intrinsic  nature,  both  of  religion  and  philosophy,  bear  direct 
and  abundant  witness.  The  "reason"  in  question  is  one  whose 
whole  industry  is  absorbed  in  the  detection  of  abstract  con- 
tradictions and  identities.  Its  spirit  and  its  weapons  are 
only  mechanical  and  dead,  not  organic  and  living.  It  is 
abstract,  and  not  concrete.  All  its  logic  is  formal,  and  not 
substantial.  It  is  "  metaphysical,"  dealing  with  "  uncriti- 
cised  categories,"  and  not  philosophical.  Its  "  dialectic  " 
is  subje*ctive,  artificial,  and  superficial,  not  objective,  con- 
tentful, and  dictated  by  the  essential  nature  of  whatever 
may  be  the  subject  of  its  inquiry.  In  short,  and  in  fact,  it 
is  sense-conditioned  rcason-ing,  and  not  sense-conditioning 
reason.  The  Germans  distinguish  these  two  under  different 
names,  calling  the  former  Versiand,  or  "  understanding  " — 
as  though  its  characteristic  work  were  best  described  as 
consisting  in  arresting,  or  bringing  to  a  standstill,  the  living, 
moving  process  of  reality,  with  a  view  to  the  separate,  ana- 
lytical examination  of  its  parts,  and  of  the  mode  of  their 

*  Vol.  ii,  p.  353. 


3o6  Philosophy  of  Religioti. 

mechanical  combination.  To  the  pure  understanding,  rea- 
son proper,  and  all  its  objects — all  living,  organic  wholes, 
and  all  vitally  synthetic  processes — are  a  mystery  and  in- 
credible. What  reason,  as  a  faculty,  whose  seat  is  at  the 
very  center  of  human  experience,  perceives,  is  imperceptible 
for  the  understanding.  Reason  is  the  faculty  of  insight — 
i.  e.,  of  essential,  thoroughly,  and  completely  objective,  or 
experimental  intelligence  j  understanding  is  the  faculty — if  I 
may  so  express  myself — of  outsight,  or  of  superficial,  empiri- 
cal, contingent  information  respecting  external  particulars, 
viewed  in  abstraction  and  separation  from  their  essential  and 
vital  ground. 

To  men  of  the  eighteenth  century  "  reason "  meant 
"  understanding  "  ;  and  the  self-styled  "  Age  of  Reason  " 
was,  accordingly,  not  the  age  of  true,  concrete,  vital  reason 
— which,  in  operation,  is  simply  equivalent  to  Experience 
taking  true  and  complete  and  tmprejudiced  account  of  herself — 
but  rather  the  age  of  '^reasons,"  of  argument,  or  alleging 
of  "reasons,"//-^  and  ^<?«,  and  of  consequent  "doubt,"  re- 
specting all  that  can  be  made  a  subject  of  argument — as 
everything  can.  Let  us  not,  then,  confound  the  "  reason  " 
of  Thomas  Paine  with  the  reason  of  Aristotle,  or  of  philoso- 
phy. And,  finally,  let  us  not  forget  that,  while  any  true 
revelation  may  be  expected  to  transcend  and  confound  the 
"  reasonings  "  of  an  unvitalized  "  understanding,"  the  very 
condition  of  its  reception  is  the  existence  of  reason,  as  also 
the  condition  of  its  effectiveness  is  that  by  it  reason  finds 
itself  truly  illuminated. 

As  matter  of  fact,  philosophy  has  received  illumination 
from  the  Christian  consciousness  in  regard  to  three  funda- 
mental conceptions,  of  the  Absolute,  of  Nature,  and  of  Man. 
And  let  it  be  remembered  that,  when  I  say  "  philosophy," 
I  do  not  mean  any  mere  jargon  of  words,  nor  any  arbitrary 
collection  of  dogmatic  opinions,  but  philosophic  science —  , 
the  science,  in  the  strictest  sense,  of  experience,  and  of  ex- 
perience taken  in  the  deepest,  most  comprehensive,  truest, 


The  Absolute  Religion.  307 

and  richest  sense  of  the  term.  Under  the  influence  of  the 
Christian  consciousness,  then,  philosophy  has  come  to  a 
more  definite  and  complete  conception  of  the  concrete,  liv- 
ing unity  of  the  Absolute,  as  Spirit.  It  has,  secondly,  been 
enabled  to  conceive  and  comprehend  more  distinctly  the 
personal,  living  relation  of  the  divine  Logos  to  the  world. 
It  need  hardly  be  said  that,  in  proportion  as  this  relation  is 
distinctly  conceived,  and  its  truth  perceived,  the  possibility 
of  a  lapse  into  pure  naturalism  or  pantheism  is  taken  away. 
And,  thirdly,  Christianity  has  contributed  to  philosophy  a 
fuller  sense,  and  demonstration,  of  the  truth  that  man  is 
made  perfect  man,  not  through  mere  "  imitation  "  of  God, 
or  "  resemblance  "  to  him,  but  "  in  one  "  with  him,  by  an 
organic  union  which,  so  far  from  interfering  with  his  free- 
dom, is  the  very  condition  of  his  true — i.  e.,  his  spiritual — 
freedom,  and  of  his  true  spiritual  personality,* 

Moreover,  as  Hegel  affirms,  this  whole  process 
of  thought  must  take  place  within  the  Church  itself. 
ft  is  to  be  Christian  thinking,  subject  to  the  Church, 
even  when  criticising  and  doubting  its  formal  doc- 
trines on  its  way  to  speculative  insight  and  har- 
mony of  them.  Hegel  distinguishes  three  stages  or 
classes  in  this  work  :  "  The  first  is  that  of  immediate, 
unquestioning  religion  and  belief;  the  second,  that 
of  the  understanding,  or  the  rationalism  of  the  so- 
called  people  of  culture ;  and,  finally,  that  of  philos- 
ophy." t  The  rationalism  of  the  second  class  creates 
discord  which  itself  is  powerless  to  heal.  Hence 
the  inadequacy  of  the  Apologetics  of  the  Under- 
standing, which  I  have  criticised  in  Chapter  IV. 
Only  reason  can  heal  the  wounds  made  by  reason, 
but  it  must  be  the  higher  reason  of  philosophy. 
Though  discord  and  skepticism  still    appear  in  the 

*  Philosophy  and  Christianity,  pp.  313-315.  \  Vol.  ii,  p  354. 


3o8  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

actual  Church,  we  dare  not  speak  of  its  possible 
decadence.  The  gates  of  hell  can  not  prevail  against 
the  Church  inspired  by  the  Holy  Ghost.  The  dis- 
cord of  semi-pagan  life  exists  in  many  members  of 
the  communion.  But  the  discord  of  thought,  of 
skepticism,  Hegel  says,  "  has  been  dissolved  for  us 
by  philosophy,  and  the  aim  of  these  lectures  has 
been  to  reconcile  reason  with  religion,  to  discern  the 
latter  in  its  various  forms  as  necessary,  and  to  find 
again  in  revealed  religion  the  Truth  and  the  Ideay  * 
This  song  of  triumph  to  philosophy  at  the  end  of  his 
work,  however,  is  not  as  naively  joyous  as  the  an- 
them of  praise  to  religion  with  which  he  begins  (first 
page  of  Chapter  III).  For  he  throws  in  this  minor 
chord :  "  But  this  reconciliation  is  only  a  partial  one, 
not  having  acquired  external  universality.  Philos- 
ophy is,  in  this  respect,  a  secluded  sanctuary,  and  its 
servants  form  an  isolated  priesthood,  which  can  not 
go  hand  in  hand  with  the  world,  but  must  guard  the 
treasure  of  the  Truth."  f 

*  Vol.  ii,  p.  355.  f  Ibid.,  p.  356. 


APPENDIX. 


CHRISTIAN    UNITY  IN    AMERICA  AND    THE    HISTORIC 
EPISCOPATE. 

Ubi  Spiritus  ibi  Ecclesia. 

The  American  Church  is  a  church  of  the  future,  a  real- 
izable vision,  an  ideal  certainly  more  potent  to-day  than  at 
any  other  time  in  our  history.  Its  elements  appear  to  be 
mere  disjecta  inetnbra  to  some,  who  can  not  see  the  working 
of  the  synthesizing  spirit  in  the  various  Christian  communi- 
ties of  our  land.  The  Roman  Catholics  say  that  this  Church 
is  already  in  our  midst.  There  are  evidences  of  an  effort 
on  its  part  to  translate  its  foreign  title  Roman  into  Ameri- 
can. It  seems  to  be  an  impossible  feat.  The  grip  of  Rome 
will  never  be  relaxed  so  as  to  allow  its  members  here  to 
form  an  autonomous  national  church. 

Some  in  our  own  Protestant  Episcopal  Church,  also,  be- 
lieve that  the  American  Church  is  a  present  existing  organ- 
ism. All  that  seems  necessary  is  to  strike  out  the  obnox- 
ious epithet  of  Protestant  Fpiscopal,  and  by  this  simple  de- 
vice we  appear  in  our  true  light  as  "  The  Church  in  the 
United  States  of  America." 

None  of  the  other  large  Christian  bodies  have  such  a 
short  and  easy  method  of  realizing  this  ideal.  In  fact,  they 
have  no  definitely  framed  ideal  as  to  the  form  of  this  Church 
of  the  future.  They  labor  and  pray  for  Christian  unity.  The 
Evangelical  Alliance  is  the  exponent  of  their  eirenical  effort, 


3IO  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

seeking  their  common  faith  and  spirit.  It  has  no  plan  of 
union,  and  no  authority  to  organize.  But  it  certainly  pro- 
motes that  unity  of  spirit  which  must  be  primal  and  causal 
in  any  union  of  the  parts.  It  thus  begins  at  the  heart  of 
the  question,  and  so  commands  the  sympathy  of  those  who 
believe  that  any  worthy  valid  union  of  organization  can 
only  come  as  the  natural  expression  of  an  ethical  unity  of 
spirit. 

Certainly  this  is  better  than  ready-made  artificial  plans 
of  unity,  and  better  than  any  dogmatic  claim  that  the  for- 
mal organism  is  already  in  our  midst,  and  all  that  is 
needed  is  that  all  other  bodies  should  conform  to  it.  But 
it  does  lack  that  practical  element  which  is  so  noticeable  a 
feature  of  the  report  of  the  Committee  on  Christian  Unity 
adopted  by  the  House  of  Bishops  and  by  the  House  of 
Clerical  and  Lay  Deputies  in  the  General  Convention  of 
1886.  That  was  the  outcome  of  the  loftiest  devotion  to  the 
kingdom  of  God,  as  distinguished  from  merely  sectarian 
devotion  to  their  own  Church.  It  is  as  eirenical  as  it  is 
practical.  It  was  put  forth  from  a  yearning  for  unity  to 
meet  the  like  yearning  for  Christian  fellowship  visibly  mov- 
ing the  hearts  of  so  many  Christians  in  our  land.  It  de- 
clares "that  this  Church  does  not  seek  to  absorb  other 
communions,"  and  "  that  in  all  things  of  human  ordering  or 
human  choice,  relating  to  the  modes  of  worship  and  disci- 
pline, or  to  traditional  customs,  this  Church  is  ready  in  the 
spirit  of  love  and  humility  to  forego  all  preferences  of  her 
own,  ...  to  heal  the  wounds  of  the  body  of  Christ."  But  it 
also  declares  that  Church  unity  can  only  be  attained  by  the 
(  acceptance  by  all  Christian  communions  of  these  four  essen- 
tials of  catholicity  :  i.  The  Holy  Scriptures;  2.  The  Nicene 
Creed,  as  the  sufficient  statement  of  the  Christian  faith ; 
3.  The  two  sacraments ;  and,  4.  The  "  historic  Episcopate, 
locally  adapted  in  the  methods  of  its  administration  to  the 
varying  needs  of  the  nations  and  peoples  called  of  God  into 
the  unity  of  his  Church." 


Appendix,  3 1 1 

It  furthermore  declares  "  a  desire  and  readiness  ...  to 
enter  into  brotherly  conference  with  all  or  any  Christian 
bodies  seeking  the  organic  unity  of  the  Church,  with  a  view 
to  the  earnest  study  of  the  conditions  under  which  so  price- 
less a  blessing  might  happily  be  brought  to  pass,"  * 

*  The  declaration  of  the  bishops  is  so  lofty,  humble,  and  earnest  that 
it  deserves  to  be  widely  known.  I  gladly  give  the  text,  omitting  the  pre- 
amble : 

"  We  do  hereby  solemnly  declare  to  all  whom  it  may  concern,  and  es- 
pecially to  our  fellow-Christians  of  the  different  communions  in  this  land, 
who  in  their  several  spheres  have  contended  for  the  religion  of  Christ, 

"  I.  Our  earnest  desire  that  the  Saviour's  prayer  '  that  we  all  may  be 
one '  may,  in  its  deepest  and  truest  sense,  be  speedily  fulfilled. 

"2.  That  we  believe  that  all  who  have  been -duly  baptized  with  wa- 
ter, in  the  name  of  the  Father,  and  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost, 
are  members  of  the  Holy  Catholic  Church. 

"  3.  That  in  all  things  of  human  ordering,  or  human  choice,  relating 
to  modes  of  worship  and  discipline,  or  to  traditional  customs,  this  Church 
is  ready,  in  the  spirit  of  love  and  humility,  to  forego  all  preferences  of 
her  own. 

"4.  That  this  Church  does  not  seek  to  absorb  other  communions,  but 
rather,  co-operating  with  them  on  the  basis  of  a  common  faith  and  order, 
to  discontinue  schism,  to  heal  the  wounds  of  the  body  of  Christ,  and  to 
promote  the  charity  which  is  the  chief  of  Christian  graces,  and  the  visible 
manifestation  of  Christ  to  the  world. 

"  But,  furthermore,  we  do  hereby  affirm  that  the  Christian  unity  now 
so  earnestly  desired  by  the  memorialists,  can  be  restored  only  by  the  re- 
turn of  all  Christian  communions  to  the  principles  of  unity  exemplified 
by  the  undivided  Catholic  Church,  during  the  first  ages  of  its  existence  ; 
which  principles  we  believe  to  be  the  substantial  deposit  of  Christian 
faith  and  order  committed  by  Christ  and  the  apostles  to  the  Church,  unto 
the  end  of  the  world,  and  therefore  incapable  of  compromise  or  surren- 
der by  those  who  have  been  ordained  to  be  its  stewards  and  trustees  for 
the  common  and  equal  benefit  of  all  men.  As  inherent  parts  of  this  sa- 
cred deposit,  and  therefore  as  essential  to  the  restoration  of  unity  among 
the  divided  branches  of  Christendom,  we  account  the  following  ;  to  wit : 

"  I.  The  Holy  Scriptures  of  the  Old  and  New  Testament  as  the  re- 
vealed word  of  God. 

"2.  The  Nicene  Creed  as  the  sufficient  statement  of  the  Christian 
faith. 

22. 


312  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

We  note  several  characteristics  of  this  noble,  lofty,  and 
catholic  declaration  :  First,  that  it  has  in  view  almost  entirely 
Christians  of  the  Froiesta?it  communions  of  this  country. 
Second,  that  it  can  afford  no  ground  for  the  suspicion  of  its 
being  an  attempt  to  open  the  way  for  the  absorption  of  other 
communions  in  that  of  the  Episcopal  Church,  for  final  self- 
aggrandizement.  Third,  that  on  the  first  three  of  its  de- 
clared essentials  there  is  already  practical  agreement,  unity 
of  faith,  affording  a  basis  for  some  practical  steps  toward 
organic  unity.  Fourth,  that  the  fourth  term  of  communion 
sfated  —  the  "historic  Episcopate" — is  the  only  one  that 
they  practically  declare  the  other  bodies  to  lack,  while  their 
Church  holds  it  only  as  a  trust  to  be  imparted  whenever 
demanded  by  fellow-Christians.  There  is  nothing  in  the 
declaration  to  lead  one  to  suspect  that  this  is  considered  as 
a  whit  more  essential  than  the  other  three  already  held  by 
the  other  Christian  bodies.  But  it  is  evident  that  this 
"  historic  Episcopate  "  will  be  the  chief  topic  in  all  "  brother- 
ly conferences  "  on  the  subject  of  Church  unity  or  of  inter- 
Church  communion. 

Our  own  chief  work,  then,  should  be  to  set  forth  "  the 
historic  Episcopate  "  as  free  as  possible  from  the  parasitical 
accretions,  distortions,  the  accidental  and  unessential  debris 
that  cluster  about  it.    We  should  set  it  forth,  not  in  any  one 

"  3.  The  two  sacraments — Baptism  and  the  Supper  of  the  Lord — min- 
istered with  unfailing  use  of  Christ's  words  of  institution,  and  of  the  ele- 
ments ordained  by  Him. 

"4.  The  historic  episcopate,  locally  adapted  in  the  methods  of  its  ad- 
ministration to  the  varying  needs  of  the  nations  and  people  called  of  God 
into  the  unity  of  His  Church. 

"  Furthermore,  deeply  grieved  by  the  sad  divisions  which  afflict  the 
Christian  Church  in  our  own  land,  we  hereby  declare  our  desire  and 
readiness,  so  soon  as  there  shall  be  any  authorized  response  to  this  decla- 
ration, to  enter  into  brotherly  conference  with  all  or  any  Christian  bodies 
seeking  the  restoration  of  the  organic  unity  of  the  Church,  with  a  view  to 
the  earnest  study  of  the  conditions  under  which  so  priceless  a  blessing 
might  happily  be  brought  to  pass." 


Appcjidix.  313 

of  its  transient  historical  forms,  but  as  studied  and  estimated 
in  the  spirit  of  the  historical  method.  This  would  be  a  com- 
mon method  that  the  leading  students  of  church  history 
in  all  communions  could  employ.  It,  however,  would  un- 
doubtedly demand  the  giving  up  of  the  traditional  spirit  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  dogjuatic  spirit  on  the  other,  where 
these  still  exist.  Now,  "  the  present  predominance  of  this 
historical  method"  is,  as  Prof.  Sidgwick  says  (History  of 
Ethics,  p.  26S),  largely  due  to  Hegel.  It  is  true  that  no 
such  a  problem  as  confronts  us  ever  came  before  him.  He, 
however,  believed  strongly  in  national  Churches. 

He  considered  religion  in  its  essence  to  be  the  foundation 
of  the  state.  Indeed,  "  though  the  aspects  of  religion  and 
the  state  are  different,  they  are  radically  one ;  and  the  laws 
find  their  highest  confirmation  in  religion  "  (Philosophy  of 
History,  p.  468).  When  religion  exists  as  separate,  dissenting 
organizations  within  the  state,  they  must,  he  says,  be  subor- 
dinated to  the  ethical  supervision  of  the  state.  They  can 
not  be  allowed  to  foster  anything  absolutely  "  alien  or  op- 
posed to  the  constitution,"  or  to  treat  the  State  as  a  soulless, 
Godless  mechanism.  The  ultimate  guarantee  of  the  state 
laws  is  the  disposition  of  its  people.  Churches  have  the 
large  part  of  the  work  of  forming  this  disposition.  Hence 
a  want  of  freedom  in  religion  will  produce  the  same  lack 
in  the  state,  and  a  wrong  conception  of  God  will  lead 
to  bad  laws  and  government.  Modern  states  base  their 
constitutions  on  the  principle  of  freedom.  Hence,  wher- 
ever the  Roman  Catholic  religion  becomes  the  prevail- 
ing form,  the  free  state  is  endangered.  Here  two  kinds 
of  conscience  exist,  the  religious  conscience,  under  the 
direction  of  its  priests,  making  the  other  virtually  to  be 
no  conscience.  Hence  Hegel  gave  the  political  pref- 
erence to  Protestantism,  because  it  inculcates  freedom  of 
thought  and  conscience.  The  Protestant  conscience  is  the 
ethical  {Sittlichc)  conscience,  which  harmonizes  with  the 
principle  of  free  political  life  (Philosophie  der  Religion,  vol. 


314  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

ii,  p.  246,  and  Philosophie  des  Geistes,  p.  439).  He  con- 
sidered the  Reformation,  as  we  have  seen,  to  be,  in  one  as- 
pect, the  abrogation  and  the  reconciliation  of  the  unethical 
dualism  between  the  Church  and  the  world  of  ethical  [^Sitt- 
liche)  institutions  of  family  and  state.  Religion  now 
esteems  the  secular  life  as  sacred;  affirms  the  family  life 
to  be  more  truly  ethical  than  celibacy,  and  Christian  rulers, 
as  well  as  priests,  to  be  the  servants  of  the  Lord.  Thus 
Christianity  came  to  build  up  the  great  ethical  world  of 
modern  life.* 

We  have  also  noted  how  thoroughly  it  is  in  the  historical 
spirit  that  he  studies  the  origin  of  the  Christian  Church  and 
ministry.  "  It  seemed  good  to  the  Holy  Ghost  and  to  us  " 
(Acts  XV,  28)  is  the  one  formula  concurrent  with  all  the  de- 
veloping forms  of  church  life,  justifying  them;  present  and 
future  generations  of  Christians  were  to  be  guided  into  the 
truth,  and  to  exert  plenary  authority,  not  infallible  wisdom, 
in  developing  its  own  form  of  secular  life,  or  external  or- 
ganization— that  is,  an  ecclesiastical  kingdom  (cf.  Chapter 
Vni,  p.  300). 

There  is  no  radical  dualism  between  "  the  Holy  Ghost " 
and  "  us  "  in  this  work,  except  when  any  one  phase  of  de- 
velopment is  stereotyped  as  ultimate.  Hooker  thus  identi- 
fies the  vox  populi  and  vox  Dei:  "The  general  and  per- 

*  How  entirely  did  Maurice  agree  with  this  view  of  the  relation  of 
the  Church  and  the  world  !  He  says :  "  The  world  contains  the  elements 
of  which  the  Church  is  composed.  The  Church  is,  therefore,  human 
society  in  its  normal  state  ;  the  world  that  same  society  irregular  and 
abnormal.  The  world  is  the  Church  without  God  ;  the  Church  is  the 
world  restored  to  its  relation  with  God,  taken  back  by  him  into  the  state 
for  which  he  created  it.  Deprive  the  Church  of  its  center,  and  you 
make  it  into  a  world.  If  you  give  it  a  false  center,  as  the  Romanists 
have  done,  still  presei-ving  the  sacraments,  forms,  and  creeds,  which 
speak  of  the  true  center,  there  necessarily  comes  out  that  grotesque 
hybrid  which  we  witness — i.  e.,  a  world  assuming  all  the  dignity  and 
authority  of  a  Church — a  Church  practicing  all  the  worst  fictions  of  a 
world  "  (Theological  Essays,  p.  305). 


Appendix.  3 1 5 

petual  voice  of  man  is  as  the  sentence  of  God  himself." 
But  this  does  not  make  %VicS\jure  divino  church  organizations 
unchangeable,  they  also  being  of  the  nature  of  human  adap- 
tations to  existing  needs  (Ecclesiastical  Polity,  iii,  x). 

No  historian  of  repute  to-day  denies  the  fact  of  the 
Episcopate  as  a  power  or  function  of  the  Church,  having, 
in  its  substantial  form,  from  primitive  times,  an  essentially 
unbroken  continuity  of  development.  Its  historic  validity 
is  unquestioned.  We  accept  and  put  it  forth  as  one  of  the 
bonds  of  historic  continuity  and  present  community.  But 
some  such  questions  as  the  following  will  be  asked  :  Is  it 
essential  to  the  existence  {csse^  of  a  Church  ?  Or  is  it  essen- 
tial to  the  well-being  {betu  esse)  of  a  Church,  which  was 
Hooker's  contention  ?  If  so,  what  is  its  essential  nature  and 
its  intrinsic  excellence  ?  Does  it  unchurch  non-Episcopal 
communions  by  denying  that  they  possess  a  valid  ministry 
and  sacraments,  as  our  English  Church  reformers  did  not  ? 
Can  our  Church  so  interpret  this  "  historic  Episcopate  "  in 
the  historical  method  that  she  can  impart  this  fourth  essen- 
tial to  non-Episcopal  bodies,  either  without  reordination 
of  their  clergy,*  or  with  hypo-thetical  ordination  ?  Or, 
finally,  can  she  not  impart  this  essential  to  others,  as  she 
does  to  her  own  clergy,  without  requiring  subscription 
to  any  doctrinal  theory  of  holy  orders,  without,  I  mean, 
fettering  it  with  the  sacerdotal  theory  of  the  ministry, 
which  is  contrary  to  whole  current  of  Protestant  Chris- 
tianity ? 

This  is  neither  an  arbitrary,  sentimental,  nor  a  merely 
politic  interpretation,  but  the  only  one  that  is  justified  by 
the  spirit  of  the  historico-philosophical  method.  The  same 
method  gives  it  to  us  as  a  trust  to  hold  and  yet  not  with- 

*  This  interpretation  is  given  by  the  Rev.  Henry  Forrester,  in  his 
Christian  Unity  and  the  Historic  Episcopate.  This  is  a  calm  study  of 
the  discretion  with  which  the  Church  in  various  ages  has  met  like  emer- 
gencies, by  exercising  her  plenary  authority,  in  dispensing  with  reordi- 
nation for  the  sake  of  Cliurch  unity  (cf.  Gore.,  pp.  1S9-I96). 


3i6  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

hold.  We  believe  in  preserving  the  historical  institution 
of  the  Church.  We  accept  the  Episcopate  as  the  bond 
of  formal  historic  unity.  We  do  not  care,  we  not  dare,  to 
give  it  up.  But  we  do  dare,  and  care  very  much,  to  give 
up  invalid  interpretations  of  it  that  distort  its  chartered 
functions,  and  prevent  all  "  friendly  conference  "  with  other 
Christian  bodies,  on  the  subject  of  Church  unity.  The  Rev. 
Dr.  McConnell  well  says  of  this  anti-Protestant  and  really  un- 
Catholic  interpretation  :  "  It  costs  us  now  the  opportunity  to 
gain  a  friendly  hearing  for  the  wise  and  temperate  proposals 
of  the  House  of  Bishops,  in  the  interests  of  Christian  unity. 
Until  this  suspicion  of  sacerdotalism  shall  be  removed,  the 
historic  Episcopate  will  go  begging  "  (American  Episcopacy, 
p.  36).  This  interpretation  has  only  false  historical  justi- 
fication. That  is,  it  can  be  found  to  be  the  prevailing  view 
at  certain  times  and  with  certain  parties  in  the  Church. 
But  the  true  historical  justification  of  past  forms  is  only  for 
their  own  concurrent  times  and  circumstances,  not  for  others. 
It  vindicates  the  Papacy  in  the  past,  and  yet  invalidates  it 
for  the  present  Church.  So,  too,  it  invalidates  the  sacerdotal 
theory  of  holy  orders  that  has  been  attached  to  the  purely 
governmental  function  of  the  Episcopate  of  the  Apostolic  and 
post-Apostolic  Church. 

The  Church's  organization  was  evolved,  and  so  was 
divine.  It  is  yet  evolving,  and  may  evolve  into  different 
forms.  Nay,  it  must  thus  evolve,  to  retain  its  vital  power  and 
divine  significance.  This  principle  must  be  controlling  in  all 
attempts  to  give  the  historic  Episcopate  to  our  brethren  of 
other  communions,  on  the  way  to  the  forming  of  the  national 
Church  of  America.  This  alone  will  save  our  offer  from  the 
opprobrium  of  arrogance. 

The  whole  result  of  the  historical  method  in  this  de- 
partment is  opposed  to  what  I  have  called  the  unhistorical, 
sacerdotal  conception  of  the  origin  and  function  of  the 
Episcopate.  That  fiction  of  obscurantism,  the  creation  of 
feeling,  fancy,  and  priestcraft,  which  reads  the  New  Testa- 


Appendix.  3 1 7 

ment  with  sacerdotal  glasses,  should  be  relegated  to  the 
limbo  of  other  man-made, /«r^  divino  theories.  That  of  the 
jure  divino  theory  of  kings  to  govern  their  people  well,  served 
its  mission.  But  the  same  theory,  perverted  to  that  of  the 
right  to  govern  people  badly  for  their  own  profit  ("ZV/a/ 
c'est  moi"),  has  already  led  the  way  that  its  sister  must  fol- 
low. How  often  it  is  true  that  "  the  children  of  this  world 
are  in  their  generation  wiser  than  the  children  of  light  !  " 
How  often  the  state  leads  the  way,  forcing  the  Church  to 
follow  the  Divine  guidance ! 

Martin  Luther  once  wrote  to  King  Henry  VHI,  "I, 
Martin  Luther,  by  the  grace  of  God  an  ecclesiastic,  to  Henry, 
by  the  ungrace  of  God,  King  of  England."  And  yet  the 
state,  as  the  organization  for  the  perfection  of  human  life 
in  public  affairs,  is  as  jure  divino  as  is  the  Church  in  its 
sphere.  They  are  both  means  to  the  end  of  man's  well- 
being,  and  as  such  Jure  divino,  necessary.  Any  other  Jure 
divino  interpretation  of  Church  polity  is  both  mechanical 
and  mythical. 

Hooker's  claim  for  the  Episcopate  was  based  strictly 
on  the  history  and  well-being  of  the  Church.  He  was  con- 
tending against  the  Puritan  for  holding  the  same  jure  di- 
vino theory  of  a  New-Testament-given  polity  that  our  Anglo- 
Catholics  hold  to-day.  No  wonder,  then,  that  this  party 
have  ceased  to  refer  to  Hooker,  and  that  they  are  doing 
all  they  can  to  shelve  him,  and  bring  out  Laud  and  Ban- 
croft as  the  true  exponents  of  Church  principles.  Indeed, 
it  was  not  until  the  close  of  the  sixteenth  century  that 
the  Jure  divino  theory  of  the  Episcopate  was  broached  in  a 
sermon  by  Bancroft.  Denied  by  Hooker  in  the  interest  of 
a  larger  view,  it  was  taken  up  again  and  pressed  to  its  ex- 
treme form  by  those  ecclesiastics  who  sought  to  uphold  the 
Stuart  theory  of  the  divine  right  of  kings,  in  return  for  the 
support  given  by  the  Stuarts  to  the  divine  right  of  Episco- 
pacy. Till  that  time  no  leading  divine  had  made  Episco- 
pacy to  be  the  chief  essence  of  the  Church,  or  "  unchurched 


3i8  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

the  bodies  of  the  Continent  for  an  infelicity,  not  a  fault." 
Hooker  never  claims  Episcopacy  as  essential  to  the  being  of 
the  Church,  but  freely  allows  that  such  churches  as  were, 
by  untoward  circumstances,  organized  without  the  Episco- 
pate, are  authorized  to  have  a  ministry  suited  to  their  needs. 
He  rather  laments  than  exagitates  their  defect  of  not  having 
government  by  bishops.  In  his  whole  treatment  of  the  topic 
he  is  practically  a  contemporary  of  those  who  use  the  his- 
torical method  to-day. 

The  Church  of  Christ,  as  an  organized  body,  is  clearly 
a  secular  institution,  subject  to  all  the  conditions  of  a  de- 
velopment in  time  and  in  the  world.  Its  early  literature  is 
now  so  well  studied  that  there  is  little  room  left  for  the 
holding  omne  ignotiim  pro  mirifico.  It  is,  too,  being  studied 
with  reference  to  the  forms  of  social,  civil,  and  religious 
organizations  at  the  time  of  its  rise,  and  of  those  of  the 
various  stages  through  which  it  has  since  passed.  The 
transforming  power  of  the  new  leaven  is  seen  entering  the 
prepared  lump.  The  faith  and  the  life  of  Christ  in  his 
disciples  and  the  early  converts  was  the  leaven.  There  was 
no  prescript  draft  of  polity  given  either  by  Christ  or  his 
apostles.  That  it  developed  according  to  its  wants.  The 
form  of  the  family  or  of  a  brotherhood  was  sufficient  for 
its  primal  needs.  Only  saintly  idealists,*  and  ecclesiastical 
dreamers  and  pedants  and  politicians,  are  capable  of  the 
vision  of  the  Church  dropping  ready  made  from  the  skies, 

*  Principal  Gore,  in"  arguing  for  the  Episcopate  *'  as  a  devolution 
from  above  and  not  a  delegation  from  below  " — that  is,  from  the  apostles 
by  localization  rather  than  from  the  presbyters  as  an  elevation — can  not 
find  the  needed  facts.  He  admits  that  "  there  was  not,  indeed,  such  a 
localized  ruler  in  every  Church  in  the  age  immediately  after  the  destruc- 
tion of  Jerusalem,"  and  appeals  to  unfounded  tradition,  very  honestly 
qualifying  its  worth  in  this  way  :  "  But  even  if  this  and  similar  traditions 
present  us  with  the  facts  somewhat  idealized,  as  is  the  habit  of  tradition, 
at  least  they  do  not  misrepresent  the  facts  "  (The  Church  and  the  Minis- 
try, p.  306). 


Appendix.  3 1 9 

or  of  a  definite  polity  imparted  by  our  Lord  during  the 
great  forty  days.  They,  alone,  can  have  the  conscience  to 
apply  all  the  scriptural  terms,  applicable  only  to  the  ideal, 
the  perfected,  the  wholly  holy  bride  of  Christ,  to  the  visible 
historic  forms  of  its  secular  life  ;  and  they  alone  care  for  the 
right  to  use  certain  consecrated  phrases  in  anathematizing 
all  who  attempt  to  lift  the  mythical  veil  from  their  idol  and 
reveal  the  living  power  of  the  Holy  Spirit  immanent  in  what 
they  choose  to  stigmatize  as  secular. 

The  historical  method  says.  Given  the  new  and  wondrous 
life  and  spirit  of  Christ  and  the  contemporary  forms  of  so- 
cial, civil,  and  religious  organizations,  and  the  new  needs  of 
the  Christian  communities,  and  then  the  presumption  of  any 
mechanically  supernatural  origin  of  the  Church's  organiza- 
tion is  an  impertinence.  As  Dr.  McConnell  says,  "  If  one 
had  been  present  when  God  was  beginning  the  establish- 
ment of  his  new  kingdom,  all  that  he  could  have  seen  would 
have  been  ordinary  men  engaged  in  ordinary  activities — 
moving  from  place  to  place,  teaching,  preaching,  organizing, 
experimenting  under  the  conditions  of  ordinary  men."  The 
definite  forms  of  the  Church  and  the  ministry  were  the 
natural  development  of  this  life,  its  needs  and  work.  The 
Episcopate,  as  the  governing  body,  not  as  the  channel  of 
priestly  grace,  was  soon  one  of  the  most  essential,  as  it  has 
been  the  most  continuous,  forms  of  this  organization. 

These  are  the  two  interpretations  of  this  historic  Epis- 
copate :  I.  That  it  is  either  an  essential  or  a  desirable  mode 
of  church  govermnentj  and,  2.  That  it  is  the  necessary 
channel  for  imparting  the  grace  of  a  valid  ministry  and 
sacraments  (cf.  Gore,  pp.  70,  345). 

I.  The  first  is  plainly  the  view  of  the  English  reformers 
till  the  time  of  Laud.  The  greatest  divines  of  the  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  centuries  (as  Usher,  Stillingfleet, 
Tillotson,  Burnet,  and  Waterland)  agreed  with  Hooker  in 
this  anti-sacerdotal  interpretation.  This  was  the  view  of 
those  who  framed  the  preface  to  the  Ordinal,  and  of  a  long 


320  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

line  of  eminent  divines  of  the  Church  of  England  (as  Arch- 
bishop Whately  and  Bishops  Thirlwall  and  Lightfoot)  and 
of  the  Episcopal  Church  in  America. 

Both  these  views,  the  unhistorical  jure  divino  sacerdotal, 
and  the  historical  jure  divino  governmental  theories  are 
maintained  by  leading  divines  in  our  own  Church,  which  has 
made  the  oifer  of  the  historic  Episcopate.  The  so-called 
Loiv  and  Broad  Churchmen  maintain  ex  animo  "  the  his- 
toric Episcopate,  locally  adapted  in  the  methods  of  its  ad- 
ministration to  the  varying  needs."  They  are  vindicated 
by  both  the  spirit  and  the  results  of  the  historical  method 
of  studying  the  facts.  Two  of  the  recent  Bampton  Lecturers 
(Canon  Freemantle  and  Dr.  Edwin  Hatch)  simply  modern- 
ize Hooker  and  Whately,  as  Lightfoot  did  before  them. 

*'  There  are  some,"  says  Prof.  Hatch  (The  Organization 
of  the  Early  Christian  Churches,  p.  19),  "no  doubt,  who  will 
think  that  to  account  for  the  organization  of  the  Church  in 
this  way  is  to  detract  from  the  nobility  of  its  birth,  or  from  the 
divinity  of  its  life.  There  are  some  who  can  see  divinity  in 
the  thunder-peal,  which  they  can  not  see  in  the  serenity  of 
a  summer  noon.  But  I  would  ask  those  who  think  so  to 
look  for  a  moment  at  that  other  monument  of  divine  power, 
and  manifestation  of  divine  life,  which  we  bear  about  with 
us  at  every  moment.  .  .  .  From  antecedent  and  lower  forms 
came  into  being  these  human  bodies,  with  their  marvelous 
complexity  of  structure,  with  their  almost  boundless  capacity 
of  various  effort,  with  their  almost  infinitely  far-reaching 
faculty  of  observation.  And  so,  out  of  elements,  and  by 
the  action  of  forces  analogous  to  those  which  have  resulted 
in  other  institutions  of  society  and  other  forms  of  govern- 
ment, came  into  being  that  widest  and  strongest  and  most 
enduring  of  institutions  which  bears  the  sacred  name  of  the 
Holy  Catholic  Church." 

Nothing  is  gained  by  showing  that  this  or  that  element 
is  more  primitive  than  another,  for  the  preservation  we  seek 
is  not  so  much  ancient  form  as  historical  continuity.     It  is 


Appendix.  321 

given  to  each  generation  to  inherit,  and  also  to  revise  and 
reform,  its  splendid  inheritance  ;  but  it  can  never  bring  back 
or  copy  the  past,  without  losing  its  own  life.  "  To  suppose 
a  polity  fitted  to  the  youth  of  our  religion,"  says  Dr.  Wash- 
burn (Epochs  of  Church  History,  p.  22),  "  to  be  the  abso- 
lute law  of  all  times,  is  a  sectarianism  as  palpable  as  to 
insist  on  immersion.  I  know  that,  in  saying  this,  I  offend 
many  champions  of  our  communion.  But  I  urge  no  radical- 
ism, I  give  the  sound  church  principle  of  all  our  great  re- 
formed divines." 

This  historical  view  of  the  origin  and  function  of  the 
Church  and  ministry  is  a  more  truly  jure  divino  conception 
than  the  one  which  accounts  for  them  by  a  mechanical  and 
external,  supernatural  imposition. 

Churchmen  of  this  type  accept  con  amore  the  historical 
place  and  worth  of  their  own  communion,  as  a  member  of 
that  "blessed  company  of  all  faithful  people."  But  they 
decline  to  unchurch  *  the  large  evangelical  bodies  about 
them  who  are  so  well  known  by  their  fruits  in  all  depart- 
ments of  Christian  activity,  in  missionary,  educational  and 

*  Hooker  says  that  the  Church  "hath  not  ordinarily  allowed  any  other 
than  bishops  alone  to  ordain,  but  there  may  be  sometimes  very  just  and 
sufficient  reason  to  allow  ordination  to  be  made  without  a  bishop." 

And  Bishop  Andrews  says  :  "  Though  our  government  be  of  Divine 
right,  it  follows  not  that  a  church  can  not  stand  without  it.  He  must 
needs  be  stone-blind  that  sees  not  churches  standing  without  it." 

Archbishop  Whately  maintains  (The  Kingdom  of  Christ,  pp.  209, 
215)  that  "  it  is  a  plain  duty  for  men  so  circumstanced  (as  the  Conti- 
nental Reformers  were)  to  obey  their  heavenly  Master,  and  forsake  those 
who  have  apostatized  from  him.  So  far  from  being  rebellious  subjects, 
they  would  be  guilty  of  rebellion  if  they  did  not."  "  These  bodies  had 
full  power  to  retain  or  restore,  or  to  originate  whatever  form  of  church- 
government  they,  in  their  deliberate  and  cautious  judgment  might  deem 
best  for  the  time  and  country,  and  persons  they  had  to  deal  with.  They 
were,  therefore,  at  perfect  liberty  to  appoint  bishops,  even  if  thi-y  had 
none  that  had  joined  them  in  the  Reformation  ;  or  to  discontinue  the 
appointment,  even  if  they  had" 


322  Philosophy  of  Religiojt. 

philanthropic  work.  They  will  not  be  guilty  of  the  scarcely 
pardonable  sin  and  intellectual  blunder,  of  calling  them  sec- 
tarians and  schismatics.  They  decline  to  deny  the  validity 
of  their  orders  and  sacraments. 

This  proper  jure  divino  theory  is  applicable  to  all  normal 
authorities  in  all  states  and  churches,  justifiable  revolution 
being  always  recognized.  It  justifies  the  Papacy  and  Puri- 
tanism for  certain  times  and  places,  and  repudiates  them  as 
evil  for  others.  It  recognizes  the  right  of  might  in  all  his- 
torical products  or  forms  of  ethical  {sittliche)  life,  so  far  as 
they  have  served  their  day  and  generation  in  the  advance- 
ment of  the  well-being  of  man.  As  the  natural  congenial 
product  of  inner  life,  all  such  forms  are  rational.  When 
they  cease  to  be  natural  and  useful,  they  cease  to  be  rational 
and  ethical.  To  claim  finality  for  any  one  transient  rational 
form  is  irrational.  Finality  means  sterility.  But  this  is  not 
the  way  of  the  Spirit  in  this  world.  The  Spirit  was  there. 
But  now  he  is  here.  "  The  powers  that  be  are  ordained  of 
God."  St.  Paul  could  write  this  even  when  Nero  was  per- 
secuting Christians,  and  could  add,  **  He  is  a  minister  of  God 
{@tov  6iaKavog)  to  thee  for  good."  The  ruling  powers  or- 
dained in  the  various  churches  (Articles  XXIII;  XXXIV) 
are  ministers  of  God  for  good.  Thus  (e.  g.)  the  ministers  in 
the  Presbyterian  Church  are  ordained  of  God  for  good. 
This  maybe  frankly  and  gladly  admitted  by  those  holding 
the  historical /2^r^  divino  theory  that  all  normal  ethical  insti- 
tutions, and  their  reformed  form,  zxt  jure  divino. 

Esteeming  the  value  of  the  continuity  and  the  heritage 
of  the  past,  not  lightly  to  be  given  up,  this  school  heartily 
believes  their  form  of  polity  and  worship  to  be  by  far  the 
best  fitted  to  maintain  and  spread  abroad  the  kingdom  of 
Christ.  But  they  are  not  sacerdotalists  nor  sacramentarians 
in  the  mediaeval  sense  of  these  terms,  though  they  recognize 
the  worth  of  this  form  of  Christianity  in  the  past,  and  in 
the  present  too,  where  conditions  of  the  past  still  exist. 
They  deny,  as  does  our  Article  XXV,  holy  orders  to  be  a 


Appendix.  323 

sacrament.  They  affirm  the  laity  to  be  an  important  part 
of  the  universal  priesthood  of  believers,  and  do  not  con- 
found the  Church  with,  nor  make  it  a  mere  appendage  to, 
the  clergy.  While  clinging  to  the  heritage  of  the  past,  they 
are  especially  concerned  to  integrate  the  true,  the  good,  and 
the  beautiful  in  the  present  work  of  the  spirit  of  Christ 
among  Christians.  Our  first  and  foremost  work  lies  with 
our  own  flesh  and  blood — the  Protestant  communions  of  our 
country.  It  is  pleasant  to  be  able  to  quote  at  least  one  of 
the  other  school  who  favors  the  same  direction  of  effort.  The 
Rev.  E.  S.  Ffoulkes,  after  his  return  from  Rome,  writes  thus  : 
"  We  are  impatient  that  the  Roman  Church  refuses  to  admit 
our  orders  ;  let  us  now  observe  that  attitude  toward  Luther- 
ans, Calvinists,  and  Wesleyans,  that  we  should  wish  Rome 
hereafter  to  observe  toward  us  ;  let  us  not  be  too  stiff  in  our 
requirements ;  too  captious  in  our  criticisms  ;  too  certain  that 
our  views  are  not  founded  on  prejudice,  and  do  not  require 
modifying  to  be  consistent  with  truth.  We  have  a  great 
fight  to  wage,  but  not  with  Christians  "  (a  sermon  preached 
at  All  Saints,  Lambeth,  1871). 

Churchmen  of  this  school  cherish  their  ministry  and  wor- 
ship for  their  intrinsic  excellence,  and  yet  emphasize  points 
of  agreement  rather  than  points  of  difference  with  those  of 
other  communions.  They  do  not  propose  to  surrender 
the  historic  Episcopate,  which  is  their  own  contribution  to 
the  cause  of  Christian  unity.  But  they  do  propose  to  sur- 
render all  that  prevents  it  from  being  Catholic,  Protestant, 
and  republican.  They  take  a  higher,  broader,  and  more 
hopeful  view  of  the  Church  in  America  than  those  can  who 
look  upon  the  Reformation  as  a  wicked  schism  and  upon 
Protestantism  as  a  failure.  They  believe  that  the  breaking 
of  this  dead  unity  was  the  necessary  step  to  spiritual  utiiiy 
and  life ;  that  Protestantism  is  the  inherent  and  essential 
life  of  Catholicity,  coaxing  or  forcing  it  on  to  fuller  life  and 
richer  development.     They  believe  in  a  Providence,  in  a 

philosophy  of  history,  in  a  law  of  growth  and  development, 
29 


324  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

through  Romanism  and  Protestantism,  to  a  larger  and  better 
Catholicity.  This  can  not  be  as  simple  and  definite  as  more 
primitive  forms,  for  nothing  can  be  that  has  passed  through 
a  course  of  historical  development.  A  few  neat  antique 
phrases,  or  a  few  definite  antique  forms,  will  not  suffice  to 
define  and  hold  the  differentiated  types  of  Christianity  that 
must  enter  as  elements  into  the  national  Church  of  America. 

Nearly  every  important  schism  from  external  unity  has 
either  been  forced  by  an  untrue  Catholicity,  or  it  has  sprung 
from  an  attempt  to  supply  and  emphasize  essential  Chris- 
tian elements  that  were  in  danger  of  being  lost  or  forgotten. 
They  have  thus  been  the  true  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and 
they  are  known  by  their  fruits.  If  Protestantism,  with  its 
four  centuries  of  most  stirring  life  of  Christian  thought  and 
of  ethical  and  secular  blessings,  with  its  churches  and  so- 
cial order,  and  educational  and  philanthropic  work,  has 
been  a  failure,  no  one  can  point  us  to  any  success  or  to  any 
divine  guidance  of  the  Spirit.  It  was  the  Divine  necessity 
for  Christian  Europe. 

But  everything  finite  is  imperfect.  The  Reformed 
Churches  on  the  Continent  were,  in  God's  providence,  pre- 
vented from  duly  recognizing  the  continuity  of  Church  his- 
tory and  the  victories  for  Christ  and  civilization  won  by 
the  united  Church  of  the  West,  and  so  lost  the  historic 
Episcopate.  But  that  great  Church  had  so  apostatized 
from  Christ  that  schism  from  her  was  the  duty  of  the 
hour  (cf.  Whately's  Kingdom  of  Christ,  p.  210).  In  God's 
providence  they  lost  a  great  good,  the  historic  Episcopate, 
in  order  to  keep  the  chief  good,  evangelical  Christianity. 
Rome  would  not  recognize  the  guiding  finger  of  Provi- 
dence pointing,  through  the  modern  state  theory,  to  the 
autonomy  of  national  Churches,  and  so  lost  the  Church  of 
England.  In  God's  providence  the  Church  of  England  was 
able  to  retain  the  historic  Episcopate,  without  losing  the 
better  part  of  the  Reformation.  It  was  given  to  her  to  hold 
as  the  common  heritage  of  Protestantism,  in  due  time.     But 


Appendix.  325 

she  was  not  catholic  enough  to  contain  within  her  fold  the 
Puritan  and  the  Methodist  types  of  Christianity,  and  so 
lost  these  vital  parts  of  her  realm.  Is  she,  or  rather  is  the 
Episcopal  Church  in  America,  catholic  enough  to-day  to 
make  this  the  due  time  to  impart  this  heritage  to  other 
communions,  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  of  appreciable  and  ap- 
preciated benefit  ?  Can  she  offer  this  essential  element  of 
the  historical  Church  as  the  basis  upon  which  a  truly  national 
Church  can  be  formed,  without  arrogating  that  position  for 
herself  by  a  mere  word-juggling  with  her  honest  title  ?  Can 
she  supply  this  missing  link  so  that  it  may  be  a  vital  bond 
of  ethical  unity  ?  Can  she  so  demonstrate  its  present  worth 
as  a  divinely  ordained  power,  fitted  for  furthering  the  well- 
being  of  the  Church  of  Christ  in  this  land,  that  the  gift  will 
be  received  on  its  own  intrinsic  merits,  which  form  its  only 
sanction,  as  an  essential  note  of  the  Church  ?  The  school 
of  which  we  have  been  speaking  labor  and  pray  and  hope 
that  she  can.  But  there  is  some  suspicion  that  the  ofiice 
and  its  work  are  hopelessly  connected  with  a  theology  and 
an  ecclesiastic  tendency  which  is  out  of  all  sympathy  with 
the  current  intellectual,  social,  and  religious  life  of  our 
Protestant  Christianity.  This  is,  as  Dr.  McConnell  says 
(American  Episcopacy,  p,  27)  : 

"  I.  Because  the  idea  of  Episcopacy  is  so  fast  entangled 
with  other  ideas  which  are  not  necessary  to  it ;  and,  2.  Be- 
cause it  is  in  the  popular  mind  associated  with  a  religious 
movement  which  is  counter  to  the  broad,  strong,  and  true 
current  of  American  Christianity." 

II.  The  other  school  of  interpretation  which  we  have 
mentioned  is  responsible  for  this  suspicion,  which  has  cost 
us  an  appalling  price,  among  other  things  the  good-will 
of  Protestantism  and  the  opportunity  to  gain  a  friendly 
hearing  for  the  wise  and  temperate  proposals  of  the  House 
of  Bishops.  In  truth,  that  party  does  not  desire  either  of 
these.  It  is  self-labeled  Catholic.  It  holds  the  Episcopate 
in  an  unhistorical  and  sacerdotal  spirit.     It  obscures  it  by 


326  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

enveloping  it  with  a  certain  theory  of  the  apostolical  suc- 
cession, making  it  a  necessary  channel  for  the  grace  of  valid 
ministry  and  sacraments.*  Churchmen  of  that  party  hold 
it  in  an  unhistorical  spirit,  because  they  hold  it  in  a  form 
"  locally  adapted  "  not  to  the  present  living  Christianity  of 
this  country,  but  to  that  of  the  middle  ages,  as  the  costume 
of  a  barbarian  child  might  be  "locally  adapted"  to  the 
needs  of  a  full-grown  man  of  this  generation  and  culture. 
It  looks  upon  Protestant  Christianity  as  a  failure  or  a  chaos, 
as  Carlyle's  minnow  in  his  little  creek  might  upon  the  ocean- 
tides  and  periodic  currents,  and  has  but  one  short  and  easy 
recipe  for  its  salvation — "  Hear  the  Church."  Too  often 
this  means  only  the  church  in  their  own  person,  or  parish, 
or  party. 

It  denies  that  the  protesting,  differentiating  dialectic  of 
the  life  of  a  Christian  commonwealth  is  as  much  the  work 
of  the  Holy  Spirit  as  the  conservative  and  synthetic  ele- 
ment. It  takes  a  part  for  the  whole.  It  stands  only  for 
the  arrested  growth  of  the  organization  at  an  earlier  period. 
But  history  is  not  a  mere  dead  past.  It  is  a  living  present 
in  organic  connection  with  a  living  past,  that  only  becomes 
dead  when  locally  unadapted.  The  same  fact  is  held  by 
both  schools.     But  it  is  interpreted  by  the  two  with  both 

*  Their  theory  or  doctrine  of  apostolical  succession  is  thus  stated  by 
Froude  :  "  i.  The  participation  of  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ  is  es- 
sential to  the  maintenance  of  Christian  life  and  hope  in  each  individual. 
2.  It  is  conveyed  to  individual  Christians  only  by  the  hands  of  the 
successors  of  the  apostles  and  their  delegates.  The  successors  of  the 
apostles  are  those  who  are  descended  in  a  direct  line  from  them  by 
the  imposition  of  hands  ;  and  the  delegates  of  these  are  the  respective 
presbyters  whom  each  has  commissioned  "  (quoted  by  Rev.  John  J.  Mc- 
Elhinney,  The  doctrine  of  the  Church,  p.  359).  Again  (from  Tract  No. 
LII) :  "  In  the  judgment  of  the  Church,  the  Eucharist,  administered  with- 
out apostolical  commission,  may,  to  pious  minds,  be  a  very  edifying  cere- 
mony ;  but  it  is  not  that  blessed  thing  which  our  Saviour  graciously  meant 
it  to  be  ;  it  is  not  '  verily  and  indeed  taking  and  receiving '  the  body  and 
blood  of  him,  our  Incarnate  Lord  "  (ibid.). 


Appendix,  2>'^7 

a  different  historical  and  philosophical  spirit.  The  one 
says  the  old  must  be  transmuted  into  the  new ;  the  other 
says  that  the  new  is  bad  and  the  old  is  good.  The  latter 
sacrifices  the  kingdom  of  God  to  the  Church  as  an  end. 
To  be  a  good  churchman  is  more  than  to  be  a  good  Chris- 
tian. They  give  it  a  sanctity  above  and  apart  from  its 
intrinsic  excellence  as  a  means  to  the  welfare  of  the  whole 
estate  of  Christ's  Church  militant.  So  as  to  the  value  placed 
upon  Church  authority  and  holy  orders.  It  calls  "  orders  " 
a  sacrament,  though  our  article  (XXV)  denies  it  this  grace. 
Without  bishops  no  priest,  without  priest  no  sacraments, 
and  so  no  salvation  except  in  some  way  of  irregular, 
unauthorized,  uncovenanted  Divine  mercy.  It  travesties 
presbyter  into  priest,  and  arrogates  to  itself  the  grandest 
title  in  God's  universe  "Catholic."  Fortunately  for  formal 
truth,  it  limits  this  by  calling  itself  the  Catholic  party.  It 
declines  discussion,  and  deals  in  emphatic  assertion.  Its 
devout  thanks  to  the  Lord  for  the  unity  of  the  Church  are 
drowned  by  its  constant  litany  and  commination  service  for 
the  one  mortal  sin  of  schism  from  a  dead  past.  A  few 
local  directions  given  to  local  churches  in  the  apostolical 
age  are  magnified  into  a  whole  book  of  Leviticus.  St. 
Paul's  "  cloak  "  is  translated  "  Eucharistic  vestment,"  and 
his  **  parchments "  ''liturgy."  Apist  is  developing  into 
papist.  Miraculous  powers,  uninterrupted  descent,  infal- 
lible authority,  fixed  dogmas,  and  ready  anathemas — all 
are  of  Rome,  Romish. 

As  Archbishop  Whately  said  :  **  It  is  curious  to  observe 
how  common  it  is  for  any  sect  or  party  to  assume  a  title 
indicative  of  the  very  excellence  in  which  they  are  especially 
deficient,  or  strongly  condemnatory  of  the  very  errors  with 
which  they  are  especially  chargeable.  The  phrase  '  catho- 
lic' is  most  commonly  in  the  mouths  of  those  who  are  the 
most  limited  and  exclusive  in  their  views,  and  who  seek 
to  shut  out. the  largest  number  of  Christian  communities 
from  the  gospel  covenant.      *  Schism,'  again,  is    by    none 


328  Philosophy  of  RcUgioti. 

more  loudly  reprobated  than  by  those  who  are  not  only  the 
immediate  authors  of  schism,  but  the  advocates  of  princi- 
ples tending  to  generate  and  perpetuate  schisms  without 
end.  And  '  Church  principles  ' — *  High  Church  principles  ' 
— are  the  favorite  terms  of  those  who  go  the  farthest  in  sub- 
verting all  these  "  (The  Kingdom  of  Christ  Delineated,  p. 
125).  There  can  be  no  more  wicked  form  of  schism  than 
that  which  thus  binds  the  oracles  of  God  where  he  has  not 
himself  bound  them.  And  this  theory  is  called  that  of  or- 
ganic unity,  while  it  unfrocks  the  whole  body  of  non-Episco- 
pally  ordained  ministers,  denying  the  validity  of  the  orders 
and  sacraments  of  those  who  have  been  foremost,  under 
God's  uncovenanted  mercy,  in  spreading  the  principles  and 
doctrines  and  spirit  of  Christ  among  men.  Better  call  it 
the  inorganic  unity  of  petrifaction.  Its  spirit  is  really 
Donatistic,  not  churchly.  Its  Church  history  can  all  be 
put  in  one  small  volume,  a  portable  but  pitiable  commentary 
on  the  Saviour's  promise  and  power  of  fulfillment.  "  His- 
tory is  heresy,"  said  a  doctor  of  the  Roman  communion, 
which  puts  herself  above  history,  or  only  takes  out  her  own 
from  the  great  current.  To  it  Christ  has  been  defeated  by 
anti-Christ.  Certain  it  is  that  the  great  mass  of  American 
Christians  will  respond  to  either  Roman  or  Anglo-Roman 
assertion  that  "  history  is  heresy"  in  the  words  of  St.  Paul : 
"  After  the  way  they  call  heresy,  so  worship  I  the  God  of 
my  fathers "  (Acts  xxiv,  14).  The  Romish  interpretation 
given  to  the  Church  by  this  party  can  never  be  accepted  by 
American  Christianity.  For  it  ignores  all  the  fine  spiritual 
life  and  thought  of  the  Protestant  centuries,  the  outcome  of 
the  deepest  mental  and  spiritual  struggles  and  life  of  any 
age  of  Christendom.  It  is  reactionary,  not  progressive — 
hierarchical,  not  democratic — priestly  rather  than  propheti- 
cal and  ethical.  It  aims  at  once  more  subjecting  the  con- 
sciences of  the  laity  to  the  direction  of  priests  through  the 
confessional,  practically  making  it  obligatory  for  confirma- 
tion and  the  Holy  Communion.      It  imitates  the  Roman 


Appendix.  329 

costume  and  cult  and  dialect,  often  out-Romaning  the  Ro- 
mans. It  is  a  party,  rather  than  a  school  of  thought,  bent 
upon  propagating  and  proselytizing.  It  is  instant  in  season 
and  out  of  season  in  circulating  its  little  reasons  for  bein"-  a 
churchman  of  its  typ6.  It  has  its  index  expiir gator ius.  With 
impudent  assumption  it  puts  the  Church's  impriniatur  upon 
its  pseudo-Catholic  tracts,  manuals,  and  books  of  devotion 
and  of  doctrine.  Its  peculiar  horror  is  sectarianism,  and 
its  chief  mortal  sin  is  schism.  Protestantism  is  "  the  man 
of  sin."  Shame  forbids  me  giving  the  name  of  the  bishop 
who  could  write  thus  :  "  The  question  with  the  Protestant 
is  not  so  much  what  you  affirm,  but  what  do  you  deny ;  and 
the  more  he  denies  and  the  less  he  affirms,  the  better  Protes- 
tant is  he.  He  is  not  expected  to  give  much  heed  to  the 
Lord's  Prayer  or  the  Ten  Commandments,  and  for  the  most 
part  he  does  not  disappoint  the  expectation."  It  is  but  a 
sorry  eirenicon  that  this  party  can  attempt  with  the  great 
rich  current  of  American  Christianity.  If  the  offer  of  the 
historic  Episcopate  in  their  interpretation  of  its  signifi- 
cance could  be  accepted,  it  would  only  lead  to  an  American 
Church  that  would  need  to  repent  in  sackcloth  and  ashes 
for  its  spiritual  apostacy  from  Christ,  and  pray  to  be  speedily 
baptized  with  the  fiery  baptism  of  a  Reformation. 

Certainly  a  polemical  protest  against  the  interpretation 
of  the  historic  Episcopate  by  this  very  polemical  party,  is 
essential  to  our  holding  it  forth  as  an  eirenicon  to  our  breth- 
ren of  the  great  Christian  communions  of  America.  This 
protest  is  necessary,  because  this  party,  though  small,  is 
very  noisily  aggressive.  It  is  the  polemical  party  in  the 
Church,  loudly  and  constantly  protestant  against  the  Protes- 
tantism of  its  own  communion.  It  thus  greatly  misrepresents 
us  to  others.  For,  measured  by  the  number  and  dogmatism 
of  its  words,  it  might  well  be  considered  as  representing  the 
dominant  view  of  our  Church.  In  the  interest  of  internal 
peace  the  greatest  possible  latitude  has  been  allowed  to  this 
party.     It  has  been  protected  in  its  youth,  but,  as  it  gains 


330  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

strength,  it  turns  again  only  to  rend  those  who  have  protected 
it,  and  seeks  to  make  its  liberty  the  tyranny  of  the  whole 
Church.  It  seems  necessary  and  just  at  this  time  to  thus  de- 
scend to  the  level  of  its  polemical  arena,  and  to  answer  a  fool 
according  to  his  folly.  It  is  more  than  that.  It  is  the  ser- 
pent warmed  to  life  in  the  bosom  of  the  mother,  whom  now 
it  would  gladly  wound  unto  death — that  is,  sting  her  back 
to  the  dead  past  of  sacerdotal  mediaevalism.  Church  infalli- 
bility, a  mediasval  system  of  sacramental  grace,  priestly  au- 
thority, the  confessional,  the  mass,  and  the  seven  sacra- 
ments —  these  Anglo  -  Roman  doctrines  will  not  commend 
our  offer  to  others  ;  nor  do  we  wish  they  would.  In  its  be- 
ginning, this  party  sprang  from  a  real  revival  of  religion.  It 
had  then,  and  has  always  had,  its  devout  scholars,  saintly 
men,  and  genuine  philanthropists.  It  has  done  much  for 
our  own  Church  in  infusing  a  reverent  devotion  into  worship, 
and  has  done  a  noble  work  of  Christian  love  among  the 
poor.  But  this  does  not  commend  the  system.  The  same 
lofty  praise  due  to  many  of  them  is  also  justly  accorded  to 
very  many  of  the  Jesuits.  For  its  many  holy  men  and  their 
self-sacrificing  labors  of  love  I  have  all  honor  and  thankful- 
ness. For  much  that  they  have  done  to  adorn  *i  the  Bride 
of  Christ,"  for  the  "  gold,  silver,  and  precious  stones  "  they 
have  built  upon  the  one  foundation,  I  have  due  apprecia- 
tion. But  for  the  theory,  and  for  many  of  its  practical  as 
well  as  logical  results — for  its  "  wood,  hay,  and  stubble  " — 
I  have  only  sorrow  and  shame. 

This  retrogressive  party  is  not  a  large  one.  While  many 
of  its  exponents  are  too  devout  and  holy  to  put  it  forth  in 
the  obnoxious  form  described,  it  is  yet  as  a  party  extremely 
pronounced  and  polemical  in  its  assertion  of  the  sacerdotal 
character  of  the  ministry.  It  is  a  clerical  party.  It  em- 
braces a  very  few  laymen.  Neither  can  it  be  said  that  the 
other  school  of  thought  is  dominant  in  the  Church,  just  in 
the  form  described.  The  conservative  High  Churchmen, 
perhaps,  form  the  bulk  of  our  communion.     These  hold  to 


Appendix.  331 

episcopacy  as  essential  to  the  very  being  of  a  visible  Church, 
without  giving  it  the  obnoxious  sacerdotal  interpretation. 
For  the  most  part,  they  also  hold  it  in  the  true  historical 
spirit  described. 

The  attempt  by  the  sacerdotal  party  to  capture  this 
large  element  wholesale  bade  fair  of  success  but  recently.  It 
has  failed  and  will  fail.  For  that  school  stands  firmly  loyal 
to  the  historical  Reformation  of  the  Church  of  England.  Its 
wider  perspective,  its  larger  practical  wisdom  and  sympathy 
with  the  work  of  the  Spirit  in  the  modern  world,  will  prevent 
its  members  accepting  mediaeval  sacerdotalism  as  essentially 
connected  with  their  view  of  the  Episcopate.  It  is  freedom 
from  this  that  makes  them  at  one  with  the  Evangelical  and 
Broad  Church  schools  in  their  desire  "  to  enter  into  friendly 
conference  with  all  or  any  Christian  bodies  seeking  the  or- 
ganic unity  of  the  Church."  It  is  the  sacerdotal  system  con- 
nected with  the  mediaeval  theory  of  the  Episcopate  as  the 
necessary  channel  of  divine  grace,  instead  of  the  primitive 
and  reformation  view  of  it  as  the  best  mode  of  government, 
that  forms  the  line  of  radical  demarkation  between  parties 
in  our  Church.  Between  these  two  there  is  as  yet  no  tenable 
middle  ground.  The  former  is  not,  and  the  latter  is,  Primi- 
tive, Reformed,  Anglican,  and  American. 

This  question  of  our  interpretation  of  the  "  historic 
Episcopate "  is  a  most  practical  spiritual  one.  It  is  the 
question  of  the  relation  of  the  Protestant  Episcopal  Church 
to  the  other  Christian  Churches  of  America.  The  historic 
fact  may  be  interpreted  into  an  unhistorical  and  unchristian 
theory  ;  or  it  may  be  so  interpreted  as  to  be  the  form  for 
unifying  in  external  organization  the  large  spiritual  unity 
already  existing  between  the  different  churches  of  this 
country.  It  may  be  interpreted  so  as  to  lead  us  to  stretch 
out  our  hands  to  the  a«holy  Orthodox  Greek  Church,  that 
scarcely  awakes  sufficiently  from  its  torpid  slumber  to  recog- 
nize our  infantile  presence  ;  or  to  beckon  to  Rome — to  the 
great,  wily,  comprehensive,  absolute  master  of  this  theory — 


332  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

as  Mohammed  beckoned  to  the  mountain.  Or  it  may  be 
interpreted  so  broadly,  reasonably,  practically,  and  philo- 
sophically in  the  Spirit  of  Christ  and  of  the  historic  method, 
that  we  shall  not  stretch  out  our  hands  in  vain  to  our 
sister  churches  of  America.  No  age  and  no  form  of  eccle- 
siastical institution  are  perfect  or  lasting,  and  yet  the  Holy 
Spirit  is  the  diversifying  and  unifying  principle  of  them 
all.  Holding  fast  in  the  spirit  of  the  historico-philosophical 
and  practical  method,  all  that  is  true  in  the  past  in  vital 
connection  with  all  that  is  good  in  the  present,  we  need 
no  arrogant  pretension  of  absorbing  all  into  an  Anglican 
Church  with  its  fully  developed  polity  and  liturgical  wor- 
ship, in  order  to  be  the  leader  of  broken  American  Chris- 
tendom into  the  higher  catholicity  of  the  American  Church 
of  the  future. 

The  vision  of  and  the  sure  confidence  in  the  One  Holy 
Catholic  Church  as  realized,  or  as  being  realized,  through 
historic  process  under  Divine  guidance,  has  come  to  all 
devout  disciples  of  the  One  Lord.  But,  under  this  guid- 
ance, the  practical  step  to  be  taken  by  us  to-day  is  toward 
an  autonomous  national  Church.  It  is  the  ecclesiastical 
problem  of  the  country.  It  is  a  longing  of  every  Christian 
heart.  To  no  heart  is  it  dearer  than  to  the  universally  known 
and  beloved  Bishop  of  Minnesota,  who  is  very  much  more 
than  *'  the  Apostle  to  the  Indians."  No  one  prays  and  labors 
more  for  this  than  he  does.  A  few  of  his  many  earnest 
words  on  the  subject  are  of  worth  and  weight  to  all.  In 
his  centennial  sermon,  before  the  General  Convention  of 
1889,  he  says  :  "  The  saddest  of  all  is  that  the  things  which 
separate  us  are  not  necessary  for  salvation.  The  truths  in 
which  we  agree  are  part  of  the  Catholic  faith.  In  the  words 
of  Dr.  Doellinger  :  '  We  can  say  each  to  the  other  as  bap- 
tized, We  are,  on  either  side,  brothers  and  sisters  in  Christ. 
In  the  great  garden  of  the  Lord  let  us  shake  hands  over 
these  confessional  hedges,  and  let  us  break  them  down,  so  as 
to  be  able  to  embrace  one  another  altogether.    These  hedges 


Appendix.  333 

are  doctrinal  divisions  about  which  either  we  or  you  are  in 
error.  If  you  are  in  the  wrong,  we  do  not  hold  you  morally 
culpable  ;  for  your  education,  surroundings,  knowledge,  and 
training  made  the  adherence  to  these  doctrines  excusable 
and  even  right.  Let  us  examine,  compare,  and  investigate 
the  matter  together,  and  we  shall  discover  the  precious 
pearl  of  peace  and  unity;  and  then  let  us  join  hands  to- 
gether in  cultivating  and  cleansing  the  garden  of  the  Lord, 
which  is  overgrown  with  weeds.'  There  are  blessed  signs 
that  the  Holy  Spirit  is  deepening  the  spiritual  life  of  widely 
separated  brothers.  Historical  churches  are  feeling  the 
pulsation  of  a  new  life  from  the  Incarnate  God.  All  Chris- 
tian folk  see  that  the  Holy  Spirit  has  passed  over  these 
human  barriers  and  set  his  seal  to  the  labors  of  separated 
brethren  in  Christ.  The  ever-blessed  Comforter  is  quick- 
ening in  Christian  hearts  the  divine  spirit  of  charity.  Chris- 
tians are  learning  more  and  more  the  theology  which  centers 
in  the  person  of  Jesus  Christ.  It  is  this  which  world-wide 
is  creating  a  holy  enthusiasm  to  stay  the  flood  of  intemper- 
ance, impurity  and  sin  at  home,  and  gather  lost  heathen 
folk  into  the  fold  of  Christ.  In  our  age  every  branch  of  the 
Church  can  call  over  the  roll  of  its  confessors  and  martyrs, 
and  so  link  its  history  to  the  purest  ages  of  the  Church. 
We  would  not  rob  them  of  one  sheaf  they  have  gathered  into 
the  garner  of  the  Lord.  We  share  in  every  victory  and  we 
rejoice  in  every  triumph.  There  is  not  one  of  that  great 
company  who  have  washed  their  robes  white  in  the  blood 
of  the  Lamb  who  is  not  our  kinsman  in  Christ.  Brothers 
in  Christ  of  every  name,  shall  we  not  pray  for  the  healing  of 
the  wounds  of  the  body  of  Christ,  that  the  world  may  be- 
lieve in  him  ? " 

In  his  sermon  at  the  opening  of  the  Lambeth  Conference, 
1888,  he  says:  "I  reverently  believe  that  the  Anglo-Saxon 
Church  has  been  preserved  by  God's  providence  (if  her 
children  will  accept  this  mission)  to  heal  the  divisions  of 
Christendom,  and  lead  on  in  his  work  to  be  done  in  the 


334  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

eventide  of  the  world.  .  .  .  Surely  we  may  and  ought  to  be 
the  first  to  hold  up  the  olive-branch  of  peace  over  strife  and 
say,  '  Sirs,  ye  are  brethren.'  " 

The  elements  of  this  problem  are  before  us  in  the  shape 
of  the  large  organized  bodies  of  Christians  in  America, 
The  principles  under  which  it  must  find  gradual  solution 
are  :  First  and  always,  the  spirit  of  Christ  gladly  recognizing 
each  other  as  "very  members  incorporate  in  the  mystical 
body  of  Christ,  which  is  the  blessed  company  of  all  the 
faithful."  As  Dr.  Washburn  said,  "I  know  no  other 
churchmanship  than  this,  which  loves  Christ  first,  and  be- 
lieves that,  if  we  seek  first  his  kingdom  and  righteousness, 
all  shall  be  added."  And,  secondly,  only  in  this  spirit,  as 
essential  to  large,  valid  ecclesiastical  organization,  the  his- 
toric Episcopate,  the  other  three  essentials  being  practically 
common  to  all  communions.  It  is  thus  that  the  interpreta- 
tion of  the  historic  Episcopate  is  a  most  important  and 
practical  one. 

Those  who  assert  that  there  has  always  been  such  a 
visible  corporate  unity  through  the  undivided  Episcopate, 
and  that  upon  connection  with  this  depends  the  spiritual 
relations  of  the  members  of  Christ's  mystical  body — that 
is,  those  who  confound  or  identify  the  real,  living,  invisible 
Church  with  its  visible  organization — can  not  fail  to  recog- 
nize that  much  of  the  Master's  work  is  being  done  outside 
of  this  close  corporation.  But  they  maintain,  as  they  must 
on  the  ground  of  their  mechanical  theory  of  unity  and  its 
concomitant  sacerdotalism,  that  this  can  only  be  recognized 
as  irregular  and  defective.  It  frankly  unchurches  all  non- 
Episcopal  communions,  and  thus  estranges  instead  of  win- 
ning them  to  Christian  unity  as  the  necessary  step  to  Church 
unity.* 

*  The  Rev.  Charles  Gore,  Principal  of  the  Pusey  House,  in  a  recent 
work  on  The  Church  and  the  Ministry,  gives  this  view  of  the  Episco- 
pate in  a  volume  which  is  a  model  of  calm,  scholarly,  and  honest  treat- 


Appendix.  335 

On  the  other  hand,  those  who  hold  the  historic  Epis- 
copate as  a  governing  function,  to  be  the  best  visible  mark  of 
real  continuity  of  the  ideal  Church,  still  in  the  process  of 
making,  do  not  conceive  it  to  be  absolutely  necessary  to  the 
being  of  a  church,  nor,  under  such  providential  circum- 
stances as  have  visibly  accompanied  the  setting  up  of  the 
important  non-Episcopal  Churches,  as  essential  to  the  well- 
being  of  a  church.* 

ment  of  the  evidence.  One  can  speak  of  such  a  book  with  the  deepest 
respect.  But  it  is  a  white  raven  among  its  fellows.  He  states  this  point 
with  great  mildness.  He  says  :  "  Beyond  all  question  they  "  (the  Pres- 
byterians, etc.)  "  took  to  themselves  these  powers  of  ordination,  and  con- 
sequently had  them  not.  It  is  not  proved — nay,  it  is  not  even  perhaps 
probable — that  any  presbyter  had  in  any  age  the  power  to  ordain.  It 
follows,  then,  that  a  ministry  not  Episcopally  received  is  invalid  "  (p.  345). 
This  is  to  be  taken  in  connection  with  his  teaching  of  the  sacraments 
as  the  channels  of  grace  which  can  only  be  administered  by  such  Epis- 
copal priests.  They  do  not  all,  however,  deny  the  validity  of  lay  bap- 
tism, as  they  euphemistically  call  it,  as  the  early  members  did  (cf.  Tract, 
No.  XXXV). 

*  Since  writing  this  chapter,  an  article  has  appeared  in  the  North 
American  Review,  by  Canon  Farrar,  entitled  Why  I  am  an  Episco- 
palian. I  give  the  following  extracts,  as  indicating  a  similar  estimate  of 
Episcopacy : 

"  Let  me  begin  by  saying  that,  though  I  am  a  convinced  Episcopalian, 
I  hold  the  question  of  Church  organization  to  be  altogether  secondary 
and  subordinate,  and  in  no  sense  essential  to  morality  or  salvation.  I 
consider  Episcopacy  to  be  in  most  cases  the  best,  the  most  authorized, 
and,  in  its  rudiments  at  least,  the  most  ancient  form  of  Church  govern- 
ment ;  but  I  do  not  regard  it  as  one  of  the  necessary  notes  of  a  true 
Church,  nor  do  I  consider  it  to  be  at  all  indispensable  for  the  esse,  or  even 
for  the  ^d'«^  ^i'j^,  of  any  Church.  .  .  .  Neither  here"  (in  the  Prayer  Book) 
"  nor  in  any  document  of  the  Church  of  England  is  Episcopacy  insisted 
on  as  a  thing  indispensable.  .  .  .  The  revival  and  exaggeration  of  Romish 
principles  in  Reformed  churches  may  make  these  views  appear  lax  to 
some  ;  yet  they  are,  almost  totidein  verbis  et  Uteris,  the  views  of  some  of 
our  most  honored  divines.  It  naturally  follows  that,  though  Episcopacy 
seems  to  me  to  have  the  Divine  sanction,  I  do  not,  in  any  sense,  regard 
Episcopacy  as  a  thing  of  immediate  Divine  institution  or  universal  obli- 
gation, any  more  than  I  regard  monarchy.  .  .  .  There  is  but  one  flock 
30 


336  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

They  hold  that  to  deny  a  valid  ministry  and  sacraments 
to  those  who  have  the  same  belief  in  Christ  and  his  sacra- 
ments, and  who  are  foremost  in  evangelizing  the  world, 
is  to  make  us  sectarian  and  uncatholic.  They  hold  that 
to  unchurch  all  Christian  communions  without  this  note, 
is  to  weaken  both  spiritual  and  ecclesiastical  commun- 
ion with  fellow-Christians.  They  recognize  that  the  great 
mass  of  American  Christianity  is  outside  their  Church,, 
and  they  recognize  it  as  Christianity.  To  call  these 
bodies  sects  is  as  great  an  intellectual  blunder  as  to  call 
them  Dissenters. 

Dr.  Washburn  (Epochs  of  Church  History,  p.  237)  writes 
thus  of  these  two  schools  :  "  The  one  holds  the  Protestant 
Reformation  to  be  the  true  historic  step  in  the  progress  of 
the  Church,  and  would  only  preserve  the  continuity  of  the 
body  with  the  real  life  of  the  past ;  the  other  plants  itself 
on  a  fancied  Catholic  age  before  the  Papacy,  and  rejects 
the  Reformation  as  a  failure.  The  one  hoJds  the  supremacy 
of  God's  Word,  and  denies  the  infallibility  of  even  general 
councils ;  the  other  rests  on  the  decrees  of  Nice  as  concur- 
rent authority  with  Scripture  and  ultimate  authority.  The 
one  retains  the  Episcopate  as  of  historic  worth  ;  the  other 
rejects  the  validity  of  other  orders." 

The  two  schools  start  from  the  same  historical  facts. 
But  they  represent  two  fundamentally  different  methods 
of  interpretation,  based  upon  two  different  conceptions  of 
God,   man,  and  the  world.      We  may  say  that  the  one  is 

(TTo/yui^).     There  are,  and  to  the  end  of  tune  there  will  always  be,  many 
folds  (oi>Aor). 

"  If  we  are  to  choose  the  form  which,  apart  from  exceptional  circum- 
stances, is  ideally  and  absolutely  the  best,  I  believe  that  form  to  be 
Episcopacy.  I  am  an  Episcopalian  because  I  believe  that  the  Church 
acted  under  the  guidance  of  the  Spirit  of  God  in  early  and  finally 
adopting  the  rule  of  bishops,  as  a  rule  that  would  best  promote  the  ad- 
vancement of  the  kingdom  of  Christ,  and  the  integrity  of  the  faith,  once 
for  all  delivered  to  the  saints." 


Appendix.  337 

based  upon  the  conception  of  the  Divine  immanence  and 
the  natural  and  eternal  kinship  of  the  Divine  and  the  human 
manifested  and  certified  to  in  the  incarnation  of  our  Lord. 
The  other  is  based  upon  the  conception  of  the  Divine  ab- 
sence, and  of  only  a  supernatural  and  mechanical  connection 
of  God  and  man.  Further  characterization  is  not  needed 
or  in  place  here. 

The  following  are  the  chief  historical  facts  for  interpre- 
tation : 

1.  As  to  the  apostolate.  The  apostles  were  sent  by 
Christ;  they  preached,  gained  converts,  appointing  over  them 
other  teachers,  while  retaining  the  oversight  of  them  all. 
They  appointed  assistants  in  preaching  and  in  the  care  of 
the  poor, 

2,  The  Church  grew  in  many  different  places,  and  among 
many  different  people.  The  need  of  organization  became 
more  evident  as  the  apostles  died.  To  continue  their  work 
in  the  larger  sphere,  the  church  in  each  city  selected  and 
appointed  a  president,  styled  o  eVto-KOTros,  in  distinction  from 
the  rest  of  the  Episcopoi.  These  were  already  also  designated 
by  the  more  general  and  applicable  term  presbyters.  Both 
Ignatius  and  Jerome  represent  the  elders  (presbyters)  as  the 
successors  of  the  apostles,  over  whom  the  bishop  presides,  as 
Christ  (Ignatius),  or  as  a  president  elected  from  their  own 
number  (Jerome). 

3.  The  chief  question,  then,  is  whether  or  not  the  Epis- 
copate was  formed  out  of  the  apostolate  by  localization,  or 
out  of  the  presbyterate  by  elevation.  Facts  may  be  quoted 
to  show  that  it  was  in  the  first  way  in  the  church  of  Jeru- 
salem, and  in  the  other  way  in  the  church  at  Alexandria, 

4,  It  was  not  till  the  sixteenth  century  that  any  attempt 
was  made  to  prove  from  the  Scriptures  that  Episcopacy  was 
definitely  instituted  by  Christ.  Hooker  argued  stoutly  that 
neither  Puritan  nor  Romanist  could  find  any  fixed  definite 
form  of  church  polity  revealed  in  the  Scriptures  (Ecclesi- 
astical Polity,  Book  III,  chap,  ii,  §  i,  and  chap,  x,  §  8).    The 


338  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

state  had  led  the  way  into  this  jure  divino  theory  of  polity, 
but  was  rapidly  obeying  the  monitions  of  God  in  history 
and  leading  the  way  out  of  it. 

5.  It  is  impossible  for  any  party  to  revert  to  x^ox^  primi- 
tive forms.  Thus  modern  Episcopacy  is  very  different  from 
that  of  early  Christianity,  in  respect  not  only  to  jurisdic- 
tion, but  also  in  respect  to  official  function  and  daily  round 
of  duties. 

It  is  also  a  fact  that  by  the  middle  of  the  second  cent- 
ury Episcopal  polity  was  the  prevailing  form  of  organiza- 
tion, though  the  diocesan  system  was  of  much  later  growth. 
On  the  other  hand,  all  the  evidence  goes  to  show  that  this 
form  of  polity  was  based  upon,  grew  up  in  consequence  of, 
and  was  defended  by  an  appeal  to,  the  needs  of  the  Church. 
And  it  is  impossible  to  prove  that  it  was  a  definitely  fixed 
polity  instituted  by  Christ  himself  or  by  his  apostles,  and 
so  essential  to  the  being  of  the  Church.  These  latter  points 
are  the  missing  links  that  the  ultra  High  Church  party 
needs  to  complete  the  facts  upon  which  to  base  its  theory. 
That  is,  there  is  no  proof  (i)  of  the  formal  constitution 
of  Episcopacy,  by  either  Christ  or  his  apostles,  as  the 
direct  succession  of  the  apostolate  as  distinct  from  the 
presbyterate.  These  points,  as  well  as  the  following,  are 
candidly  admitted  by  Gore  (The  Church  and  the  Ministry, 
p.  269).  (2)  Nor  is  there  any  evidence  of  definitely  fixed 
duties  of  the  Episcopate  in  its  earlier  supposed  forms,  all 
facts  showing  that  both  the  office  and  the  duty  grew  out 
of  local  needs.* 

I.  The  ultra  High  Church  interpretation  of  these  facts 
and  their  missing  links  has  a  strong  attraction  for  many  of 

*  It  is,  doubtless,  in  view  of  these  necessary  admissions  that  Gore 
says,  in  an  earlier  part  of  his  volume  (p.  72),  that  "  it  is  a  matter  of  very 
great  importance — as  will  appear  further  on — to  exalt  the  principle  of  the 
apostolical  succession  above  the  question  of  the  exact  form  of  the  minis- 
try, in  which  the  principle  has  expressed  itself,  even  though  it  be  of 
apostolical  ordering."     That  is,  it  seems,  making  an  a  piio7-i  theory  of 


Appendix.  339 

the  most  earnest,  wise,  and  zealous  men  in  our  Church.  It 
meets  the  needs  of  those  who  want  a  clear,  simple,  definite, 
and  working  theory.  It  is  a  theory  as  logical  as  mathemat- 
ics is  logical,  and  not  as  illogical  as  all  life  and  all  history 
are.  For  history  follows  the  non-logical  logic  of  life  rather 
than  the  formal  or  Aristotelian  logic  of  the  understanding. 
Thus  it  presents  other  facts  for  which  that  theory  has  no 
place,  and  can  only  recognize  as  irregular  and  defective  and 
inscrutable.  It  holds  external  schism  as  the  most  heinous 
of  sins,  and  yet  it  sees  a  divided  Christendom.  It  can  ac- 
count for  this  by  the  wiles  of  the  devil  or  of  sinful  man.  But 
along  with  this  it  is  forced  to  recognize  the  "  fruits  of  the 
Spirit,"  the  manifest  presence  and  work  of  the  Divine  Mas- 
ter, and  to  grant  that  sectarians  are  often  saints.  Yet  it 
is  logically  compelled  to  unchurch  all  non-Episcopal  com- 
munities. It  has  generally  the  courage  of  its  convictions, 
though  it  sometimes  tries  to  conceal  its  denial  of  the  validity 
of  their  ministry  and  sacraments  by  allowing  that  of  their 
baptism.  In  doing  this  it  does  not  help  meet  the  concrete 
situation.  It  does  not  make  for  either  spiritual  or  visible 
Christian  unity.  In  fact,  however,  its  arrogant  position  to- 
day has  ceased  to  inflame  or  humiliate  other  Christians, 
because  of  its  patent  untruthfulness.  Its  logical  and  its  as- 
serted "extra  ecclesia  nulla  salus"  is  a  perfectly  harmless, 
rusty  old  weapon.  Its  ubi  Episcopos  ibi  Ecclesia^  is  not 
catholic  enough  as  a  definition  of  the  local  or  spiritual 
boundaries  of  the  kingdom  of  Christ. 

2.  The  other  school  accepts  the  same  facts,  and  is  ready 
to  accept  the  missing  links  when  discovered.  But,  begin- 
ning with  a  different  conception  of  God  and  man  and 
their  relations,  and  with  a  different  conception  of  the  per- 


the  ministry  to  be  the  interpreter  of  its  historical  development.  Cf.  also 
Gore  (p.  343),  where  his  reasoning  necessarily  justifies  the  Papacy  as  of 
Divine  institution,  as  that  was  the  logical  and  historical  culmination  of 
the  one  un-Jividcd  Episcopate  theory. 


340  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

son,  work,  method,  and  spirit  of  Christ,  they  give  them  a 
very  different  interpretation,  as  already  shown.  They  deem 
it  incongruous  with  the  method  and  spirit  of  the  Divine 
Master  when  on  earth,  that  he  should  have  given  such  a 
definite  binding  organization  to  his  Church  as  the  other 
theory  claims,  or  that  he  should  have  fixed  upon  a  me- 
chanical method  of  imparting  his  spirit  and  life  to  future 
generations  so  utterly  unlike  the  method  and  spirit  he 
used  in  his  own  day  and  generation.  They  find  the 
apostolate  and  the  mission  of  the  seventy  perfectly  con- 
genial with  his  own  manifested  spirit  and  method,  as 
also  was  the  appointment  of  deacons,  presbyters,  and  bish- 
ops by  the  growing  community.  Church  organization  is 
all  the  movement  and  growth  of  highly  concentrated  life, 
creating  its  own  body  out  of,  or  in  analogy  with,  other 
institutions. 

They  study  Church  history  as  in  organic  relation  with 
secular  history,  and  thus  trace  the  inner  and  the  outer  life 
of  the  Church  through  the  apostolic  age,  the  vast  mission- 
ary age,  the  growth  of  the  Papacy,  the  Renaissance,  and  the 
Reformation,  recognizing  throughout  the  work  of  the  same 
Spirit  dividing  severally  to  each  as  he  will,  and  as  each  is 
able  and  willing  to  receive.  They  adopt  the  eirenical  maxim, 
ubi  Spiritus  ibi  Ecdesia.  In  the  interest  of  truth,  as  inter- 
preted by  the  method  and  spirit  of  Christ,  as  well  as  by  the 
spirit  of  the  modern  historical  method,  they  decline  to  un- 
church the  other  churches  of  America.  In  the  interest  of 
truth,  and  of  a  more  comprehensive  organization  of  the 
various  branches  of  the  Church,  and  consequently  more 
extended  usefulness,  they  also  hold  out  "  the  historic  Epis- 
copate locally  adapted  in  the  methods  of  its  administration 
to  the  varying  needs,"  as  making  for  peace,  unity,  and  the 
best  interests  of  Christ's  kingdom. 

Recognizing  the  working  value  of  the  other  theory  as  a 
needed  schoolmaster,  where  the  middle  ages  still  prevail, 
they  also  recognize  the    exceeding  practical  value  of  the 


Appe7idix.  341 

recovery  and  restatement  of  the  Gospel  after  the  Law, 
They  believe  that  the  sole  object  for  which  the  Church 
exists  is  as  a  means  to  impart  the  Divine  life  to  men,  and 
that  its  visible  form  should  be  a  catholic  embodiment  of  all 
Christian  life.  And  their  interpretation  of  "  the  facts " 
affords  a  large,  generous,  comforting,  hopeful,  and,  we  be- 
lieve, Christly  view  of  the  Christian  Church.  They  love 
their  own  Church,  but  they  frankly  say,  We  are  not,  and  in 
exclusive  form  we  can  not  be,  the  Church  of  America.  Nor, 
it  is  only  just  to  add,  do  any  of  the  riper  minds  in  any  party 
seek  to  absorb  the  other  communions. 

The  Puritans  and  Presbyterians  and  Lutherans  and 
Baptists  and  Methodists  and  Moravians  have  had  far  too 
large  a  share  in  the  upbuilding  of  Christ's  kingdom  here 
for  us  to  ignore.  The  Presbyterians  in  Pennsylvania,  for 
instance,  like  the  Puritans  of  New  England,  planted  the 
religious  academies  and  colleges  that  shaped  the  mental  and 
moral  character  of  the  largest  part  of  that  State.  It  can 
not  be  amiss,  for  one  who  knows  from  experience  the  deep 
religious  and  moral  life  of  that  communion,  to  render  grate- 
ful homage  for  its  part  in  the  upbuilding  of  Christ's  king- 
dom in  this  land.  The  progress  of  Christianity  in  our 
country  has  been  the  progress  of  society  as  organized  by 
vital  Christianity.  In  this  progress  the  influence  of  these 
great  bodies  has  gone  along  with  the  whole  spirit  of  the 
nation,  permeating  and  deepening  its  Protestant  religious 
life.  The  future  Church  of  America  must  be  the  synthe- 
sized outcome  of  all  these  religious  factors.  It  must  grow, 
develope  through  formative  influences  and  epochs  just  as 
the  great  Roman  Church  of  feudal  and  monarchical  Eu- 
rope did.  It  must  be  bound  up  with  the  whole  social, 
religious,  and  national  life  of  the  people.  No  one  present 
form  of  the  Church  in  America  can  absorb  into  itself  all  the 
religious  life  of  the  country.  There  is  nothing  strange, 
unhistorical,  or  undivine  in  all  this  formative  process.  But 
nothing  can  be  more  clear  than  that,  not  till  we  are  in  our 


342  Philosophy  of  Religion, 

decadence,  can  a  hierarchy  of  any  type  dominate  this  land. 
Our  knowledge  of  the  past,  in  the  historic  spirit,  is  our 
only  prophecy  of  the  future.  The  unity  of  a  nation,  and 
the  divine  guidance  in  human  history,  may  be  our  polar 
star  as  we  sail  across  the  broad  ocean  of  history.  It  may 
lead  us  to  act  well  our  part  in  this  formative  process  to 
an  organic  unity,  which  shall  manifest  and  contain  the 
transmuted  diversities  of  administrations  and  gifts  which 
that  one  and  self-same  Spirit  worketh,  dividing  to  each 
one  severally  as  he  will.  It  is  the  one  body  of  many 
members,  for  by  one  Spirit  we  are  all  baptized  into  one 
body.  For  the  body  is  not  one  member,  but  many.  But 
the  manifestation  of  the  Spirit  is  given  to  every  one  to  profit 
withal  (i  Cor.,  xii). 

Our  gift  is  our  constitutional  order,  modeled  after  that 
of  the  republic  ;  our  "historic  Episcopate,"  as  the  bond  of 
unity  and  continuity  with  the  past ;  our  admirable  and  en- 
richable  liturgy  of  common  worship,  ethical  tone,  and  gen- 
uine devotion  ;  our  oecumenical  symbols,  for  transmitting  and 
not  for  strangling  the  witness  of  the  Spirit ;  our  practical 
system  of  organized  life  ;  our  professed  "  happy  mean  be- 
tween too  much  stiffness  in  refusing  and  too  much  easiness 
in  admitting  variation  in  things  once  advisedly  established"; 
our  "general  aim,  to  do  that  which  may  most  tend  to 
the  preservation  of  peace  and  unity  in  the  Church;  the 
procuring  of  reverence  and  exciting  of  piety  and  devotion 
in  the  worship  of  God "  ;  and  to  make  nothing  binding 
"  which  a  godly  man  may  not  with  a  good  conscience  use, 
or  which  is  not  fairly  defensible,  if  allowed  such  just  and 
favorable  construction  as  in  common  equity  ought  to  be 
allowed  to  all  human  writings  "  (Preface  to  the  Book  of 
Common  Prayer).  This  gift  is  given  to  us  "  to /r<7/f/ withal." 
Not  to  renounce  but  to  exercise  our  gift  is  the  call  of  the 
Spirit  to  us  to-day.  Not  to  give  up  any  positive  landmarks 
of  faith  or  order  for  any  vague,  fanciful,  unreal,  inorganic 
unity,  but  to  manifest  the  intrinsic  value  of  them  to   the 


Appendix.  343 

spiritual  life  of  the  whole,  and  that  not  as  our  own  private 
property,  but  as  the  common  heritage  of  all  Christians ;  not 
to  love  others  less  because  we  love  ourselves  more ;  but 
while  coveting  the  best  gifts,  to  heed  the  voice  of  the  Spirit 
whispering  unto  us  the  "  more  excellent  way  "  of  charity, 
which  never  faileth,  but  shall  abide  when  all  other  gifts 
vanish  away.  **  Every  good  and  every  perfect  gift  is  from 
above."  By  their  fruits  we  may  know  that  the  other  Chris- 
tian churches  grow  out  of  the  organic  life  of  the  one  body  ; 
that  the  branches  which  bear  such  fruit  can  only  do  so  by 
abiding  in  the  Vine.  "  Charity  envieth  not ;  charity  vaunteth 
not  itself,  is  not  puffed  up."  We  need  not  wish  for  external 
union  until  we  have  the  organic,  ethical,  spiritual  unity  of 
charity.  No  mere  side-by-side  addition,  no  mere  swallow- 
ing of  part  by  part,  no  artificial  or  hierarchical  absolutism, 
no  primitive,  mediaeval,  or  reformation  type  of  the  ever-grow- 
ing historic  Episcopate,  can  afford  that  plan  of  unity  which 
the  Spirit  himself  is  forming  in  and  through  them  all. 
There  can  be  no  ethical  external  union  until  there  is  spirit- 
ual unity.  There  is,  I  rejoice  to  believe,  more  of  this  unity 
now  than  our  idols  of  the  cloister  allow  us  to  perceive. 
Without  this  ethical  unity  of  the  Spirit,  any  external  cor- 
porate union  would  be  but  the  dark  walls  of  a  prison-house, 
or  the  paper  polity  of  priests.  With  it  there  will  come  that 
integration  of  the  expressed  "  variations  of  Protestantism," 
and  of  the  suppressed  variations  of  Romanism,  that  may 
justly  be  called  the  Catholic  Church  of  America. 

In  the  way  of  practical   suggestions  *  I  have  not  much 
to  add  to  the  one    made  throughout  this  chapter.      Cer- 

*  Since  writing  this  chapter  I  have  read  with  great  pleasure  Rev.  Dr. 
W.  W.  Newton's  admirable  study  of  the  spirit,  parties,  and  drift  of  our 
Church,  entitled  The  Vine  out  of  Egypt.  Candor  and  charity  are  its 
marked  characteristics.  It  is  written  in  the  interest  of  Christian  unity, 
and  gives  many  valuable  suggestions  as  to  practical  steps  toward  this 
result,  the  author  having  been  actively  identified  with  the  work  of  The 
American  Congress  of  Churches. 


344  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

tainly  I  have  no  paper  polity,  no  doctrinaire  scheme,  no 
definite  vision  of  this  still  distant  city  of  God  on  earth.  No 
one  formula  is  sufficient  to  define  it.  But  certainly  the  non- 
sacerdotal  interpretation  of  the  historic  Episcopate  is  a 
practical  step  toward  it.  And  this,  too,  is  the  very  letter 
and  spirit  of  the  offer  made  by  our  House  of  Bishops.  If 
the  great  true  voice  of  our  Church  will  speak  out  and  sus- 
tain them,  we  may  hope  for  many  fruitful  "  brotherly  con- 
ferences." If  the  continuous  and  vehement  protestations 
of  the  sacerdotal  party  be  allowed  to  represent  the  true  in- 
wardness of  their  offer,  then  we  can  not. 

I  have  also  mentioned  with  approval  the  plan  *  of  giving 
the  other  communions  the  Episcopate  without  requiring  re- 
ordination  of  their  present  clergy,  under  the  condition  of 
the  future  use  of  this  historical  method  of  ordination.  The 
historical  precedents  for  such  action  have  been  well  stated 
in  the  small  volume  by  the  Rev.  Henry  Forrester. 

It  may  seem  "  good  to  the  Holy  Ghost  and  to  us  "  to  ex- 
ercise again  this  wise  discretion  to  meet  a  present  emergency, 
looking  toward  a  nearer  organic  unity.  We  can  not,  however, 
suppose  that  these  large  bodies  would  at  once  dissolve  under 
the  Episcopal  alembic  so  as  to  create  an  immediate  fusion  of 
all  into  one  ;  that  would  have  to  come  through  the  further 

*  The  re-establishment  of  Episcopacy  in  Ireland,  under  the  Duke  of 
Ormond  and  his  coadjutor,  Archbishop  Bramhall,  is  an  example  of  the 
efficiency  of  the  method  of  conditional  or  hypothetical  ordination  of  the 
Presbyterian  clergy  (cf.  Carwithen's  History  of  the  Church  of  England, 
vol.  ii,  p.  342).  A  similar  scheme  was  proposed  at  the  Revolution  by 
Tillotson,  Stillingfleet,  and  others,  and  again  by  Rev.  Dr.  White  (after- 
ward bishop)  after  our  own  Revolution,  The  scheme  was  to  form  a 
Church  here,  ordain  clergy,  and  do  all  the  work  of  a  church,  hoping  to 
obtain  the  Episcopacy  later.  If  that  should  be  obtained,  "  any  supposed 
imperfections  of  the  intermediate  ordinations  might,  if  it  were  judged 
proper,  be  supplied,  without  acknozuledging  their  nullity,  by  a  conditional 
form  of  ordination  resembling  that  of  conditional  baptism  in  the  Liturgy  " 
(Wilberforce,  History  of  the  American  Church,  chap,  vi,  and  McElhin- 
ney's  Doctrine  of  the  Church,  p.  346). 


Appeitdix.  345 

work  of  the  Spirit  in  historic  process.  It  would  be  matter  for 
further  most  serious  consideration  and  wise  prudence,  as  the 
handmaid  of  love.  Closer  affiliation  and  co-operation  would 
have  to  ripen  gradually  into  more  vital  relations.  Learned 
and  wise  laymen  should  have  a  large  part  to  do  in  shaping 
the  form  of  the  coming  national  Church.  Laymen  skilled 
in  the  history  and  science  of  politics,  as  well  as  in  the  prac- 
tical politics  of  our  republic,  would  have  to  be  the  inter- 
preters of  its  essential  needs  in  the  way  of  organization. 

The  clergy  were  the  Church  in  pre-Reformation  times. 
The  laity  were  not  recognized  as  a  part  of  the  universal 
priesthood  of  Christians,  and  had  no  voice  in  the  shaping 
of  her  organization.  But  our  laity  are  wiser  now,  and  are 
fortunately  claiming  their  just  voice  in  this  work  of  the 
Church.     This,  indeed,  is  almost  our  spes  ecdesicB  to-day. 

We  possess  this  fourth  essential  of  a  larger  organic  unity. 
We  do  so  only  as  a  trustee.  Our  opportunity  is  our  duty. 
It  is  also  our  duty  to  help  make  our  opportunity,  and  to 
make  all  possible  sacrifices  for  it.  We  have  made  a  noble 
beginning  in  the  declaration  of  our  House  of  Bishops. 
Will  the  love  of  Christ  constrain  us  to  make  that  more  than 
an  empty,  formal  letter.-*  The  reception  of  other  clergy, 
say  of  the  Presbyterians,  into  our  ministry  without  reordina- 
tion,  as  we  receive  Roman  Catholic  clergymen,  might  be 
made  one  step  of  this  process.  The  plan  proposed  by  the 
Rev.  Dr.  Shields,  in  his  notable  and  noble  article  (The  Cent- 
ury Magazine,  December,  1887)  seems  feasible  and  lawful 
and  expedient  in  regard  to  the  mutual  recognition  of  their 
present  orders.  "  Let  both  parties,"  he  says,  "  openly  and 
generously  recognize  each  other  in  concurrent  ordinations, 
as  occasion  requires.  By  such  means  all  question  of  valid 
ministrations  would  at  length  die  out,  as  in  a  marriage  of 
rival  houses.  .  .  .  He  would  be  a  bold  prophet  who  vyould 
strike  out  either  Presbytery  or  Episcopacy  from  the  future 
Christian  civilization  of  this  continent.  ...  I  venture  to 
hope  that  in  any  union  to  be  devised,  the  historic  Episco- 


346  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

pate  can  be  retained.  .  .  .  The  four  terms  proposed  (by 
the  bishops)  are  so  large  and  fair  that  they  will  almost 
carry  consent  in  their  statement."  Certainly  we  must  at 
least  recognize  the  spiritual  efficiency  of  their  ministry  and 
sacraments,  though  we  hold  to  the  organic  validity  of  our 
own,  with  reference  to  the  total  organization  of  ecclesiastical 
unity.  But,  if  we  wish  to  restrict  the  application  of  this 
term  valid  to  our  method  of  ordination,  we  certainly  thus 
take  out  the  stinging  injustice  it  has  when  restricted  for 
sacerdotal  reasons.  We  can  hold  it  in  the  same  firm  and 
evangelical  spirit  that  the  Moravians  do. 

If  "  nations  redeem  each  other,"  mutually  supplying 
mutual  deficiencies,  we  must  believe  that  Churches  also 
may  thus  redeem  each  other.  That  this  may  be  recognized, 
is  a  chief  ground  of  our  hope  of  unity.  To  this  end  the 
bishops  declare  "  that  in  all  things  of  human  ordering  or 
choice,  relating  to  the  modes  of  worship  and  discipline,  or 
to  traditional  customs,  this  Church  is  ready  in  the  spirit  of 
love  and  humility  to  forego  all  preferences  of  her  own." 
If  this  means  anything,  it  means  that  all  of  us,  all  schools 
in  the  Church,  have  personal  sacrifices  to  make  of  feelings 
and  tastes  that  are  so  strong  as  to  seem  to  be  almost  prin- 
ciples too  sacred  to  be  given  up.  Many  things  relating  to 
modes  of  worship,  and  many  traditional  customs,  might  be 
mentioned,  the  giving  up  of  which  in  love  and  humility 
would  help  break  down  the  hedges  and  heal  the  breaches 
of  our  Christianity. 

The  best  means  for  discovering  just  what  these  special 
obstacles  are,  is  for  each  clergyman  to  adopt  the  message  of 
the  bishops,  and  like  them  manifest  his  "  desire  and  readi- 
ness to  enter  into  brotherly  conference  with  all " — say  with 
all  the  clergy  of  the  other  communions  in  his  own  commu- 
nity,* with  a  view  to  the  earnest  study  of  the  unessential 

*  Canon  Freemantle,  writing  to  the  Christian  Commonwealth,  a  dis- 
senting paper,  says  that  a  proposal  in  that  journal,  that  Christians  of  all 


Appendix.  347 

elements  of  division.  This  willingness  to  understand  one 
another's  difficulties  and  predilections,  to  make  reasonable 
concessions,  and  finally  to  appreciate  and  emphasize  points 
of  agreement  rather  than  points  of  difference  with  our  sepa- 
rated brethren,  seems  the  best  practical  step  just  now  to 
help  on  God's  work  of  drawing  the  members  of  his  blessed 
Son  into  vital  unity.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  this  will 
often  require  the  most  Christly  self-denial,  the  bravely  step- 
ping out  of  the  grooves  of  congenial  methods  to  make  a 
voyage  of  discovery.  But  we  shall  be  largely  repaid  by 
finding  ourselves  somewhat  at  home  everywhere,  because 
we  shall  find  so  much  of  the  essential  undivided  Christ 
everywhere.  The  spirit  of  admiration  and  love  will  come 
to  take  the  place  of  ungenerous  criticism  and  misunder- 
standing. This  spiritual  schism  being  largely  healed,  the 
corresponding  change  will  come  over  the  external  divisions. 
In  the  midst  of  our  nation's  bitterest,  bloodiest  sectional 
strife.  President  Lincoln  uttered  words  that  we  of  the 
Church  may  well  adapt  and  adopt  in  this  work  :  "  With 
malice  toward  none,  with  charity  for  all,  with   firmness   in 

kinds  should  meet  together  in  order  to  discuss  the  mode  of  action  to  be 
adopted  with  a  view  to  practical  good  and  to  renewing  society  through 
the  Spirit  of  Christ,  was  one  which  had  his  warmest  sympathy  : 

"The  difficulties  in  the  way  lie  almost  wholly  with  the  Episcopalian 
clergy.  There  are  among  them  many  who  long  for  Christian  unity. 
But  some  are  afraid  that  their  ministry  might  suffer  if  they  met  on  equal 
terms  with  other  ministers  ;  some  are  haunted  by  what  Church  authorities 
and  Church  newspapers  might  say  ;  some  imagine  that,  by  avoiding  the 
questions  on  which  Christian  bodies  have  separated  from  each  other,  all 
discussion  would  become  insipid.  '  The  only  result,'  said  one  of  the  most 
distinguished  to  me,  '  would  be  that  we  should  separate  with  the  mutual 
assurance  that  we  are  all  very  good  fellows.'  Such  fears  are  almost 
wholly  chimerical.  A  single  bishop  who  would  boldly  put  himself  at 
the  head  of  such  a  congress  as  you  propose,  though  he  might  run  some 
risks  in  this  enterprise  of  faith,  would,  I  am  convinced,  carry  all  before 
him.  Such  risks  ought  to  be  undertaken  if,  as  I  am  persuaded,  the  words 
of  the  Episcopal  Encyclical  at  Lambeth  in  1888  were  sincere  and  meant 
to  be  effective." 
31 


348  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

the  right,  as  God  gives  us  to  see  the  right,  let  us  strive  on 
to  finish  the  work  we  are  in,  to  bind  up  the  nation's 
(Church's)  wound  ;  ...  to  do  all  which  may  achieve  a 
just  and  a  lasting  peace  among  ourselves  and  with  all  na- 
tions." 

May  this  Christly  spirit  of  love  constrain  us  to  sympa- 
thetic co-operation  with  our  Bishops  toward  the  realization 
of  our  common  Saviour's  prayer  to  his  Father,  "  that  they 
mav  all  be  one,  .  .  .  even  as  we  are  one." 


THE   END. 


STUDIES   IN   HEGEUS 
PHILOSOPHY  OF   RELIGION. 

WITH  AN  APPENDIX  ON 
CHRISTIAN    UNITY. 


By  J.  MACBRIDE    STERRETT,  D.  D, 

Professor  of  Ethics  and  Apologetics  in  the  Seabury  Divinity  School. 


CONTENTS: 

Chapter  I.  Hegelianism — A  Prefatory  Study. 

II.  Introductory. 

III.  Hegel's  Introduction  to  his  Philosophy  of  Religion. 

IV.  The  Vital  Idea  of  Religion. 

V.  Theology,  Anthropology,  and  Pantheism. 
VI.  The  Method  of  Comparative  Religion. 
VII.  Classification    of    the    Positive   (pre-Christian)   Re- 
ligions. 
VIII.  The  Absolute  Religion. 
Appendix.  Christian  Unity  in  America  and  the  Historic  Epis- 
copate. 

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is  remarkably  careful  and  accurate  in  getting  at  the  place  which  t*ie  prophets, 
before  the  exile,  occupy  in  the  history  of  Israel,  and  that  he  has  put  the  modem 
reader  almost,  for  the  first  time,  in  a  position  to  understand  how  a  Divine  revela- 
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but  has  a  singular  gift  of  making  a  hard  subject  iiitellisjiblo.  .  .  .  He  loves  to 
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ishment? or  is  It  out  of  our  power  to  decide  which  of  these  views  is  the  truth? 
The  discussion  is  intensified  by  being  narrowed  to  the  meaning  of  a  single  word, 
aionios.  The  opinions  of  those  to  whom  Christ  spoke,  and  how  they  understood 
him,  are  vital  questions  in  the  argument;  and,  to  solve  them,  the  opinions  and 
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port of  his  words.  In  the  light  of  all  preceding  ages ;  and,  lastly,  to  trace  the  de- 
velopment of  opinion  downward  through  the  Cbnstian  ages." 

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THE    LIFE    AND    WORDS    OF    CHRIST.     By  CiNMNGnAM 

Geikie,  D.  D.      a  new  and  cheap  edition,  printed    from  the  fame 

stereotype  plates  as  the  fine  illustrated  edition.     Complete  in  one 

vol.,  8vo,  1,258  pages.     Cloth,  §1.50. 

This  is  the  only  cheap  edition  of  Geikie's  Life  of  Christ  that  contains 

the  copious  notes  of  the  author,  the  marginal  references,  and  an  index. 

"  A  work  of  the  highest  rank,  breathing  the  spirit  of  true  faith  in  Christ."— 
Dr.  Delitzsch,  the  Commentator. 

"A  mopt  valuable  addition  to  sacred  literature."— A.  N.  Littlejohn,  D.  D., 
Bishop  of  Long  Island. 

THE    LIFE    AND    WORDS    OF    CHRIST.      By  Cunningham 
Geikie,  D.  D.    New  revised  edition.    In  two  vols.,  12mo.    Cloth,  §2.50. 
A  new  edition  of  this  eminently  popular  Life  of  Christ,  in  a  more  con- 
venient form  and  at  a  comparatively  low  price. 

"We  anticipate  for  it  an  extensive  circulation,  to  which  it  is  entitled  for  its 
Bubatantial  worth,  its  erudition,  its  brilliant  style,  and  its  fervent  devotion." — 
The  Kev.  Dr.  Adams,  President  of  Union  Theological  Seminary. 

"A  great  and  noble  work,  rich  in  information,  eloquent  and  scholarly  in 
style,  earnestly  devout  in  feeling."— iondora  Literary  World. 

"  We  think  Dr.  Geikie  has  caught  a  neio  ray  from  the  '  Mountain  of  Licht,' 
and  has  added  a  new  page  to  our  Christology  which  many  will  delight  to  read." 
— Evangelist. 

EARLY    CHRISTIAN    LITERATURE    PRIMERS.      Now 

complete. 
Vol.      I.  THE  APOSTOLIC   FATHERS  AND  THE  APOLOGISTS 
OF  THE  SECOND  CENTURY,  a.  d.  95-180.     Cloth. 
Vol.    n.  THE  FATHERS  OF  THE  THIRD  CENTURY,  a.  d.  180- 

325.     Cloth. 
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Park  Fisher,  D.  I).     18mo,  cloth,  60  cents  each;  or  put  up  in  sets 
in  box,  §2.40. 

The  "Early  Christian  Literature  Primers"  embody,  in  a  few  small  and  in- 
expensive volumes,  the  substance  of  the  characteristic  works  of  the  great  Fathers 
of  the  Chnrch.  .  .  .  Nearly  every  known  author  of  the  period  is  meniioned, 
and  his  place  pointed  out. 

"The  numbers  of  this  series  are  so  unpretentious  that  they  mieht  easily  fail 
to  receive  the  attention  they  deserve.  They  are  done  very  well  indeed,  and 
really  give  a  better  introdnctiim  to  the  inner  Christian  life  of  the  times  and  (he 
real  state  of  Christian  opinion  than  could  be  obtained  from  a  history." — Ihile- 
ptndent. 

"The  work  shows  a  great  amount  of  careful  study,  and  excellent  judgment  nrd 
candor.'"— Professor  E.  C.  Smttu,  D.  D.,  Andover  Theological  Seminary  (Con- 
gregational). 

"I  commend  ronr  nlan  heartily."— Professor  T.  W.  Coit,  Berkeley  Divinity 
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THE     FOUNDATIONS    OF    RELIGIOUS    BELIEF.      The 

Methods  of  Natural  Theology  vindicated  against  Modern  Objections. 
The  Eishop  Paddock  Lectures,  1883.  By  the  Rev.  W.  D.  Wilson, 
D.  D.,  Presbyter  Diocese  of  Central  New  York,  and  Professor  in 
Cornell  University.     12mo.     Cloth,  $1.50. 

"Dr.  Wilson  treats  his  subject  in  the  ecientific  spirit.  He  makes  no  appeal 
either  to  the  feelings  or  the  imagination,  but  addresses  himself  exclusively  to  the 
reason.  Taking  up  the  scientific  and  rationalistic  objections  to  the  supernatural 
basis  of  the  Christian  religion,  he  answers  them  seriatim,  and  while  his  arau- 
ments  are  not  like  a  mathematical  demonstration,  irresistibly  convincing,  they 
must  carry  great  weight  with  every  impartial  vumd.''''— Philadelphia  North  Ameri- 
can. 

CHRIST  IN  3IODERN  LIFE.  Sermons  preached  at  St.  James's 
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"No  one  who  reads  these  sermons  will  wonder  that  Mr.  Brooke  is  a  great 
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eiastic.  They  are  fiery,  energetic,  impetuoas  sermons,  rich  with  the  treasures  of 
a  cultivated  imagination.'' — Guardian. 

CHRISTIAN  BALLADS.  By  the  Right  Rev,  Arthur  Cleveland 
CoxE,  D.  D.,  Bishop  of  Western  New  York.  Beautifully  illustrated 
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pieces,  by  John  A.  Hows.  8vo.  Cloth,  gilt,  $3.60 ;  morocco,  an- 
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"  These  ballads  have  gained  for  the  anthor  an  enviable  distinction,  and  have 
opened  hia  way  to  multitudes  of  hearts  and  homes  in  the  Old  World,  as  well  as 
in  the  New,  where  in  cottage,  castle,  and  hall  he  has  found  the  eame  warm  and 
hearty  welcome.  .  .  .  This  work  stands  almost  without  a  rival." — Christian 
Times. 

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$1.00. 

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mind  of  his  own  countrymen  In  relation  to  the  '  fundamental  principles  of  faith 
.  and  morals.'  The  language  is  admirably  lucid  and  clear,  and  the  meaning  of  the 
writer  is  never  buried  under  profound  and  technical  phraseology,  too  often  used 
in  such  works.  Clergymen  will  find  it  excellently  fitted  for  teaching  to  thought- 
ful working-men  in  their  pariahes."— ^wgr^M  Churcaman  and  Clerical  Journal 
(London). 

BIBLE  TEACHINGS  IN  MATURE,  By  the  Rev.  Hugh  Mac- 
MiLLAN.     12mo.     Cloth,  $1.50. 

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revelation  and  to  illustrate  its  truths."— iViJti;  York  Observer. 


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STUDIES  IN  THE  CREATIVE  WEEK.     By  Rev.  Georgb  D. 

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are  capable  of  being  defended  without  violence,  without  deiiuuciation,  without 
misrepresentation,  without  the  impugning  of  motives." — National  Baptist. 

STUDIES  IN  THE  MODEL  PRAYER.     By  Rev.  George  D. 

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"  The  book  is  an  exhaustive  treatise  upon  its  fruitful  theme ;  few  will  gainsay 
the  author's  profound  study  of  his  subject  or  question  the  sincerity  of  his  views. 
The  chapter  on  temptation  is  one  of  the  most  original  and  striking  interpreta- 
tions of  this  line  of  the  prayer  that  has  been  presented.  The  book  is  one  that 
will  have  more  than  a  passing  interest." — New  York  Herald. 

EPIPHANIES  OF  THE  RISEN  LORD.     By  Rev.  George  D. 
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"  The  author  has  brought  to  the  study  of  the  epiphanies  that  profound  knowl- 
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popular.  The  first  and  second  chapters  relate  to  the  entombment  and  the  resur- 
rection. Then  the  epiphanies  are  discussed  in  their  order:  1.  To  Marv  Magda- 
lene; 2.  To  the  other  Women  ;  3.  To  the  Two;  4.  To  the  Ten;  5.  To  Thomas  ; 
6.  'J'he  Epiphany  in  the  Galilean  Mountains  ;  7.  To  the  Seven  ;  8.  The  Ascension  : 
9.  The  Forty  Days  ;  10.  To  Saul  of  Tarsus.  It  is  a  book  to  be  profitably  read.'' 
—Baltiinore  Gazette. 

STUDIES  IN  THE  MOUNTAIN  INSTRUCTION.      By   Rev. 

George  D.  Boardman,  D.  D.     12mo.     Cloth,  $1.26. 

"  Replete  with  the  Christian  spirit,  and  the  genius  and  learning  for  which  the 
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FIFTEEN    SERMONS.      By  William  Rollinson   Whittingham, 

Fourth  Bishop  of  Maryland.     12mo.     Cloth,  $1.50. 

"The  late  Bishop  of  Maryland  destroyed  many  of  his  sermons  before  his 
death.  It  was  very  diflicult  to  make  a  selection  from  those  remaining,  but,  at  the 
urgent,  repeated  request  of  his  friends,  twelve  have  been  chosen,  and  three  al- 
ready published,  but  now  out  of  print,  added  by  special  desire,  to  form  a  single 
yo\\\iiie.'"—EztractJroin  Preface. 

SERMONS   PREACHED  ON  VARIOUS   OCCASIONS.     By 

James  De  Koven,  late  Warden  of  Racine  College.  With  an  Intro- 
duction by  the  Rev.  Morgan  Dix,  S.  T.  D.,  Rector  of  Trinity  Parish, 
New  York.     With  Portrait.     12mo.     Cloth,  $1.50. 


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STUDIES  IN  THE  lilFE  OF  CHRIST.  By  the  Rev.  A.  M. 
Faiubairn,  D.  D.,  Principal  of  Airedale  College,  Bradford,  and  au- 
thor of  "  Studies  in  the  Philosophy  of  Keligion  and  History."  12mo. 
Cloth,  $1.50. 

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or  poverty  of  thought,  but  the  noble  rhetoric  which  is  alive  with  thought 
and  imagination  to  its  utmost  and  finest  extremities." — Rev.  Samuel  Cox, 
in  the  Expositor. 

THE  PROPHETS  OF  ISRAEL,  AND  THEIR  PLACE  IN 
HISTORY,  TO  THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  EIGHTH  CENTURY 
B.  C.  By  W.  Robertson  Smith,  M.  A.,  LL.  D.,  author  of  "  The  Old 
Testament  in  the  Jewish  Church."     12ino.     Cloth,  $1.75. 

"  Mr.  Robertson  Smith  is  not  only  a  '  full  man,'  but  has  a  singular 
gift  of  making  a  hard  subject  intelligible.  ...  He  loves  to  blow  away 
the  mists  of  controversy  and  show  the  truth  in  all  its  attractive  simplici- 
ty."—  The  Academy. 

THE    OLD   TESTAMENT    IN    THE    JEWISH  CHURCH. 

Twelve  Lectures  on  Biblical  Criticism,  with  Notes.  By  W.  Robert- 
son Smith,  M.  A.,  recently  Professor  of  Hebrew  and  Exegesis  of  the 
Old  Testament,  Free  Church  College,  Aberdeen.  12mo.  Cloth, 
$1.75. 

"  Speaking  after  mature  deliberation,  we  pronounce  Professor  Robert- 
son Smith's  book  on  Biblical  Science  one  of  the  most  important  works 
that  has  appeared  in  our  time.  It  justifies,  in  a  convincing  and  conclu- 
sive manner,  what  we  have  from  first  to  last  maintained  regarding  him — 
namely,  that  he  was  engaged  in  an  enterprise  auspicious  to  the  Christian 
Church ;  that  he  was  not  assailing  the  faith,  but  fortifying  it.  He  has 
not  abandoned  one  jot  or  one  tittle  of  his  principles,  but  he  now  for  the 
first  time  states  them  comprehensively,  and  points  out  their  natural  and 
logical  applications." — Christian.  World,  London. 

SCOTCH  SERMONS,  1880.  By  Principal  Caird  and  Others. 
12mo.     Cloth,  $1.25. 

"  It  reveals  a  great  change  in  the  theological  sentiments  of  a  large 
and  influential  section  of  Calvinistic  and  Presbyterian  Scotland — a  wide 
and  most  pronounced  departure  from  the  opinions  of  their  forefathers. 
Aside  altogether  from  the  opinions  which  it  advocates,  it  is  a  volume  of 
great  ability.  With  scarcely  an  exception  the  sermons  are  models  of 
pulpit  eloquence.  The  thought  is  vigorous  and  fresh,  and  the  language, 
is  clear,  natural,  direct,  and  forceful." — Neio  York  Herald. 


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